In J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that utility patents may be issued for newly developed, sexually reproduced plants and plant seeds. Specifically, the Court denied the petitioner's contention that the exclusive means of protecting sexually reproduced plants and plant seeds are found in the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act. The Court instead affirmed the decisions of the District Courts and the Federal Circuit and held that (...) 35 U.S.C. § 101 also allows for the patenting of living organisms.The respondent, Pioneer Hi-Bred, a large seed producer, filed suit for patent infringement on the part of the petitioner, J.E.M. AG Supply, doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., for reselling bags of respondent's patented hybrid seeds. Pioneer is a major producer and manufacturer of hybrid seeds. (shrink)

Drawing on the work of Berger, Giddens and others, this article explores ways in which curricula might be reformed to take account of the experience of the self in the modern world. A degree of consonance is noted between the trajectory of the self in the circumstances of late modernity and the liberal educational ideal of personal autonomy.

With an inside view from an expert in the field and a clear and engaging writing style, Asian Philosophies, Seventh Edition invites students and professors to think along with the great minds of the Asian traditions. Eminent scholar and teacher John M. Koller has devoted his life to understanding and explaining Asian thought and practice. He wrote this text to give students access to the rich philosophical and religious ideas of both South and East Asia. New to this seventh (...) edition: Added material on Confucianism, including focused coverage of (1) the Analects and society and (2) ren and nature; Additional information on Theravada Buddhism, Vajrayana Buddhism, and Zen Buddhism as well as new in-depth coverage of ecological attitudes in Buddhism; Expanded coverage of ecological attitudes in all of the Asian traditions; Brief excerpts from primary sources to help better explain the key concepts; Added timelines for essential texts in each tradition; Improved Glossary and Pronunciation Guide; Additional text boxes, to help students quickly understand key ideas, texts, and concepts; Updated Further Reading sections. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Philosophers often do not make as sharp a distinction as they should between rationality and normativity. Partly this is because the word ‘reason’ can be used to refer to either, and this leads to a confusion over meanings. This paper starts by clarifying the meanings of ‘normativity’ and ‘rationality’. It argues that it is a conceptual truth that rationality supervenes on the mind. Then it considers substantive arguments that purport to show there is no real distinction between rationality and (...) normativity. Many philosophers give a reductive account of rationality in terms of reasons. In particular, many claim that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. Since responding correctly to reasons is the concern of normativity, this in effect identifies rationality with normativity. This paper denies that rationality is identical to normativity, by means of what I call a ‘quick objection’. The quick objection is that rationality supervenes on the mind whereas complying with normativity does not. I consider and reject some ways of responding to the quick objection, including an argument by Kiesewetter to the effect that normativity supervenes on the mind and one by Lord to the effect that rationality does not. I also consider a different, Kantian argument to the effect that rationality does not supervene on the mind. (shrink)

For many of us, the term 'medieval philosophy' conjures up the figure of Thomas Aquinas, and is closely intertwined with religion. In this Very Short Introduction John Marenbon shows how medieval philosophy had a far broader reach than the thirteenth and fourteenth-century universities of Christian Europe, and is instead one of the most exciting and diversified periods in the history of thought.Introducing the coexisting strands of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish philosophy, Marenbon shows how these traditions all go back to (...) the Platonic schools of late antiquity and explains the complex ways in which they are interlinked. Providing an overview of some of the main thinkers, such as Boethius, Abelard, al-Fârâbî, Avicenna, Maimonides, and Gersonides, and the topics, institutions and literary forms of medieval philosophy, he discusses in detail some of the key issues in medieval thought: universals; mind, body and mortality; foreknowledge and freedom; society and the best life. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)

Originally published by Goethe's friend and personal secretary, Johann Peter Eckermann in German in 1836, this work comprises Eckermann's recollections of his conversations with the German writer and philosopher during the last nine years of his life. Eckermann published a further volume in 1848 using both his own memories and material from the journals of Swiss scientist Frédéric Soret, who was also a close acquaintance of Goethe. The work initially sold poorly in Germany, but quickly became popular internationally, and contributed (...) to the rehabilitation of Goethe's scholarly reputation both within Germany and throughout the world. This edition, translated by British playwright and translator John Oxenford was published in two volumes in London in 1850. Oxenford combined the original three volumes, putting the conversations in chronological order. The topics discussed include religion, politics, literature, poetry and natural sciences. Volume 1 covers the years 1822 to 1827. (shrink)

Originally published by Goethe's friend and personal secretary, Johann Peter Eckermann in German in 1836, this work comprises Eckermann's recollections of his conversations with the German writer and philosopher during the last nine years of his life. Eckermann published a further volume in 1848 using both his own memories and material from the journals of Swiss scientist Frédéric Soret, who was also a close acquaintance of Goethe. The work initially sold poorly in Germany, but quickly became popular internationally, and contributed (...) to the rehabilitation of Goethe's scholarly reputation both within Germany and throughout the world. This edition, translated by British playwright and translator John Oxenford was published in two volumes in London in 1850. Oxenford combined the original three volumes, putting the conversations in chronological order. The topics discussed include religion, politics, literature, poetry and natural sciences. Volume 2 runs from September 1827 to 1832. (shrink)

SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY PRICE! Daniel Dennett has been one of the central voices in the philosophy of mind for at least the past forty years. Unlike most philosophers of his generation, Dennett’s work has resonated far and wide. It has powerfully influenced the development of cognitive science, robotics, developmental psychology, and artificial intelligence. Indeed, his work has led to many new lines of inquiry. For example, he has developed a theory of consciousness which provides an approach to naturalizing mind which circumvents (...) many of the most significant philosophical arguments against the possibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness. The daunting quantity of literature available on Dennett makes it difficult to discriminate the useful from the tendentious, superficial, and otiose. Moreover, because no comparable philosopher has had a profound impact across such a wide range of disciplines and on intellectual culture in general, responses to Dennett’s philosophy are dispersed across a broad range of scientific, philosophical, and cultural domains. That is why this new title in the highly regarded Routledge series, Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, is so urgently needed. Edited by John Symons, this new Routledge Major Work is a four-volume collection of the best scholarship on Dennett; the collected materials have been carefully selected from a wide range of academic journals, edited collections, research monographs, and other sources. The tightly focused organization of this collection allows users quickly and easily to access both established and cutting-edge assessments of Dennett’s work. The set is also made for irresistible browsing. With comprehensive introductions to each volume, providing essential background information and relating the various works to each other, Daniel Dennett is destined to be an indispensable resource for research and study. (shrink)

Democracy means rule by the people, but in practice even the most robust democracies delegate most rule making to a political class The gap between the public and its representatives might seem unbridgeable in the modern world, but Legislature by Lot examines an inspiring solution: a legislature chosen through “sortition”—the random selection of lay citizens. It’s a concept that has come to the attention of democratic reformers across the globe. Proposals for such bodies are being debated in Australia, Belgium, Iceland, (...) the United Kingdom, and many other countries. Sortition promises to reduce corruption and create a truly representative legislature in one fell swoop. In Legislature by Lot, John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright make the case for pairing a sortition body with an elected chamber within a bicameral legislature. Gastil is a leading deliberative democracy scholar, and Wright a distinguished sociologist and editor of the Real Utopias series, of which this is a part. In this volume, they bring together critics and advocates of sortition who have studied ancient Athens, deliberative polling, political theory, social movements, and civic innovation. Without obscuring its limitations, the contributors offer a wide variety of ideas for how to implement sortition and examine its potential for reshaping modern politics. Legislature by Lot includes sixteen essays that respond to Gastil and Wright’s detailed proposal. Essays comparing sortition to contemporary reforms see it as a dramatic extension of deliberative “minipublics,” which gather random samples of citizens to weigh public policy dilemmas without being empowered to enact legislation. Another set of essays explores the democratic principles underlying sortition and elections and considers, for example, how a sortition body holds itself accountable to a public that did not elect it. The third set of essays considers alternative paths to democratic reform, which limit the powers of a sortition chamber or more quickly establish a pure sortition body. With contributions by Arash Abizadeh, Tom Arnold, Terrill Bouricius, Deven Burks, Lyn Carson, Dimitri Courant, Donatella della Porta, David M. Farrell, Andrea Felicetti, James S. Fishkin, Brett Hennig, Vincent Jacquet, Raphaël Kies, Tom Malleson, Jane Mansbridge, Christoph Niessen, David Owen, John Pitseys, Min Reuchamps, Yves Sintomer, Graham Smith, Jane Suiter, and Pierre-Étienne Vandamme. (shrink)

