A critically important ethical issue facing the AI research community is how AI research and AI products can be responsibly conceptualised and presented to the public. A good deal of fear and concern about uncontrollable AI is now being displayed in public discourse. Public understanding of AI is being shaped in a way that may ultimately impede AI research. The public discourse as well as discourse among AI researchers leads to at least two problems: a confusion about the notion of (...) ‘autonomy’ that induces people to attribute to machines something comparable to human autonomy, and a ‘sociotechnical blindness’ that hides the essential role played by humans at every stage of the design and deployment of an AI system. Here our purpose is to develop and use a language with the aim to reframe the discourse in AI and shed light on the real issues in the discipline. (shrink)

This collection is the first extended investigation of the relation between time and memory in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s thought as a whole as well as the first to explore in depth the significance of his concept of institution. It brings the French phenomenologist’s views on the self and ontology into contemporary focus. Time, Memory, Institution argues that the self is not a self-contained or self-determining identity, as such, but is gathered out of a radical openness to what is not self, and (...) that it gathers itself in a time that is not merely a given dimension, but folds back upon, gathers, and institutes itself. Access to previously unavailable texts, in particular Merleau-Ponty’s lectures on institution and expression, has presented scholars with new resources for thinking about time, memory, and history. These essays represent the best of this new direction in scholarship; they deepen our understanding of self and world in relation to time and memory; and they give occasion to reexamine Merleau-Ponty’s contribution and relevance to contemporary Continental philosophy. This volume is essential reading for scholars of phenomenology and French philosophy, as well as for the many readers across the arts, humanities, and social sciences who continue to draw insight and inspiration from Merleau-Ponty. Contributors: Elizabeth Behnke, Edward Casey, Véronique Fóti, Donald Landes, Kirsten Jacobson, Galen Johnson, Michael Kelly, Scott Marratto, Glen Mazis, Caterina Rea, John Russon, Robert Vallier, and Bernhard Waldenfels. (shrink)

Empathy can be terribly important when we talk to people who are different from ourselves. And it can be terribly important that we talk to people who are different precisely about those things that make us different. If we’re to have productive conversations across differences, then, it seems we must develop empathy with people who are deeply different. But, as Laurie Paul and others point out, it can be impossible to imagine oneself as someone who is deeply different than oneself—something (...) that plausible definitions of empathy seem to require. How then, can these terribly important conversations take place? I argue that philosophical and psychological work on intellectual humility can show us a way to empathize and have these conversations even when we can’t imagine ourselves as the other. (shrink)

This essay returns to John Brown’s so-called Raid on Harpers Ferry and his plan to build a mountain guerilla wing of the Underground Railroad through the Appalachian Mountains in order to theorize a concept of sabotage. Learning from the Haitians and other militant and enslaved rebellions, Brown seems to have interpreted American chattel slavery infrastructurally, which meant the key to abolition was the militant sabotage of the infrastructural racism and oppression.

This study steps beyond the traditional arguments of feminism and examines homebirth from a libertarian perspective. It addresses the debate over homebirth and midwifery, which includes the use of direct-entry midwives as well as the philosophical implications of individual autonomy expressed through consumer choice. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that the medical establishment gains economic and political control primarily through medical licensing, and uses the state to undermine personal freedom as it advances a government-enforced monopoly on birth. At the same time, (...) empirical studies have established a substantial record of high safety and low medical complication rates for homebirth as compared to hospital births. Ultimately, the state’s restriction on medical choices is incompatible with the nonaggression principle and voluntarism, and therefore, with libertarianism. (shrink)

What are the processes, from conception to adulthood, that enable a single cell to grow into a sentient adult? Neuroconstructivism is a pioneering 2 volume work that sets out a whole new framework for considering the complex topic of development, integrating data from cognitive studies, computational work, and neuroimaging.

