The argument by which the Eleatic Stranger differentiates the kinds being and different (255c9-e2) is one of the most controversial in Plato’s Sophist. In it the Stranger introduces the vexed distinction between beings that are auta kath’ hauta, ‘themselves according to themselves’, and those that are pros alla, ‘relative to others’ (255c13-14). Although commentators have developed many interpretations of the argument, there is a key yet hitherto unrecognized ambiguity in the syntax of the counterfactual conditional at 255d4-6, concerning whether the (...) adjunct comparative clause, hōsper to on, should be adjoined to the protasis or apodosis. Editors from Heindorf to Robinson adjoin hōsper to on to the protasis. I argue this is mistaken. Adjoining hōsper to on to the apodosis instead allows for a more straightforward interpretation of the argument and offers a resolution to the controversies surrounding the ‘according to themselves’ / ‘relative to others’ distinction. (shrink)

A renewed focus on the role of interpersonal relationships in the cultivation of religious sensibilities is emerging in the study of religion. Matthew Ryan Robinson addresses this question in his study of Friedrich Schleiermacher's notion of "free sociability." In Schleiermacher's ethics, the human person is formed in and consists of intimate, tightly interconnecting relationships with others. Schleiermacher describes this sociability as a natural tendency prompted by experiences of physical and existential limitation that lead one to look to others to (...) complete one's experience. But this experience of incompleteness and orientation to "the completion of humanity" also constitute the fundamental structure of religion in Schleiermacher's theory of religion as orientation to "the universe and the relationship of humanity to it." Thus, Schleiermacher not only presents sociability as basic to human nature, but also as inherently religious - and, potentially, redemptive. What making such a claim means and the implications it raises are central considerations of this study of Schleiermacher's ethics, theory of religion and ecclesiology. (shrink)

Los nuevos roles de participación ciudadana, vienen de parte de otros sujetos y actores sociales que en nada se vinculan u originan con los protagonismos institucionales que caracterizaron hasta hacemuy poco la actividad política en los países latinoamericanos. Estos han sido desplazados por completo, en lamedida que su fracaso reveló el fracaso de la democracia representativa para legitimar los poderes gubernamentales, cuando en su efecto no logró los cambios que se prometían a través de las vías de la constitucionalidad y (...) el discurso ideológico. Las nuevas prácticas políticas que se insertan en el campo de la participación política son ahora mucho más directas con respecto a los sectores marginados, y la forma en la que éstos se han hecho presentes a través de las protestas y cualquier tipo de desobediencia civil en el espacio público, logrando enfrentar al Estado con los reclamos de quienes siendo la mayoría no han dejado de sufrir la explotación y alineación económica y política. (shrink)

Um dos grandes problemas postos pelo tema dos direitos humanos à filosofia é, entre outros, o de sua fundamentação filosófica. No pano de fundo deste debate, surgem questões específicas: como se pode fundamentar/justificar filosoficamente a exigência de reconhecimento aos direitos humanos? Neste estudo, procuro abordar, de modo direto, o núcleo argumentativo sobre o qual está estruturada da proposta de Höffe. Para ele, os direitos humanos têm uma profunda relação com a noção de justiça. O conceito de justiça, na sua concepção, (...) deve ser entendido fundamentalmente como troca. Embora o conceito pareça demasiado simples, ele oferece uma série de dificuldades no que se refere à sua fundamentação. (shrink)

The provision of aid in war zones can be fraught with political difficulties and may itself foster inequalities, as it is rare to be allowed access to civilians on both sides of a conflict. Over the past decade, a United Nations brokered agreement has allowed Operation Lifeline Sudan , a UN “umbrella” organisation, to provide the diplomatic cover and operational support to allow long term humanitarian and emergency food aid to both the government and the rebel sides in the long-running (...) south Sudanese civil war. Over the years, the destruction of infrastructure in the country has meant that the provision of basic health care has been seriously hampered. Operation Lifeline Sudan has coordinated the work of most of the non-governmental organisations , working in this part of Africa. Each NGO has had responsibility for a particular area of the country and has worked closely with the local Sudanese authorities on either side of the conflict, conforming to strict codes of conduct or “ground rules”, based on neutrality. Operation Lifeline Sudan has provided an air-bridge for emergency relief supplies in regions where road access is impossible, either because of landmines, or simply because the roads do not exist. The war continues, however, and the underlying causes of war—economic exploitation, marginalisation of communities, lack of political representation, and systematic violence and abuse remain unsolved. The warring factions have brought some OLS operations in south Sudan to a standstill recently, for certain political reasons that could have compromised the neutrality of the OLS-coordinated humanitarian aid schemes. It would appear that the only resolution to the country's problems are external political pressure to get the respective combatants to negotiate and, less probably, an undertaking by countries of the developed world not to continue to supply arms. Nevertheless, OLS may serve as a model for how medical aid can be delivered in an even-handed way to the populations of countries where there is civil war, irrespective of where they may live. (shrink)

