Comme la plupart des philosophes qui l’ont précédé, Michel Onfray n’a pas évité la question de Jésus : Pour vous qui suis-je? Sa réponse marque une rupture dans le consensus établit autour du Christ Summus philosophus. Au carrefour de l’autobiographie et de l’historiographie libérale, elle réveille la vieille thèse mythiste qui voit dans la vie de Jésus la biographie d’une fiction. Dès lors, si Jésus n’a pas d’existence historique réelle, la philosophie de la religion qui s’ensuit ne peut produire qu’un (...) nihilisme de la chair. Cette dénonciation onfrayenne de l’essence du christianisme pose les bases d’une nouvelle épistémè, une ontologie matérialiste, une érotique débarrassée de la morale commune, une existence jubilatoire au risque d’une liberté sans limite. Le parcours suivi dans cet article montre cependant que le Christ, entre l’attirance et le rejet qu’il suscite, reste la pierre de touche des attitudes philosophiques face à la foi. (shrink)

This chapter illustrates character as the fundamental facet of ethics. This book explores, analyzes, and defines character in different ways. Character involves habits and tendencies of thought and action that are not, or at least need not have been, original to a person. It has a vital role in how we act. It can provide the threads that bind together the various episodes and commitments of a person's life. The word personality is sometimes treated as interchangeable with character. On the (...) other hand, the word character is less concerned with distinctiveness and individuality than the word personality. Nevertheless, how people take on and handle various kinds of responsibility best describe the role of character in ethical behavior. (shrink)

I defend a perceptual account of face-to-face mindreading. I begin by proposing a phenomenological constraint on our visual awareness of others' emotional expressions. I argue that to meet this constraint we require a distinction between the basic and non-basic ways people, and other things, look. I offer and defend just such an account.

The death penalty by lethal injection is a legal punishment in the United States. Sodium Thiopental, once used in the death penalty cocktail, is no longer available for use in the United States as a consequence of this association. Anesthesiologists possess knowledge of Sodium Thiopental and possible chemical alternatives. Further, lethal injection has the look and feel of a medical act thereby encouraging physician participation and comment. Concern has been raised that the death penalty by lethal injection, is cruel. Physicians (...) are ethically directed to prevent cruelty within the doctor-patient relationship and ethically prohibited from participation in any component of the death penalty. The US Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty is not cruel per se and is not in conflict with the 8th amendment of the US constitution. If the death penalty is not cruel, it requires no further refinement. If, on the other hand, the death penalty is in fact cruel, physicians have no mandate outside of the doctor patient relationship to reduce cruelty. Any intervention in the name of cruelty reduction, in the setting of lethal injection, does not lead to a more humane form of punishment. If physicians contend that the death penalty can be botched, they wrongly direct that it can be improved. The death penalty cocktail, as a method to reduce suffering during execution, is an unverifiable claim. At best, anesthetics produce an outward appearance of calmness only and do not address suffering as a consequence of the anticipation of death on the part of the condemned. (shrink)

Profound offenses are misleadingly characterized as simply “offensive nuisances” because of their perceived qualitative difference from mere nuisances, and because of their independence of actual perception. The nub of the offensiveness in the “profound” cases is not personal resentment over a disagreeable experience, but outrage at the offending conduct on grounds quite independent of its effect on oneself. Examples of profound offenses include voyeurism, Nazis and Klansmen, execrated but “harmless” deviant religious moral practices, desecration of venerated symbols, and abortion and (...) mistreatment of corpses. The offense principle does not warrant legal interference in a person’s private conduct on the grounds that those who know that the conduct is taking place need protection from the profound offensiveness of their own bare knowledge. (shrink)

: In this paper, I shall defend the thesis that the idea of a universal history in Kant’s third Critique is not legitimated from a theoretical and systematic point of view but instead from a practical point of view. In order to sustain this interpretation, I shall reconstruct parts of arguments from the entire Critique of Teleological Judgment. First, I shall argue that in the Analytic as in the Dialectic, the external purposiveness can legitimize only a teleological history of nature (...) but not a universal history. Second, I defend that in the Methodology, the idea of a universal history is grounded in an interest of pure practical reason. (shrink)

The Fourfold Gospel of regeneration, sanctification, divine healing, and the Second Coming was introduced to Korea in the early 20th century and played a crucial role in developing the Korea Holiness Churches. It seems, however, that the previous understanding of the Fourfold Gospel has some limitations in helping Christians to participate in missio Dei. Because missiological hermeneutics of the Fourfold Gospel has focused mainly on the theology of redemption, it has frequently led to a narrow understanding of missio Dei. Through (...) the reading of the two creation stories in Genesis, we can recognize that God’s creative works already have redemptive meanings and that His redemptive works already have creative/creational meanings. In this sense, it is also possible to see the Fourfold Gospel from a creation theological perspective. This understanding may positively motivate Christians to participate in missio Dei to restore and complete God’s creation as his vicegerents and stewards. (shrink)

À la fin du xixe siècle, le rôle de l’école de la République est d’alphabétiser la France. Il est aussi de donner une éducation morale purement laïque. Les enjeux du fait moral traversent l’œuvre de Durkheim sur l’école, dans laquelle il défend la thèse que l’éducation est morale et qu’elle procède de la seule raison. Cependant, Durkheim ne s’appesantit pas, ou peu, sur le dispositif grâce auquel l’école mène cette éducation morale et rationnelle. L’article traite de ce dispositif abordé sous (...) l’angle du temps. La démonstration vise deux objectifs. Le premier est de montrer que le temps de l’école est l’instrument de soumission à une discipline rationnelle. À ce titre, le temps est au cœur de la socialisation méthodique des enfants qui d’abord les discipline puis les rend autonomes. Toutefois, ce modèle ne vaut que dans un contexte historique donné d’amplification par l’école de l’État-nation et du patriotisme. Le deuxième objectif est de montrer que les usages du temps ont évolué avec la transformation de l’école. Prenant acte de cette évolution, la conclusion pose la question de la morale dans un lieu dégagé d’une part des tensions entre les individus et les collectifs, d’autre part des usages instrumentaux du temps. (shrink)

-/- Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves (...) as themselves; it is manifest to them that they themselves are the object of awareness. Self-consciousness is a form of consciousness that is paradigmatically expressed in English by the words “I”, “me”, and “my”, terms that each of us uses to refer to ourselves as such. -/- A central topic throughout the history of philosophy—and increasingly so since the seventeenth century—the phenomena surrounding self-consciousness prompt a variety of fundamental philosophical and scientific questions, including its relation to consciousness; its semantic and epistemic features; its realisation in both conceptual and non-conceptual representation; and its connection to our conception of an objective world populated with others like ourselves. (shrink)

I offer an account of the ontology of emotions and their expressions, drawing some morals for the view that we can perceive others' emotions in virtue of seeing their expressions.

_reduction in favour of his existentialist account of être au monde. I show that whilst Merleau-Ponty _ _rejected, what he saw as, the transcendental idealist context in which Husserl presents the _ _reduction, he nevertheless accepts the heart of it, the epoché, as a methodological principle. _ _Contrary to a number of Merleau-Ponty scholars, être au monde is perfectly compatible with the _ _epoché and Merleau-Ponty endorses both. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that Merleau-_ _Ponty’s (...) liberal use of the results of empirical psychology signify a rejection of the epoché. A proper _ _understanding of his views on the relation between phenomenology and psychology shows that, at _ _least in Merleau-Ponty’s eyes, the methods of phenomenology and the empirical sciences are _ _largely similar. I conclude that we have every reason to think that Merleau-Ponty accepted _ _Husserl’s demand that the phenomenologist place the world in brackets._. (shrink)

The commentaries on our target article have raised important issues about central neuroplasticity and its role in persistent pain states. Some suggest that central neuroplasticity plays nothing more than a minor role in persistent pain, while others argue that persistent pain depends critically on peripheral inputs for its maintenance. Some stress that persistent pain relies to a large extent on changes in the brain and on centrifugal inputs from brain to spinal cord, whereas others argue that it depends on alterations (...) in inhibitory as well as excitatory systems. We attempt to addresseach of the commentators' points, while defending our position that central neuroplasticity is critical to pathological persistent pain states. (shrink)

A self-ascription is a thought or sentence in which a predicate is self-consciously ascribed to oneself. Self-ascriptions are best expressed using the first-person pronoun. Mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of mental predicates (predicates that designate mental properties), non-mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of non-mental predicates (predicates that designate non-mental properties). It is often claimed that there is a range of self-ascriptions that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM for short). What this means, (...) and exactly which self-ascriptions are properly classed as IEM, is a topic hotly disputed. Some claim that only mental self-ascriptions are IEM, others claim that some non-mental self-ascriptions are IEM. Before this question can be decided, it needs to be judged exactly what it means to say that a self-ascription is IEM. And here we stumble across the fact that there are, at least, two non-equivalent ways of defining the phenomenon1. I will be claiming that one of these definitions should be rejected. (shrink)