Aristotle normally begins a teleological explanation of a living thing with an identification of its goods. The existence of these goods implies certain requirements or “hypothetical necessity”. For example, if a fish is to survive and reproduce, it must be able to acquire food, which requires that it move, and so it must have fins, which in turn require tissues, and these must be composed of a certain combination of the elements. Some features of living things are not necessary for (...) its survival, but only as a concomitant to some other necessity, or because it is better for the creature that way. The case of animal behavior shows that Aristotle does not indulge in anthropomorphism: apparently purposeful behavior is not caused by deliberation. In fact, far from assimilating animal to human behavior, Aristotle goes the other direction and shows how many purposeful human activities happen without deliberation. (shrink)

At the outset I would like to note how much I enjoyed working with Jacques, Sean, and Solanus on this year-long project. This session today is the culmination of our combined efforts, and with Wayne – my longstanding mentor and friend – here everything has come full circle. Indeed, I am honored today to present a paper on The Rediscovered Life. As we have already heard, Jacques’ research indicates this vita was authored sometime between 1232-1239. This date alone may be (...) sufficient to assign hermeneutical priority to The Rediscovered Life when discussing the question of Franciscan theory and praxis in the 1230s. Such a claim is confirmed, however, not simply by chronology, but by the author’s intent, liturgical... (shrink)

In How States Think, John Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato argue that the two dominant approaches to decision-making in international politics—rational choice theory and political psychology—are fundamentally flawed. Instead, they propose a model of rationality in which individuals use “credible theories” of how the world works to guide their assessments, and elites deliberate over these theories to determine foreign policy. I suggest that existing theory is too hastily rejected, and that these apparently opposing models can be reconciled by taking an evolutionary (...) perspective—the process by which humans and human brains were built and therefore a critical, yet missing, part of the puzzle. An evolutionary perspective suggests: (1) rational choice is not always the most effective or efficient solution to decision-making problems; (2) cognitive biases are not mistakes, but adaptive “strategic instincts,” which evolved because they helped us make good decisions, not bad ones; (3) these “non-rational” dispositions follow a systematic pattern, allowing predictions about how people are likely to react under given conditions; (4) a theory for the origins of preferences; (5) an explanation for why humans can sometimes seem rational and sometimes non-rational (because adaptive behavior depends on context); and finally (6) error management theory suggests that cognitive biases evolved precisely because of uncertainty, as a way of minimizing costs over time. Human decision-making and behavior does not match the definition of either “rationality” or “non-rationality,” and is much better described as “adaptive rationality,” honed over the millennia to compete strategically for survival and reproduction under conditions of uncertainty. (shrink)

This is a book about moral reasoning: how we actually reason and how we ought to reason. It defends a form of 'rule' utilitarianism whereby we must sometimes judge and act in moral questions in accordance with generally accepted rules, so long as the existence of those rules is justified by the good they bring about. The author opposes the currently more fashionable view that it is always right for the individual to do that which produces the most good. Among (...) the salient topics covered are: an account of the utilitarian function in society of generally accepted moral rules; a discussion of how we interpret existing moral rules and create new ones; and a defence of 'rule' utilitarianism against the charge that it either commits one to irrational rule worship, or collapses into a form of 'act' utilitarianism. This is a book about moral reasoning: how we actually reason and how we ought to reason. It defends a form of 'rule' utilitarianism whereby we must sometimes judge and act in moral questions in accordance with generally accepted rules, so long as the existence of those rules is justified by the good they bring about. (shrink)

(1) a. Satoshi sent Thilo the Schw¨abische W¨orterbuch. b. Satoshi sent the Schw¨abische W¨orterbuch to Thilo. Many have entertained the notion that there is a rule that relates sentences such as these. This is suggested by the fact that it is possible to learn that a newly coined verb licenses one of them and automatically know that it licenses the other. Marantz (1984) argues for the existence of such a rule in this way, noting that once one has learned of (...) the new verb shin by exposure to (2a), the grammaticality of (2b) is also learned. (2) a. Thilo shinned the ball to Satoshi. b. Thilo shinned Satoshi the ball. This is explained if there is a rule that ties the double object frame together with the NP+PP frame, making it sufficient to know that a verb licenses one if it licenses the other. Frequently, the rule involved has been taken to be syntactic in nature. See, among many others, Fillmore (1965), Oehrle (1976), Baker (1988), and Larson (1988). The leading idea under this view is that the two frames are simply different surface manifestations of the same underlying structure. Typically, this approach posits that the NP+PP frame represents that underlying structure from which the double object frame is transformationally derived. There is evidence, however, that the two frames instead have different underlying structures, and are not related by transformation. This evidence, then. (shrink)

This is a well-behaved concept in Newtonian physics. But a center of gravity is not an atom or a subatomic particle or any other physical item in the world. It has no mass; it has no color; it has no physical properties at all, except for spatio-temporal location. It is a fine example of what Hans Reichenbach would call an abstractum. It is a purely abstract object. It is, if you like , a theorist's fiction. It is not one of (...) the real things in the universe in addition to the atoms. But it is a fiction that has nicely defined, well delineated and well behaved role within physics. (shrink)

