Wurde bereits beim ersten Band der Reihe 'Philosophie & Repräsentation' / 'Philosophy & Representation' das Verhältnis von Dargestelltem und Darstellung am Beispiel des Diagramms bzw. der Diagrammatik erörtert und problematisiert, so geht es nun im zweiten Band um die Frage der grundsätzlichen Notwendigkeit von Modellen für das Denken. Die mechanischen oder symbolischen Modelle sind in allen ihren Formen die Vergegenständlichung menschlicher Vorstellung, und das sowohl in rationalistischer, also theorie-immanenter, wie auch in irrationalistischer Hinsicht. Sie sind dies nicht nur im Sinne (...) ihrer explikativer Modellhaftigkeit, also als adäquate Repräsentation von Realität aufgrund quantifizierbarer oder meßbarer Größen, sondern als Garant wahren Wissens, das sich in einer phänomenologischen Sichtung des eigenen Erfahrungs- und Verstehenshorizontes vergewissert. (shrink)

This paper analyzes responsible human–machine interaction concerning artificial neural networks (ANNs) and large language models (LLMs) by considering the extension of human agency and autonomy by means of artificial intelligence (AI). Thereby, the paper draws on the sociological concept of “interobjectivity,” first introduced by Bruno Latour, and applies it to technologically situated and interconnected agency. Drawing on Don Ihde’s phenomenology of human-technology relations, this interobjective account of AI allows to understand human–machine interaction as embedded in the social lifeworld. Finally, the (...) paper develops a connectionist account of responsible AI, thereby focusing on patterns such as social goals and actions. (shrink)

This paper analyses falsely implicating from the point of view of Gricean theory of implicature, focusing on the Story of the Mate and the Captain which is a classical example of lying while saying the truth. It is argued that the case of falsely implicating should be included within a general definition of lying. Whether Particularised Conversational Implicatures (PCI), as in the Story of the Mate and the Captain, and Generalised Conversational Implicatures (GCI) behave differently with regard to falsely implicating (...) is discussed with reference to Levinson's theory of presumptive meaning [Levinson, Stephen C., 2000. Presumptive Meanings. The Theory of Generalised Conversational Implicature. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass]. It turns out that, in contrast to PCIs, the case where the assertion is false and the implicature is true is not possible with GCIs. In addition, tautology and irony are analysed, and some repercussions on the speech act notion of lying are pointed out. (shrink)

Martin Buber believed that life's deepest truth lies in human relationships. In this classic work he puts this belief into practice, applying it to the concrete problems of contemporary society.

Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her (...) own appropriate response to some agent-neutral value. This view helps reconcile important elements of deontology and consequentialism. (shrink)

Ultimately this book provides a theory of intergenerational justice that is both intellectually robust and practical with wide applicability to law and policy.

Let κ < λ be regular uncountable cardinals. Using a finite support iteration (in fact a matrix iteration) of ccc posets we obtain the consistency of b = a = κ < s = λ. If μ is a measurable cardinal and μ < κ < λ, then using similar techniques we obtain the consistency of b = κ < a = s = λ.

This article explores the elective affinities between Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and the sociology of critical capacities. It argues that these two research programmes can be understood as symmetrical twins. We show the extent to which the exchange between Bruno Latour and Luc Boltanski has influenced their respective theoretical developments. Three strong encounters between the twin research programmes may be distinguished. The first encounter concerns explanations for social change. The second encounter focuses on the status of objects and their relationship to (...) places. The third encounter is about the concept of critique. Drawing on their long-term mutual readings, we gain insight into how pleas for symmetrical analysis raised in response to Bourdieu’s theory of fields have evolved within both ANT and the sociology of critical capacity. We conclude by relating the development of the respective research programmes to the issue of disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

We show the consistency of ${\frak o} <{\frak d}$ where ${\frak o}$ is the size of the smallest off-branch family, and ${\frak d}$ is as usual the dominating number. We also prove the consistency of ${\frak b} < {\frak a}$ with large continuum. Here, ${\frak b}$ is the unbounding number, and ${\frak a}$ is the almost disjointness number.

Abstract“Sign stimuli” elicit specific patterns of behavior when an organism's motivation is appropriate. In the toad, visually released prey-catching involves orienting toward the prey, approaching, fixating, and snapping. For these action patterns to be selected and released, the prey must be recognized and localized in space. Toads discriminate prey from nonprey by certain spatiotemporal stimulus features. The stimulus-response relations are mediated by innate releasing mechanisms (RMs) with recognition properties partly modifiable by experience. Striato-pretecto-tectal connectivity determines the RM's recognition and localization (...) properties, whereas medialpallio-thalamo-tectal circuitry makes the system sensitive to changes in internal state and to prior history of exposure to stimuli. RMs encode the diverse stimulus conditions referring to the same prey object through different combinations of “specialized” tectal neurons, involving cells selectively tuned to prey features. The prey-selective neurons express the outcome of information processing in functional units consisting of interconnected cells. Excitatory and inhibitory interactions among feature-sensitive tectal and pretectal neurons specify the perceptual operations involved in distinguishing the prey from its background, selecting its features, and discriminating it from predators. Other connections indicate stimulus location. The results of these analyses are transmitted by specialized neurons projecting from the tectum to bulbar/spinal motor systems, providing a sensorimotor interface. Specific combinations of such projective neurons – mediating feature- and space-related messages – form “command releasing systems” that activate corresponding motor pattern generators for appropriate prey-catching action patterns. (shrink)

A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so-called relationships view, according to which associative duties within personal relationships arise because of the value of those relationships. Against this view, it has been argued that there can be cases of undemanding friendships, that is, genuine friendships with no associative duties. In this article, I argue that undemanding friendships do not show that associative duties are not grounded in the value of the relationship that gives rise to (...) them by providing an interpretivist account of the normativity of friendships. I argue that friendships are complex values that need to be interpreted in order to determine which response to them would be appropriate, and that understanding one's friendship as undemanding is one valid interpretation of the value of friendship. Subsequently, I demonstrate that this solution is not ad hoc, because friendship is not the only complex value that needs to be interpreted. (shrink)

New technologies are the source of uncertainties about the applicability of moral and morally connotated concepts. These uncertainties sometimes call for conceptual engineering, but it is not often recognized when this is the case. We take this to be a missed opportunity, as a recognition that different researchers are working on the same kind of project can help solve methodological questions that one is likely to encounter. In this paper, we present three case studies where philosophers of technology implicitly engage (...) in conceptual engineering (without naming it as such). We subsequently reflect on the case studies to find out how these illustrate conceptual engineering as an appropriate method to deal with pressing concerns in the philosophy of technology. We have two main goals. We first want to contribute to the literature on conceptual engineering by presenting concrete examples of conceptual engineering in the philosophy of technology. This is especially relevant, because the technologies that are designed based on the conceptual work done by philosophers of technology potentially have crucial moral and social implications. Secondly, we want to make explicit what choices are made when doing this conceptual work. Making explicit that some of the implicit assumptions are, in fact, debated in the literature allows for reflection on these questions. Ultimately, our hope is that conscious reflection leads to an improvement of the conceptual work done. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the method of normative reconstruction that is underlying Freedom’s Right undermines Critical Theory’s aspiration to be a force that is unreservedly critical and progressive. I start out by giving a brief account of the four premises of the method of normative reconstruction and unpack their implications for how Honneth conceptualizes social pathologies and misdevelopments, specifically that these notions are no longer linked to radical critique and normative revolution. In the second part, I demonstrate that (...) abandoning forms of radical critique and normative revolution is internally linked to adopting this method, before arguing that Freedom’s Right entails no resources to account for why abandoning them does not amount to a deficiency. In the final part, I point out two problematic implications of turning away from radical critique and normative revolution for the very project Honneth pursues in Freedom’s Right. I show that Honneth’s own view about the limited scope of application of the method of normative reconstruction and his account of the dangers associated with social misdevelopments give us reasons to consider this method to be incomplete. Finally, I contend that the explanatory power of Freedom’s Right is dubious because methodological premises that form part of normative reconstruction lead Honneth to ignore relevant alternative explanations of processes of deviation and disassociation from norms of social freedom, which he characterizes as social misdevelopments. (shrink)

Infra-experimentality. Traces ; Models ; Making visible ; Grafting ; Protocols -- Supra-experimentality. Shapes of time ; Experimental cultures ; Knowing and narrating ; Thinking wild ; Eulogy of the fragment -- Postscript.