Bayesian conceptions of evidence have been invoked in recent arguments regarding the existence of God, the hypothesis of multiple physical universes, and the Doomsday Argument. Philosophers writing on these topics often claim that, given a Bayesian account of evidence, our existence or something entailed by our existence (perhaps in conjunction with some background knowledge or assumption) may serve as evidence for each of us. In this paper, I argue that this widespread view is mistaken. The mere fact of one's existence (...) qua conscious creature cannot serve as evidence on the standard Bayesian conception of evidence because knowledge of one's existence is a necessary part of the background knowledge relative to which all epistemic probabilities are defined. It follows that some formulations of the fine-tuning argument (for theism or a multiverse), the argument from consciousness (for theism) and a rejoinder to the Doomsday argument are mistaken. (shrink)

Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in way in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), (...) our sense of balance, and our awareness of bodily sensations such as pains, tickles, and sensations of pressure or temperature. We can group these together under the title. (shrink)

Deonna and Teroni’s The Emotions is both an excellent introduction to philosophical work on emotions and a novel defence of their own Attitudinal Theory. After summarising their discussion of the literature I describe and evaluate their positive view. I challenge their theory on three fronts: their claim that emotions are a form of bodily awareness, their account of what makes an emotion correct, and their account of what justifies an emotion.

: This paper addresses the need to examine teaching practices from the observation that they are beyond what they should be. This task devolved to scientists of education is to learn about teaching practices in their relationship to student learning in order to build the database useful to teacher educators and reflexivity necessary for any teacher about their own practice. The concepts of competence, pattern and are useful instrument in this endeavor of explanation and understanding of the practices. The proposed (...) theoretical framework is illustrated by a perspective of teaching practices of teachers in schools and colleges. These differ in many aspects and this requires the testing of new hypotheses to explain -/- La présente contribution traite de la nécessité d’étudier les pratiques d’enseignement à partir du constat de ce qu’elles sont au delà de ce qu’elles devraient être. Cette tâche dévolue aux chercheurs en sciences de l’éducation vise à mieux connaître les pratiques d’enseignement dans leurs relations aux apprentissages des élèves afin de constituer la base de données utiles aux formateurs d’enseignants et nécessaire à toute réflexivité des enseignants à propos de leur propre pratique. Les notions de compétence, de schème et d’instrument sont utiles à cette entreprise d’explication et de compréhension des pratiques. La proposition de cadrage théorique est illustrée par une mise en perspective des pratiques d’enseignement de professeurs des écoles et de collèges. Celles-ci se distinguent sur bien des aspects ce qui réclame la mise à l’épreuve de nouvelles hypothèses explicatives. (shrink)

In the second half of this essay, we continue our reading of Leo Strauss’ important later essay on Maimonides, ‘How to Begin to Study the Guide of the Perplexed’. Our method is to try, as best as we are able, to read this essay as Strauss directs us to read esoteric texts in Persecution and the Art of Writing. As a means of testing and attempting to confirm our reading of this difficult later essay on Maimonides, we will close by (...) situating our reading of ‘How to Begin to Study’ and Strauss’ partly concealed positions there on philosophy, prophecy and the Torah alongside the claims of his earlier, much less esoteric, but also rarely studied 1930s essay: ‘Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi’. Because of the widely recognised foundational importance of Maimonides in understanding Leo Strauss’ own lasting positions, this work aims at making a contribution to the continuing, and presently highly contentious, task of trying to understand Strauss’ thoughts on Athens and Jerusalem, reason and revelation, the city and man. (shrink)

Kant's introduction of a distinctive form of philosophical investigation and proof, known as transcendental, inaugurated a new philosophical tradition. Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism assesses the present state and contemporary relevance of this tradition. The contributors aim to understand the theoretical structures involved in transcendental explanation, and to assess the contemporary relevance of the transcendental orientation, in particular with respect to contemporary philosophical naturalism. These issues are approached from both naturalistic and transcendental perspectives.

Vers la fin du XIVe siècle se fait jour une théorie du signe et de la signification qui, par une réélaboration des principaux concepts sémantiques, renouvelle toute l’analyse logique du langage.Partant de Guillaume d’Ockham, dont l’œuvre est ici décisive, cet ouvrage suit le développement d’une logique fondée sur des éléments de sémiologie, à travers différents auteurs du XIVe siècle tels que Gauthier Burley, Jean Buridan, Albert de Saxe, Marsile d’Inghen, Pierre d’Ailly...Une telle « logique du signe » prend place dans (...) toute une mutation du savoir, en ce siècle où la crise profonde du monde médiéval appelle une autre conception des rapports entre l’homme, les choses extérieures et le langage. (shrink)

I discuss the relation between egocentric spatial representation and the capacity for bodily activity, with specific reference to Merleau-Ponty.