Typically, we think of both artificial and natural computing devices as following rules that allow them to alter their behaviour (output) according to their environment (input). This approach works well when the environment and goals are well defined and regular. However, 1) the search time for appropriate solutions quickly becomes intractable when the input is not fairly regular, and 2) responses may be required that are not computable, either in principle, or given the computational resources available to the system. It (...) may seem that there is no way to deal with these conditions, but if we think of systems as dynamical non-equilibrium autonomous entities, there are ways to deal with the unexpected and irregular by taking advantage of self-organising and self-preserving capacities of such systems. A generalised force acting on a system far from equilibrium will cause the system to reorganise itself in the direction of the generalised force in such a way as to minimise its effects (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977), but there can be unpredictable effects in different generalised directions in the system’s phase space. In order to preserve system integrity, these effects must be damped or used for further self-reorganisation, possibly starting a cascade effect that leaves the system in a substantially different state in which it can handle further instances of this sort of information. This model is similar to and extends the theoretical model of accommodation and assimilation of Piaget, derived from his observations of the development of intelligence in children. (shrink)

Originally published by Goethe's friend and personal secretary, Johann Peter Eckermann, in German in 1836, this work comprises Eckermann's recollections of his conversations with the German writer and philosopher during the last nine years of his life. Eckermann published a further volume in 1848 using both his own memories and material from the journals of Swiss scientist Frédéric Soret, who was also a close acquaintance of Goethe. The work initially sold poorly in Germany, but quickly became popular internationally, and contributed (...) to the rehabilitation of Goethe's scholarly reputation both within Germany and throughout the world. This edition, translated by British playwright and translator John Oxenford was published in two volumes in London in 1850. Oxenford combined the original three volumes, putting the conversations in chronological order. The topics discussed include religion, politics, literature, poetry and natural sciences. (shrink)

Originally published by Goethe's friend and personal secretary, Johann Peter Eckermann in German in 1836, this work comprises Eckermann's recollections of his conversations with the German writer and philosopher during the last nine years of his life. Eckermann published a further volume in 1848 using both his own memories and material from the journals of Swiss scientist Frédéric Soret, who was also a close acquaintance of Goethe. The work initially sold poorly in Germany, but quickly became popular internationally, and contributed (...) to the rehabilitation of Goethe's scholarly reputation both within Germany and throughout the world. This edition, translated by British playwright and translator John Oxenford was published in two volumes in London in 1850. Oxenford combined the original three volumes, putting the conversations in chronological order. The topics discussed include religion, politics, literature, poetry and natural sciences. Volume 1 covers the years 1822 to 1827. (shrink)

Language is a human universal reflecting our deeply social nature. Among its essential functions, language enables us to quickly and efficiently share information. We tell each other that many things are true—that is, we routinely make assertions. Information shared this way plays a critical role in the decisions and plans we make. In Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion, a distinguished philosopher and cognitive scientist investigates the rules or norms that structure our social practice of assertion. Combining evidence from philosophy, (...) psychology, and biology, John Turri shows that knowledge is the central norm of assertion and explains why knowledge plays this role. -/- Concise, comprehensive, non-technical, and thoroughly accessible, this volume quickly brings readers to the cutting edge of a major research program at the intersection of philosophy and science. It presupposes no philosophical or scientific training. It will be of interest to philosophers and scientists, is suitable for use in graduate and undergraduate courses, and will appeal to general readers interested in human nature, social cognition, and communication. (shrink)

The original edition of What Computers Can't Do comprised three roughly equal parts: (i) a harsh critical survey of the history and state of the art in AI, circa 1970; (ii) a brilliant philosophical expose of four hidden assumptions shoring up AI's rmsplaced optimism; and (iii) a much more tentative exploration of ways to think, about intelligence without those assumptions. Part I, because it was the most combative (and also the easiest to understand), got most of the attention. Also, since (...) that discussion was the most timely — hence the most quickly obsolete — it is what the excellent substantive introductions to the later editions.. (shrink)

Albert Einstein read philosophy. It was not an affectation of a celebrity-physicist trying to show his adoring public that he was no mere technician, but a cultured thinker. It was an interest in evidence from the start. In 1902, Einstein was a poorly paid patent examiner in Bern seeking to make a few extra Francs by offering tutorials in physics. Maurice Solovine answered the advertisement. The tutorials quickly vanished when they discovered their common fascinations in reading and talking. They were (...) soon joined in their raucous meetings by Conrad Habicht, completing what they dubbed their “Olympia Academy.” Their explorations where wide-ranging, devouring texts and sausages with gusto. They read the philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists of the day, including Pearson, Mach, Hill, Hume, Spinoza, Avenarius, Cifford and Poincaré. (shrink)

It’s morning. You sit down at your desk, cup of coffee in hand, and prepare to begin your day. First, you turn on your computer. Once it is running, you check your e-mail. Having decided it is all spam, you trash it. You close the window on your e-mail program, but leave the program running so that it will periodically check the mail server to see whether you have new mail. If it finds new mail it will alert you by (...) playing a musical tone. Next you start your word processor. You have in mind to write a paper in moral philosophy about whether people who send spam deserve capital punishment. So you open a new window and type several paragraphs of text into it. You like what you wrote, so you save it, creating a file. Later, you have more thoughts about spam and capital punishment, so you open the file again and make some changes. Then it is time to go to class. You turn off your word processor, but leave your computer running so that your email program can collect your e-mail. This mundane sequence of events can seem philosophically puzzling when we think about it carefully. While in your word processor, you opened several windows, entered text into them, and created files. What sorts of things are these files, windows, and text? It might seem that windows are easy to understand. You can, after all, see windows. That is the whole point of them. You see a window by seeing a pattern on the surface of your monitor. Isn’t the window identical with that physical pattern? But that is too quick. First, you can turn your monitor off. The window is still open. You can type text into it, and if you turn the monitor back on you can verify that you made that change. Second, you can drag another window in front of the original window. The original window disappears from view, but it still exists. Things may be happening in it that you cannot see. For example, if it is an e-mail window, new messages may be listed in it as they are 1 downloaded.. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I approach the political and philosophical similarities and differences between late eighteenth-century thinkers John Thelwall and William Godwin from the point of view of their respective choices for the genre of political communication. I approach their thought and its expression by weaving an interpretation of what they were saying with a reflection on how and to whom they were speaking. This, I contend, helps us clarify further the thought of each thinker and track the changes in (...) their conception of equality in the framework of political communication. As the 1790s unfolded, both thinkers, I argue, tried to diversify their audience, be generally more inclusive, and re-think the hierarchies of relationship between authors/speakers and their audience in their political communication. Nevertheless, they did so asymmetrically and in different ways: Thelwall quickly started tapping into popular culture, especially oral culture, while Godwin chose the modes of fiction and the conversational essay. By making these choices, both authors enacted a different understanding and practice of political education, and political equality. (shrink)

THE heterogeneity of the good--its division into the moral good, as virtue, and the natural good, as happiness--is central to Kant's philosophy. In order to clarify and sustain this division, Kant was compelled to specify the valuational characteristics of each kind of good and their relation to one another. But in trying to analyze the good in its heterogeneity Kant faced a terminological difficulty. He could no longer speak simply of "the good" without speaking ambiguously. To avoid this ambiguity Kant (...) decided to refer to the moral good by the term "das Gute," and to the natural good by the term "das Wohl," to moral evil by the term "das Böse," and to natural evil by the term "das Übel." This attempt at linguistic reform was not successful, however, for at least two reasons. First, Kant did not carry his reform of the language far enough. And second, Kant seriously underestimated and quickly fell victim to the power of common usage. The force of linguistic habit, both personal and social, and the wisdom inherent in common usage opposed the adoption of his terminology. (shrink)

Most of the contemporary literature regarding teleology or design in nature assumes that we human beings make some sort of tacit inference when we form "design beliefs" person is causally relevant to the occurrence of some event). It is often held that this inference occurs so quickly that we are unaware of the inferential process. Attempts to reconstruct this inference have met with varying degrees of success, but none of them seem to match the strength with which ordinary design beliefs (...) are held. This dissertation therefore offers a challenge to this "inferential model" of design belief formation by arguing that in many ordinary cases we do not infer to design beliefs at all. Rather, human design beliefs often form spontaneously and properly whenever certain conditions are met, and receive some measure of positive epistemic status just in virtue of their proper and spontaneous formation. This alternative model is called a "Reidian" model because it is analogous to Thomas Reid's account of sense perception. The Reidian model offers the dialectical advantage of shifting the burden of proof from the one arguing for design to the one who claims to have a suitable "defeater" belief. It also better matches our introspective judgments about design beliefs and resolves some puzzling problems that have been noted in recent literature on design inferences. ;The Reidian model can also generate some reasonably persuasive design arguments from the deliverances of the natural sciences , but it does not sanction the inclusion of design hypotheses within the content of the natural sciences. It is also argued that none of the "defeater" propositions one might consider carries enough epistemic "weight" to defeat design beliefs that form according to the model. The resulting Reidian design arguments also have the advantage that they do not require the rejection of the Darwinian paradigm. However, it is also noted that the Reidian model presents several occasions for dialectical impasse between disputants about design in nature. (shrink)

Experimental philosophy is a recent development whose broader aims and goals are still being debated. Some prominent experimental philosophers have articulated an attitude toward perennial philosophy that is reminiscent of an early explicitly defended goal of neurophilosophy, a field that predated experimental philosophy by at least one decade. But relative to that early goal, neurophilosophy quickly “fell” within broader philosophy, and came to assume its current status, a technical specialty within the philosophy of science (now more commonly referred to as (...) “the philosophy of neuroscience”). In this paper I document the revolutionary goal of early neurophilosophy, provide a novel explanation of its “fall,” and suggest that analogous goals of some experimental philosophers set that field up for a similar “fall.” I document recent published evidence that experimental philosophy is trending in this direction. (shrink)

Personal AI assistants are now nearly ubiquitous. Every leading smartphone operating system comes with a personal AI assistant that promises to help you with basic cognitive tasks: searching, planning, messaging, scheduling and so on. Usage of such devices is effectively a form of algorithmic outsourcing: getting a smart algorithm to do something on your behalf. Many have expressed concerns about this algorithmic outsourcing. They claim that it is dehumanising, leads to cognitive degeneration, and robs us of our freedom and autonomy. (...) Some people have a more subtle view, arguing that it is problematic in those cases where its use may degrade important interpersonal virtues. In this article, I assess these objections to the use of AI assistants. I will argue that the ethics of their use is complex. There are no quick fixes or knockdown objections to the practice, but there are some legitimate concerns. By carefully analysing and evaluating the objections that have been lodged to date, we can begin to articulate an ethics of personal AI use that navigates those concerns. In the process, we can locate some paradoxes in our thinking about outsourcing and technological dependence, and we can think more clearly about what it means to live a good life in the age of smart machines. (shrink)

continent. 1.4 (2011): 253—278. A Sense of French Politics Politics itself is not the exercise of power or struggle for power. Politics is first of all the configuration of a space as political, the framing of a specific sphere of experience, the setting of objects posed as "common" and of subjects to whom the capacity is recognized to designate these objects and discuss about them.(1) On April 14, 2011, France implemented its controversial ban of the niqab and burqa , commonly (...) referred to as the Islamic veil, in public places. On the coattails of the 2004 prohibition of religious artifacts, including the less concealing hijab or Islamic headscarves, in schools, the veil ban sparked equal outrage across both political and theological spectra, and many on both sides of the debate were quick to inquire about enforcement. As Steven Erlanger reports, “The police do not have the authority under the law to remove full veils, only to fine or require citizenship lessons for those who violate the new law.”(2) While the legal and social implications of this interdiction are ripe for study, the reprisals for breaking the law, notably compulsory citizenship classes, illuminate the strategic governmentality underlying the French government's targeting of the Muslim community, particularly those elements it considers affiliated with fundamentalist factions and/or terrorist organizations, if only through fashion—an integral component of French citizenship. Indeed, in allowing the (fashion) police to mandate instructional courses in citizenship for offenders, France implies that any Muslim choosing to wear the niqab or burqa , perhaps even for those who are already citizens, must not be aware of the subtle nuances of dress indicative of the French citizenry within public space. Furthermore, the degree of instruction requisite to citizenship, which clearly can and must be updated as the state sees fit, cements the imagined relation between citizens and states within the discourses on the veil ban. As Sharma contends, “Concepts of citizenship are the ideological glue that bonds the nation to the state. Citizenship provides the legal framework through which the state performs its role as ruler for the nation.”(3) Speaking for/as the state, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared in a 2009 presentation before members of the government and other citizens that the burqa “is not welcome on the territory of France.”(4) Although there is nothing unique, especially recently, about a nation-state taking extreme measures to guard itself against what it deems to be threats to its sovereignty, the way in which the ongoing discourses on hijab have (d)evolved, which coincide with recent pronouncements by governmental leaders in Germany, Britain, and France that policies of multiculturalism have “failed,”(5) points toward nationalist reterritorializations, which is also to say physical and ideological re-appropriations, of public space within democratic milieux, which remain predicated upon the mediation of spaces. As Panagia deduces from Rancière, “Democracy […] is not an institutional form of government […], but an appearance whose visibilities and audibilites arise out of the dissonant blur of the everyday.”(6) Ultimately, the veil ban represents a calculated move to regulate the every day, which is to say the micropolitics of, that which is visible and invisible within French society, which makes it nothing short of a struggle to manage (the sensation of) bodies. Re-situating the political within the context of sense, Rancière argues that the fundamental essence of politics lies within the distinction between consensus and dissensus , and whereas most consider politics proper as fundamentally concerned with the fluid operations of the state— consensus , Rancière actually locates the political within events that disrupt the normative sensory order of things— dissensus . He explains, “Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time.”(7) This reformulation of politics centers on agency and, albeit perhaps unintended, representationality and offers a useful formulation for spatializing the discourses surrounding the Islamic veil, which are mired within seemingly senseless policies and practices of objectification. Instituting a normative “regime of visibility,” the French veil ban encapsulates the political economy of agency, now both mediated and representational, under the rule of nationalist governmentalities in increasingly transnational contexts.(8) Adjudicating presence within public space signals a concern with the sensory aspects of agency itself—what Rancière terms the “distribution of the sensible,” which is “a matrix that defines a set of relations between sense and sense: that is, between a form of sensory experience and an interpretation which makes sense of it.”(9) To be concerned with sense is to focus upon the body, and this somatic repositioning of the (fashionable) citizen within the territory of the state augurs the resurgence of nationalist bio-politics within Europe, since, as Hage explicates, “Nationalism, before being an explicit practice or a mode of classification, is a state of the body. It is a way of imagining one's position within the nation and what one can aspire to as a national.”(10) The French government's attempt to make (bodily) sense of public space for its citizens by and through policies aimed against a burqa-clad Muslim minority, which might only apply to “less then 400 to fewer than 2,000” women(11), reveals the necessary, yet mercurial, transmutation of public space into national space through bio-political strategies of sense-making, which, as Hage observes, denotes that “nationalists perceive themselves as spatial managers.”(12) At the center of this concern over public space is the equally contentious dimension of governing female Islamic identity, which has become one of the main critiques levied against Islam from outsiders who view the veil in its various forms as a clear sign of the religion's actual and symbolic violence against women, even if such critiques remain ensconced within nationalist discourses. As Halim and Meyers argue, “Although Western news media may focus their coverage of Muslim women on the debate over whether and the extent to which the veil may by oppressive to the women who wear it, they have exhibited little interest in the physical oppression of violence against women in Islamic countries.”(13) While it falls outside of the scope of this analysis to arbitrate all of the dimensions of this debate, understanding some of the issues related to female identity and hijab within public space are crucial to this study. As these topics are extraordinarily complex, even and perhaps especially within the Muslim community, it is necessary to provide some context concerning the value, purpose, and meaning of the Islamic veil, which has a rich and arduous history. The Art of the Veil At present, there are only two countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, that require women to wear hijab , which is a decidedly problematic term and concept whose locus is itself caught within a struggle of sensation. Noting the strategic reterritorialization of the term, Berger explains: The choice of the name, hijab , now widely adopted to designate the “Islamic veil,” it itself interesting, although the semantic shift it operates is not directly commented upon by its users. Although the design (both the cut and the symbolic function) of the hijab and the Iranian chador are indeed the same, as opposed, for instance, to the traditional Algerian haik , the word hijab has come to replace the term chador popularized by the Iranian revolution, as a properly Arabic (hence Koranic) designation. This discursive shift points to the successful reclaiming of the national revolution in Iran by a transnational pan-Islamic movement, whose language of reference can only be Koranic Arabic.(14) While the hijab is certainly a point of contention within various countries dealing with immigrant Islamic populations (of which France has the largest in Europe as part of its colonial legacy in Algeria), it is clear that the veil is a historically contextualized artifact of Muslim identity with a variety of manifestations, even as forces outside of and within Islam seek to codify its actual and symbolic value. Ultimately, the varieties of hijab , including the full-faced burqa and niqab , are complex assemblages of meaning that speak to the multitudinous flows of Islamic identities over time and space. As Gökariksel and McLarney observe, “Wearing a certain style of veil may simultaneously be a disciplinary practice crucial to the cultivation of piety (Mahmood 2005; Gokariksel 2009) and a gendered performance of social distinction in terms of class, taste, and urbanity (White 1999; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Gokariksel and Secor 2009) or of ethnicity and race (Dwyer 1999).”(15) The ideological marketplace from which the varieties of hijab ebb and flow serves both as a reflection of the ever-present materiality and dynamic functionality of spiritual economies, which are derivative of the equally ubiquitous flows of transnational capital driving agency and representationality within our historical moment. Keeping these dual, yet deeply interconnected, capital ecologies as the site of exploration for how the veil is represented within public space, one might begin to sense what lurks behind such veiled agendas. Examining the symbolic and representational nature of the Islamic “veil” in its various forms, this project situates the decidedly political contestations of public space at stake in the French ban alongside recent condemnations of multiculturalism as calculated efforts to re-distribute the sensible so as to valorize national identity within increasingly transnational and globalized socio-economic spaces, which collapse exchange values between distinct, yet interwoven, economies of (cultural/material/spiritual) capital. As the discourses on the veil rely upon representational imag(in)ings, it seems fitting to explore the political economy and art of the veil through the phenomenon of street art, which, much like hijab , is a complex assemblage of meaning of sensation mired in representationality and capital exchange. As street artists have taken up hijab in various forms, the movement offers a lens with which to situate critical responses to the veil debate across both spiritual and material economies. Situating this street art both aesthetically and historically, Lewisohn explains, “'Street art' is a sub-genre of graffiti writing and owes much to its predecessor. Though there is a good deal of crossover between the genres, they are distinct and separate in their own right.”(16) Evolving out of the graffiti explosion of the late 1970's and 1980's, street art broke the unspoken rules of the artistic underground by challenging and re-examining one's sensory experience of art in public space by experimenting with both content and form in ways that harken back to the Situationist International, which as a collective challenged one's experience of urban space through various media and experiential phenomena. Again, Lewisohn observes, “It's important to note street art's break with the tradition of the tag, and its focus on visual symbols that embrace a much wider range of media than graffiti writers would use.”(17) From stencils to prints and murals to one-liners, street artists developed a reputation for critical social and political commentary, and while it is certainly the case that not all street art is intentionally political, in challenging the normative “regime of visibility,” as Rancière puts it, of public space, street artists—even if unconsciously—call into question the common sensory experience of the politics underlying the formation of (nationalist) space.(18) Indeed, Rancière refers to the partisan sensory managers as “police,” who ultimately forge “the rules governing the circulation of appearances, of their visibility and audibility, and the proper distribution of bodies therein.”(19) As such, one can sense that street art's relationship with the police is tenous for a variety of reasons. Writing about his own experience as a street artist, Shepard Fairey observes, “With street art, there's no committee deciding whether I can put my work up on the street, there's no censorship, and I have total freedom of expression, and that concept of freedom is expressed just by using the street as a medium.”(20) As Fairey and other street artists demonstrate, the medium, to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, is the most glaring aspect of street art's message, and even as it now finds itself in galleries and usurped by private collectors, the ethos of the movement remains relavent to politics as it is, first and foremost, concerned with the configuration and experience of space. Just as examining the punishments for breaking the veil ban can map the terrain of French politics, a representational genealogy of street artist's deployment of hijab and female Muslim identity can assist in mining the depths of public space as a site of bio-political control and contestation in light of recent events in France and the rising tide of anti-multiculturalist rhetoric across Europe, even though the Islamic presence there is radically heterogenous. Using the work of Shepard Fairey, Princess Hijab, br1, and Banksy, this paper sets out to answer a number of key questions concerning the deployment of hijab, and female Islamic identity in particular, within street art as a movement now integral to and critical of the economies of exchange underlying global capitalism, which as a force of influence cannot be underestimated as a driver in the resurgence of nationalist biopolitical governmentalities. Although there exists a litany of artists to choose from, the aforementioned quartet of designers integrate hijab into their work in a seminal and critical fashion, and all have been working with the veil in some way prior to the French ban, which grants some additional context to their usage of it as a symbol in regards to the breakdown of multiculturalism across Europe, even if unconsciously. Although each artist depicts various amalgamations of hijab in their respective corpus, they share common tropes that raise significant questions concerning the veil debate, namely: what are the conditions of possibility for hijab to become a marker of Islamic identity within public space? How can we make sense of the representational topologies within street art's utilization of the hijab and female Islamic identity in light of the French ban? How might these aesthetic imag(in)ings simultaneously inhabit and combat normative discourses concerning hijab , multiculturalism, female Islamic identity, and public space? With these considerations as a backdrop, it is first necessary to outline more fully the hijab as a representative marker of female Islamic identity. The (Veiled) Writing on the Wall

