There is widespread agreement that the European Union is presently suffering from a lack of social justice. Yet there is significant disagreement about what the relevant injustice consists in: Federalists believe the EU can only remedy its justice deficit through the introduction of direct interpersonal transfers between people living in separate states. Intergovernmentalists believe the justice-related purpose of the EU is to enable states to cooperate fairly, and to remain internally just and democratic in the face of increased global pressure (...) on welfare states. I suggest that despite their fundamental differences, many of the most reasonable and prominent philosophical accounts of social justice in the EU nonetheless converge in their institutional prescriptions. In particular, they may each serve as a justificatory basis for introducing the European social minimum, an EU-wide income support scheme. (shrink)

Nakba is ignored in Western philosophy encyclopedias, and the notion of genocide is rarely explained. In turn, there is much talk about the Holocaust.

To any metric space it is possible to associate the cardinal invariant corresponding to the least number of rectifiable curves in the space whose union is not meagre. It is shown that this invariant can vary with the metric space considered, even when restricted to the class of convex subspaces of separable Banach spaces. As a corollary it is obtained that it is consistent with set theory that any set of reals of size ℵ 1 is meagre yet there (...) are ℵ 1 rectifiable curves in R 3 whose union is not meagre. The consistency of this statement when the phrase "rectifiable curves" is replaced by "straight lines" remains open. (shrink)

It is shown to be consistent with set theory that every set of reals of size ℵ1 is null yet there are ℵ1 planes in Euclidean 3-space whose union is not null. Similar results will be obtained for other geometric objects. The proof relies on results from harmonic analysis about the boundedness of certain harmonic functions and a measure theoretic pigeonhole principle.

Although Van de Vliert presented an entertaining story containing several original observations, an implicit assumption that climate affects human society identically through the history is not realistic. If almost everything is explained by cold winters or hot summers, then nothing is explained. Ignoring rival explanations does not make the proposed theory more convincing.

This article applies the tools of experimental philosophy to the ongoing debate about both the theoretical viability and the practical import of partially aggregative moral theories in distributive ethics. We conduct a series of three experiments (N=383): First, we document the widespread occurrence of the intuitions that motivate this position. Our study then moves beyond establishing the existence of partially aggregative intuitions in two dimensions: First, we extend experimental work in such a way as to ascertain which amongst existing versions (...) of partial aggregation (localised vs. global) chimes more fully with moral common sense. Specifically, we document how, in tie-breaking cases, ‘irrelevant goods’ judgments (Kamm) are just as robust as the original aggregative/non-aggregative pair of judgments that constitute partial aggregation. Second, by pairing laypeople’s moral judgments in standard cases with their intuitions about the limits of permissible self-prioritisation, we investigate whether one prominent explanation of why irrelevant claims may not be aggregated (Voorhoeve’s ‘personal prerogative’ argument) can be said to underpin people’s intuitions about the (ir)relevance relation of claims in conflict cases. We close with a discussion of our findings’ practical and theoretical import and highlight avenues for future research. (shrink)

The Neo-Confucian writings of Bangye Yu Hyeong-won, the pioneer of Shilhak, did not remain, and he himself confessed his conversion from a ‘Qi centered view’ to 'Shilli theory', resulting in a variety of interpretations, making the whole aspect of his Neo-Confucian philosophy difficult to figure out. From that time on, as interpreted in his conversion from ‘anti Zhuzi Studies’ to ‘Zhuzi Studies’, he has been recognized as a Juri-theorist with a Li-centered thinking. Nevertheless, many scholars who paid attention (...) to Yu's 'The Theory of Governing Society' evaluated him as a reality-oriented Qi-theorist and experientialist. In this article, through analyzing the content and character of his Shilli theory expressed by Yu himself, and exploring the content, inclination degree, motive and purpose of the conversion he confessed at the age of 37, I examine whether his confession really meant a turn to Juri. I point out that even if he recognized Li's substance and developed Shilli theory, which emphasized Li’s independence and Superintendence Character, he still did not give up 'Qiwaiwuli' and 'Qizhili' and maintained a reality-oriented perspective that focuses on things and practice. I also point out that his Shilli theory has a light inclination that just adds reinforcement of the essential nature to the existence that is already firmly established in his philosophy. The trigger or purpose of the turn to Shilli theory was to secure absolute moral standards that could not be solved by Qi-centered theory, and to lay the cornerstone of his lifelong work, Bangyesurok, on the absolute principle of Tianli. Through this, I develop the argument that his Shilli theory was not a conversion to Juri. (shrink)

A strong coloring on a cardinal$\kappa $is a function$f:[\kappa ]^2\to \kappa $such that for every$A\subseteq \kappa $of full size$\kappa $, every color$\unicode{x3b3} <\kappa $is attained by$f\restriction [A]^2$. The symbol$$\begin{align*} \kappa\nrightarrow[\kappa]^2_{\kappa} \end{align*}$$asserts the existence of a strong coloring on$\kappa $.We introduce the symbol$$\begin{align*} \kappa\nrightarrow_p[\kappa]^2_{\kappa} \end{align*}$$which asserts the existence of a coloring$f:[\kappa ]^2\to \kappa $which isstrong over a partition$p:[\kappa ]^2\to \theta $. A coloringfis strong overpif for every$A\in [\kappa ]^{\kappa }$there is$i<\theta $so that for every color$\unicode{x3b3} <\kappa $is (...) attained by$f\restriction ([A]^2\cap p^{-1}(i))$.We prove that whenever$\kappa \nrightarrow [\kappa ]^2_{\kappa }$holds, also$\kappa \nrightarrow _p[\kappa ]^2_{\kappa }$holds for an arbitrary finite partitionp. Similarly, arbitrary finitep-s can be added to stronger symbols which hold in any model of ZFC. If$\kappa ^{\theta }=\kappa $, then$\kappa \nrightarrow _p[\kappa ]^2_{\kappa }$and stronger symbols, like$\operatorname {Pr}_1(\kappa,\kappa,\kappa,\chi )_p$or$\operatorname {Pr}_0(\kappa,\kappa,\kappa,\aleph _0)_p$, also hold for an arbitrary partitionpto$\theta $parts.The symbols$$\begin{gather*} \aleph_1\nrightarrow_p[\aleph_1]^2_{\aleph_1},\;\;\; \aleph_1\nrightarrow_p[\aleph_1\circledast \aleph_1]^2_{\aleph_1},\;\;\; \aleph_0\circledast\aleph_1\nrightarrow_p[1\circledast\aleph_1]^2_{\aleph_1}, \\ \operatorname{Pr}_1(\aleph_1,\aleph_1,\aleph_1,\aleph_0)_p,\;\;\;\text{ and } \;\;\; \operatorname{Pr}_0(\aleph_1,\aleph_1,\aleph_1,\aleph_0)_p \end{gather*}$$hold for an arbitrary countable partitionpunder the Continuum Hypothesis and are independent over ZFC$+ \neg $CH. (shrink)

We examine collective decision-making in a jury voting game under the unanimity rule when voters have ambiguous beliefs. Unlike in existing studies (Ellis in Theoretical Economics 11:865–895, 2016; Fabrizi et al., in: AUT Economics Working Paper, 2021; Ryan in Theory and Decision 90:543–577, 2021), the locus of ambiguity is the likelihood function (signal precision) rather than the prior. This significantly alters the properties of symmetric equilibria. While prior ambiguity may induce multiple equilibria (Fabrizi et al., in: AUT Economics Working (...) Paper, 2021; Ryan in Theory and Decision 90:543–577, 2021) we show that, under likelihood ambiguity, there exists a unique non-trivial symmetric responsive equilibrium that takes the same form as in the absence of ambiguity (Feddersen and Pesendorfer in The American Political Science Review 92:23–35, 1998). Moreover, likelihood ambiguity partially offsets the pernicious effects of pivotality on decision quality: the frequency of Type I error (convicting the innocent) is typically lower than in the absence of ambiguity. (shrink)

Anglo-American theories of criminal responsibility require scholars to grapple with, inter alia, the relationship between the formal rule of law and the powers of the lay jury as well as two inherent ideas of freedom: freedom of the will and political liberty. Here, by way of canvassing my past work and prefiguring future work, I sketch some elements of the history of the Anglo-American jury and offer some glimpses of commentary on the interplay between the jury—particularly its application of conventional (...) morality to criminal judgments—and the formal rule of law of the state. My central intent is to pose questions for further study regarding the historical behavior of the jury, the jury’s role in reinforcing notions of political liberty and free will, and, primarily, how scholarly conceptions of the jury’s role and behavior have informed elite theory regarding the justifications for imposing criminal responsibility. (shrink)

Politics appears to have a direct impact on the quality of our lives as citizens of states. We outline here the dependence between culture and its inherent mechanism of forgetting, and between a hero and a political subject. We employ the theory of Juri Lotman, who underlines the role of individuals and of single events in culture. The primary illustration given is the figure of Lech Wałęsa, politician, legendary co-founder of the Solidarity trade union, and Nobel Peace Prize (...) winner. He exemplifies Lotman’s notion of a mobile hero, one who powered the course of history, but whose present-day political and social activity is of an empty and querulous nature, lacking a goal and deeper meaning, while the actions he performs take place within a closed semantic field. He is an example of a paradoxical hero, whose actions no longer generate tensions or build a new semiotic quality. Wałęsa’s problem is the ossification of his discourse and failure to perceive that transformation has already taken place. (shrink)

In a homogeneous jury, in which each vote is correct with the same probability, and each pair of votes correlates with the same correlation coefficient, there exists a correlation-robust voting quota, such that the probability of a correct verdict is independent of the correlation coefficient. For positive correlation, an increase in the correlation coefficient decreases the probability of a correct verdict for any voting rule below the correlation-robust quota, and increases that probability for any above the correlation-robust quota. The jury (...) may be less competent under the correlation-robust rule than under simple majority rule and less competent under simple majority rule than a single juror alone. The jury is always less competent than a single juror under unanimity rule. (shrink)

Four years after the Panama Papers scandal, tax avoidance remains an urgent moral-political problem. Moving beyond both the academic and policy mainstream, I advocate the “democratization of tax enforcement,” by which I mean systematic efforts to make tax avoiders accountable to the judgment of ordinary citizens. Both individual oligarchs and multinational corporations have access to sophisticated tax avoidance strategies that impose significant fiscal costs on democracies and exacerbate preexisting distributive and political inequalities. Yet much contemporary tax sheltering occurs within the (...) letter of the law, rendering criminal sanctions ineffective. In response, I argue for the creation of Citizen Tax Juries, deliberative minipublics empowered to scrutinize tax avoiders, demand accountability, and facilitate concrete reforms. This proposal thus responds to the wider aspiration, within contemporary democratic theory, to secure more popular control over essential economic processes. (shrink)

