Social mechanisms and explaining how : A reply to Kimberly Chuang

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (9):37-41 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Kimberly Chuang’s detailed and very helpful reply to my article concerns Jon Elster’s struggle to develop a mechanistic account that sheds light on explanation in social science. I argue that a problem exists with Elster’s current conception of mechanistic explanation in social contexts. Chuang defends Elster’s conception against my critique. I still believe I have identified a problem with Elster’s conception. In this reply I want to recapitulate briefly Elster’s idea, as I understand it, and then use some of Chuang’s critical points to advance the position I advocate.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,854

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Functional explanation and metaphysical individualism.Justin Schwartz - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):278-301.
Historical materialism and functional explanation.Allen W. Wood - 1986 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (1-4):11 – 27.
Returning to Bloor and the Strong Program: A Brief Rejoinder to Shahryari.Finn Collin - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (8):38-40.
Elster's Marx.Michael Taylor - 1986 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (1-4):3 – 10.
Functional explanation, consequence explanation, and marxism.G. A. Cohen - 1982 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):27 – 56.
What Makes a Home: A Reply.Christopher Essert - 2022 - Law and Philosophy 41 (4):469-489.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-01-13

Downloads
10 (#1,479,591)

6 months
5 (#1,071,419)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Johannes Persson
Lund University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations