Walter Conn's theory of Christian Conversion (1986) provides an illuminating lens for understanding Dorothy Day's conversion experience. Day's story, conversely, offers an opportunity to test selected features of Conn's theory, specifically the affective, cognitive, moral, and religious categories of analysis. The dialectic is a fruitful one, yielding insight into both Day's story and Conn's theory, while at the same time raising provocative questions about and contributing to the current debate regarding an "ethic of care" as distinct from an "ethic of (...) justice.". (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped, and the Church. By Stanley Hauerwas.

It has been proposed in South Africa and other sites that forgiveness is a political necessity if social reconstruction is to be effective following regimes of terror and torture. By placing the spotlight on forgiveness, these claims raise questions about the realism and relevance of forgiveness to public life. This paper interrogates the moral realism of forgiveness in public life by identifying some of its defining features, by comparing it to forgiveness in therapeutic and interpersonal settings, and by examining proposed (...) reasons and motivations for forgiveness in the face of moral atrocities inflicted, tolerated, or ignored by an apartheid governance in South Africa. The author argues that the South African experience displays forgiveness as a realistic, though difficult moral choice, when forgiveness in the public square is construed as a feature of the common good. (shrink)

ETHICS IS ABUNDANT IN POPULAR CULTURE—IN RADIO TALK SHOWS, television, films, moral advice columns, books and workshops on popular psychology and spirituality, and other venues. This essay explores the ways in which ethics is presented in three select popular settings; the ethical questions addressed in those settings; the moral theories, perspectives, and values that are privileged in opinions offered; and the judgments that are proffered. Of special interest to professional ethicists are the ways in which ethics in popular culture participates (...) in the ways ethics is done in the academy and the ways in which popular media frame and foster ethics differently from the ways the academy does. This article was the Presidential Address at the 2004 Society of Christian Ethics annual meeting in Chicago. (shrink)

Reflecting on a career that temporally coincides with that of the JRE and discloses a like commitment to approaching ethics through attention to multiple religious traditions, the author traces the evolution of her abiding interest in socio-historical expressions of religious convictions and the processes of ethical reflection and analysis that accompany and challenge these. As her research has increasingly focused on a North-South axis, the compelling voices of the poor have provided moral insight and have reformed the author's questions about (...) the interplay of circumstance and moral sensibility, awakening new appreciation both of indomitable moral integrity and of the fragility of virtue. (shrink)

To study and to do religious ethics is to be engaged in a three-tieres task which is likened to the process of climbing a three-step ladder. The climber is free to move both up and down depending on the need at hand, depending upon what it is that is to be reached for. The first step refers to the concrete-experiential level where we address conflicting value claims and engage in decision-making procedures; the second refers to the theological-philosophical level where we (...) examine the interpretive framework brought to bear at level one, and the third calls for examination and justification of the epistemological roots of that interpretive framework. The paper argues that concern with reason and the rational processes of justifying actions dominates ethical discussion today, and that although this concern is appropriate, it is also insufficient. The author thus lingers over the often-neglected role of feeling in ethical analysis and argues that feeling as well as reason has epistemological value in the search for ethical insight. (shrink)

Whereas the chief development question of the past has been "how much is a nation producing?" the human development perspective that characterizes the United Nations Human Development Reports shifts the question to "how are its people faring?" This shift reflects the fundamental moral orientation of the human development perspective which makes a case for the common good in a global economy. Relating the themes and claims of the human development reports to Brian Stiltner's recent study on religion and the common (...) good, the author shows a variety of ways in which the common good as a moral norm is embedded in the human development perspective, without the context of religion. She explicates the presence and utility of this norm in these United Nations reports written by economists, development specialists, and policy advisors who seek to present and assess the humanizing and dehumanizing features of globalization. (shrink)

The detection and spread of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza in the United States led to a complex and multi-faceted response by the public health system that lasted more than a year. When the first domestic case of the virus was detected in California on April 15, 2009, and a second, unrelated case was identified more than 130 miles away in the same state on April 17, 2009, the unique combination of influenza virus genes in addition to its emergence and rapid (...) spread at the end of the typical Northern Hemisphere influenza season suggested the potential for a high morbidity, high mortality event. In response, federal, state, and local public health officials conducted epidemiologic investigations with federal and state laboratory support to help to determine the scope of the H1N1 pandemic. On April 26, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services declared a public health emergency that was renewed through June 23, 2010. The pandemic that ensued tested virtually every aspect of U.S. public health preparedness and response systems, from laboratory capabilities and capacities to social distancing plans. (shrink)

D. J. O'Connor; I—The Presidential Address: Beliefs, Dispositions and Actions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 June 1969, Pages 1.

