The past decade has seen a renewed interest in moral psychology. A unique feature of the present endeavor is its unprecedented interdisciplinarity. For the first time, cognitive, social, and developmental psychologists, neuroscientists, experimental philosophers, evolutionary biologists, and anthropologists collaborate to study the same or overlapping phenomena. This review focuses on moral judgments and is written from the perspective of cognitive psychologists interested in theories of the cognitive and affective processes underlying judgments in moral domains. The review will first present and (...) discuss a variety of different theoretical and empirical approaches, including both behavioral and neuroscientific studies. We will then show how these theories can be applied to a selected number of specific research topics that have attracted particular interest in recent years, including the distinction between moral and conventional rules, moral dilemmas, the role of intention, and sacred/protected values. One overarching question we will address throughout the chapter is whether moral cognitions are distinct and special, or whether they can be subsumed under more domain-general mechanisms. (shrink)

Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good. This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only (...) to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory and economics.The Handbook's twenty-two newly commissioned chapters are divided into three parts. Part I: Foundations concerns fundamental and interrelated issues about the nature of value and distinctions between kinds of value. Part II: Structure concerns formal properties of value that bear on the possibilities of measuring and comparing value. Part III: Extensions, finally, considers specific topics, ranging from health to freedom, where questions of value figure prominently. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of the phrase ‘acting on behalf of another.’ To do this, acting on behalf is first distinguished from ‘acting for the sake of another,’ the latter being a matter of other-directed motivation, the former of what we call ‘normative other-directedness’—i.e., acting on the claims and duties of the other. Second, we provide a distinction between two kinds of acting on behalf of another: representation as other-directedness plus normative replacement, and normative support as other-directedness without normative (...) replacement. Third, the paper offers conditions of appropriateness for both types of acting on behalf. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Special Issue of Theoria entitled "Quantum Mechanics and Reality". We first comment on its origins related to the VIII International Workshop on Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information, promoted by the International Network on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information. We then briefly introduce each contribution individually, bringing the papers together under the Special Issue's topic.

RESUMO No Livro I, parte IV, do "Tratado da natureza humana", Hume desenvolve aquilo que vamos chamar de lógica da ficção. Não se trata de um simples erro da imaginação enquanto fantasia, mas de uma propensão a criar ideias, entidades e objetos a partir das percepções presentes na mente. O que resulta daí é um sentido rico e novo de ficção que permite a Hume desenvolver uma história natural da filosofia, descrevendo a gênese inevitável de conceitos metafísicos. Partindo de uma (...) inspiração kantiana, iremos abordar esse tema ressaltando as semelhanças e diferenças entre as ficções naturais e a ilusão transcendental. ABSTRACT In Book I, part IV, of the "Treatise of Human Nature", Hume develops what we will call logic of fiction. It is not the case of a mere error of imagination as fancy, but a tendency to feign ideas, entities and objects from the perceptions in the mind. The result is a rich and new sense of fiction that allows Hume to establish a natural history of Philosophy, describing the unavoidable genesis of metaphysical concepts. From a Kantian point of view, we will approach this subject by highlighting the similarities as well as the differences between the natural fictions and the transcendental illusion. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade.ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, (...) as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions. (shrink)

Logical abductivism features in the recent literature as a _new epistemology_ for logic, in connection with logical anti-exceptionalism. According to this account, (i) logical knowledge is obtained by the justified _choice_ of a logical theory using abduction, which (ii) _replaces_ problematic approaches in traditional logical epistemology. We argue that such claims are not properly warranted; they conflate justification and theory choice methods. Abduction requires that one starts with _justified data_, and justification, in such cases, needs to appeal to sources that (...) are not granted by abduction. In this sense, abduction cannot be all there is to the epistemology of logic. Some abductivists, we shall see, even appeal to methods of the traditional epistemology to obtain the data. Keeping justification and theory choice separated may contribute to avoid obscurities in discussion of the nature of data in logic and in understanding more clearly how to frame the anti-exceptional nature of logic. (shrink)