Panels, boards, and committees throughout society evaluate all manner of things by grading them, first individually and then collectively. Thus risks are prioritized, research proposals are funded, and candidates are shortlisted for jobs. It is not usual to pick winners in political elections by grading the candidates, but there are examples in history. This article takes up a question about the quality of judgments and decisions made by grading: under which conditions are they likely to be right? An answer comes (...) in the form of a jury theorem for median grading. Here, the collective grade for a thing is the median of its individually assigned grades—the one in the middle, when all of them are listed from "top" to "bottom." A second objective of this article is to suggest a solution to problems of voter ignorance in democracies. The idea is for democratic assemblies to use voting methods that make more of people's limited knowledge than do commonly used methods, such as majority voting. It turns out that in theory anyway, and perhaps also in practice, median grading can enable unenlightened assemblies to “track the truth”—even as majority voting would run them off the rails. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between jury nullification and participatory democracy, arguing that the power of juries to nullify laws is essential for the democratic function of the jury system. Jury nullification, defined as a jury's decision to acquit a defendant despite evidence of guilt, serves as a mechanism through which citizens can challenge unjust laws. This analysis explores a dominant criticism of jury nullification, that it is antithetical and contrary to the foundational principles of a stable democratic state. Ultimately, (...) I argue that jury nullification, pace the ‘democracy objection,’ actually serves to promote and enhance democratic engagement and influence in the criminal law by ensuring that legal outcomes reflect community values and standards. (shrink)

The present essay addresses the conceptual structure of customary law, understood as a set of customary rules. More specifically, it deals with the core question of what opinio juris entails as a constituent element of customary law. The work will begin with an analysis of samples of common strategies in contemporary legal theory that deal with opinio juris when analyzing the structure of customary law. Subsequently, following Hart’s notion about what constitutes social rules, and introducing explanatory features from Game (...) Theory applied to social philosophy and some insights from Behavioral Economics, the goal of the present study is to propose a different conceptual path for analyzing and identifying customary law with what could be understood as “opinio juris”, given the conceptual necessity of finding the normative element that lies within the usus, or social practices. (shrink)

This article argues that, given the current pervasive uncertainty about the reliability of jury deliberation, we ought to treat it with epistemic humility. I further argue that epistemic humility should be expressed and enforced by turning jury deliberation from a mandatory rule of the jury trial to a waivable right of the defendant. I consider two main objections to my argument: the first one concerns the putative self-defeatingness of humility attitudes; the second objection points to the burdensomeness of granting an (...) unconditional jury deliberation waiver to the defendant. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate, formally, an ambiguity in the exercise of political influence. To wit: A voter might exert influence with an eye toward maximizing the probability that the political system (1) obtains the correct (e.g. just) outcome, or (2) obtains the outcome that he judges to be correct (just). And these are two very different things. A variant of Condorcet's Jury Theorem which incorporates the effect of influence on group competence and interdependence is developed. Analytic (...) and numerical results are obtained, the most important of which is that it is never optimal--from the point-of-view of collective accuracy--for a voter to exert influence without limit. He ought to either refrain from influencing other voters or else exert a finite amount of influence, depending on circumstance. Philosophical lessons are drawn from the model, to include a solution to Wollheim's "Paradox in the Theory of Democracy". (shrink)

This essay is part of a special issue celebrating 50 years of Political Theory. The ambition of the editors was to mark this half century not with a retrospective but with a confabulation of futures. Contributors were asked: What will political theory look and sound like in the next century and beyond? What claims might political theorists or their descendants be making in ten, twenty-five, fifty, a hundred years’ time? How might they vindicate those claims in their future (...) contexts? How will the consistent concerns of political theorists evolve into the questions critical for people decades or centuries from now? What new problems will engage the political theorists (or their rough equivalents) of the future? What forms might those take? What follows is one of the many confabulations published in response to these queries. (shrink)

Many political theorists and philosophers use Condorcet's Jury Theorem to defend democracy. This paper illustrates an uncomfortable implication of Condorcet's Jury Theorem. Realistically, when the conditions of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem hold, even in very high stakes elections, having more than 100,000 citizens vote does no significant good in securing good political outcomes. On the Condorcet model, unless voters enjoy voting, or unless they produce some other value by voting, then the cost to most voters of voting exceeds the expected epistemic (...) benefits to the common good of their casting a vote. Anyone who is committed to democracy on the basis of the Jury Theorem ought also to hold that widespread voting is wasteful, at least unless she can provide some further justification of mass democratic participation. (shrink)