The question of what characterizes feelings of being alive is a puzzling and controversial one. Are we dealing with a unique affective phenomenon or can it be integrated into existing classifications of emotions and moods? What might be the natural basis for such feelings? What could be considered their specifically human dimension? These issues are addressed by researchers from various disciplines, including philosophy of mind and emotions, psychology, and history of art. This volume contains original papers on the topic of (...) feelings of being alive by Fiorella Battaglia, Eva-Maria Engelen, Joerg Fingerhut, Thomas Fuchs, Alice Holzhey-Kunz, Matthias Jung, Tanja Klemm, Riccardo Manzotti, Sabine Marienberg, Matthew Ratcliffe, Arbogast Schmitt, Jan Slaby, and Achim Stephan. (shrink)

Let A[ω]ω be a maximal almost disjoint family and assume P is a forcing notion. Say A is P-indestructible if A is still maximal in any P-generic extension. We investigate P-indestructibility for several classical forcing notions P. In particular, we provide a combinatorial characterization of P-indestructibility and, assuming a fragment of MA, we construct maximal almost disjoint families which are P-indestructible yet Q-destructible for several pairs of forcing notions . We close with a detailed investigation of iterated Sacks indestructibility.

It is relatively consistent with ZFC that every countable $FU_{fin} $ space of weight N₁ is metrizable. This provides a partial answer to a question of G. Gruenhage and P. Szeptycki [GS1].

We explore the connection between combinatorial principles on uncountable cardinals, like stick and club, on the one hand, and the combinatorics of sets of reals and, in particular, cardinal invariants of the continuum, on the other hand. For example, we prove that additivity of measure implies that Martin’s axiom holds for any Cohen algebra. We construct a model in which club holds, yet the covering number of the null ideal is large. We show that for uncountable cardinals κ≤λ and , (...) if all subsets of λ either contain, or are disjoint from, a member of , then has size at least etc. As an application, we solve the Gross space problem under by showing that there is such a space over any countable field. In two appendices, we solve problems of Fuchino, Shelah and Soukup, and of Kraszewski, respectively. (shrink)

Beim Stichwort ”Kognition“ denken die meisten an das Gehirn, Computermodelle oder Informationsverarbeitung. In der realen Welt treffen wir aber immer nur auf Wesen mit Körpern, die in eine Umwelt eingebunden und in ihr aktiv sind. Kognition findet nicht im Kopf statt, sondern in der Welt. So lautet der Grundgedanke der Philosophie der Verkörperung. Die Hinwendung zu Körper und Umwelt stellt eine der vielleicht weitreichendsten Neuorientierungen der modernen Kognitionswissenschaft und Philosophie dar, die auch unser Verständnis von Wissenschaft und Kultur prägen wird. (...) Der Band versammelt die Grundlagentexte zu diesem Thema zum ersten Mal in deutscher Sprache. (shrink)

This article examines the relativistic view according to which the interpretation of texts is a matter of opinion and one interpretation is as good as any other. It clarifies the question by establishing precise understandings of texts and interpretations and by introducing various distinctions between different kinds of interpretations based on their function. It argues that not all kinds of interpretations are relativistic, although all interpretations are relative, and that even those interpretations that are relativistic are not so in the (...) same ways. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Plato's conception of expertise as a part of the Platonic theory of a good, successful life (eudaimonia). In various Platonic dialogues, Socrates argues that the good life requires a certain kind of knowledge that guides all our good, beneficial actions: the “knowledge of the good and bad”, which is to be acquired by “questioning ourselves and examining our and others’ beliefs”. This knowledge encompasses the particular knowledge of how to recognize experts in a given technical (...) domain. The central element in Socrates’ account of an expert is what I call the truth-and-caring criterion: an expert has to make seeking the truth and avoiding (avoidable) error her supreme epistemic goal and she has to make caring for common goods the supreme goal of practising her expertise. (shrink)

