Niche construction is a concept that captures a wide array of biological phenomena, from the environmental effects of metabolism to the creation of complex structures such as termite mounds and beaver dams. A central point in niche construction theory is that organisms do not just passively undergo developmental, ecological, or evolutionary processes, but are also active participants in them Evolution: From molecules to men, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983; Laland KN, Odling-Smee J, Feldman MW, In: KN Laland and T Uller (...) Evolutionary causation: Biological and philosophical reflections, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2019). In this paper, we distinguish between two fundamentally different ways in which organisms are active participants: as agents and as contributors. Roughly, organisms act as agents when niche constructing effects are a result of a goal-directed behavior over which the organisms have some degree of control. Organisms act as contributors when the niche constructing effects do not arise from a goal to perform the constructive activity. As illustrative examples we discuss plants altering leaf-morphology to optimize light exposure as reported by Sultan and bacteria creating novel niches through excreting energy-rich metabolites. The difference between agential and contributional niche construction is important for understanding the different ways organisms can actively participate in development, ecology, and evolution. Additionally, this distinction can increase our understanding of how the capacity of agency is distributed across the tree of life and how agency influences developmental and evolutionary processes. (shrink)

Niche construction theory concerns how organisms can change selection pressures by altering the feature–factor relationship between themselves and their environment. These alterations are standardly understood to be brought about through two kinds of organism–environment interaction: perturbative and relocational niche construction. We argue that a reconceptualization is needed on the grounds that if a niche is understood as the feature–factor relationship, then there are three fundamental ways in which organisms can engage in niche construction: constitutive, relational, and external niche construction. We (...) further motivate our reconceptualization by showing some examples of organismic activities that fall outside of the current categorization of niche construction, but nonetheless should be included. We end by discussing two objections to niche construction and show how our reconceptualization helps to undercut these objections. 1Introduction2Niche Construction Theory 2.1The standard account of niche construction2.2Two problems with the standard account of niche construction3Three Kinds of Niche Construction 3.1Constitutive niche construction3.2Relational niche construction3.3External niche construction4Conceptual Improvement on Niche Construction Theory 4.1Constitutive niche construction4.2Relational niche construction4.3External niche construction5The Status of Niche Construction Theory within Evolutionary Theory 5.1Is niche construction a helpful addition to evolutionary theory?5.2Is niche construction an evolutionary process?6Conclusion. (shrink)

Current knowledge about the variety and complexity of the processes that allow regulated gene expression in living organisms calls for a new understanding of genes. A ‘postgenomic’ understanding of genes as entities constituted during genome expression is outlined and illustrated with specific examples that formed part of a survey research instrument developed by two of the authors for an ongoing empirical study of conceptual change in contemporary biology.

Since its origin in 15th century European imperialism, the globe has been an object of conquest involving regimes of territorial exclusion and various forms of land abstraction now known as nationalism, colonialism, capitalism, and industrialism. Coming to think like the Earth system and generating politics grounded in it could pose a welcome disruption of these systematically controlling orders only if such planetary thinking is grounded in a nondominating orientation. We propose that this grounding be geological wonder, the open consideration of (...) Earth as a system exceeding human narcissism. Following Dipesh Chakrabarty's distinction between the globe and the planet, we articulate planetarism in an emerging cosmology decentering human life while emphasizing human limits. Globality, by contrast, is a modern, narcissistic formation that geological wonder unsettles. We draw on Martha C. Nussbaum's politics of wonder to articulate a postglobal, disruptive virtue. (shrink)

The linear sequence specification of a gene product is not provided by the target DNA sequence alone but by the mechanisms of gene expressions. The main actors of these mechanisms, proteins and functional RNAs, relay environmental information to the genome with important consequences to sequence selection and processing. This `postgenomic' reality has implications for our understandings of development not as predetermined by genes but as an epigenetic process. Critics of genetic determinism have long argued that the activity of `genes' and (...) hence their contribution to the phenotype depends on intra- and extraorganismal `environmental' elements. As will be shown here, even the mere physical existence of a `gene' is dependent on its phenotypic context. (shrink)

Not too long ago, neurotechnology was the purview of the clinic and research. In 2011, researchers at Brown University succeeded for the first time in using an implanted sensor in the brain of a pa...