The clinical research enterprise is changing in fundamental ways. The bright line that separates research and clinical care is beginning to fade, as both “research” and “nonresearch” converge into and are embodied by the concept of the learning health care system. Here, data about care and operations are translated into practice improvement. VA has been a leader in this area, and based on its use of electronic health records and other inputs, has formed large databases and a data‐driven health care (...) system. These changes raise questions about the traditional approach to “research subject” protection. (shrink)

Inconsistent representations of the world have in fact played and should play a role in scientific inquiry. However, it would seem that logical analysis of such representations is blocked by the explosive nature of deductive inference from inconsistent premisses. "Paraconsistent logics" have been suggested as the proper way to remove this impediment and to make explication of the logic of inconsistent scientific theories possible. I argue that installing paraconsistent logic as the underlying logic for scientific inquiry is neither a necessary (...) nor a sufficient condition for giving a philosophical alternative, I suggest that identification of heuristic strategies, based on the network of confirming evidence for inconsistent proposals for reasoning from such proposals to their consistent replacements is the proper way to explicate their function in science. (shrink)

This paper investigates the compatibility of Hegel’s analyses of the mechanization of work in industrial society with Hegel’s notion of freedom as rational self-determination. Work as such is for Hegel a crucial moment on the way to a more complete realization of human freedom, but, as I maintain with Adorno, the technological developments of the last two centuries raise the question of whether the nature of work itself has changed since the industrial revolution. In his Jena lectures, Hegel recognized significant (...) problems that the mechanization of work poses for human freedom that—on my assessment—his later, mature thought does not sufficiently address. One finds, however, a more comprehensive depiction of the same worries that Hegel mentioned in his Jena lectures in Adorno’s critique of the dominant forms of labor in contemporary society and his understanding of technological rationality, which according to Adorno, dominates the contemporary world. I suggest, furthermore, that juxtaposing Hegel’s and Adorno’s thoughts on technology and the mechanization of work reveals Adorno’s philosophy of technology to be an extension, rather than a critique, of the spirit of Hegel’s own philosophical project as immanent critique of the necessary entailments of any given concept. (shrink)

The consequences of taxation matter for the optimal design of the tax system. Those consequences depend on behavioral responses to taxation, as summarized by the elasticity of taxable income. Although this elasticity depends on characteristics of preferences, such as the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure, it also depends on the avoidance technology, and on the response of government to avoidance behavior. It depends on the size of states, and the amount of tax coordination and harmonization. To some degree (...) the elasticity of response can be affected by government policies, and the government need not accept it passively, but rather should put in place policies that optimally determine it. (shrink)

Le 14e siècle est une période où les débats sur l'infini se multiplient. Les mêmes doctrines se trouvent indifféremment développées dans les oeuvres théologiques, dans les commentaires sur la "Physique" d'Aristote voire dans des traités spécialement dévolus à la question du continu. Cet ouvrage révèle la place de ces doctrines dans la logique, les mathématiques, la philosophie naturelle.

We show that subspaces of the space ${\mathbb{Q}}$ of rational numbers give rise to uncountably many d-logics over K4 without the finite model property.

Résumé Cet article examine la Logique de Port Royal en regard des théories médiévales du signe et du langage. Il reprend les célèbres passages consacrés aux signes afin de préciser comment se croisent les notions de représentation et de signification. La Logique de Port Royal récuse la théorie du langage mental, qui était dominante au Moyen Âge tardif, au bénéfice de la force expressive de l’esprit. Celui-ci se subordonne le langage, en une procédure où le langage doit sans cesse s’ajuster (...) à l’idée. L’article montre dans cette conception des rapports entre pensée et langage une présence forte de plusieurs thèses augustiniennes, bien au-delà de la seule définition usuelle du signe. Ni linguistique cartésienne, ni simple théorie cartésienne du jugement, la philosophie du langage de Port Royal se bâtit sur un véritable « augustinisme sémiologique ». (shrink)

Nesta conferência analisa-se o impasse do juiz que se vê chamado a servir à justiça, por dever de consciência, e a aplicar a lei, ainda quando injusta, por dever de ofício. Deslocando a discussão da difícil relação do juiz com a lei para o ethos iníquo do social, a exposição conclui que todos temos, mas especialmente o juiz pela natureza das responsabilidades que lhe são inalienáveis, o dever moral de servir à justiça – dever que paira acima da imposição jurídica (...) –, em busca de uma sociedade mais ética. (shrink)

Une part substantielle de la réflexion philosophique est née et s'est développée aux confins de la science. Depuis l'aube de la philosophie, on ne peut faire l'économie des mathématiques, de l'astronomie, de l'optique... si l'on veut comprendre les voies empruntées par les philosophes et les modèles qu'ils ont élaborés. Cette étude examine quelques-uns de ces liens jusqu'à l'âge moderne.