Die sprachliche und soziale Natur der Erkenntnis ist eine Grundeinsicht der Moderne. Doch welchen Spielraum lässt sie noch der Kritik, der distanzierten Prüfung der eigenen Sprache und Lebensform? Vor dem Hintergrund des Werkes Stanley Cavells fragt dieses Buch nach dem Verhältnis von Lebensform und Selbsterkenntnis. In ungewohnter Weise liest es Wittgenstein und Foucault als komplementäre Antwortstrategien auf dieses Grundproblem: Philosophie muss als eine "Arbeit an sich", als körperliche "Selbsttechnik" verstanden werden. Nicht ethische Programmatik, so kann gezeigt werden, sondern systematische Konsequenz (...) führt zu einer Engführung von Philosophie und Lebenspraxis. (shrink)

We investigate which filters onωcan contain towers, that is, a modulo finite descending sequence without any pseudointersection. We prove the following results:Many classical examples of nice tall filters contain no towers.It is consistent that tall analytic P-filters contain towers of arbitrary regular height.It is consistent that all towers generate nonmeager filters, in particular Borel filters do not contain towers.The statement “Every ultrafilter contains towers.” is independent of ZFC.Furthermore, we study many possible logical implications between the existence of towers in filters, (...) inequalities between cardinal invariants of filters $,${\rm{co}}{{\rm{f}}^{\rm{*}}}\left$,${\rm{no}}{{\rm{n}}^{\rm{*}}}\left$, and${\rm{co}}{{\rm{v}}^{\rm{*}}}\left$), and the existence of Luzin type families, that is, if${\cal F}$is a filter then${\cal X} \subseteq {[\omega ]^\omega }$is an${\cal F}$-Luzin family if$\left\{ {X \in {\cal X}:|X \setminus F| = \omega } \right\}$is countable for every$F \in {\cal F}$. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, EarlyView.

We investigate some aspects of bounding, splitting, and almost disjointness. In particular, we investigate the relationship between the bounding number, the closed almost disjointness number, the splitting number, and the existence of certain kinds of splitting families.

Deontic buck-passing aims to analyse deontic properties of acts in terms of reasons. Many authors accept deontic buck-passing, but only few have discussed how to understand the relation between reasons and deontic properties exactly. Justin Snedegar has suggested understanding deontic properties of acts in terms of both reasons and reasons to require: A is required to φ iff A has most reason to φ, and there is most reason to require A to φ. This promising proposal faces two open questions: (...) the question of why there can only be most reason to require A to φ if A has most reason to φ, and the question of what role agent-relative reasons play in generating requirements. In this paper, I address these questions and argue that the key to answering them is to reject evaluative buck-passing and accept a value-based theory of practical reasons instead. The result is a two-level theory of moral explanation: on the first level, practical reasons are explained in terms of appropriate responses to value; on the second level, deontic properties of acts are explained in terms of reasons: reasons to act as well as reasons to require. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Sven Danielsson argued that the ‘original paradoxes' of deontic logic, in particular Ross's paradox and Prior's paradox of derived obligation, can be solved by restricting the modal inheritance rule. I argue that this does not solve the paradoxes.

We consider several game versions of the cardinal invariants \, \ and \. We show that the standard proof that parametrized diamond principles prove that the cardinal invariants are small actually shows that their game counterparts are small. On the other hand we show that \ and \ are both relatively consistent with ZFC, where \ and \ are the principal game versions of \ and \, respectively. The corresponding question for \ remains open.

Unter dem Namen "Oracula Sibyllina" ist eine Sammlung in Hexametern abgefasster Pseudoorakel uberliefert mit den Buchern 1-8 und 11-14 in etwa 4230 Versen. Die fruhesten Teile entstanden im judischen Milieu seit der 2. Halfte des 1. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.; nach 150 n. Chr. wurden diese durch christliche Autoren rezipiert, erganzt und uberarbeitet. Die historischen Anspielungen reichen bis in das 3. nachchristliche Jahrhundert; die Endfassung wurde wohl im 6. Jahrhundert abgeschlossen. Der Legende nach hat Tarquinius Superbus, der letzte legendare Konig Roms, (...) die Bucher direkt von der Sibylle von Cumae erworben. Im Tempel des Iuppiter Capitolinus aufbewahrt und von 15 Priestern gehutet, durften sie nur eingesehen werden, wenn der Senat dies wegen beangstigender Vorzeichen anordnete. Im Jahr 83 v. Chr. vernichtete ein Brand auf dem Kapitol die Sammlung, eine neue wurde aufgrund von Nachforschungen an griechischen Sibyllenheiligtumern zusammengestellt.". (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 24 Heft: 1 Seiten: 219-232.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 21 Heft: 1 Seiten: 357-361.