This paper serves as an introduction to the special issue on “Reconciling Nature and Nurture in Behavior and Cognition Research” and sets its agenda to resolve the 'interactionist' dichotomy of nature as the genetic, and stable, factors of development, and nurture as the environmental, and plastic influences. In contrast to this received view it promotes the idea that all traits, no matter how developmentally fixed or universal they seem, contingently develop out of a single-cell state through the interaction of a (...) multitude of developmental resources that defies any easy, dichotomous separation. It goes on to analyze the necessary ingredients for such a radical, epigenetic account of development, heredity and evolution: 1. A detailed understanding of the epigenetic nature of the regulatory mechanisms of gene expression; 2. The systematical questioning of preconceptions of 'explanatory' categories of behavior, such as 'innate' or 'programmed'; 3. Especially in psychological research the integration of the concepts of 'development' and 'learning', and a richer classification of the concept of 'environment' in the production of behavior; 4. A fuller understanding of the nature of inheritance that transcends the restriction to the genetic material as the sole hereditary unit, and the study of the process of developmental niche construction; and last 5. Taking serious the role of ecology in development and evolution. I hope that an accomplishment of the above task will then lead to a 'postgenomic' synthesis of nature and nurture that conceptualizes 'nature' as the natural phenotypic outcome 'nurtured' by the natural developmental process leading to it. (shrink)

This article is constructed through a series of linked aphorisms that articulate the relations between autonomy, sense, the world, different people’s worlds, disagreement, and wonder. It advances anthroponomy—the organization of humankind to support autonomous life. In the context of the planetary, sociallycaused environmental changes of today such as global warming or the risk of a mass extinction cascade, a part of autonomous engagement with our planetary situation is developing an autonomous conception of it—a conception of our situation that makes sense (...) to us. This pluralistic idea has consequences for environmentalism, notably around coloniality, and the reduction of different autonomous worlds to a dominant world, which is currently part of the discourse of the Anthropocene. The aphorisms in this article develop a reflective path toward autonomous conceptions of our planetary situation given the reality of coloniality in how that situation is understood. One result of this path is to open up a way for people to become more autonomously engaged with our environmental situation, an engagement grounded in wonder and critical of the discourse of the “Anthropocene”. (shrink)

Recent years have seen the development of an approach both to general philosophy and philosophy of science often referred to as ‘experimental philosophy’ or just ‘X-Phi’. Philosophers often make or presuppose empirical claims about how people would react to hypothetical cases, but their evidence for claims about what ‘we’ would say is usually very limited indeed. Philosophers of science have largely relied on their more or less intimate knowledge of their field of study to draw hypothetical conclusions about the state (...) of scientific concepts and the nature of conceptual change in science. What they are lacking is some more objective quantitative data supporting their hypotheses. A growing number of philosophers , along with a few psychologists and anthropologists, have tried to remedy this situation by designing experiments aimed at systematically exploring people’s reactions to philosophically important thought experiments or scientists’ use of their scientific concepts. Many of the results have been surprising and some of the conclusions drawn from them have been more than a bit provocative. This symposium attempts to provide a window into this new field of philosophical inquiry and to show how experimental philosophy provides crucial tools for the philosopher and encourages two-way interactions between scientists and philosophers.Keywords: Experimental philosophy; Naturalism; Continuity thesis; Philosophy of science; Quantitative data. (shrink)