Wielding his philosophical razor, William of Ockham declared, in the early 14th century, that in slicing the world into categories, thou shalt not multiply entities needlessly. He might have been pleased when, half a millennium later, James Clerk Maxwell helped tidy things up by writing the equations that show magnetism and electricity as perpendicular shadows cast by light beams, radio waves, X-rays and other forms of what we now call electromagnetic radiation. Einstein did Maxwell one better by equating mass with (...) energy. And today the physicists promise us that once we give them their superconducting supercollider, they will take a giant step toward the day when they can unify light with gravity and the two forces at work inside the nuclei of atoms -- showing how everything, even the geometry of space and time, crystallized from the primordial flash of the big bang. (shrink)

_The first unauthorized look at the philosophy behind _Heroes_, one of TV's most popular shows_ When ordinary individuals from around the world inexplicably develop superhuman abilities, they question who they are, struggle to cope with new responsibilities, and decide whether to use their new power for good or for evil. Every episode of Tim Kring's hit TV show _Heroes_ is a philosophical quandary. _Heroes and Philosophy_ is the first book to analyze how philosophy makes this show so compelling. It lets (...) you examine questions crucial to our existence as thinking, rational beings. Is the Company evil, or good? Does Hiro really have a destiny? Do we? Is it okay to lie in order to hide your powers or save the world? _Heroes and Philosophy_ offers answers to these and other intriguing questions. Brings the insight of history's philosophical heavyweights such as Plato and Nietzche to _Heroes_ characters and settings Adds a fun and fascinating dimension to your understanding of the show Expands your thinking about _Heroes_ as the series expands from graphic and text novels to action figures and a video game Whether you're new to _Heroes_ or have been a fan since day one, this book will take your enjoyment of the show to the next level. (shrink)

The daddy longlegs clinging vertically to my bathroom wall is a marvel of airy symmetry, its tiny head perched delicately at the center of eight arching limbs. A moment later, struck by the back of my hand, it lies crumpled on the floor. I’m sorry, but I don’t like spiders in the house.

"The only laws of matter are those which our minds must fabricate, and the only laws of mind are fabricated for it by matter." -- James Clerk Maxwell.

In this paper we propose a new way of conceptualizing animals in experimentation – the animal-as-patient. Construing and treating animals as patients offers a way of successfully addressing some of the entrenched epistemological and ethical problems within a practice of animal experimentation directed to human clinical benefit. This approach is grounded in an epistemological insight and builds on work with so-called ‘pet models’. It relies upon the occurrence and characterization of analogous human and nonhuman animal diseases, where, if certain criteria (...) of homology and mechanism are met, the animal simultaneously becomes a patient and a spontaneous model of the human disease. (shrink)

Concussion is a common, serious injury in youth ice hockey, affecting up to 25% of players per season by one estimate. • Bodychecking is a major cause of injury and concussion in hockey, yet some Canadian provinces allow players as young as nine years to engage in bodychecking. • Reducing rates of concussion requires eliminating bodychecking for all except elite hockey players aged 16 years and older, as per the recommendations of the Canadian Academy of Sports and Exercise Medicine.

This paper looks at an approach to Principle C in which the disjoint reference effect triggered by definite description arises because there is a preference for using bound pronouns in those cases. Philippe Schlenker has linked this approach to the idea that the NP part of a definite description should be the most minimal in content relative to a certain communicative goal. On a popular view about what the syntax and semantics of a personal pronoun is, that should have the (...) effect of favoring a pronoun over a definite description. This paper shows how that can be made the source of “Vehicle Change,” an effect in ellipsis contexts in which definite descriptions seem to behave like pronouns. It requires, however, a way of distinguishing bound pronouns from non-bound pronouns, and the paper makes a proposal about how these two kinds of pronouns can be distinguished in the way needed. (shrink)

'You ought to make something of yourself.' That certainly has the ring of truth about it. But is there really any obligation to develop yourself? Those who let abilities lie idle are shortsighted, of course. But are they guilty of anything more than imprudence? It is easy to think that there could be a moral fault in failing to help others such as your children to develop their talents and abilities. But what about not developing your own? And if this (...) is a moral failing, is the fault solely in your having let others down in some way? Or is there fault in having let yourself down as well? (shrink)

