To examine the influence of bilateral motor behaviors on flexibility performance, two studies were conducted. Previous research has shown that when performing unilateral motor behavior that activates the affective and motivational systems of approach versus avoidance (arm flexion vs. extension), it is the congruence between laterality and motor activation that determines flexibility-rigidity functioning (Cretenet & Dru, 2009). When bilateral motor behaviors were performed, a mechanism of embodiment was revealed. It showed that the flexibility scores were determined by the match (...) between the respective qualities of congruence of each of the unilateral motor behaviors performed. These results bring to light an overall embodied mechanism associated with the compatibility of the cognitive impact(s) of each motor behavior performed. (shrink)

We show that the theory, consisting of the usual axioms of but with the power set axiom removed—specifically axiomatized by extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity, separation, replacement and the assertion that every set can be well‐ordered—is weaker than commonly supposed and is inadequate to establish several basic facts often desired in its context. For example, there are models of in which ω1 is singular, in which every set of reals is countable, yet ω1 exists, in which there are sets of (...) reals of every size, but none of size, and therefore, in which the collection axiom fails; there are models of for which the Łoś theorem fails, even when the ultrapower is well‐founded and the measure exists inside the model; there are models of for which the Gaifman theorem fails, in that there is an embedding of models that is Σ1‐elementary and cofinal, but not elementary; there are elementary embeddings of models whose cofinal restriction is not elementary. Moreover, the collection of formulas that are provably equivalent in to a Σ1‐formula or a Π1‐formula is not closed under bounded quantification. Nevertheless, these deficits of are completely repaired by strengthening it to the theory, obtained by using collection rather than replacement in the axiomatization above. These results extend prior work of Zarach. (shrink)

The present paper draws on climate science and the philosophy of science in order to evaluate climate-model-based approaches to assessing climate projections. We analyze the difficulties that arise in such assessment and outline criteria of adequacy for approaches to it. In addition, we offer a critical overview of the approaches used in the IPCC working group one fourth report, including the confidence building, Bayesian and likelihood approaches. Finally, we consider approaches that do not feature in the IPCC reports, including three (...) approaches drawn from the philosophy of science. We find that all available approaches face substantial challenges, with IPCC approaches having as a primary source of difficulty their goal of providing probabilistic assessments. (shrink)

Questions for Further Consideration and Recommended Further Reading, which follow each relevant chapter, encourage readers to think further and to craft their own perspectives.

In this article, I pursue two related goals. First, I aim to put theory back into our picture of the development of the American human sciences during the Cold War. While historians have rightly highlighted the empiricist methodologies employed by postwar human scientists, I show how an influential group of social scientists, led by the sociologist Talcott Parsons, attempted to establish theorizing as the primary means of interdisciplinary inquiry. My second goal is to show that the “abstract” theory envisioned by (...) Parsons and his followers can and should be studied as a material practice. (shrink)

The experimental laboratory can be a horror house for rats, monkeys, and other nonhuman animals. Yet their use in this setting is usually reported in a routine manner in publications that discuss the results. These contentions are illustrated with an analysis of the way animal evidence is presented in David J. Linden’s recent book, The Accidental Mind: How Brain Evolution Has Given Us Love, Memory, Dreams, and God (Harvard University Press, 2007). The article concludes with a call to science authors (...) to acknowledge formally in their written work the ethical significance of such use of nonhuman animals. (shrink)

This book is a groundbreaking history of balance, exploring how a new model of equilibrium emerged during the medieval period.

This chapter illustrates character as the fundamental facet of ethics. This book explores, analyzes, and defines character in different ways. Character involves habits and tendencies of thought and action that are not, or at least need not have been, original to a person. It has a vital role in how we act. It can provide the threads that bind together the various episodes and commitments of a person's life. The word personality is sometimes treated as interchangeable with character. On the (...) other hand, the word character is less concerned with distinctiveness and individuality than the word personality. Nevertheless, how people take on and handle various kinds of responsibility best describe the role of character in ethical behavior. (shrink)

Resumo Este artigo analisa a influência da filosofia de Rousseau na teoria antropológica de Kant. No primeiro momento, apresentam-se as semelhanças e diferenças acerca do modo como cada autor compreende o estado de natureza. No segundo momento, estabelece-se uma comparação entre o conceito de sociabilidade insociável de Kant e os conceitos de piedade e amor próprio, na filosofia de Rousseau.This paper analyses the influence of Rousseau’s philosophy on Kant’s anthropological theory. Firstly, the similarities and differences between each philosopher’s understanding of (...) the state of nature is presented. Secondly, a comparison between Kant’s concept of unsocial sociability and Rousseau’s concepts of piety and self-love is presented. (shrink)

Diante do lema “sapere aude”, com o qual Kant apresenta sua caracterização de esclarecimento, colocaseimediatamente a questão: o que signifi ca pensar por si mesmo? Apesar de Kant procurar respondera isso ao longo do texto, muitas difi culdades permanecem enquanto as teses ali defendidas não foremintegradas no horizonte da fi losofi a crítico-transcendental. Em primeiro lugar, mostra-se como o esclarecimentoé uma noção ambivalente, por um lado se refere ao indivíduo, por outro, se refere a uma época.Em segundo lugar, o esclarecimento (...) implica essencialmente uma mudança no método e não necessariamenteno conteúdo do pensamento, nesse sentido, o esclarecimento exige um determinado modo depensar , que se caracteriza pela disposição de se fazer um uso público da razão, ou seja, adisponibilidade pública de pedir e oferecer razões para justifi car determinada posição. Em terceiro lugar,defende-se que na expressão “fazer uso de teu próprio entendimento”, o termo entendimento deve serinterpretado em um sentido lato, isto é, de forma a abarcar tanto a razão no seu uso teórico quanto noseu uso prático. Mais do que isso, defende-se que o principal objetivo do Esclarecimento, segundo Kant,é o estabelecimento de um modo de pensar autônomo em sentido moral. Perpassando todos esses trêspontos, evidencia-se a importância desempenhada pela fi losofi a, seja enquanto aquela que deve zelarpelos princípios do uso público da sã razão, seja enquanto doutrina da sabedoria.Facing the dilemma “sapere aude”, with which Kant introduces his enlightenment characterization, immediately appears the question: what means to think by oneself? Despite Kant tries to answer to that along the text, many dif culties will remain while the thesis defended there are not integrated in the horizon of critical-transcendental philosophy. First, it is showed how the enlightenment is an ambivalent notion, on one side it refers to the individual, on the other, it refers to an epoch. Second, the enlightenment implies essentially a change in the method and not necessarily in the thought content, in this sense, the enlightenment demands a certain way of thinking , that is characterized by the disposition to make a public use of reason, in other words, the public availability to request and offer reasons to justify determined position. Third, it is defended that in the expression “make use of your own understanding”, the term “understanding” should be interpreted in a lato sensu, that is, in order to taking into account the reason in its theoretical as well as in its practical use. Furthermore it is defended that the main goal of Enlightenment, according to Kant, is to establish an autonomous way of thinking in a moral sense. Passing by all of these three points, it stays evident the importance performed by philosophy, both as the one that should look after the principles of the public use of the sane reason, and as wisdom doctrine. (shrink)

This chapter describes character as a second self or, on the other hand, as a first self. To understand the importance of character in human life, we must appreciate who it is that has a character. Full understanding of what character is will have to include the background of a metaphysical account of the self. The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation that the relation relates to its own (...) self; the self is not the relation but that the relation relates itself to its own self. Everyone is born with a self, which remains strictly self-identical throughout that person's life, in that, whatever character the person develops or however he or she changes, the self remains itself. (shrink)

This chapter explores ways in which an ethical theory can develop through time and, in particular, variations in Kantian ethical theories. The chapter argues that a Kantian could say that we have duties to particular people as part of ongoing commitments, but an adequate and sufficient account of good and poor decisions in personal relationships cannot be based entirely on the categorical imperative, nor can we do justice to seriously wrong decisions by regarding them as violations of duty. Any ethical (...) philosophy, which includes an adequate account of ongoing personal commitments, will have to recognize that our judgments of what is wrong are of more than one sort and are made, so to speak, in more than one kind of voice. (shrink)

In their major book devoted to the Herbert Spencer ‘affair’, Daniel Becquemont and Laurent Mucchielli profess themselves to be quite ready to share the opinion of Georges Guille-Escuret: the 19th-century British thinker would appear to dominate ‘discreetly our spontaneous perceptions‘. The forgotten philosopher in France appears to colour the moral atmosphere of the West. He appears to be, without our knowing it, our major contemporary. The surprising lapse of memory in which his name has found itself stuck fast appears to (...) guarantee the triumph of his ideas. To unearth his name and resubmit his work to scrutiny takes on a certain urgent character when seen from this perspective: it would mean putting the so-called ideological evidence of our time to the test of the history of ideas. To render unto Spencer that which is Spencer's would be to remove from this so-called evidence the ‘immediate and unquestionable character’ with which it invests itself. (shrink)

Many would consider the lengthening debate between moral realists and anti-realists to be draw-ish. Plainly new approaches are needed. Or might the issue, which most broadly concerns realism in relation to normative judgments, be broken down into parts or sectors? Physicists have been saying, in relation to a similarly longstanding debate, that light in some respects behaves like waves and in some respects like particles. Might realism be more plausible in relation to some kinds of normative judgments than others?

In his masterly article, “Sir Arthur Eddington and the Physical World,” which appeared in the January 1934 issue of Philosophy, Dr. Stace has brought out a number of interesting points on which I should like to comment. However, as the main issues between Professor Stace and Professor Eddington are with regard to the physical world and reality, these will form the main topics of my remarks.

This essay illuminates a number of nuances implicit in the commandment to “love your neighbor as yourself” by exploring its connection to Israeli election theology as well as to the larger Priestly theology that forms much of the framework of the Torah.

_Jung and the Monotheisms_ provides an exploration of some of the essential aspects of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Leading Jungian analysts, theologians and scholars - including Baroness Vera von der Heydt, Ann Belford Ulanov and Murray Stein - bring to bear psychological, religious and historical perspectives in an attempt to uncover the nature and psychology of the three monotheisms. The editor, Joel Ryce-Menuhin, is especially concerned to bring both the essential and comparative elements of the religious psychology of Islam to (...) the attention of the contemporary reader and to provide a forum for an increased dialogue between the three monotheisms. (shrink)

Sociologists who use in-depth interview methods have become sensitized to the ways that race-ethnicity and class can form barriers to rapport with respondents, but the question of gender has been largely unexamined. This article compares data from two independently conducted in-depth interview studies of male nurses: one by a female researcher and one by a male researcher. Observed differences in how the men in the samples framed their responses to questions in the two studies are discussed. It is argued that (...) in-depth interviewers can and should become sensitized to respondents' negotiation of the gendered context of the interaction, but the existing proscriptions against cross-gender research are challenged. (shrink)

Antiphon is often criticized for confusing two distinct species of responsibility, causal and moral. Insofar as this distinction is fundamental to any mature legal or ethical theory, Antiphon appears at best naïve, at worst dishonest. I argue that a careful analysis of his second tetralogy reveals that Antiphon was well aware of the distinction and the rationale for recognizing it. However, Antiphon questions whether the distinction can be so easily made in every case, and he suggests that the inadequacy of (...) the distinction might have radical implications for traditional ideas at the core of the Greek legal system. In short, Antiphon's second tetralogy gives us yet another reason to question whether the sophists were as philosophically unsophisticated as we are often led to believe. (shrink)