BackgroundThe ARRIVE (Animal Research: Reporting of In Vivo Experiments) guidelines are widely endorsed but compliance is limited. We sought to determine whether journal-requested completion of an ARRIVE checklist improves full compliance with the guidelines.MethodsIn a randomised controlled trial, manuscripts reporting in vivo animal research submitted to PLOS ONE (March–June 2015) were randomly allocated to either requested completion of an ARRIVE checklist or current standard practice. Authors, academic editors, and peer reviewers were blinded to group allocation. Trained reviewers performed outcome (...) adjudication in duplicate by assessing manuscripts against an operationalised version of the ARRIVE guidelines that consists 108 items. Our primary outcome was the between-group differences in the proportion of manuscripts meeting all ARRIVE guideline checklist subitems.ResultsWe randomised 1689 manuscripts (control: n = 844, intervention: n = 845), of which 1269 were sent for peer review and 762 (control: n = 340; intervention: n = 332) accepted for publication. No manuscript in either group achieved full compliance with the ARRIVE checklist. Details of animal husbandry (ARRIVE subitem 9b) was the only subitem to show improvements in reporting, with the proportion of compliant manuscripts rising from 52.1 to 74.1% (X2 = 34.0, df = 1, p = 2.1 × 10−7) in the control and intervention groups, respectively.ConclusionsThese results suggest that altering the editorial process to include requests for a completed ARRIVE checklist is not enough to improve compliance with the ARRIVE guidelines. Other approaches, such as more stringent editorial policies or a targeted approach on key quality items, may promote improvements in reporting. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 24.1 (2004) 135-157 [Access article in PDF] "That We May Know Each Other": The Pluralist Hypothesis as a Research Program Paul O. Ingram Pacific Lutheran University When an African American Muslim named Siraj Wahaj served as the first Muslim "Chaplain of the Day" in the Unites States House of Representatives on 25 June 1991 he offered the following prayer, the first Muslim prayer in the in (...) the history of the House of Representatives: In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most merciful. Praise belongs to thee alone; O God, Lord and Creator of all the worlds. Praise belongs to Thee Who shaped us as and colored us in the wombs of our mothers; colored us black and white, brown, red, and yellow. Praise belongs to Thee who created us from males and females and made us into nations and tribes that we may know each other.1Siraj Wahaj's prayer is a direct reference to one of the most cited verses of the Qur'an: "Do you not know, O people, that I have made you into tribes and nations that you may know each other." Of course, "knowing each other" is an important goal in the practice of interreligious dialogue, but Muslims often move on to cite further Qur'anic advice about religious pluralism: "If God had so willed, He would have made you a single people," the verse reads, "But His plan is to test you in what He hath given you; so strive as in a race in all virtues."2 According to Siraj Wahaj and many like-minded American Muslims, Islam and pluralism go hand in hand and respect for the dignity for each person, no matter what religious or secular label he or she wears, rests on Islamic foundations. Of course, this interpretation of the Qur'an is rejected by radical communities within the House of Islam as well as by fundamentalist communities within Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, and Jewish traditions. Nor are the foundations of pluralism only found in the Qur'an; Buddhist, Jewish, Hindu, Christian, and aboriginal traditions support religious pluralism as well.This essay's thesis, what John Hick first posited as the "pluralist hypothesis," offers us the most coherent theoretical framework—minus Hick's Kantian epistemology—from which to interpret contemporary postmodern experiences of religious [End Page 135] diversity. Furthermore, I shall argue that the pluralist hypothesis constitutes a coherent history-of-religions research program from which to investigate and interpret the facts of religious diversity.3 In order to demonstrate the adequacy of my thesis and argument, I shall appropriate the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos's account of the methodology and structure of scientific research programs, guided by Nancy Murphy's application of Lakatos's work in the construction of theological research programs. But first, some preliminary clarifications about what I mean by "religious pluralism" and "religious diversity."4 The Structure of the Experience of Religious Pluralism In a recent book on the lives of four Catholic writers—Dorothy Day, Thomas Merton, Flannery O'Connor, and Walker Percy—Paul Elie provides one of the most accurate descriptions of the structure of postmodern experience of religious diversity in English print: We are all skeptics now, believer and unbeliever alike. There is no one faith, evident at all times and places. Every religion is one among many. The clear lines of orthodoxy are made crooked by our experience, and are complicated by our lives. Believer and unbeliever are in the same predicament, thrown back onto ourselves in complex circumstances, looking for a sign. As ever, religious belief makes its claim somewhere between revelation and projection, between holiness and human frailty, but the problem of proof, indeed the burden of belief, for so long upheld by society, is now back on the believer, where it should be.5Assuming that Elie's description is an accurate one, certain implications follow that will serve as working assumptions of this essay."Pluralism" is not just another name for "diversity." Diversity names the fact of the existence of differing... (shrink)