Despite an intractable judiciary, there is widespread consensus within the legal academy that jury nullification is compatible with the rule of law. This proposition is most strongly tested by where a jury nullifies simply because it disagrees with the law itself. While some substantive nullifications can comport with the rule of law, most commentatorsjustice,vely undifferentiated view of a morality (even though jurisdictional and vicinage morality can diverge). In doing so, a healthy vision of antityrannical nullifications is presented, but this leaves (...) out many problematic cases. Once these errors are rectified, a more nuanced picture emerges, and it becomes apparent that localism will often disrupt the congruence feature of the rule of law. (shrink)

In the framework of the theory of the semiosphere elaborated by Juri Lotman in the 1980s, the notion of translation acquires a new, broadened meaning and is used to describe a general mechanism of cultural dynamics. This is a direct consequence of the understanding of the semiosphere as a “continuum of semiotic systems” of which heterogeneity and polyglotism are constitutive features. If the “smallest functioning semiotic mechanism” is not an isolated system, but always a (at least) binary system, (...) translation will play a central role in communication not only between different cultures, but also within every single culture.The article focuses on the different places of translation within the semiosphere as a system of systems and its relations to the notion of border. It argues that in Lotman’s theory, translation can function both as a homogenizing and a heterogenizing semiotic force, depending on its position at the center or the periphery of a given semiotic system. The first part of the article develops a theoretical argument on the relation between translation processes and cultural borders, which acquire different meanings and functions within Lotman’s theory of the semiosphere corresponding to differently oriented kinds of translation. The second part of the article develops a close analysis of Giacomo Leopardi’s poem “L’Infinito,” where the tension and dialogue between the different functions of the Lotmanian borders and the different kinds of cultural translation become devices for the generation of new meanings. Finally, the article briefly considers the significance of Lotman’s semiospheric understanding of the relation between borders and translation for contemporary translation and border studies. (shrink)

This paper studies the three kinds of conservativeness in a jury decision-making structure: the voting rule, the threshold of reasonable doubt, and the legal information system. In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (The American Political Science Review, 92(1), 23-35, 1998) argue that the unanimity rule is the worst-performing voting rule because voters with strategic behaviour mitigate the bias brought about by the voting rule. If this bias can be offset by an opposing (less conservative) bias in the (...) legal information system, we would be able to restore the rationality of informative voting. The new informative equilibrium is strictly better than the original strategic equilibrium in terms of ex post error probability. When a strategic equilibrium survives, we can lower the probability of convicted defendant being innocent by making the information system more informative or by forming a jury with a higher (more conservative) threshold of reasonable doubt. (shrink)

Maimon once described the philosophical project underlying his Essay on Transcendental Philosophy as an attempt “to unify Kantian philosophy with Spinozism”. But in the only reference to Spinoza in the Essay, he stresses that Spinoza was not the source of his argument. In this paper I will argue that, notwithstanding the disclaimer, Maimon's solution for the problems that in his view haunted Kant's theory of knowledge was indeed significantly influenced by Spinoza, as well as by the medieval Jewish Aristotelian (...) Maimonides. Since the key concept in the solution proposed by Maimon is the metaphysical doctrine of the “infinite intellect”, my focus will be on clarifying how this doctrine is related to Maimonides' doctrine of the divine intellect and to Spinoza's doctrine of Deus sive Natura. My main contention is that important aspects of Maimon's doctrine of the “infinite intellect” are based on a Spinozistic interpretation of Maimonides' doctrine of the divine intellect. (shrink)