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The idea that humans should abandon their individuality and use technology to bind themselves together into hivemind societies seems both farfetched and frightening – something that is redolent of the worst dystopias from science fiction. In this article, we argue that these common reactions to the ideal of a hivemind society are mistaken. The idea that humans could form hiveminds is sufficiently plausible for its axiological consequences to be taken seriously. Furthermore, far from being a dystopian nightmare, the hivemind society (...) could be desirable and could enable a form of sentient flourishing. Consequently, we should not be so quick to deny it. We provide two arguments in support of this claim – the axiological openness argument and the desirability argument – and then defend it against three major objections. (shrink)

Demonstratives seem to have posed a severe difficulty for Frege’s philosophy of language, to which his doctrine of incommunicable senses was a reaction. In “The Thought,” Frege briefly discusses sentences containing such demonstratives as “today,” “here,” and “yesterday,” and then turns to certain questions that he says are raised by the occurrence of “I” in sentences (T, 24-26). He is led to say that, when one thinks about oneself, one grasps thoughts that others cannot grasp, that cannot be communicated. However, (...) nothing could be more out of the spirit of Frege’s account of sense and thought than an incommunicable, private thought. In the first part of the paper, I explain the problem demonstratives pose for Frege, and explore three ways he might have dealt with it. I argue that none of these ways provides Frege with a solution to his problem consistent with his philosophy of language. The first two are plausible as solutions, but contradict his identification of the sense expressed by a sentence with a thought. The third preserves the identification, but is implausible. In the second part, I suggest that Frege was led to his doctrine of incommunicable senses as a result of some appreciation of the difficulties his account of demonstratives faces, for these come quickly to the surface when we think about “I.” I argue that incommunicable senses won’t help. I end by trying to identify the central problem with Frege’s approach, and sketching an alternative. (shrink)

The three major essays collected in this volume were written in the latter half of Mill's life (1806-1873) and were quickly accepted into the canon of European political and social thought. Today, when liberty and representative government collide with other principles and when women still experience prejudice, Mill's essays reveal his sense of history, intelligence, and ardent concern for human liberty, and continue to shed light on politics and contemporary society.

This commentary challenges the conclusions reached by Franklin Miller and Robert Truog in their criticism of the President's Council's White Paper, "Controversies in the Determination of Death." I agree with much of Miller and Truog's criticism of the rationale offered by the President's Council for accepting neurological criteria for determining death but argue that they too quickly dismiss the alternative rationale of determining death by neurological criteria-i.e., the destruction of the psychophysical integrity of the human being that occurs when the (...) potential for consciousness and every other mental function is lost due to catastrophic injury to the brain. By focusing on the death of bodies instead of human beings, their view absurdly implies that decapitation would not necessarily result in one's death. Since total brain failure is a form of physiological decapitation, the neurological criterion coheres perfectly well with the ordinary understanding of decapitation as death. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe historical process underlying Darwin’s Origin of Species did not play a significant role in the early editions of the book, in spite of the particular inductivist scientific methodology it espoused. Darwin’s masterpiece did not adequately provide his sources or the historical perspective many contemporary critics expected. Later editions yielded the ‘Historical Sketch’ lacking in the earlier editions, but only under critical pressure. Notwithstanding the sources he provided, Darwin presented the Origin as an ‘abstract’ in order to avoid giving sources; (...) a compromise he acknowledged and undertook to set right in later editions, yet failed to provide throughout the six editions under his supervision. Darwin’s reluctance to publish the historical context of his theory and his sources, particularly sources which were also ‘precursors’, may be attributed as much to the matter of intellectual ownership as science, or even good literary practice. Of special concern to Darwin were issues of priority or originality over ‘descent with modification’ and especially over Natural Selection. Many later historians have argued that Darwin was unaware of the work of his precursors on Natural Selection. Darwin’s theory was an example of independent discovery, albeit along with such obscure precursors as Matthew or Wells, who were unknown to Darwin until after the publication of the Origin. Both Matthew and Wells had a medical education, like James Hutton or Erasmus Darwin earlier in the eighteenth century, or even Charles Darwin. Evolutionary theory, at least in Britain was a product largely of the medical evolutionists rather than the natural historians which ‘history’ has chosen to select for the focus of attention; and among the medical evolutionists the figure of John Hunter stands out as theorist, experimentalist and teacher: the medical evolutionists were predominantly the product of Hunter’s legacy or of the medical profession and particularly the Scottish Universities. Much recent Darwin scholarship has focused on the private Notebooks, to establish Darwin’s discovery of Natural Selection around 1837–1838 and demonstrate Darwin’s ignorance of his precursors; requiring an explicit acknowledgement by Darwin as the legitimate substantiation of any claim to prior influence. The precursors have been categorized as uniformly obscure or irrelevant to the science of evolution which may be defined exclusively as ‘Darwinian’. The inclination to acknowledge influences, however was not something Darwin was gratuitously given to doing, especially on matters of priority. The Notebooks are not Darwin’s private thoughts; from an early stage he considered them incipient public documents and later sought to protect them as proof of his originality. William C. Wells was not an obscure thinker, but a celebrated scientist whom Herschel, Darwin’s guide to scientific methodology, had recommended as providing a model of scientific method. Darwin discovered Wells through Herschel, and quickly acquired a copy of Wells’ recommended work, no later than 1831, and held it thereafter in his library at Down House. This book, the 1818 edition of Wells’ Two Essays contains a third essay, Wells’ account of Natural Selection. Later, in the Descent of Man Darwin acknowledged his separate discovery of the correlation of colour and disease immunity in man, also earlier recounted by Wells. (shrink)