In almost every human society some people get more and others get less. Why is inequity the rule in human societies? Philosopher Cailin O'Connor reveals how cultural evolution works on social categories such as race and gender to generate unfairness.

This provocative book refurbishes the traditional account of freedom of will as reasons-guided "agent" causation, situating its account within a general metaphysics. O'Connor's discussion of the general concept of causation and of ontological reductionism v. emergence will specially interest metaphysicians and philosophers of mind.

Cailin O’Connor on power and the emergence of bargaining norms.

Many philosophers are persuaded by familiar arguments that free will is incompatible with causal determinism. Yet, notoriously, past attempts to articulate how the right type of indeterminism might secure the capacity for autonomous action have generally been regarded as either demonstrably inadequate or irremediably obscure. This volume gathers together the most significant recent discussions concerning the prospects for devising a satisfactory indeterministic account of freedom of action. These essays give greater precision to traditional formulations of the problems associated with indeterministic (...) accounts and to the range of theoretical avenues for pursuing resolutions. The first four essays set out different challenges (from both compatibilists and those skeptical of the possibility of free will) to the adequacy of standard indeterministic theories. The next seven essays meet one or more of these challenges. Each of the fundamental types of approach--simple indeterminism, causal indeterminism, and agent causation--is represented in these novel and sophisticated proposals. The collection finishes with two essays that debate whether compatibilism entails that freedom of choice is a comparatively rare phenomenon within an individual's life. Eloquently presenting some of the most compelling and accessible arguments surrounding this central philosophical issue, Agents, Causes, and Events makes a valuable contribution to courses in free will/action theory and metaphysics. (shrink)

“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millenia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it.) Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very (...) closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action. (Clearly, there will also be epistemic conditions on responsibility as well, such as being aware—or failing that, being culpably unaware—of relevant alternatives to one's action and of the alternatives' moral significance.) But the significance of free will is not exhausted by its connection to moral responsibility. Free will also appears to be a condition on desert for one's accomplishments (why sustained effort and creative work are praiseworthy); on the autonomy and dignity of persons; and on the value we accord to love and friendship. (See Kane 1996, 81ff. and Clarke 2003, Ch.1.). (shrink)

"Why should we care about having true beliefs? And why do demonstrably false beliefs persist and spread despite consequences for the people who hold them? Philosophers of science Cailin O’Connor and James Weatherall argue that social factors, rather than individual psychology, are what’s essential to understanding the spread and persistence of false belief. It might seem that there’s an obvious reason that true beliefs matter: false beliefs will hurt you. But if that’s right, then why is it irrelevant to (...) many people whether they believe true things or not? In an age riven by "fake news," "alternative facts," and disputes over the validity of everything from climate change to the size of inauguration crowds, the authors argue that social factors, not individual psychology, are what’s essential to understanding the persistence of false belief and that we must know how those social forces work in order to fight misinformation effectively."–Publisher’s description. (shrink)

An analysis of how Adorno's "pure" philosophy can be seen to provide a justification of the rationality required by critical theory.

O'Connor and Wyatt use more than 250 color photographs and illustrations to help us break out of the linear mode and see the world differently.

All organised bodies are composed of parts, similar to those composing inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state; but the phenomena of life, which result from the juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any of the effects which would be produced by the action of the component substances considered as mere physical agents. To whatever degree we might imagine our knowledge of the properties of the several ingredients of a (...) living body to be extended and perfected, it is certain that no mere summing up of the separate actions of those elements will ever amount to the action of the living body itself. (shrink)

This is an Element surveying the most important literature using game theory and evolutionary game theory to shed light on questions in the philosophy of biology. There are two branches of literature that the book focuses on. It begins with a short introduction to game theory and evolutionary game theory. It then turns to working using signaling games to explore questions related to communication, meaning, language, and reference. The second part of the book addresses prosociality - strategic behavior that contributes (...) to the successful functioning of social groups - using the prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, and bargaining games. (shrink)

