Technological development plays a critical role in society’s ability to address environmental issues. Building on Teece’s profiting from innovation framework, we articulate how a double-externality problem weakens the appropriability regime surrounding pollution reduction technology (PRT). We then develop a theoretical framework articulating how weak appropriability induces firms to modify their innovation strategies for PRT development by increasing the extent to which they engage in organizational exploration (rather than exploitation) and emphasizing incremental (rather than radical) technologies. Noting that the effects of (...) weak appropriability are unlikely to be static, we detail how the accumulation of organizational capabilities for reducing pollution diminishes the extent to which firms modify their innovation strategies for PRT. That is, firms become less exploratory and less focused on incremental technology as they gain experience with pollution reduction. Results of broad-sample empirical analyses of 206,277 patents held by 203 U.S. manufacturing firms over a 20-year period provide support for our framework. (shrink)

In this way a domain for the theory of desire will be sketched out. One preliminary clarification: In the beginning is the word, "desire. ...

This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers (...) systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalise rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterising this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925-1969, a sectarian form of critical philosophy. (shrink)

An increasing number of scholars at the intersection of feminist philosophy and critical disability studies have turned to Merleau-Ponty to develop phenomenologies of disability or of what, following Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, I call "non-normate" embodiment. These studies buck the historical trend of philosophers employing disability as an example of deficiency or harm, a mere litmus test for normative theories, or an umbrella term for aphenotypical bodily variation. While a Merleau-Pontian-inspired phenomenology is a promising starting point for thinking about embodied experiences of (...) all sorts, I here draw a cautionary tale about how ableist assumptions can easily undermine accounts of non-normate experience. I first argue that the omission or misguided treatment of disability within the history of philosophy in general and the phenomenological tradition in particular is due to the inheritance of what I call “the ableist conflation” of disability with pain, suffering, and disadvantage. I then show that Merleau-Ponty’s famous reading of the blind man’s cane is problematic insofar as it omits the social dimensions of disabled experiences, misconstrues the radicality of blindness as a world-creating disability, and operates via an able-bodied simulation that confuses object annexation or extension with incorporation. In closing, I contend that if phenomenology is to overcome the errors of traditional philosophy, as Merleau-Ponty once hoped, it must heed the insights of “crip” or non-normate phenomenology, which takes the lived experience of disability as its point of departure. [French translation forthcoming in Pour une phénoménologie critique, ed. Donald A. Landes, Quebec City, Les Presses de l'Université Laval/Paris, J.Vrin]. (shrink)

This paper argues that the political adage “Be ye prudent as serpents and guileless as doves” involves three different types of relation between prudence and morality, namely: unification (Vereinigung), subordination (Unterordnung), and association (Beigesellung). I maintain that these relations are set up according to the same principle that determines the relationship between mechanical and teleological causality in the third Critique. Thus, I argue that morality and prudence are much more systematically related within the system of critical philosophy than is normally (...) assumed in the literature and that this is made possible by way of an intimate relationship between prudence and teleological judgment. (shrink)

The theoretical foundations of climate science have received little attention from philosophers thus far, despite a number of outstanding issues. We provide a brief, non-technical overview of several of these issues – related to theorizing about climates, climate change, internal variability and more – and attempt to make preliminary progress in addressing some of them. In doing so, we hope to open a new thread of discussion in the emerging area of philosophy of climate science, focused on theoretical foundations.

In apparent conflict with the popular conception of veterinarians as animals' best friends, the Veterinarian's Oath, as well as its clarifying Principles of Animal Welfare, imply that animal welfare is entirely derivative from human welfare. This article calls for an explicit alignment of the Oath and Principles with the priority of nonhuman animals.