While quick to question the claims to knowledge that others make, philosophers have not so readily submitted their own affirmations to the same scrutiny. In fact, it seems to be the common conviction of philosophers that the assertions they make are cognitive, are true or false, and that philosophical disagreement is genuine disagreement. In this stimulating essay Professor Lange confronts this assumption, presents his own view of philosophy as proposal, and then seeks a solution to the paradox that his (...) view poses for philosophy. Originally published in 1970. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

This article examines cognitive process models of human sentence comprehension based on the idea of informed search. These models are rational in the sense that they strive to find a good syntactic analysis quickly. Informed search derives a new account of garden pathing that handles traditional counterexamples. It supports a symbolic explanation for local coherence as well as an algorithmic account of entropy reduction. The models are expressed in a broad framework for theories of human sentence comprehension.

Scholars such as Simon (2007; 2004) and Loland (2002) as well as the authors of the World Anti-Doping Code (2001) argue that using performance-enhancing substances is unhealthy and unfairly coercive for other athletes. Critics of the anti-doping position such as Hoberman (1995), Miah et al. (2005) and Tamburrini (2007) are quick to argue that such prohibitions, even though well-intended, constitute an unjustifiable form of paternalism. However, advocates for both of these positions assume that preserving good health and, conversely, avoiding (...) health-related harms, lie at the centre of the debate. Given the apparent stalemate in the debate over the validity of health concerns on performance-enhancing drugs, in this essay, I investigate ethical issues of ‘harm-free’ pharmaceutical performance enhancement. Beginning with the hypothesis that a harm-free performance-enhancing drug may be produced in the future, I ask if there would still be compelling reasons for prohibiting such a drug. I address this question by providing two arguments against allowing athletes to use pharmaceutical performance-enhancing drugs – the damage to the testing and contesting of sport and the loss of internal goods that are intrinsically satisfying. These two arguments taken together, I argue, are sufficient to sustain the prohibition of pharmaceutical performance-enhancing drugs without citing their harmful side effects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Rembrandt BookProfessor Emeritus John Adkins RichardsonThe Rembrandt Book by Gary Schwartz. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2006, 384 pp. $40.95, cloth.This truly is the Rembrandt book. Substantial in every way, it is physically imposing, magnificently printed on heavy, glossy stock and profusely illustrated with splendid color reproductions of all the master’s major works and many sketches and preparatory drawings, as well as etchings and dry-point engravings. (...) Gary Schwartz, who studied art history at New York University and Johns Hopkins University, is now living in the Netherlands. The merits of his book are enormous. Not only is it filled with magnificent reproductions, there are tables and graphs detailing such things as the number of Rembrandt paintings in catalogues from 1836 to 1992; analyses of the artist’s borrowings and adaptations in five-year periods; key dates in the life of the man; Rembrandt’s relation to the forms of sale for paintings in the Dutch seventeenth century; and so on. There is even a computer rendering of the famous depiction of Captain Banning Cocq’s Company of Guards at the Gates of Amsterdam (popularly called The Night Watch), specifying the weapons shown and identifying all present, either by name and title or by a description, such as “girl in gold and blue,” “pikeman,” “musketeer,” etc.A sampling of the chapter headings and subcategories suggests just how comprehensive is Schwartz’s treatment: 1. Introduction, 2. A Dutch Artist’s Life, 3. Family, Loved Ones, Households, 4. Craft, 5. Earning and Spending, 6. Patrons, 7. Landscape, 8. Humankind, 9. Man and God. Just the specifics of the last chapter are remarkably capacious: Holy Family; Christ’s Ministry; Passion, Death and Afterlife; Divine Intervention; Holy People; Moral Examples from the Old Testament; The Man of God, Simeon; Afterlife; and Rembrandt as a Christian Rhetorician of the Brush. It’s hard to imagine a better reference for the lay reader than The Rembrandt Book.The book is also full of interesting contrasts of opinion as well as some surprising remarks. As for one of the latter, Schwartz writes that Rembrandt’s “portraits are said to be more ‘psychological’ than those of his contemporaries. What this might mean I frankly do not understand” (213). He goes on to note that the field of psychology did not exist in Rembrandt’s time. However, from long before its invention people spoke of Rembrandt’s ability to reveal the soul of the sitter. Indeed, the reason I was not surprised, although somewhat distressed, when the Rembrandt Research Project—a group of connoisseurs set up in 1969 with the explicit charge of authenticating all works ascribed to the master—announced in 1985 that The Man with a Golden Helmet in Berlin was not by the master at all, was that I had all along been troubled by this face that lacked the quality of animation in repose so [End Page 115] characteristic of Rembrandt portraits. Schwartz thinks the artist would have to have relied upon the ancient theory of the humors to do “characterological descriptions” of his sitters, and that in portraiture, “such characterizations would quickly resemble caricatures.” And, indeed, they do, but in profoundly subtle ways, much as someone like the popular illustrator Norman Rockwell employed tiny caricature-like distortions to project a kind of homely Americanism. I’m not comparing Rockwell to Rembrandt but choosing a realistic illustrator in whose work the trick is more apparent. Caricature can be as broad as it is in Jacques Callot, William Hogarth, or Honoré Daumier and yet be a feature of true art. Or so it seems to me, admittedly, a sometimes cartoonist as well as painter and engraver.Schwartz’s completeness of coverage leads him to include, in addition to superb drawings and prints, some that are so careless and hasty as to make one doubt their authenticity. One of the works of marginal quality is an etching of Six’s Bridge, which is said to have been created outdoors, hastily, on the site. This is a hotly debated issue. Rembrandt is known to have carried “varnished”—that is, grounded—copper etching plates, so there wouldn’t seem much reason to... (shrink)

How should ethics help decide the morality of enhancing morality? The idea of morally enhancing the human brain quickly emerged when the promise of cognitive enhancement in general began to seem realizable. However, on reflection, achieving moral enhancement must be limited by the practical challenges to any sort of cognitive modification, along with obstacles particular to morality’s bases in social cognition. The objectivity offered by the brain sciences cannot ensure the technological achievement of moral bioenhancement for humanity-wide application. Additionally, any (...) limited moral enhancement will not easily fulfil ethical expectations. Three hypothetical scenarios involving putative moral enhancement help illustrate why. Philosophical concerns about the “Does-Must Dichotomy” and the “Factor-Cause Plurality,” as I label them, forbid easy leaps from views about morality on to conclusions about ways to enhance morality, and then further on to ethically justifying those enhancements. A modest and realistic approach to moral enhancement emerges from exploring these issues. (shrink)