William S. Robinson has for many years written insightfully about the mind-body problem. In Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness he focuses on sensory experience and perception qualities such as colours, sounds and odours to present a dualistic view of the mind, called Qualitative Event Realism, that goes against the dominant materialist views. This theory is relevant to the development of a science of consciousness which is now being pursued not only by philosophers but by researchers in psychology and the brain sciences. (...) This provocative book will interest students and professionals who work in the philosophy of mind and will also have cross-disciplinary appeal in cognitive psychology and the brain sciences. (shrink)

Although it is well documented that language plays an important role in cognitive development, there are different views concerning the mechanisms underlying these effects. Some argue that even early in development, effects of words stem from top‐down knowledge, whereas others argue that these effects stem from auditory input affecting attention allocated to visual input. Previous research (e.g., Robinson & Sloutsky, 2004a) demonstrated that non‐speech sounds attenuate processing of corresponding visual input at 8, 12, and 16 months of age, whereas (...) the current study demonstrates that words attenuate visual processing at 10 months but not at 16 months (Experiment 1). Furthermore, prefamiliarization with non‐speech sounds (Experiment 2) resulted in able processing of visual input by 16‐month‐olds. These findings suggest that some effects of labels found early in development may stem from familiarity with human speech. The possibility of general‐auditory factors underlying the effects of words on cognitive development is discussed. (shrink)

Arguments for property dualism offer a strong challenge to materialist views, but even if they are regarded as successful, a large task remains, namely, to develop a positive account of the place of non-physical properties in the world -- one that holds some promise of eventual satisfaction regarding the hard problem. After noting some difficulties in current approaches to this task, this paper outlines one possible line of development for a dualistic view. Like all other suggestions for routes to progress (...) in this area, this one is speculative. However, the empirical findings that would support this line of development lie within current epistemic possibility. Moreover, the conceptual changes that would be required are intelligible from our present vantage point, and have parallels in views that are accepted in science and by non-dualist philosophers. (shrink)

A great deal of attention has been paid recently to the claim that traditional Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which depend for their success on the presence of a perfectly reliable indicator (or prior sign ) of what an agent will freely do if left to act on his own, are guilty of begging the question against incompatibilists, since such indicators seem to presuppose a deterministic relation between an agent’s free action and its causal antecedents. Objections (...) of this sort have given rise to considerable efforts to construct alternative Frankfurt-type counterexamples that do not rely on prior signs of this kind and so do not presuppose determinism in a way that incompatibilists should find objectionable. One consequence of this shift in the way Frankfurt-type counterexamples are formulated is that it provides an opportunity for the forceful resurgence of certain versions of the so-called flicker defense of PAP. In this paper I develop two versions of the flicker defense, indicate their advantages over other versions of this strategy, and defend them against objections. Insofar as either of these is successful, it will show not only that PAP has yet to be falsified by any of the modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples currently on offer but that cases of this sort are in principle incapable of falsifying PAP. (shrink)

Philosophers employing Frankfurt-style cases to challenge the principle of alternative possibilities have mostly sought to construct scenarios that eliminate as many of an agent’s alternatives as possible—and all alternatives at the moment of action, within the agent’s control—without causally determining the agent’s actions. One of the chief difficulties for this traditional approach is that the closer one gets to ruling out absolutely all alternative possibilities the more it appears that agents’ actions in these cases are causally determined. “Limited-blockage” versions of (...) these cases are meant to sidestep this worry by blocking all and only those alternatives that are intrinsically relevant to moral responsibility (“robust alternatives”) while leaving open all other alternatives, including a significant range of alternatives that are within the agent’s voluntary control at the moment of action. I argue that, owing to the fact that omissions (and not just actions) are capable of constituting robust alternative possibilities, limited-blockage cases cannot avoid collapsing into the more traditional sort of Frankfurt-style case to which they are meant to be an alternative and so are vulnerable to the very same concerns they are meant to avoid. (shrink)

We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should exploit the formal analogy between (...) moral uncertainty and moral multi-objective decision problems. Our ‘multi-objective story’ enables noncognitivists to save our moral uncertainty thought and talk by explaining how the underlying phenomenon could be noncognitive. (shrink)