Written as a series of lectures, The Ecological Life offers a humanistic perspective on environmental philosophy that challenges some of the dogmas of deep ecology and radical environmentalism while speaking for their best desires. The book argues that being human-centered leaves us open to ecological identifications, rather than the opposite. Bendik-Keymer draws on analytic and continental traditions of philosophy as well as literature and visual media. He argues for a sense of ecological justice consonant with human rights, and shows (...) how humanistic thinking is committed to deepening respect for life and our ecological orientation. In a clear, jargon-free and conversational tone, The Ecological Life presents a timely and important contribution to civic engagement in an ecological century. (shrink)

In this article I argue that we should pay extra attention to the ecological dimension of natural selection. By this I mean that we should view natural selection primarily as acting on the outcomes of the interactions organisms have with their environment, which influences their relative reproductive output. A consequence of this view is that natural selection is not sensitive to what system of inheritance ensures reoccurrences of organism-environment interactions over generations. I end by showing the consequences of this view (...) when looking at how processes like niche construction and the Baldwin effect relate to natural selection. (shrink)

Proponents of the extended evolutionary synthesis have argued that there are explanatory gaps in evolutionary biology that cannot be bridged by standard evolutionary theory. In this paper, we consider what sort of explanatory gaps they are referring to. We outline three possibilities: data-based gaps, implementation-based gaps, and framework-based gaps. We then examine the purported evolutionary gaps and attempt to classify them using this taxonomy. From there we reconsider the significance of the gaps and what they imply for the proposed need (...) for an extended evolutionary synthesis. (shrink)

The validity and utility of the proximate-ultimate distinction in biology have recently been under debate. Opponents of the distinction argue that it rules out individual-level organismic processes from evolutionary explanations, thereby leading to an unfounded separation between organismic causation and evolutionary causation. Proponents of the proximate-ultimate distinction, on the other hand, argue that it serves an important epistemological role in forming different kinds of explanation-seeking questions in biology. In this paper we offer an interpretation the proximate-ultimate distinction not only as (...) a means of forming explanation-seeking questions, but also as a distinction that can help highlight the way in which individual-level organismic processes can be evolutionary causes. We do this by interpreting the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes as a distinction between structuring and triggering causes. (shrink)

We argue that philosophical and historical research can constitute a ‘Biohumanities’ which deepens our understanding of biology itself; engages in constructive 'science criticism'; helps formulate new 'visions of biology'; and facilitates 'critical science communication'. We illustrate these ideas with two recent 'experimental philosophy' studies of the concept of the gene and of the concept of innateness conducted by ourselves and collaborators.

The paper describes the change from molecular genetics to postgenomic biology. It focuses on phenomena in the regulation of gene expression that provide a break with the central dogma, according to which sequence specificity for a gene product must be template derived. In its place we find what is called here ‘constitutive molecular epigenesis’. Its three classes of phenomena, which I call sequence ‘activation’, ‘selection’ and ‘creation’, are exemplified by processes such as transcriptional activation, alternative cis- and trans-splicing, and RNA (...) editing. These phenomena support the following main theses of the paper: 1. Other molecular resources share the causal role of ‘genes’: the ‘causal specificity’ for the linear sequence of any gene product is distributed between the coding sequence, cis-acting sequences, trans-acting factors, environmental signals, and the contingent history of the cell (the cellular code) (thesis of distributed causal specificity). 2. These multiple and overlapping processing and targeting mechanisms amplify the repertoire of RNA and protein products specified through the eukaryotic genome, expanding the possibilities specified by the literal code of DNA (thesis of genetic underdeterminism). 3. These mechanisms of gene expression change the focus of postgenomic research from single molecules and their molecular, biochemical and intrinsic function to their cellular, constituent, component or contextual function due to their recruitment and organization in complex cellular networks. In other words, all agents involved in the regulation of gene expression, including DNA, must interact with other agents to achieve full specificity, which is imposed by regulated recruitment and combinatorial control (theses of regulated recruitment and of system analysis). I conclude from these three main theses that the complexity of higher organisms lies not in its number of genes but in the flexibility, versatility and reactivity of its whole genome. (shrink)