By providing a phenomenological presentation of Aquinas’s duplex operatio intellectus, the author argues that a reader is better equipped to understand where and when Aquinas arrives at the real distinction between essence and existence in the much disputed De Ente et Essentia, chapter four. “Phenomenological presentation” means an honest description of one’s own mental life as it conducts the duplex operatio. From phenomenological observations in the Thomistic texts, the author argues that a penetrative and rebounding movement of attention upon some (...) initially presented multiplicity characterizes the duplex operatio. When this dynamic is conducted upon the multiplicity of a real thing juxtaposed to itself cognitionally existing in sensation, the rebound of the secunda operatio presents the real existence in a sui generis relation of priority to the individual thing understood as existence neutral. Unfortunately, the rebound of attention is too quick to discern accurately the nature of the borderline between the attribute of existence and its subject, the individual thing. The attribute of existence may actuate the thing by shading into it or by remaining distinct from it. Fortunately, the phenomenological situation is sufficient to leave phenomenology and to initiate the third intellectual operation of reasoning. Reasoning concludes to a first cause of phenomenologically observable attributive existence. In this first cause existence is the thing itself. In order for this first cause to have its proper effect corresponding to what it is, the author argues that the second of the above two alternatives for phenomenologically observable attributive existence must be the true one. After linking these reflections to stages of De Ente, chapter 4, the author critically relates them to other interpretations of the text. These interpretations include those of Cahalan, McDonald, Wippel, Dewan, Patt, Kenny, and Owens. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:What Did the Romans Know? An Inquiry into Science and Worldmaking by Daryn LehouxJohn M. OksanishDaryn Lehoux. What Did the Romans Know? An Inquiry into Science and Worldmaking. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2012. xii + 275 pp. 10 black-and-white figs., 2 tables. Cloth, $45.“Have we ever been modern?” Thus author Daryn Lehoux expresses one of the fundamental questions underlying the book under review, which seeks to (...) present a historicizing account of the various lenses through which elite Romans in the late Republic and early Empire understood and, importantly, expressed their understanding of our world. I say “our” world because, as Lehoux makes clear from the beginning of this fascinating, if sometimes challenging, monograph, continuity with our scientific forebears is as fundamental a key to accessing their ambitions, limits, and scope, as are our divergences from them. In this sense, What Did the Romans Know? provides a kind of study in the reception of Roman sciences, whose plurality, interdependence, and context-specific viability are emphasized throughout. For although (1) physical realities have per se not [End Page 343] changed since antiquity, and (2) how we regard and describe them has, Lehoux insinuates that our own laws of nature remain limited by specific ontological and rhetorical constraints—“blind spots”—that render our modern science in some ways comparable with the sciences that operated in antiquity. By first emphasizing various contexts (epistemological, ontological, etc.) and showing readers how the ancient sciences operated within them, Lehoux effectively shows us that ancient sciences did indeed work, even astrology. However, Lehoux ultimately reveals himself as a scientific realist: the contextual viability of the ancient sciences notwithstanding, he does not believe in a Lucretian “swerve” but in atoms, electrons, and other phenomena that he has never seen directly. That he waits until the ninth chapter (200) for this admission to materialize fully is surely purposeful, but it can sometimes make for disorienting reading. Equally disorienting is the book’s tendency to present ancient scientific terms with little or no explanation (e.g., equant, 68; synodic anomaly, 69), while terms whose specific valences will be well-known to many readers of this journal (e.g., religio, 26; pietas, 27) are glossed, sometimes simplistically. Despite this and a few other caveats, however, Lehoux has broadly succeeded at a very difficult task, i.e., presenting ancient science in a manner that is accessible and interesting to Classicists of various stripes, while simultaneously delivering classical texts to historians of science through an essentially new historicist lens.The first three chapters provide examples from and discussions of selected texts that show the Romans making links between nature and law in science, religion (especially divination), and in legal theories. We quickly learn that Lehoux’s is not a book about Romans who merely applied Greek theories in the interest of technology or about the ways in which slave-power made an ancient industrial revolution unnecessary at Rome (the so-called blocage question, discussed by Serafina Cuomo in Technology and Culture in Greek and Roman Antiquity [Cambridge, 2007]). Rather, this is a book about science as a reflection of, and participant in, the creation of Roman ideology and society. Any good discussion of Roman-ness at the end of the Republic inevitably involves a good deal of Cicero, who conveniently, and thus perhaps problematically, provides ample discussion of the kinds of topics in which Lehoux is interested, especially divination. Cicero’s apparently contradictory positions on the practice (Leg. 2.32 and Div. 2.74) are noted, as is the movement in the past thirty years away from the “naive” reading of De Divinatione as a “vigorous rationalistic protest” against a national superstition. Divination, for Lehoux’s Cicero, is neither an intellectual offense nor a politically expedient fiction; rather, it is a thoroughly Roman way of both seeing the world and doing business. Some of what is found here will not be new to classicists, and the chapter overall seems less interested in breaking new ground than in establishing, in deliberate fashion, the book’s foundational interest in seeing nature, law, and religion as legitimately connected. Divination and other phenomena reflect a Roman interest in a kind... (shrink)

Analogical inferences are an important consequence of the way semantic knowledge is represented, that is, with relations as explicit structures that can take arguments. We review evidence that this feature of semantic cognition successfully predicts how quickly and broadly children's concepts change with experience and show that Rogers & McClelland's (R&M's) parallel distributed processing (PDP) model fails to simulate these cognitive changes due to its handling of relational information.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Whisper Before You GoJohn K PettyDavid came with a bang.1A momentary prelude from a dysphonic chorus of pagers announce “Level 1 Pediatric Trauma—MVC ejected” before the abrupt crescendo of the trauma bay doors opening. He is maybe two. Maybe three–years–old. It is hard to tell when a child is strapped in, strapped down, nonverbal, intubated, and alone.The flight team speaks for him, “Four–year–old boy improperly restrained in a single–vehicle (...) crash into a ditch. He was partially ejected. He was unresponsive and pulseless at the scene. He got CPR and code drugs, and they got a pulse back. Emergency medical service (EMS) took him to the nearest hospital where they needled his chest, called for air transport, and scanned him up. He has been shocky for us since we picked him up. Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) has been three the whole time. They said his head scan showed subarachnoid hemorrhage.”With the words of the flight team as background narrative, we get about doing our thing—hopefully more method and less madness. Bang, bang, bang! Check the tube. Vital signs. IV fluids. Place a chest tube. Hang the blood. Quick X–ray. Neuro exam—nothing. Get him off the board. Warm him up. Place the orogastric (OG) tube. Bang, bang, bang!The neurosurgery resident opens the CT scans from the other hospital. The brain and cervical spine scans show a disaster: some swelling and bleeding in the higher brain, but the worst damage is in the lower brain, brainstem, and top of the spinal cord. I have heard a neurosurgeon describe this pattern before as “internal decapitation.” Such language never makes it into the patient’s chart. For David the last two words of the neurosurgery consult note will eventually read, “Prognosis grim.”He remains unstable in the trauma bay. Inaction is death. We ultrasound his heart, abdomen, and pelvis. He has fluid that shouldn’t be around his heart. He is dying of the neuro injury we cannot control, but the pericardial fluid might be giving him shock, and we can control that. We can’t ignore the fluid. Shouldn’t ignore it. At least, wouldn’t ignore it. So, we bang up to the operating room. Squeezing blood. Spiking fluid. Oxygen tank and crash cart. Up we go.In the operating room, we do much and we do well. We release the fluid around the heart and find it was CPR, not heart injury that put it there. In the pericardial flash we get a view of the cardiac athlete, pounding like the 26th mile of the marathon. We explore the abdomen and find it swollen but innocent of an injury that would take his life. We place our lines and tubes as the neurosurgeons place theirs. If nothing else, we will be able to measure what lies ahead.“Good work, team,” and we bump the door on the way to the pediatric intensive care unit (PICU).The care in the PICU is more Apache brave than Gaelic knight—more bottles, fewer scissors. The curtains and carpets mute the tones. Our efforts continue, but I get a word that David’s father has arrived. He is sitting in a small, private waiting room off of the main PICU waiting room. The PICU staff colloquially refer to this as “the bad news room.” I take a seat next to a solitary man who is having the worst day of his life. His worst day so far.“I am Dr. Petty, and I am one of the doctors who is taking care of your son. I am very sorry about what has happened. Maybe you can tell me a little bit about what you understand is going on, and I’ll tell you what I know.” [End Page 17]He tells me that his wife was driving David back from her sister’s house, just the two of them. He doesn’t know what happened, but he got a call from the other hospital about the crash. His wife was badly hurt. He heard that David had died, but they got him back. Both were transferred up to the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Moral Distress: The Face of Workplace BullyingJohn S. MurrayAfter a 28–year long distinguished military career I accepted a research position in a tertiary academic health science center, which I considered to be my dream job following retirement. Initially I was to be responsible for one department. A second was added because of my expertise with disaster preparedness. Following my orientation, I immersed myself into my new roles recognizing that (...) there was much to be done to achieve the goal of getting both departmental research programs up to par with the rest of the organization. In a short time, I began to recognize one of my bosses was going to be challenging to work with.She expected that her name be included on all grant proposals and manuscripts despite making no substantial intellectual contributions to either. Additionally, she wanted unwarranted control over all research and scholarship activities I was engaged in with staff despite having no research experience. Even meeting with her to discuss my plans for the direction of research in this department, my efforts were met with argumentative and condescending behavior. She would agree to discuss my plans. When I showed up for meetings in her office she would get angry with me oftentimes for situations, which she herself created. I continued to move forward with my work feeling that how I had conducted research and scholarly work in the past, with integrity and uncompromising ethical standards, was going to be threatened. This created great moral stress for me. I felt overwhelmed, powerless and frustrated as a result of the uncertainty as to whether or not I could fulfill my responsibilities while still meeting moral obligations.Over time, my moral compass prevented me from deviating from the principles, which helped me to build a long–standing stellar reputation as a leader in the field of pediatric nursing. However, this came with a cost. Working for this particular boss was like being on an emotional rollercoaster. One day I would feel like she was pleased with my work, but the next day my efforts could be met with anger, demeaning and dismissive behaviors. Once she praised me in front of staff for the “great” work I was doing with the evidence–based practice initiative nurse leaders. The following day she reprimanded me for not working closely with this group. She was extremely well versed at singing my praises in front of staff. Behind her closed office door was a very different experience.I confided in some colleagues in this department how I was being treated. I quickly learned that all staff were treated in this manner by this one individual. They shared that condescending language and fear and intimidation were the norm. When [End Page 112] I asked them why no one had the awareness or courage to say this treatment was not right, they quickly shared with me that staff were deterred from speaking up for fear of greater bullying behaviors. Sadly, while everyone knew what was the right thing to do, institutional constraints made it nearly impossible to pursue the right course of action. It was readily apparent these nurses were missing advocacy. At that point, I decided it was important to seek a remedy to this problem recognizing it would be no easy task.Progressively, my work environment with this particular boss became intolerable. Despite working relentlessly to develop a research program, unwarranted criticism, unjustified blame, exclusion, isolation, unreasonable demands and denied opportunities persisted. By this time, I was suffering from nightmares, headaches, fear, anxiety, depression, difficulty concentrating, and problems with self–esteem. I felt like my professional competence and reputation was being unjustifiably denigrated by this one individual.In the past, I confided in trusted organizational leaders for guidance when faced with difficult situations. As such, I approached my other boss and shared what was happening. She was deeply concerned. She encouraged me to seek guidance from a safe and confidential environment where staff members can share concerns and receive assistance with how to handle these apprehensions. I had used a program like this in the past when dealing with moral distress. This experience was very helpful. In fact, I returned on multiple... (shrink)