This article develops an approach to ethical globalization based on a feminist, political ethic of care; this is achieved, in part, through a comparison with, and critique of, Thomas Pogge's World Poverty and Human Rights. In his book, Pogge makes the valid and important argument that the global economic order is currently organized such that developed countries have a huge advantage in terms of power and expertise, and that decisions are reached purely and exclusively through self-interest. Pogge uses an institutional (...) rights framework to argue that direct responsibility for global poverty and inequality lies with the citizens of developed countries, since suffering and death are caused by global economic arrangements designed and imposed by our governments. While this argument is certainly compelling, I have argued that it tells us little about the actual effects of globalization on the real people of the South - including women, children and the elderly. As a result, it can offer little in the way of real alternatives or policy prescriptions. As a moral orientation, a care ethic relies on a relational moral ontology, and leads us to consider different values in terms of human flourishing. Moreover, it pushes us to consider the normative implications of aspects of the global political economy which are usually not 'seen' at all, including the global distribution of care work and the corresponding patterns of gender and racial inequality, the underprovision of care and resources for caring work in both the developed and developing world, and the ways in which unpaid or low-paid caring work helps to sustain a cycle of exploitation and inequality on a global scale. (shrink)

Charles Hermes argues that the Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility fails because one of the inference rules on which it relies, Rule A, is invalid. Rule A states that if a proposition p is broadly logically necessary, then p is true and no one is, or ever has been, even partly morally responsible for the fact that p. Hermes purports to offer a counterexample to Rule A which focuses on agents’ moral responsibility for disjunctions. Hermes’s (...) objection is motivated by the idea that the logic of moral responsibility ought to be based on the logic of truthmakers rather than the logic of propositions. I show that the logic of moral responsibility does not track the logic of truthmakers and defend the validity of Rule A against Hermes’s objection. (shrink)

"An American psychologist, Daniel N. Robinson, traces the development of the insanity plea...[He offers] an assured historical survey." Roy Porter, The Times [UK] "Wild Beasts and Idle Humours is truly unique. It synthesizes material that I do not believe has ever been considered in this context, and links up the historical past with contemporaneous values and politics. Robinson effortlessly weaves religious history, literary history, medical history, and political history, and demonstrates how the insanity defense cannot be fully understood (...) without consideration of all these sources." Michael L. Perlin, New York Law School "Daniel N. Robinson has written a graceful history of insanity and the law stretching from Homer to Hinckley. He attempts no final theory as to how the law should cope with the insane; he seeks, rather, to use the shifting notions of when madness exculpates criminal activity to illuminate the core self-perceptions of the cultures developing ever-evolving resolutions of the problem...[T]he grandeur of the theme...commands attention and respect." --Neal Johnston, The Nation . (shrink)

Moral obligations rest on circumstances. But what are these obligating reasons and in virtue of what are they such reasons? Nomological conceptions define such reasons in terms of moral laws. I argue that one such conception cannot be correct and that others do not support the familiar and plausible view that obligating reasons are pro tanto reasons, either because they entail that this view is false or else because they cannot explain—or even help to explain—how it could be true. I (...) also argue that a particular dispositional conception of obligating reasons does support this view of obligating reasons by enabling an explanation of how it could be true. Moreover, my arguments show that the dispositional moral metaphysic on which this conception is predicated can do something that nomological alternatives cannot: explain why obligating reasons and moral obligations are pro tanto reasons and obligations. (shrink)

This is the story of the clattering of elevated subways and the cacophony of crowded neighborhoods, the heady optimism of industrial progress and the despair of economic recession, and the vibrancy of ethnic cultures and the resilience of ...

A philosophical analysis of sonically charged concepts to map a theory of "sound affects.".

Engineering, as a profession and business, is at the sharp end of the ethical practice. Far from being a bolt on extra to the ‘real work’ of the engineer it is at the heart of how he or she relates to the many different stakeholders in the engineering project. Engineering, Business and Professional Ethics highlights the ethical dimension of engineering and shows how values and responsibility relate to everyday practice. Looking at the underlying value systems that inform practical thinking the (...) book offers a framework for ethical decision-making. Covering global corporate responsibility to the increasing concern for the environment within the engineering business, the book offers ways in which value conflict can be handled. Integrating practice, value and diversity the book helps to prepare the engineer for the ethical challenges of the 21st century. This book is essential reading for all students on courses accredited by the Engineering Council e.g. Civil, Chemical, Mechanical and Environmental Engineering who need to be aware of ethics. Also of interest to practicing engineers and professionals such as Sustainability Managers and Community Workers involved in engineering projects. The authors have worked together in the area of engineering, professional and business ethics for many years and are all members of the National Centre for Applied Ethics at the University of Leeds. •Integrates ethical considerations into everyday decision-making •Shows how to review and overcome professional ethical problems •Practical case studies and examples throughout. (shrink)