The paper argues against the central dogma and its interpretation by C. Kenneth Waters and Alex Rosenberg. I argue that certain phenomena in the regulation of gene expression provide a break with the central dogma, according to which sequence specificity for a gene product must be template derived. My thesis of 'molecular epigenesis' with its three classes of phenomena, sequence 'activation', 'selection', and 'creation', is exemplified by processes such as transcriptional activation, alternative cis- and trans-splicing, and RNA editing. It argues (...) that other molecular resources share the causal role of genes; the sequence specificity for the linear sequence of any gene product is distributed between the coding sequence, cis-acting sequences, trans-acting factors, environmental signals, and the contingent history of the cell (thesis of distributed causal specificity). I conclude that the central dogma has unnecessarily restricted genetic research to the sequencing of protein-coding genes, unilinear pathway analyses, and the focus on exclusive specificity. (shrink)

The possibility of consciousness in human brain organoids is sometimes viewed as determinative in terms of the moral status such entities possess, and, in turn, in terms of the research protections such entities are due. This commonsense view aligns with a prominent stance in neurology and neuroscience that consciousness admits of degrees. My paper outlines these views and provides an argument for why this picture of correlating degrees of consciousness with moral status and research protections is mistaken. I then provide (...) an alternative account of the correlation between moral status and consciousness, and consider the epistemic ramifications for research protections of this account. (shrink)

Recent theories in cognitive science have begun to focus on the active role of organisms in shaping their own environment, and the role of these environmental resources for cognition. Approaches such as situated, embedded, ecological, distributed and particularly extended cognition look beyond ‘what is inside your head’ to the old Gibsonian question of ‘what your head is inside of’ and with which it forms a wider whole—its internal and external cognitive niche. Since these views have been treated as a radical (...) departure from the received view of cognition, their proponents have looked for support to similar extended views within (the philosophy of) biology, most notably the theory of niche construction. This paper argues that there is an even closer and more fruitful parallel with developmental systems theory and developmental niche construction. These ask not ‘what is inside the genes you inherited’, but ‘what the inherited genes are inside of’ and with which they form a wider whole—their internal and external ontogenetic niche, understood as the set of epigenetic, social, ecological, epistemic and symbolic legacies inherited by the organism as necessary developmental resources. To the cognizing agent, the epistemic niche presents itself not just as a partially self-engineered selective niche, as the niche construction paradigm will have it, but even more so as a partially self-engineered ontogenetic niche, a problem-solving resource and scaffold for individual development and learning. This move should be beneficial for coming to grips with our own (including cognitive) nature: what is most distinctive about humans is their developmentally plastic brains immersed into a well-engineered, cumulatively constructed cognitive–developmental niche. (shrink)

The paper investigates the effects of a humanoid robot’s online feedback during a tutoring situation in which a human demonstrates how to make a frog jump across a table. Motivated by micro-analytic studies of adult-child-interaction, we investigated whether tutors react to a robot’s gaze strategies while they are presenting an action. And if so, how they would adapt to them. Analysis reveals that tutors adjust typical “motionese” parameters. We argue that a robot – when using adequate online feedback strategies – (...) has at its disposal an important resource with which it could proactively shape the tutor’s presentation and help generate the input from which it would benefit most. These results advance our understanding of robotic “Social Learning” in that they suggest a paradigm shift towards considering human and robot as one interational learning system. Keywords: human-robot-interaction; feedback; adaptation; multimodality; gaze; conversation analysis; social learning; pro-active robot conduct. (shrink)

The human right to health has been established in international law since 1976. However, philosophers have often regarded human rights doctrine as a marginal contribution to political philosophy, or have attempted to distinguish ‘human rights proper’ from ‘aspirations’, with the human right to health often considered as falling into the latter category. Here the human right to health is defended as an attractive approach to global health, and responses are offered to a series of criticisms concerning its demandingness.