Whatever specific beliefs pragmatists share concerning experience, knowledge, value, and meaning, they generally agree that a central part of the business of life is to make life better. James speaks of the ideal of meeting all needs, Royce of defeating evil, and Dewey of making experience richer and more secure. They are at one in thinking that human intelligence can make a vast difference to how well we live, and they extol the possibility of improving our circumstances. They tend to (...) be dissatisfied with the status quo and see indefinitely sustained amelioration as the solution to our problems. Stoics, in sharp contrast, are quick to call attention to the limits of our powers and recommend accepting them without complaint. They tend to think that only our beliefs and attitudes fall securely in our control. Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius agree that anything we would consider an improvement of the human condition is temporary and that, in any case, fulfilling our desires accomplishes little. The key to living well, they maintain, is control over self, not over circumstance, and they embrace inner calm in the face of whatever misfortune befalls us. Even such a brief characterization of these two great philosophical traditions makes it clear that pragmatic ambition and... (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction to the 30th Anniversary Issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & PsychologyJohn Z. Sadler (bio)This issue marks the 30th anniversary of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology (PPP). All of us at the journal are grateful to our authors, readers, editors, and publishers for enabling this landmark. To commemorate this event, I invited our Founding Editor and Chair of the Advisory Board, K.W.M. "Bill" Fulford to write a brief essay, along with (...) our panel of smart and industrious senior editors. Their instructions were simple: 500 words on PPP past, present, and/or future. These essays appear in the pages to follow. As Editor-in-Chief, I write about PPP's early commitments as a scholarly journal, situate these in the history of academic publishing, and muse over our current moment.Bill Fulford briefly discusses the early years of the journal in his essay. My perspective emerges from an editor's perspective. As co-editors in the early years, Bill and I were committed to an international authorship with comparable editorial oversight. We wanted to build a journal that would equally recognize clinical science and practice and philosophy, maintaining the rigor of each field. We saw philosophers and mental health practitioners as equal partners, collaborators, innovators, and educators. More important, PPP was intended to offer up the best criticism of the mental health and related fields.The scattershot history of scholarly editing has identified several functions of the editor over the centuries following Gutenberg's invention of the printing press in the mid-1440s. The earliest editors took liberties with the language of the Bible, trying to make it more accessible to the public; the printing press permitted fast and inexpensive reproduction. Not surprisingly, this popularizing of the Bible led to praise as well as outrage. The printing of other scholarly works followed quickly. In 1470, only about 25 years after the invention of the printing press, Niccolo Perroni called for Pope Paul II to censor Andrea Bussi's edition of Pliny the Elder's Natural History, an anthology of then-ancient writings about the natural world. This marked the first recorded instance of censorship of a more-or-less secular scholarly work (Monfasani, 1988). In the ensuing centuries, "editors" initially were the popularizers, and later the gatekeepers of texts worth (and not worth) reading. In the [End Page 1] ensuing centuries into the present, editors have been venerated both as defenders of good reading and reviled as censors or intellectual selfaggrandizers.The current moment, in my view, represents a crisis in the history of editing and editorship. Digital communications have liberated communications worldwide. However, this liberty has come at the cost of colossal amounts of material not worth reading and an explosion of divisive, destructive discourse. Even worse, internet "trolls" on social media have moved bullying out of the schoolyard and into international cyberspace. Determining what is worth reading has moved away from a cluster of (hopefully) responsible editors to anyone who wants to go to the small effort of silencing others through online harassment and even violent threats. Such cyberbullying does not eliminate elitism, but instead substitutes a toxic online "elite" without principle other than self-promotion and the alienation of others. Our contemporary online culture has yet to figure out how to shape what is, and is not, worth reading.My wish and intent for the future of PPP is to maintain and grow our place of rational, deliberative, and open discourse, even in the face of such disruptive cultural change.John Z. Sadler John Z. Sadler, MD, is the Editor-in-Chief of PPP. He is the Daniel W. Foster, MD, Professor of Medical Ethics at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, as well as a Professor of Psychiatry there. He has been a PPP editor since its inception.ReferenceMonfasani, J. (1988). The first call for press censorship: Niccolo Perotti, Giovanni Andrea Bussi, Antonio Moreto, and the editing of Pliny's Natural History. Renaissance Quarterly, 41, 1–31. Google ScholarCopyright © 2023 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

William Whewell was born in 1794. He was the son of a carpenter. In spite of a rather sickly childhood, he was intellectually precocious. At Cambridge his talent was quickly recognized, and the expectations for him were high. He fully overcame the sickliness of his youth to become imposing and robust as a man, adventurous and rambunctious in his intellectual life. He helped to introduce the newer French mathematical techniques as a substitute for the outdated Newtonian ones taught at Cambridge (...) and advocated mathematics as a foundation for good thinking in his research on pedagogy. For a while he was a mineralogist, a subject he studied under Mohs in Germany. He studied the tides and sought to determine the mean density of the Earth by comparing the motions of pendulums on the surface and in the interior of the Earth, in mines. He became a specialist on the architecture of cathedrals, which he inspected while traveling in Europe. He wrote poetry and studied languages. But all these activities brought him no great accomplishment or success. It was only when he turned his hand to the history and philosophy of science that he became a figure of major importance. His place in the history of the philosophy of science has by no means been secure, but his views have always reemerged, even though at various times they have been thoroughly rejected as not even serious. (shrink)