This paper argues that, according to a specific conception of the ideals of constitutional democracy - deliberative democratic constitutionalism - the proper function of constitutional review is to ensure that constitutional procedures are protected and followed in the ordinary democratic production of law, since the ultimate warrant for the legitimacy of democratic decisions can only be that they have been produced according to procedures that warrant the expectation of increased rationality and reasonability. It also contends that three desiderata for the (...) institutionalization of the function of constitutional review follow from this conception: structural independence, democratic sensitivity and the maintenance of legal integrity. Finally, evaluating three broadly different ways of institutionalizing constitutional review - solely in appellate courts, in deliberative constitutional juries of ordinary citizens and in a combined system of constitutional courts and civic constitutional amendment fora - it argues that the third arrangement would perform best at collectively fulfilling the sometimes antithetical desiderata. (shrink)

The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is based on the assumption of homogeneous voters who imperfectly know the correct policy. We reassess the validity of the CJT when voters are homogeneous and each knows the correct decision with an average probability of more than a half.

Focusing democratic theory on the pressing issue of punishment, Punishment, Participatory Democracy, and the Jury argues for participatory institutional designs as antidotes to the American penal state. Citizen action in institutions like the jury and restorative justice programs can foster the attunement, reflectiveness, and full-bodied communication needed as foundations for widespread civic responsibility for criminal justice.

In 1972 Angela Davis stood trial on charges of conspiracy, kidnapping, and murder before a White jury. A professor of philosophy, a Communist, and a member of the Black Panther Party, she had no reason to believe that any of the jurors were her peers. Yet, after three days of deliberation, they returned a Not Guilty verdict on each of the counts. Through an analysis of the case, this essay argues for a new approach to peerhood that defines it as (...) a combination of (1) demographic similarities to the defendant and (2) a worldview orientation of contestation and anticorruption that emerges from the jury’s function in the trial. Greater clarity on how these factors are important for peerhood provides insights into how jurors can best fulfill their role and what remedies are necessary to achieve a jury of one’s peers. (shrink)

The agents of a jury have to decide between a good and a bad option through simple majority voting. In this paper the jury consists of N independent couples. Each couple consists of two correlated agents of the same competence level. Different couples may have different competence levels. In addition, each agent is assumed to be better than completely random guessing. We prove tight lower and upper bounds for the quality of the majority decision. The lower bound is the same (...) as the competence of majority voting of N independent agents. The upper bound cases for negatively correlated couples can be much better than the value for 2N\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2 \, N$$\end{document} independent agents. (shrink)

This paper proves two theorems for homogeneous juries that arise from different solutions to the problem of aggregation of dichotomous choice. In the first theorem, negative correlation increases the competence of the jury, while positive correlation has the opposite effect. An enlargement of the jury with positive correlation can be detrimental up to a certain size, beyond which it becomes beneficial. The second theorem finds a family of distributions for which correlation has no effect on a jury’s competence. The approach (...) allows us to compute the bounds on a jury’s competence as the maximum and minimum probability of it being correct for a given individual competence and dependence structure. (shrink)

Despite the venerable place that "justice" occupies in social scientific theory and research, little effort has been made to see how members of society themselves define and use the concept when confronted with determining "what has happened" in some social arena, theorizing about why it happened, and deciding what should ensue. We take an ethnomethodological approach to justice, attempting to recover it as a feature of practical activity or a "phenomenon of order." Our analysis involves an actual videotaped jury (...) deliberation. In his classic study of decision making by juries, Garfinkel observed that jurors changed their reliance on commonsense reasoning very little, even though they were instructed to adhere to official and legal criteria for guilt. The vacillation between commonsense reasoning and using official criteria creates a tension; in our data this tension is manifested as the choice between adhering to law and procedural rules and providing "justice." By articulating this tension as a puzzle, several of the jurors prepare the way for using "justice," and then use this concept in formal ways which, along with other discursive patterns and strategies, constitute the deliberation as a structured, concerted activity. We show four stages in the use of the term justice as it is embedded in jurors' practical reasoning. (shrink)