Timothy O’Connor and Philip Woodward defend a version of a compositional theory, according to which an incarnate deity has two natures, each of which is a distinct component of its being. They then extend this model to permit multiple incarnations. Finally, they consider an objection to this model based on the theological idea that Christ’s work is necessary for ushering in a united community of all divine-image-bearing creatures. In response, they speculate that no such all-encompassing community would be possible, (...) given the vast differences between such creatures. Accordingly, they speculate that each incarnation could help to bring about a unified community of the relevant sort of divine-image-bearing creatures, and that each of these communities would, in its own way, participate in the common goal of union with God. (shrink)

One familiar affirmative answer to this question holds that these facts suffice to entail that Descartes' picture of the human mind must be mistaken. On Descartes' view, our mind or soul (the only essential part of ourselves) has no spatial location. Yet it directly interacts with but one physical object, the brain of that body with which it is, 'as it were, intermingled,' so as to 'form one unit.' The radical disparity posited between a nonspatial mind, whose intentional and conscious (...) properties are had by no physical object, and a spatial body, all of whose properties are had by no mind, has prompted some to conclude that, pace Descartes, causal interaction between the two is impossible. Jaegwon Kim has recently given a new twist to this old line of thought.(1) In the present essay, I will use Kim's argument as a springboard for motivating my own favored picture of the metaphysics of mind and body and then discussing how an often vilified account of freedom of the will may be realized within it. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Standard accounts of convention include notions of arbitrariness. But many have conceived of conventionality as an all-or-nothing affair. In this paper, I develop a framework for thinking of conventions as admitting of degrees of arbitrariness. In doing so, I introduce an information-theoretic measure intended to capture the degree to which a solution to a certain social problem could have been otherwise. As the paper argues, this framework can help to improve explanation aimed at the cultural evolution of social traits. (...) Good evolutionary explanations recognise that most functional traits are also conventional, at least to some degree, and vice versa. (shrink)

The case of Kafka stands at the very centre of Adorno’s articulation of modernist mimesis. His main study of Kafka is the long and complex essay “Notes on Kafka” (1953), which he republished in the collection Prisms (1955). But numerous references to Kafka are found throughout his unfinished masterpiece, Aesthetic Theory (first published in 1970) and in the four part collection of essays, Notes to Literature.

In response to those who argue for ‘property cluster’ views of natural kinds, I use evolutionary models of similarity-maximizing games to assess the claim that linguistic terms appropriately track sets of objects that cluster in property spaces. As I show, there are two sorts of ways this can fail to happen. First, evolved terms that do respect property structure in some senses can be conventional nonetheless. Second, and more crucially, because the function of linguistic terms is to facilitate successful action (...) in the world, when such success is based on something other than property clusters, we should not expect our terms to track those clusters. The models help make this second point salient by highlighting a dubious assumption underlying some versions of the cluster kinds view—that property clusters lead to successful generalization and induction in a straightforward way. As I point out, those who support property cluster kinds as natural can revert to a promiscuous realism in response to these observations. 1 Introduction2Cluster Kinds3Models and Results 3.1Similarity-maximizing games3.2Voronoi languages, clusters, and categories4Conventionality and Functionality in Kind Terms 4.1Conventional categories4.2Functionality and categories5Unnatural Perceptual Categories6The Payoff Relevance of Property Space7Conclusion. (shrink)

This paper describes a class of idealized models that illuminate minimal conditions for inequity. Some such models will track the actual causal factors that generate real world inequity. Others may not. Whether or not these models do track these real-world factors is irrelevant to the epistemic role they play in showing that minimal commonplace factors are enough to generate inequity. In such cases, it is the fact that the model does not fit the world that makes it a particularly powerful (...) argumentative tool. As I will argue, this epistemic role is a particularly important one when it comes to modeling inequity, because such models are often also aimed at interventions to stop it. Given this, it is crucial to know if we intervene on the current causes of inequity, what other, common social factors might continue to contribute to it. (shrink)