Introducing the moral philosopher and philosophical theologian Donald Mackenzie MacKinnon (1913–1994) is not an easy business. Of course, those who are already familiar with the work of the Scottish Episcopalian from Oban in the Highlands will know this but regard it as a necessary difficulty. It is necessary for two main reasons. Firstly, despite the fact that he is arguably the most influential and important postwar British philosophical theologian, (although many would want to place T. F. Torrance in this category), (...) he remains relatively unknown to theological scholarship outside of those who have in some way had connections with the Universities of Aberdeen and Cambridge, at which MacKinnon had occupied Chairs. Secondly, the intellectual labors of this former Cambridge Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity are proving to be fruitful for a new generation of theologians (the three scholars involved in this project are examples of this) in a way that saves MacKinnon, at least for a little longer, from being relegated to the fleeting memory of a historical footnote in British intellectual life. What makes the introductory project difficult (and here the term is being used in a rather glib sense, especially with reference to a thinker so deeply immersed in refusing to evade the difficulty emerging from the intractable problems of the surd by offering premature resolutions) is that MacKinnon’s work is so resistant to the quick summary, the pithy statement, or the reductive sound bite. The style of his writing is often allusive and therefore particularly demanding of his audience. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive theory of the ethics and political philosophy of public health surveillance based on reciprocal obligations among surveillers, those under surveillance, and others potentially affected by surveillance practices. Public health surveillance aims to identify emerging health trends, population health trends, treatment efficacy, and methods of health promotion--all apparently laudatory goals. Nonetheless, as with anti-terrorism surveillance, public health surveillance raises complex questions about privacy, political liberty, and justice both of and in data use. Individuals and groups can (...) be chilled in their personal lives, stigmatized or threatened, and used for the benefit of others when health information is wrongfully collected or used. Transparency and openness about data use, public involvement in decisions, and just distribution of the benefits of surveillance are core elements in the justification of surveillance practices. Understanding health surveillance practices, the concerns it raises, and how to respond to them is critical not only to ethical and trustworthy but also to publicly acceptable and ultimately sustainable surveillance practices. The book is of interest to scholars and practitioners of the ethics and politics of public health, bioethics, privacy and data technology, and health policy. These issues are ever more pressing in pandemic times, where misinformation can travel quickly and suspicions about disease spread, treatment efficacy, and vaccine safety can have devastating public health effects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:New Insights on Young PopperJohn R. WetterstenSeven essays that Popper wrote from 1925 to 1932–33 show Popper's transition from a fresh student of pedagogy into a serious philosopher of science ten years later. His first essay was published in 1925, and in 1934–35 he presented a revolutionary philosophy. These essays led first to Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie (written between 1930 and 1933 but first published in 1979) and (...) culminated in Logik der Forschung.1. Students as IndividualsIn his first published essay Popper argued that each student should be treated as an individual as much as possible.1 It is evident that Popper held this attitude throughout his life, but this essay plays no interesting role in his intellectual development.2. HeimatIn his second essay Popper developed an idea that was important not only for his pedagogy, but also for his psychology and his theory of the open society: because humans tend quite naturally to be dogmatic, they have to learn to overcome dogmatism in order to be rational.2 Following a perspective [End Page 603] heavily indebted to Eduard Burger,3 Karl Bühler,4 and Charlotte Bühler,5 Popper proposed that all aspects of learning begin with the beliefs and attitudes that one learns at "home." Teachers, Popper says, should not ignore the cultural background of their students. This background derives from their home, from their parents or village, and so forth. Teachers should accept the students' dogmatic acceptance of the views and attitudes of home as a necessary, even useful stage in any child's development. The teacher's central task is to help children move away from this dogmatic stage to broader perspectives. How to do this well, he says, poses a, if not the, central pedagogical problem. He discusses the movement from home to aesthetics, to art, to ethics, to law, to the theory of knowledge and science, and to culture. In each case he finds something in the heritage of home that each child possesses, which may be used as a starting point to expand the child's horizons.The problem of how teachers can sympathetically help children move away from the views of their home to broader perspectives is severe, Popper thought, due to the innate need of children to think dogmatically. When children learn the culture of their home they are given certainties that they cling to. As individuals mature, dogmatic thinking has to be overcome: a crucial task for teachers is to help children to set aside their innate dogmatic attitude to engage in critical thinking.At this time Popper was groping for a good philosophical approach. He said that the concept of "Heimat" had to be analyzed because, even though it was at the center of pedagogical concerns, it was a confused concept. This analytical method was quickly abandoned. It is only a historical curiosity that shows how far he had to go in order to develop a new philosophical method. Yet his use of it did bring him to adopt, or he used it to defend, views that he held throughout his life.3. Gewohnheit und Gesetzerlebnis in der ErziehungIn the same year (1927), in Gewohnheit und Gesetzerlebnis in der Erziehung, Popper turned to the task of providing a psychological explanation of the child's need for dogmatism. This third essay was submitted to the Pedagogic Institute, but only became available after Popper's death. Popper was ambivalent about it. When I visited him at his home in Penn in 1973 or 1974, I asked him for a copy. It was then listed in his bibliography, but there were no copies at the University of Vienna. His wife began to say she knew where it was, but he interrupted her before her sentence was completed. But he did not throw it away. The reason for his reluctance to show scholars his essay is [End Page 604] now clear: the essay endorses a philosophy of science—Hans Vaihinger's—with a strong inductivist component, even though its methodology is deductivist. He tried to apply this method in his own psychological investigation of dogmatism in children.Dogmatism was, he thought, a psychological... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Foundation of Ethical Theory in the ClinicJohn Collins Harvey (bio)William Osler has had a very profound and lasting effect on American medical education and medical practice. He set the pattern, still followed today, for the clinical training of medical students at the patient’s bedside and in the clinical laboratory. In such settings Osler was able to demonstrate to his pupils the principles, ethics, and standards of medical practice (...) that he espoused and thought fundamental to the profession of medicine. His monumental text book, The Principles and Practice of Medicine, first published in 1892, transformed the medical profession and remained a standard text for more than four decades (Leon 1995, p. 13). Renowned medical historians, such as Pedro Laín Entralgo, Henry Sigerist, and Richard Shyrock, recognize him as the greatest clinician that North America has ever produced.Osler, who had observed bedside teaching in his post-graduate studies, recognized that this method had much to offer in the instruction of medical students. Opportunity to introduce this method of teaching into the medical school curriculum came in 1888 when he was called to serve as Professor of Medicine and Physician-in-Chief at the newly established Johns Hopkins Medical School and Hospital. Bedside teaching proved to be very successful especially in demonstrating to students the standards and ethics of medical practice that he espoused.Osler’s teaching method was immediately adopted by many of the university medical schools in the United States, including Harvard, Columbia, the University of Pennsylvania, and Stanford, all of whom appreciated the success of the Hopkins medical educational experiment. Graduates of the Hopkins Medical School quickly became a major source of faculty in medical schools in the United States. Many of Osler’s immediate pupils became outstanding clinicians and leaders in American academic medicine and served as faculty members at Hopkins or in established or newly founded schools. Osler’s disciples taught students in the wards the “art” of medicine according to his principles, ethics, and standards. The second and third generation faculty members, who were trained by Osler’s immediate pupils, continue to this day to teach the “art” by employing this method of teaching. Consequently, the practice of medicine in the United States continues to be influenced by the ethics held by Osler. To find [End Page 343] the theories behind Osler’s teaching, we must look at Osler’s background, education, and writings.The Religio Medici: Background For Osler’S Medical EthicsOsler received a very solid traditional classical education at the small, excellent Anglican secondary school in Weston, Ontario run by the Reverend James Johnson, with whom Osler developed a life long friendship. Johnson’s avocation was natural science. He first aroused Osler’s interest in nature and science. Osler was taught Scripture well at Weston. He committed much of the Bible to memory and often quoted it in his speeches. He also studied both Greek and Latin, and was exposed to the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and other classical authors, particularly the stoics.While a student at Weston, Osler first came to know Sir Thomas Browne’s remarkable text Religio Medici (The Religion of the Physician), which was to become a lifelong favorite. In his first address as the new Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford in 1905, which was given to the Guy’s Hospital Physical Society, he vigorously recommended the Religio Medici to the students.The Religio is a deeply reflective personal inquiry into the paradoxical nature of one man as a microcosm of all men (Browne 1940, pp. 40, 53–54, 61–62). Browne participated in the Baconian program for the advancement of knowledge and the rise of “science.” As a defense of the physician’s faith, the Religio shows how neatly the scientist and the Christian united in the single figure of the inspired reader of God’s two books, nature and Scripture, can defend an attitude that is both scientific and yet reverent. The central theme in the first and much longer part of the Religio is the relation between faith and reason. The second part of the Religio is about charity: Man’s love of God and his neighbors, commanded as... (shrink)

It is not my intention in this brief essay to give an exhaustive critical analysis of the theory of art championed by Croce and his follower Collingwood; I intend only to point out certain confusions in and misunderstandings of their theory, and to make a few critical comments in the light of them. Nor do I wish to imply that the theories of Croce and Collingwood are identical; but although they diverge on some points, and although each develops views that (...) the other discusses only briefly, they are so substantially alike on all important points that, as reviewers were quick to point out on the appearance of Collingwood's The Principles of Art , the two can for all practical purposes be considered as one theory. (shrink)