In fields where science and technology overlap, so do different function-ascriptions. The entities of Synthetic Biology research are a case in point, where organisms with biological functionality are altered to perform technical functions. A function theory for SynBiofacts has to address artifactual as well as biological functions of one and the same entity. Further demands on a function theory for Synthetic Biology emerge from methods of SynBiofact creation called kludging and the use-scenarios of SynBiofacts in proof-of-concept research and BioArt. After (...) discussing intentional accounts of technical functions, etiological function theory, contextual causation and contextual selection, a pluralist and weakly normative account of function will be outlined, that, or so it will be argued, can indeed cover all function ascriptions in Synthetic Biology. Lastly, some of the advantages and disadvantages of taking this stance will be outlined. (shrink)

This paper argues against the call to democratize artificial intelligence (AI). Several authors demand to reap purported benefits that rest in direct and broad participation: In the governance of AI, more people should be more involved in more decisions about AI—from development and design to deployment. This paper opposes this call. The paper presents five objections against broadening and deepening public participation in the governance of AI. The paper begins by reviewing the literature and carving out a set of claims (...) that are associated with the call to “democratize AI”. It then argues that such a democratization of AI (1) rests on weak grounds, because it does not answer to a demand of legitimization, (2) is redundant in that it overlaps with existing governance structures, (3) is resource intensive, which leads to injustices, (4) is morally myopic and thereby creates popular oversights and moral problems of its own, and finally, (5) is neither theoretically nor practically the right kind of response to the injustices that animate the call. The paper concludes by suggesting that AI should be democratized not by broadening and deepening participation but by increasing the democratic quality of the administrative and executive elements of collective decision making. In a slogan: The question is not so much whether AI should be democratized but how. (shrink)

Models are not adequately evaluated simply by whether they capture the data, after the fact. Other criteria are needed. One criterion is parsimony; but utility and generality are at least as important. Even with respect to parsimony, however, the case against feedback is not as straightforward as Norris et al. present it. We use feedback consistency effects to illustrate these points.

Psychology and philosophy have long reflected on the role of perspective in vision. Since the dawn of modern vision science—roughly, since Helmholtz in the late 1800s—scientific explanations in vision have focused on understanding the computations that transform the sensed retinal image into percepts of the three-dimensional environment. The standard view in the science is that distal properties—viewpoint-independent properties of the environment (object shape) and viewpoint-dependent relational properties (3D orientation relative to the viewer)–are perceptually represented and that properties of the proximal (...) stimulus (in vision, the retinal image) are not. This view is woven into the nature of scientific explanation in perceptual psychology, and has guided impressive advances over the past 150 years. A recently published article suggests that in shape-perception, the standard view must be revised. It argues, on the basis of new empirical data, that a new entity—perspectival shape—should be introduced into scientific explanations of shape perception. Specifically, the article’s centrally advertised claim is that, in addition to distal shape, perspectival shape is perceived. We argue that this claim rests on a series of mistakes. Problems in experimental design entail that the article provides no empirical support for any claims regarding either perspective or the perception of shape. There are further problems in scientific reasoning and conceptual development. Detailing these criticisms and explaining how science treats these issues is meant to clarify method and theory, and to improve exchanges between the science and philosophy of perception. (shrink)

In this editorial introduction, we set out the contexts, aims and contents of this special issue on Schelling’s influence on later religious and theological thought, as well as the rationale behind its genesis.