Across the world, artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are being more widely employed in public sector decision-making and processes as a supposedly neutral and an efficient method for optimizing delivery of services. However, the deployment of these technologies has also prompted investigation into the potentially unanticipated consequences of their introduction, to both positive and negative ends. This paper chooses to focus specifically on the relationship between gender bias and AI, exploring claims of the neutrality of such technologies and how its understanding (...) of bias could influence policy and outcomes. Building on a rich seam of literature from both technological and sociological fields, this article constructs an original framework through which to analyse both the perpetuation and mitigation of gender biases, choosing to categorize AI technologies based on whether their input is text or images. Through the close analysis and pairing of four case studies, the paper thus unites two often disparate approaches to the investigation of bias in technology, revealing the large and varied potential for AI to echo and even amplify existing human bias, while acknowledging the important role AI itself can play in reducing or reversing these effects. The conclusion calls for further collaboration between scholars from the worlds of technology, gender studies and public policy in fully exploring algorithmic accountability as well as in accurately and transparently exploring the potential consequences of the introduction of AI technologies. (shrink)

This dissertation, consisting of three hundred and eighty-four pages of text, with multiple citations of the works of Heidegger and Aquinas, and of one hundred and ten pages of notes and bibliography, compares the phenomenological Seinsdenken of Heidegger with the metaphysics of esse of Aquinas. The perspective is Thomistic; however, the greater emphasis is on understanding Heideggerian Sein. ;Chapter I contains an extensive survey of the literature on the relationship between the two thinkers. Different commentators suggest various points of intersection (...) between the two thinkers and disagree as to who is guilty of Seinsvergessenheit. ;Chapter II is a study of Heidegger's Seinsfrage which emphasizes the centrality of this question in the thinker's work, the phenomenological formulation of this question, and the limits of the thinking which the phenomenological formulation of this question predetermines. ;Chapter III contains a study of Heideggerian Sein in terms of: the Nothing, Truth, Presencing, Concealing, Clearing, Language, Thinking, Time, Ereignis-Austrag, and the Numinous. ;Chapter IV contains a review of those objects of Aquinas' thought to which the author believes Heideggerian Sein may be related: ipsum esse creatum, Ipsum Esse Subsistens, the transcendental Verum, the agent intellect, esse intentionale, esse as the verbal copula, and Ly Verbum. ;Chapter V contains the author's conclusions: Heideggerian Sein is in some respects like and in other respects unlike each of the objects of Aquinas' thought considered in Chapter IV. Sein is a conflation of really distinct principles which Aquinas is careful to distinguish, most fundamentally of esse reale and esse intentionale. Inasmuch as Aquinas can distinguish intentions from real things and can reason from the sensible beings which surround us up to a pure and real Being Itself he is more truly recollective of Being than is Heidegger. (shrink)

In recent years, as the enterprise of speculative metaphysics has attained a newfound measure of respectability, incompatibilist philosophers who are inclined to think that freedom of action is not only possible, but actual, have re-emerged to take on the formidable task of providing a satisfactory indeterministic account of the connections among an agent's freedom to do otherwise, her reasons, and her control over her act. In this paper, I want to examine three of these proposals, all of which give novel (...) twists to familiar themes. I will argue that despite the considerable ingenuity these philosophers evince, their attempts do not succeed. A common criticism of these theories will be that they fail to give a satisfactory account of what I term "agent-control," a certain feature of actions whose presence I take to be a central requirement for any workable model of responsible agency. I believe that the general notion I try to capture under this label is implicit in much of the voluminous discussion of the problem of free will (especially in compatibilist criticisms of libertarianism), although I am unaware of any explicit formulations of it in just the way I have in mind. Simply put, agent-control is that feature of the process of agency that accounts for how a particular piece of behavior is connected to, or an 'outflowing of, the agent, i.e., that which allows us properly to assert that the action was controlled by the agent. (shrink)

Finding Time for the Old Stone Age explores a century of colourful debate over the age of our earliest ancestors. In the mid nineteenth century curious stone implements were found alongside the bones of extinct animals. Humans were evidently more ancient than had been supposed - but just how old were they? There were several clocks for Stone-Age time, and it would prove difficult to synchronize them. Conflicting timescales were drawn from the fields of geology, palaeontology, anthropology, and archaeology. Anne (...) O'Connor draws on a wealth of lively, personal correspondence to explain the nature of these arguments. The trail leads from Britain to Continental Europe, Africa, and Asia, and extends beyond the world of professors, museum keepers, and officers of the Geological Survey: wine sellers, diamond merchants, papermakers, and clerks also proposed timescales for the Palaeolithic. This book brings their stories to light for the first time - stories that offer an intriguing insight into how knowledge was built up about the ancient British past. (shrink)

This work aims to clarify the nature of the philosophy of education, intending to indicate both the limits and the uses of philosophical criticism of educational aims and concepts. It is based upon the fact that education is a subject full of unexamined presumptions.