The central challenges for moral fictionalism are twofold: first, to explain how its recommendation that we abandon moral belief and assertion can be reconciled with its rationale of preserving the motivational efficacy of moral thought and discourse; second, to explain what the point is of replacing moral belief and assertion to begin with. This chapter clarifies these challenges and argues that Richard Joyce’s recent “metaphorist” version of fictionalism fares no better with respect to them than his earlier “narrationist” version. Just (...) like its narrationist predecessor, metaphorist fictionalism fails to secure the motivational efficacy of moral thought and talk. The authors also find faults with yet more recent attempts at answering the above challenges for moral fictionalism, leaving the conservationist recommendation a more attractive alternative. This conclusion could be overturned if the conservationist proposal were sufficiently problematic in other respects, but the authors argue that it isn’t. (shrink)

Classroom discussion constitutes a unique opportunity for student deliberation and is often believed to be a desirable attribute of Social Science teaching. Yet, despite its potential, large scale observational research on discussion in Nordic classrooms is scarce. To address this shortcoming, the present study investigated the prevalence and contexts of classroom discussion in a Nordic sample of 375 teaching segments (each lasting 15 min). The sample was gathered through video observations, and discussion was measured by an element from the Protocol (...) for Language Arts Teaching Observations. Discussion was present in 39.2% of the investigated segments but was very unequally distributed across classes. While this study found classroom discussion to be most likely during small group work, in the middle of a 45-min lesson, and in schools with high achieving students, more research is needed to determine the sources of inequality in social science students’ opportunities for classroom deliberation. (shrink)

Apresenta a vida e fragmentos dos escritos de S. Francisco de Assis, em sentido positivo, a partir de chaves de leitura dos conceitos de dionisíaco e amor fati no filósofo germânico F. Nietzsche, bem como da integração do naturalismo em seus escritos.

En la primera parte de este trabajo se busca explicar por qué tanto la figura personal de Jorge Luis Borges como su propia obra han generado alguna clase de recelo o “miedo”. Las prevenciones de orden político hacia su persona, por un lado, y las complejas relaciones entre la dificultad y disfrute que surgen en el tratamiento sus textos, por el otro, son dos dimensiones interconectadas que participan en la configuración de una representación cultural sobre Borges en su propio país, (...) Argentina. Como un método para vencer “el miedo a Borges”, en la segunda parte se muestra cómo muy diversas y heterogéneas producciones de la cultura popular pueden llegar a ser vías de acceso para empezar a tratar temas de su obra. En la tercera parte, que es el núcleo de este trabajo, se presenta el desarrollo una investigación que recurrió a un capítulo de la serie de dibujos animados “Los Simpson” como vía de acceso a un texto de Borges. Los resultados ofrecen evidencia empírica a favor de las dos hipótesis evaluadas. En primer lugar, una tarea preparatoria con una producción de la cultura popular parece favorecer la comprensión global. En segundo lugar, la lectura en voz alta y comentada parece favorecer no sólo la comprensión en general sino también el disfrute de los textos. (shrink)

In the present article, the authors argue that the study of Salafism as a contemporary Islamic new religious movement could benefit from an analytical perspective separating fundamentalism into the modes of inferentialism and deferentialism. The basics of these concepts are outlined and discussed in relation to different aspects of contemporary Salafism as well as in relation to previous tendencies in Islamic history. As a case study, the authors employ the concept in an analysis of a contemporary Swedish Salafi discourse on (...) the ‘wiping of the socks’ in the context of ritual purity. The authors argue that the concept of ‘deferential fundamentalism’ has a potential in the study of Salafism in that it allows for comparative analysis, both cross-religiously and diachronically, in contextualising Salafism historically. It also allows for an analysis of Salafi thought and practice in relation to theories of how human beings in general process social information. (shrink)

How can we rethink anthropology beyond itself? In this book, twenty-one artists, anthropologists, and curators grapple with how anthropology has been formulated, thought, and practised 'elsewhere' and 'otherwise'. They do so by unfolding ethnographic case studies from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland - and through conversations that expand these geographies and genealogies of contemporary exhibition making. This collection considers where and how anthropology is troubled, mobilised, and rendered meaningful. 'Across Anthropology' charts new ground by analysing the convergences (...) of museums, curatorial practice, and Europe's reckoning with its colonial legacies. Situated amid resurgent debates on nationalism and identity politics, this book addresses scholars and practitioners in fields spanning the arts, social sciences, humanities, and curatorial studies."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This book both consummates and demonstrates the basic thrust of Jonas's thought: the inseparability of ethics and metaphysics, the reality of values at the ...

Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.

Although the production and recognition of social actions have been central concerns for conversation analysis from the outset, it has recently been argued that CA is yet to develop a systematic analysis of ‘action formation’. As a partial remedy to this situation, John Heritage introduces ‘epistemic status’, which he claims is an unavoidable component of the production and recognition of social action. His proposal addresses the question how is social action produced and recognized? by reference to another question how is (...) relative knowledge recognized? Despite the importance placed on the latter question, it is not clear how it is to be answered in particular cases. We argue that the introduction of epistemic status builds on a reformulation of the action formation problem that unnecessarily de-emphasizes the importance of the sequential environment. Our re-analyses of key sequences cast doubts on the empirical grounding of the epistemic program, and question whether the fundamental role of epistemic status has been convincingly demonstrated. (shrink)

A classic of phenomenology and existentialism and arguably Jonas's greatest work, The Phenomenon of Life sets forth a systematic and comprehensive philosophy -- an existential interpretation of biological facts laid out in support of Jonas ...

The modal -calculus extends basic modal logic with second-order quantification in terms of arbitrarily nested fixpoint operators. Its satisfiability problem is EXPTIME-complete. Decision procedures for the modal -calculus are not easy to obtain though since the arbitrary nesting of fixpoint constructs requires some combinatorial arguments for showing the well-foundedness of least fixpoint unfoldings. The tableau-based decision procedures so far also make assumptions on the unfoldings of fixpoint formulas, e.g., explicitly require formulas to be in guarded normal form. In this paper (...) we present a tableau calculus for deciding satisfiability of arbitrary, i.e., not necessarily guarded -calculus formulas. It is based on a new unfolding rule for greatest fixpoint formulas which allows unguarded formulas to be handled without an explicit transformation into guarded form, thus avoiding a exponential blow-up in formula size. We prove soundness and completeness of the calculus, and compare it empirically to using guarded transformation instead. The new unfolding rule can also be used to handle nested star operators in PDL formulas correctly. (shrink)

Life is fundamentally unequal, shaped by the arbitrary circumstances of birth and fate. The chapter critically explores the role of intellectual property (IP) law within the framework of meritocracy, arguing that meritocratic IP can provide effective incentives to fostering creativity, commerce, and innovation, to move up one’s position in society and change the culture in the process. However, meritocratic IP should not be used to justify or perpetuate inequality. IP rights, copyright, patents, trademarks, geographical indications (GIs), cultural heritage rights (CHR), (...) and trade secrets, are analyzed for their meritocratic value and their potential to either exacerbate or mitigate inequality. The digital transformation and the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) present new challenges, where creative destruction may widen income inequality while also lowering resource inequality by increasing access to goods and services. Additionally, the spatial and cultural dimensions of IP, particularly in the context of GIs and CHRs, are examined for how they can entrench existing disparities. The chapter advocates for a recalibration of IP law that better aligns with true meritocratic principles while ensuring that it does not reinforce inequality. It calls for a more flexible and inclusive IP system that respects both the heritage of the past and the innovation of the future, ultimately aiming to create a society where meritocracy drives inclusive progress and shared prosperity rather than entrenched inequities. (shrink)