This essay discusses the jury 's value in American democracy by examining Alexis de Tocqueville 's analysis of the jury as a free school for the public. His account of jury socialization, which stressed lay deference to judges and trust in professional knowledge, was one side of a complex set of ideas about trust and authority in American political thought. Tocqueville 's contemporary Francis Lieber held juries to have important competencies and to be ambivalent rather than deferential regarding court professionals. (...) The nineteenth-century courtroom exhibited such ambivalence and was marked by institutional conflict involving increasing professional authority demanded by the bench and populist counter-pressures. Assessing the value of the jury today may require some of the conceptual tools Tocqueville offers, but must also renew an appreciation of the jury as a site that utilizes already existing juridical capabilities of lay people and thus re-conceive the relationship between lay people and court professionals. (shrink)

The concept of Homo economicus, one of the major foundations of neoclassical economics and a subset of the ideology of laisser-faire capitalism. was recently charged and tried in the island high court. Using the island’s virtual jury system for the first time, the accused was tried before a jury of three — Plato, Schopenhauer and feminist economists — chosen by him while under a veil of ignorance of the charge. All three returned guilty verdicts. Plato’s was prescriptive: ‘One ought not (...) to be like Homo economicus’. Schopenhauer’s verdict was descriptive: ‘Human nature is not Homo economicus’. The feminist verdict was both. Following the trial — described as a thought experiment — the island’s resident philosopher put forward two claims: (a) Neoclassical economists base their theories on a deficient depiction of humankind (descriptive misconception) a claim supported by a witness expert in experimental economics; (b) The depiction holds a dominant but unjustified position in various discourses such as welfare state debates because it is promoted by a small but highly influential group of economically privileged, universityeducated whites, namely graduates of economics, a claim supported by the sociology expert witness. (shrink)

Even though he is mainly known for his concept of constituent power, Sieyès was one of the first constitutional theorists to ask for a guardian of the constitution which closely resembles contemporary constitutional courts. This article reconstructs the main tenets of his proposal, puts them in the larger context of his constitutional theory and then assesses the constitutional nature and functions of this institution. The judgment is mixed: as an organ, Sieyès’ constitutional jury is a hybrid institution, neither a (...) real third chamber nor a full-fledged constitutional court; however, its functions not only are a clear anticipation of the control of constitutionality, but are also intended to tame constituent power and to protect the rights of man in case of legal gaps. (shrink)

In a homogeneous jury, the votes are exchangeable correlated Bernoulli random variables. We derive the bounds on a homogeneous jury’s competence as the minimum and maximum probability of the jury being correct, which arise due to unknown correlations among the votes. The lower bound delineates the downside risk associated with entrusting decisions to the jury. In large and not-too-competent juries the lower bound may fall below the success probability of a fair coin flip—one half, while the upper bound may not (...) reach a certainty. We also derive the bounds on the voting power of an individual juror as the minimum and maximum probability of her/his casting a decisive vote. The maximum is less than one, while the minimum of zero can be attained for infinitely many combinations of distribution moments. (shrink)

This paper explores the role that difference plays in collective decision-making using the Condorcet jury theorem. Agents facing a dichotomous decision might prove biased toward one of the options facing them. That is, they may be more likely to decide correctly when one of the options is correct than when the other option is. A juror might be more likely to convict a guilty defendant than to acquit an innocent one. Agents may display opposing biases. This paper identifies the optimal (...) committee composition in the presence of such bias. This composition depends upon both the prior probability that each option is correct and the relative costs of the two types of possible error. Optimal committee composition will be expressed in terms of the absolute margin that a group with one form of bias should enjoy over the other. (shrink)

A jury and two valid options are given. Each agent of the jury picks exactly one of these options. The option with the most votes will be chosen by the jury. In the N-couple model of Althöfer and Thiele, the jury consisted of 2N agents. These agents form N independent couples, with dependencies within the couples. The authors assumed that the agents who form a couple have the same competence level. In this note, we relax this assumption by allowing different (...) competence levels within the couples. We show that the theoretical results of Althöfer and Thiele remain valid under this relaxation. (shrink)