In this paper, we explore the extent to which issues of simulation model validation take on novel characteristics when the models in question become particularly complex. Our central claim is that complex simulation models in general, and global models of climate in particular, face a form of confirmation holism. This holism, moreover, makes analytic understanding of complex models of climate either extremely difficult or even impossible. We argue that this supports a position we call convergence skepticism: the belief that the (...) existence of a plurality of different models making a plurality of different forecasts of future climate is likely to be a persistent feature of global climate science. (shrink)

Johannes Corrodi Katzenstein offers a contribution to the current debate on Kierkegaard, mostly concerning the rationality of religious belief and the presumed religious neutrality (autonomy) of philosophical and scientific thought. More specifically, his book is an attempt to relate Kierkegaard's theory of the stages of life (aesthetic, ethical, religious) to issues that have been of utmost concern to Anglo-American (analytical) philosophy, such as the nature of truth, rational knowledge, objectivity, etc. From this angle, Kierkegaard turns out to be not (...) the irrationalist he has often been made into but rather the outspoken witness of a passion that guides all thinking, i.e. the passion to think what cannot be thought. An attempt is made to show that for Kierkegaard, anticipating some of the arguments of contemporary postsecular philosophy, the ideal of pure or autonomous reason inevitably has its basis in a pre-rational, often tacit commitment to an origin whose primary home is in religious faith. Rather than precluding dialogue, awareness of these deeper forces and starting-points of our various philosophical and scientific outlooks is a critical requirement for mutual understanding between secularist and religious perspectives and traditions competing for cultural and political dominance. (shrink)

Polygenic effects have more than one cause. They testify to the fact that several causal contributors are sometimes simultaneously involved in causation. The importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by Mill (1893). It has since been shown to be a problem for causal-law approaches to causation and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities. However, polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly in the emerging literature on causal mechanisms. In this paper I examine whether an influential (...) theory of mechanisms proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver can accommodate polygenic effects and other forms of causal interaction. This theory is problematic, I will argue, because it ascribes a central role to activities. In it, activities are needed not only to constitute mechanisms but also to perform the causal role of mechanisms. Any such mechanism-as-activity will be incompatible with causal situations where either no or merely another kind of activity occurs. But, as I will try to illustrate in this paper, both kinds of situation may be frequent. If I am right, the view that Machamer and colleagues suggest leads to an impoverished conception of mechanism. (shrink)

In this article, Gregory of Nyssa is presented as a trinitarian thinker. It is argued that, in order to appreciate the relevance of triadic structures for his thought, one must take into consideration that the central place the Trinity held in his thought was the result of his involvement in the final phase of the so‑called trinitarian controversy of the fourth century. The article therefore begins with a brief account of the theoretical problems that arose within the later stages of (...) this debate. Particular attention is paid in this connection to the positions of Athanasius and his moderate opponents. In a second step, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory’s older brother, is introduced as a radically innovative voice in the debate. While previous thinkers were agreed on the derivative character of the divinity as passed on from the Father to the other members of the Trinity, Basil insisted on their ontological coordination with the help of terminology taken from Aristotle’s Categories. Gregory’s trinitarian system, which is presented in the remainder of the essay, builds on Basil’s foundations. Through an examination of key texts it is shown, however, that he added a greater concern for the common or shared ousia or physis by means of which divine unity was guaranteed. In this connection, Gregory developed a realistic theory of the universal which he also applied in other parts of his thought, notably his doctrine of creation. The article concludes with the observation that Gregory’s interest in trinitarian structures was different from that of Augustine in that the fundamental problem was the relationship of unity and difference, whereas the number ‘three’ did not play a recognisable role in the Cappadocian’s speculations. (shrink)

The article starts by observing a parallel between the identification of Christ's humanity and universal human nature, for which Harnack repudiates some church fathers, and David Strauss' claim, in his Life of Jesus, that the subject of the Incarnation must be all humanity. It is argued that this oppositional stance is indicative of fundamental philosophical and theological differences between the Tübingen School and the Ritschl School. Those differences, however, are then explained as emerging from what is ultimately a common project (...) of a radical form of historical theology. This project, it is argued, Ritschl took over from Baur while correcting it in crucial ways. Taken together, the two central theological schools of the 19th century thus illustrate the potential and the limits of christian theology within the historicist paradigm. (shrink)

Simulation modeling, the core thesis of Calculated Surprises, is transforming the established conception of mathematical modeling in fundamental ways. These transformations feed back into philosophy of science, opening up new perspectives on longstanding oppositions. The book integrates historical features with both practical case studies and broad reflections on science and technology.

Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on. These comments concern metaphysical premises of structural approaches, the viability of structure-preserving mappings, and the question of what a structure of conscious experience is (...) in the first place. I will also explain what, in my opinion, are the great promises of structural methodologies and how they might impact consciousness science at large. (shrink)

Facts are once again put to work in philosophical enterprises. The discussion in this paper is conducted under the presumption that we for this reason need to examine the nature of facts anew. To some extent it has been taken for granted that the question of properties and particulars is the primary problem to solve, and that the question of facts is secondary. This approach naturally leads to many of the old problems of facts and complexes. By taking facts as (...) truly basic, we should see how we can construct the particulars and universals we still have need for. In order to further this idea, I suggest that facts may be though of as tropes or once-for-all occurrent properties. However, this characterisation of facts is acceptable only if tropes manage without substances or "thin" particulars for their instantiation. (shrink)

In view of a rapid succession of events in the contemporary world, on both the political and the scientific levels, it is indeed essential to say more about the subject of democracy in the civil society. If by democracy we mean not only a form of govern- ment but also a system of living, then indeed a unanimous judgment and also a general conception cannot be expected, but nevertheless the concept need not to be debased to the stage of complete (...) meaninglessness. (shrink)

The ongoing debate on the ethics of self-driving cars typically focuses on two approaches to answering such questions: moral philosophy and social science. I argue that these two approaches are both lacking. We should neither deduce answers from individual moral theories nor should we expect social science to give us complete answers. To supplement these approaches, we should turn to political philosophy. The issues we face are collective decisions that we make together rather than individual decisions we make in light (...) of what we each have reason to value. Political philosophy adds three basic concerns to our conceptual toolkit: reasonable pluralism, human agency, and legitimacy. These three concerns have so far been largely overlooked in the debate on the ethics of self-driving cars. (shrink)

Several promising approaches have been developed to represent conscious experience in terms of mathematical spaces and structures. What is missing, however, is an explicit definition of what a ‘mathematical structure of conscious experience’ is. Here, we propose such a definition. This definition provides a link between the abstract formal entities of mathematics and the concreta of conscious experience; it complements recent approaches that study quality spaces, qualia spaces, or phenomenal spaces; and it provides a general method to identify and investigate (...) structures of conscious experience. We hope that ultimately this work provides a basis for developing a common formal language to study consciousness. (shrink)

Kimberly Chuang’s detailed and very helpful reply to my article concerns Jon Elster’s struggle to develop a mechanistic account that sheds light on explanation in social science. I argue that a problem exists with Elster’s current conception of mechanistic explanation in social contexts. Chuang defends Elster’s conception against my critique. I still believe I have identified a problem with Elster’s conception. In this reply I want to recapitulate briefly Elster’s idea, as I understand it, and then use some of Chuang’s (...) critical points to advance the position I advocate. (shrink)

COVID-19 has substantially affected our lives during 2020. Since its beginning, several epidemiological models have been developed to investigate the specific dynamics of the disease. Early COVID-19 epidemiological models were purely statistical, based on a curve-fitting approach, and did not include causal knowledge about the disease. Yet, these models had predictive capacity; thus they were used to ground important political decisions, in virtue of the understanding of the dynamics of the pandemic that they offered. This raises a philosophical question about (...) how purely statistical models can yield understanding, and if so, what the relationship between prediction and understanding in these models is. Drawing on the model that was developed by the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation, we argue that early epidemiological models yielded a modality of understanding that we call descriptive understanding, which contrasts with the so-called explanatory understanding which is assumed to be the main form of scientific understanding. We spell out the exact details of how descriptive understanding works, and efficiently yields understanding of the phenomena. Finally, we vindicate the necessity of studying other modalities of understanding that go beyond the conventionally assumed explanatory understanding. (shrink)