This chapter focuses exclusively on normative reasons. Normative reasons count in favor of actions and attitudes like beliefs, desires, feelings, and emotions. Section 11.2 explores the common ground concerning the metaphysics of reasons. We shall see that the really controversial metaphysical issues in metanormative theorizing about reasons arise with respect to the metaphysics of the reason relation. The two subsequent sections therefore go beyond the common ground and consider competing accounts of the reason relation. Robust and quietist versions of non-naturalism (...) are considered in section 11.3 and naturalism is considered in section 11.4. Section 11.5 summarizes and gives a brief comparative assessment of the accounts considered. (shrink)

The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me.

Women’s underrepresentation in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) is related to the hierarchical social structure of gender relations in these fields. However, interventions to increase women’s participation have focused primarily on women’s interests rather than on STEM managers’ hiring practices. In this research, we examine STEM hiring practices, explore the implicit bias in criteria used by STEM managers, and suggest possible corrective solutions. Using an experimental design with 213 men and women STEM managers, we show that when evaluating a (...) female candidate, women and men STEM managers apply differential selection criteria, with men demonstrating implicit in-group gender favoritism in their hiring decisions. Specifically, the ability to work long hours was a more important criterion for male managers when evaluating a female candidate, forming an implicit gender bias, whereas female managers gave greater importance to problem-solving ability, a more gender-equal criterion. Adding a personal note to the curriculum vitae stating that the candidate had hired a full-time nanny was useful in decreasing the importance of the ability to work long hours criterion for men managers. We suggest individual and institutional interventions to reduce this bias, as a path to increasing women’s participation in STEM. (shrink)

This paper investigates the impact of personal attributes and organizational conditions on attitudes toward corporate misdeeds. On the basis of social cognitive theory, we develop hypotheses that are tested against data collected from 215 German employees using an online survey. Our findings suggest that personal attributes have a much greater impact on ethical attitudes than organizational conditions. Further, a moderating effect of control-oriented culture on the relationship between personality traits and attitudes toward corporate misdeeds is found. We derive implications for (...) human resource management and further theory development. (shrink)

Reality is hierarchically structured, or so proponents of the metaphysical posit of grounding argue. The less fundamental facts obtain in virtue of, or are grounded in, the more fundamental facts. But what exactly is it for one fact to be more fundamental than another? The aim of this paper is to provide a measure of relative fundamentality. I develop and defend an account of the metaphysical hierarchy that assigns to each fact a set of ordinals representing the levels on which (...) it occurs. The account allows one to compare any two facts with respect to their fundamentality and it uses immediate grounding as its sole primitive. In the first section, I will set the stage and point to some shortcomings of a rival account proposed by Karen Bennett. The second section will present my own proposal and the third section will discuss how it can be extended to non-foundationalist settings. The fourth section discusses potential objections. (shrink)

O texto apresentado a seguir é uma traduçáo da conferência intitulada “The Burden and Blessing of Mortality” ( The Hastings Center Report , 22, n. 1, jan-fev. 1992, p. 34-40), que foi apresentada à Fundaçáo do Palácio Real [The Royal Palace Foundation], em Amsterdam, no dia 19 de março de 1991. Esta conferência foi traduzida para o alemáo por Reinhard Löw e revisada pelo próprio Jonas, aparecendo com o título “Last und Segen der Sterblichkeit” em Scheidewege 21, 1991/92, p. 26-40, (...) e mais tarde em um livro do próprio Jonas: Philosophische Untersuchungen und metaphysische Vermutungen [Investigações Filosóficas e Suposições Metafísicas] . Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1992, p. 81-100. Por sua vez, o texto original, em inglês, veio ainda a fazer parte de uma coletânea de ensaios de Jonas, editada por Lawrence Vogel ( Mortality and Morality : a search for good after Auschwits. Ed. Lawrence Vogel. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1996, p. 87-97). (shrink)