Mobile Health (m-health) technologies, such as wearables, apps, and smartwatches, are increasingly viewed as tools for improving health and well-being. In particular, such technologies are conceptualized as means for laypersons to master their own health, by becoming “engaged” and “empowered” “managers” of their bodies and minds. One notion that is especially prevalent in the discussions around m-health technology is that of empowerment. In this paper, I analyze the notion of empowerment at play in the m-health arena, identifying five elements that (...) are required for empowerment. These are (1) knowledge, (2) control, (3) responsibility, (4) the availability of good choices, and (5) healthy desires. I argue that at least sometimes, these features are not present in the use of these technologies. I then argue that instead of empowerment, it is plausible that m-health technology merely facilitates a feeling of empowerment. I suggest this may be problematic, as it risks placing the burden of health and behavior change solely on the shoulders of individuals who may not be in a position to affect such change. (shrink)

Many people, often students, appear apathetic because they do not know how to support human rights. In this paper, I explore a question that is part of a larger project helping people think through moral life in the age of human rights. What are appropriate contexts for invoking human rights? I begin with two assumptions: Our sense of common humanity is the source of human rights. There are situations where it seems we should disregard human rights out of common humanity. (...) Reflecting on two examples, I argue there is a class of harms where one should disregard human rights because one intends to be humane. I call this class “harms that exceed right”. I isolate two kinds of such harm: harms against relationship and harms against personhood. I conclude with a general point: human rights application should bear in mind an “adverbial consideration.” How we invoke human rights matters, and human rights should be invoked humanely. (shrink)

“Surfacing” is the process of rediscovering one’s sense of self-determination from within a context of enduring domination, including systems of enduring domination, such as racism, capitalism, and patriarchy. “Enduring domination” is the afterlife of domination that carries on into the conditions and mentality of anyone affected by domination, even indirectly. This article riggs together a concept from the Capability Approach to human development, a process from intersectional, epistemic justice work, and some broad possibilities within social practice art around norm play (...) and subversion to fill out a practice of wondering that helps its participants surface. It serves as a contribution to broadly decolonial work. (shrink)

This essay interprets Dipesh Chakrabarty’s The Climate of History in a Planetary Age in light of the European tradition of thought about the sublime. The first half of the essay stages Chakrabarty’s historiography within that tradition focusing on a critical understanding of Kant. Then, the essay considers how the trace of the sublime in Chakrabarty’s approach to planetary history is interpretable as a form of social alienation. That argument draws on the critical theory of Steven Vogel and decolonial critique. Finally, (...) the essay considers the moods of protest as non-alienated responses to the planetary bypassing the coloniality of the sublime. (shrink)

The Narrow Evolutionary Psychology Movement represents itself as a major reorientation of the social/behavioral sciences, a group of sciences previously dominated by something called the ‘Standard Social Science Model’. Narrow Evolutionary Psychology alleges that the SSSM treated the mind, and particularly those aspects of the mind that exhibit cultural variation, as devoid of any marks of its evolutionary history. Adherents of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology often suggest that the SSSM owed more to ideology than to evidence. It was the child of (...) the 1960s, representing a politically motivated insistence on the possibility of changing social arrangements such as gender roles: " ‘Not so long ago jealousy was considered a pointless, archaic institution in need of reform. But like other denials of human nature from the 1960s, this bromide has not aged well.’ ) " This view of history does not ring true to those, like the authors, who have worked in traditions of evolutionary theorizing about the mind that have a continuous history through the 1960s and beyond: traditions such as evolutionary epistemology and psychoevolutionary research into emotion (Griffiths. (shrink)