In this paper we critically examine mobile markets as an emerging approach to serving communities with limited healthy food options. Mobile markets are essentially farm stands on wheels, bringing fresh fruits, vegetables and other food staples into neighborhoods, especially those lacking traditional, full service grocery stores, or where a significant proportion of the population lacks transportation to grocery stores. We first trace the emergence of contemporary mobile markets, including a brief summary about how and where they operate, what they aim (...) to achieve, who they serve, and the general constraints on their operations. We then report case study findings that examine the operational benefits and challenges of two mobile markets operating in Syracuse, New York. Our research suggests that although Syracuse’s mobile markets play a positive role in alleviating geographic, economic and social barriers to fresh food access experienced by elderly, immobile and low income residents living in Syracuse’s urban neighborhoods, the impacts of the mobile markets are dampened by both operational constraints and larger political and economic forces. (shrink)

It has long been held that humans need government to impose social order on a chaotic, dangerous world. How, then, did early humans survive on the Serengeti Plain, surrounded by faster, stronger, and bigger predators in a harsh and forbidding environment? Pirates, Prisoners, and Lepers examines an array of natural experiments and accidents of human history to explore the fundamental nature of how human beings act when beyond the scope of the law. Pirates of the 1700s, the leper colony on (...) Molokai Island, prisoners of the Nazis, hippie communes of the 1970s, shipwreck and plane crash survivors, and many more diverse groups--all existed in the absence of formal rules, punishments, and hierarchies. Paul and Sarah Robinson draw on these real-life stories to suggest that humans are predisposed to be cooperative within limits. What these "communities" did and how they managed have dramatic implications for shaping our modern institutions. Should today's criminal justice system build on people's shared intuitions about justice? Or are we better off acknowledging this aspect of human nature but using law to temper it? Knowing the true nature of our human character and our innate ideas about justice offers a roadmap to a better society. (shrink)

SUFFERING HUMAN AND DIVINE INTRODUCTION I KNEW when I asked Dr. H. Wheeler Robinson to write this volume on Suffering that I was giving him the most difficult ...

Game theory is a branch of economics that uses powerful mathematical models to predict what agents ought to do when interacting with other agents strategically. Bounded rationality is a sub-field of game theory that sets out to explain why, in some interesting cases, people don't act according their utility maximizing strategies, as described by game theory. Interactive Epistemology is formal tool used by Game Theorists and computer scientists to model interactive cases of knowledge. This interesting and useful tool has been (...) previously ignored by philosophers. I'd like to introduce philosophers to interactive epistemology. After doing so, I'll go on to describe the way I've used this powerful formal tool in my own research, by giving some arguments about Bounded Epistemology, which is an analogue of Bounded Rationality, and, if I'm right, is explainable according to many, but not all, of the same models. Doing so, however, requires first setting out and explaining many of these concepts more fully. (shrink)

Promises to perform supererogatory actions present an interesting puzzle. On the one hand, this seems like a promise that one should be able to keep simply by performing some good deed or other. On the other hand, the only way to keep it is to do something that exceeds one’s duties. But any good deed that one performs, which might otherwise have been supererogatory, will not go above and beyond what one is morally required to do in such a case (...) because one has an obligation that one does not normally have—namely, an obligation to do something supererogatory. Thus, some scholars have argued that promises of this sort cannot possibly be kept and so are wrong to make. I show that, far from being impossible, keeping promises to supererogate is easy, and so there is nothing wrong with making promises of this sort. (shrink)

Most accounts of British philosophy devote some space to what is variously called “British Idealism,” or “Neo-Hegelianism,” or “Absolute Idealism” of which Bradley and Bosanquet are taken as typical representatives. Muirhead, who was sympathetic to the idealist cause, wrote that having “the work of both before us in all the fullness of its content, we may perhaps see in it the best illustration of their own central doctrine of the self-differentiating, self-enriching power of any single valid principle—the unity of sameness (...) and difference.” Many who are sympathetic to an idealistic stance would adhere more or less wholeheartedly to this judgment. Those, on the other hand, who regard the whole idealistic movement as an episode now happily over are only too willing to subscribe to the view that there is little to choose between the two thinkers. (shrink)

In his book, Building Better Beings, Manuel Vargas argues that we should reject libertarianism, on the grounds that it is naturalistically implausible, and embrace revisionism rather than eliminativism, on the grounds that the former is a shorter departure from ordinary thinking about moral responsibility. I argue that Vargas fails to adequately appreciate the extent to which ordinary judgments about moral responsibility involve ascriptions of basic desert as well as the centrality of basic desert in the ordinary conception of moral responsibility. (...) Insofar as this is correct, we have good reason to think, first, that libertarianism is much more naturalistically plausible than Vargas maintains and, second, that we ought to opt for eliminativism over revisionism in the event that libertarianism turns out to be implausible. (shrink)