Wie ist es moglich, dass der Mensch als freiwilliger Urheber seiner Handlungen - seien sie moralisch gut oder bose - angesehen werden kann? Die Studie verfolgt historisch-systematisch verschiedene im Ausgang von Kant hervorgebrachte Antworten auf diese Frage - bei Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Friedrich Schiller, Johann Gottlieb Fichte und Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Die Studie zeigt, dass diese Freiheitsdebatte in einer grosseren Tradition von Entwurfen willentlicher Selbstbestimmung steht, die sich uber Leibniz, Duns Scotus und Thomas von Aquin bis hin zu Augustinus (...) zuruckverfolgen lassen und im Begriff des liberum arbitrium voluntatis, einer reflektierten und moralisch qualifizierten Entscheidungsfreiheit, ihren systematischen Bezugspunkt haben. (shrink)

We show that determinism is false assuming a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics and considering the sensitive dynamics of macroscopical physical systems.

In this short note we develop an unorthodox panmentalistic and libertarian dualism. Especially we skech a mental-physikal law of free will. Our aim is to to provoke the contemporary scentific common-sense.

We show that every dominating analytic set in the Baire space has a dominating closed subset. This improves a theorem of Spinas [15] saying that every dominating analytic set contains the branches of a uniform tree, i.e. a superperfect tree with the property that for every splitnode all the successor splitnodes have the same length. In [15], a subset of the Baire space is called u-regular if either it is not dominating or it contains the branches of a uniform tree, (...) and it was proved that Σ21-Kσ-regularity implies Σ21-u-regularity. Here we show that these properties are in fact equivalent. Since the proof of analytic u-regularity uses a game argument it was clear that determinacy implies u-regularity of all sets. Here we show that an inaccessible cardinal is enough to construct a model for projective u-regularity, namely it holds in Solovay's model. Finally we show that forcing with uniform trees is equivalent to Laver forcing. (shrink)

In his book “Schiller as Philosopher”, Frederick Beiser laments that “contemporary Kant scholars have been intent on ignoring him. If they know anything at all about Schiller, it is only as the author of an epigram satirizing Kant”. Therefore, Beiser calls us “to consider Schiller as a philosopher, to reconstruct and appraise the arguments of his philosophical writings” (Beiser, 2005, p. vii). In this paper, I shall argue that it is Schiller's conception of freedom of the will as “heautonomy” that (...) stands behind his critique and modification of Kant's ethics. However, the systematic significance of Schiller's theory of freedom is not obvious. Its argumentative structure must first be reconstructed—as Beiser has demanded—because it is concealed by an esthetic discourse. A reconstruction of Schiller's theory of freedom shows that he contrasts his concept of heautonomy as individual self‐determination with the Kantian concept of an autonomy or autocracy of reason by the universal moral law. Schiller's own philosophical contribution to the debate on freedom after Kant must therefore not be understood as a mere esthetic balancing and softening of Kant's ethical rigorism. Rather, it shows serious transformations of Kant's approach, which justifies understanding it as a critical step beyond Kant's theory of the autonomy of reason. (shrink)

What is the role of attention in the dialectics of memory and communication? How far is attention functioning as a medium? Which role does attention play in the information management practices? Attention is not only fundamental to human existence but also to the process of understanding. If understanding is mediated by memory and communication then attention can be identified with the medium. So whenever you search to explain the role and mechanisms of memory in the information society, the question of (...) attention is asked immediately. Furthermore, attention can be analyzed under the following topics: as cognitive process, as subjective, intersubjective and cultural phenomenon, and as resource and medium within an 'Attention Economy'. Whereas the first aspect has to be seen in the context of empirical studies in psychology and cognitive sciences, the phenomenological, cultural, and economic aspects seem to have common points and similar implications in their theoretical approaches. In the last twenty years, the notion of attention has been the central core of several discourses in German phenomenology, economy and cultural studies. Similar to Georg Franck's theory of mental capitalism, the idea of an attention economy also was followed up in the American discourse. This article is supposed to explore the role of attention and its function as a medium within communication, cultural memory and science. (shrink)