What kind mechanisms one deems central for the evolutionary process deeply influences one's understanding of the nature of organisms, including cognition. Reversely, adopting a certain approach to the nature of life and cognition and the relationship between them or between the organism and its environment should affect one's view of evolutionary theory. This paper explores this reciprocal relationship in more detail. In particular it argues that the view of living and cognitive systems, especially humans, as deeply integrated beings embedded in (...) and transformed by their genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, ecological, socio-cultural and cognitive-symbolic legacies calls for an extended evolutionary synthesis that goes beyond either a theory of genes juxtaposed against a theory of cultural evolution and or even more sophisticated theories of gene-culture coevolution and niche construction. Environments, particularly in the form of developmental environments, do not just select for variation, they also create new variation by influencing development through the reliable transmission of non-genetic but heritable information. This paper stresses particularly views of embodied, embedded, enacted and extended cognition, and their relationship to those aspects of extended inheritance that lie between genetic and cultural inheritance, the still gray area of epigenetic and behavioral inheritance systems that play a role in parental effect. These are the processes that can be regarded as transgenerational developmental plasticity and that I think can most fruitfully contribute to, and be investigated by, developmental psychology. (shrink)

Philosophers and historians of biology have argued that genes are conceptualized differently in different fields of biology and that these differences influence both the conduct of research and the interpretation of research by audiences outside the field in which the research was conducted. In this paper we report the results of a questionnaire study of how genes are conceptualized by biological scientists at the University of Sydney, Australia. The results provide tentative support for some hypotheses about conceptual differences between different (...) fields of biological research. (shrink)

According to the mainstream conception of research involving human participants, researchers have been trained scientists acting within institutions and have been the individuals doing the studying, while participants, who are nonscientist members of the public, have been the individuals being studied. The relationship between the public and scientists is evolving, however, giving rise to several new concepts, including crowdsourcing and citizen science. In addition, the practice of gamification has been applied to research protocols. The role of gamified, crowdsourced citizen scientist (...) is new in the domain of scientific research and does not fit into the existing taxonomy of researchers and participants. We delineate and explicate this role and show that, while traditional roles are governed by well‐established norms and regulations, individuals engaged in gamified, crowdsourced citizen science—gamers—fall through the cracks of research protections and regulations. We consider the issues this raises, including exploitation and the absence of responsibility and accountability. Finally, we offer suggestions for how the current lack of appropriate norms may be rectified. (shrink)

We outline three very different concepts of the gene—instrumental, nominal, and postgenomic. The instrumental gene has a critical role in the construction and interpretation of experiments in which the relationship between genotype and phenotype is explored via hybridization between organisms or directly between nucleic acid molecules. It also plays an important theoretical role in the foundations of disciplines such as quantitative genetics and population genetics. The nominal gene is a critical practical tool, allowing stable communication between bioscientists in a wide (...) range of fields grounded in well-defined sequences of nucleotides, but this concept does not embody major theoretical insights into genome structure or function. The post-genomic gene embodies the continuing project of understanding how genome structure supports genome function, but with a deflationary picture of the gene as a structural unit. This final concept of the gene poses a significant challenge to conventional assumptions about the relationship between genome structure and function, and between genotype and phenotype. (shrink)

In her target article, “The End of Personhood,” Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby argues that bioethics as a field should abandon the concept of “person.” She states that for many (inside and outside of bi...

To contribute to a better understanding of the determinants of climate-friendly organizational behavior, we study the potential of behavioral policy interventions and social norms to foster individual contributions to organizational decarbonization initiatives. We investigate the effects of different types of behavioral policy interventions (default nudges vs. short-term boosts) in isolation and when they are combined with normative appeals to adopt climate-friendly behaviors in an organizational context. In a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment, we find that default nudges generally induced higher (...) individual contributions to organizational carbon compensation programs than short-term boosts. Moreover, injunctive social norm information decreased the effectiveness of both types of behavioral interventions but affected the effectiveness of short-term boosts to a stronger extent than the effectiveness of default nudges. Contributing to the nascent literature on motivating climate change mitigating behaviors in organizational contexts, we additionally explore whether factors such as personality traits, pro-social and pro-environmental beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, and the degree of organizational identification exert an influence on the effectiveness of the interventions and provide qualitative insights into participants’ reasoning for their decisions. (shrink)

Here is an account of the enlightenment experience and its consequences written by a trained philosopher and mathematician who is also a master of English prose.