Studies with captive fowl have revealed that they possess greater cognitive capacities than previously thought. We now know that fowl have sophisticated cognitive and communicative skills, which had hitherto been associated only with certain primates. Several theories have been advanced to explain the evolution of such complex behavior. Central to these theories is the enlargement of the brain in species with greater mental capacities. Fowl present us with a conundrum, however, because they show the behaviors anticipated by the theories but (...) do not have the expected changes in the brain. Consequently fowl present two challenges of interest to us here. One is a scientific challenge to explain their remarkable capabilities. The other is an ethical challenge regarding our treatment of animals with higher cognitive skills. (shrink)

There are increasing pressures for bioethics research to have translational purposes. Against this backdrop, we argue in defense of speculative bioethics. We explore methods of speculation and their importance. Further, we examine the relationship between speculative bioethics and translational bioethics and posit that they are not dimorphous enterprises, but often support each other. First, speculative research might be conducted as ethical analysis of contemporary issues through a new lens, in which case it is a means of conducting translational work. Second, (...) speculative bioethics research might be a first step prior to translational work on a topic, in which case speculative bioethics is a necessary requirement for later translational work. Finally, speculative bioethics research might be a separate kind of bioethics altogether, in which case it does not have the same objectives of impact and translation as other bioethics work. For each type of work, important methodological aspects determine whether it constitutes good speculative bioethics research. We conclude that speculative bioethics is multipurpose, and whether it should have a translational dimension—and to what extent—depends on the issue. Applying standards of impact and translation as the gold standard across bioethics may inappropriately limit bioethics, particularly on emerging technologies. (shrink)

Unlike many major figures in Western intellectual history, Hobbes has refused to become dated and quietly take his appointed place in the museum of historical scholarship. Whether by way of adoption or reaction, his ideas have remained vibrant forces in mankind's attempts to understand the problems and dilemmas of living peaceably with one another. As Richard Ashcraft said a few years ago: One of the standards by which the greatness of political theorists is measured, is their ability to evoke in (...) us new insights into 'the human condition'. Only a few political writers have risen Dionysus-like from the titanic assaults of their critics to become even more formidable forces in the shaping of our destiny. One of these giants is surely the irascible l and irrepressible Thomas Hobbes . Given the power of Hobbes's thought, it is not then perhaps surprising to find that his writings have generated seemingly endless scholarly controversy and an astonishing range of imcompatible interpretations. Among other things, he has been interpreted as a theist and an atheist, as a utilitarian and a deontologist, a humanist and a scientist, as a traditional natural law theorist and a legal positivist, a contractualist and an absolutist - indeed, as Professor Morris notes in his contribution to the present volume, 'as almost any kind of philosophical 'ist except Platonist or Aristotelist'. (shrink)

The commentary addresses philological, historical, literary, and philosophical issues raised by this Socratic dialogue. It is preceded by an introduction with sections on the life of Alcibiades and his reputation among his contemporaries; the depiction of the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates in the Alcibiades of Aeschines of Sphettus, Xenophon's Memorabilia, and Plato; the structure of the dialogue and its treatment of self-knowledge; the authenticity of the dialogue; and the history of the text. It is followed by appendices on stylometry, (...) the daimonion of Socrates, and the relationship of Spartan history to the speech of Socrates at 121a-124b. Introduction, commentary, and appendices support the authenticity of the dialogue. (shrink)

Week in Review cover story, September 16, 2007.

Clausal edges seem to have an effect on the scopes that arguments residing at those edges can have. In particular, they influence whether an argument may be interpreted at a lowered, or reconstructed, position within the clause. This is probably what is responsible for the difference between (1a) and (1b), which formed the focus for the debate in Stowell 1991 and Williams..

Icelandic is the only Scandinavian language in which the verb always moves past negation, and other sentence adverbials, in embedded clauses. We follow everyone else and take this as evidence that Icelandic as opposed to the other Scandinavian languages has V°-to-I°1 movement (see, e.g., Kosmeijer 1986, Holmberg & Platzack 1990:101, Rohrbacher 1994:30-69, and Vikner 1994:118-127, 1995:ch.5). If we assume that negation and sentence adverbials mark the left edge of VP (they could be adjoined to VP or to TP, for example), (...) then the following embedded questions clearly show that the verb has to move to I° in Icelandic and remain lower in Swedish. (shrink)