In this paper, I argue that the concept of normality in medical research and clinical practice is inextricable from the concept of ambiguity. I make this argument in the context of Edmund Pellegrino's call for a renewed reflection on medicine’s basic concepts and by drawing on work in critical disability studies concerning Deafness and body integrity identity disorder. If medical practitioners and philosophers of medicine wish to improve their understanding of the meaning of medicine as well as its concrete practice, (...) I contend that they should take seriously the import and centrality of ambiguity for biomedicine. (shrink)

A defense of amorality as both philosophically justified and practicably livable. While in synch with their underlying aim of grounding human existence in a naturalistic metaphysics, this book takes both the new atheism and the mainstream of modern ethical philosophy to task for maintaining a complacent embrace of morality. It advocates instead replacing the language of morality with a language of desire. The book begins with an analysis of what morality is and then argues that the concept is not instantiated (...) in reality. Following this, the question of belief in morality is addressed: How would human life be affected if we accepted that morality does not exist? The book argues that at the very least, a moralist would have little to complain about in an amoral world, and at best we might hope for a world that was more to our liking overall. An extended look at the human encounter with nonhuman animals serves as an illustration of amorality’s potential to make both theoretical and practical headway in resolving heretofore intractable ethical problems. (shrink)

How do certain social conflicts come to fall within the law? How does the law come to have its space? I argue that law emerged in British Honduras through a structure of racial differentiation. The law arrived as a mode of ordering space, bodies, and justice that realizes an immanent structure of racial difference. Racial difference thus founds the space of law. To advance this argument, I examine the record of the first criminal trial prosecuted in the place now called (...) southern Belize—for the murder of an unnamed Indigenous woman by an enslaved Black man. Through an analysis of the trial record that draws upon Jameson’s reading of Greimas’s semiotic method, I show that the standing of the trial, as well as the evaluation of evidence, hinge upon the delineation and operation of racial categories. While British colonialism has ended, these categories persist. (shrink)

Despite the apparently universal recognition of a pervasive "success at any cost" amorality in the professional and business world, and the need to do something about it, attempts to establish a campus-wide professional ethics curriculum continue to encounter resistance at many colleges and universities. The main stumbling block seems to be a purely practical one: How do you fit a course on professional ethics into academic worksheets that are already over-crowded with essential technical courses in every professional discipline? I maintain, (...) to the contrary, that the real problem is one of attitude and will, and these in turn rest upon a set of mistaken notions about the nature of professional ethics. In this essay I highlight what I take to be a number of fallacies about professional ethics and then suggest a better way to think about its place in the formal education of professionals. (shrink)

Liao and Carbonell point out that much of the danger embedded in “materialized oppression” derives from the fact that the essence of that marginalized oppression may not be overt. It can often rece...

Responding to Danaher et al. on self-tracking technologies, I argue that human lived experience is becoming increasingly mediated by generalized, statistical information, which I term our "infotality." Drawing on the work of Foucault, I argue that infotality is historically novel and best understood as the product of biopolitics, healthism, and informatics. I then critique the authors' "stance of cautious openness,” which misunderstands the aims of the technology in question and the fundamental ambiguity of the role information plays in the achievement (...) of human wellbeing. Self-tracking technologies are not primarily designed to change behavior; they are designed to create and sustain the desire for their use. I conclude by suggesting that infotality names a new way to fall for an old ruse: the promise that more information means more wellbeing. (shrink)

Questions for Further Consideration and Recommended Further Reading, which follow each relevant chapter, encourage readers to think further and to craft their own perspectives.

In this paper I defend three different points: first, that the concept of highest good is derived from an a priori but subjective argument, namely a maxim of pure practical reason; secondly, that the theory regarding the highest good has the validity of a practical regulative knowledge; and thirdly, that the practical regulative knowledge can be understood as the same “holding something to be true” as Kant attributes to hope and believe.

“4E” approaches in cognitive science see mind as embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. They observe that we routinely “offload” part of our thinking onto body and world. Recently, 4E theorists have turned to music cognition: from work on music perception and musical emotions, to improvisation and music education. I continue this trend. I argue that music — like other tools and technologies — is a beyond-the-head resource that affords offloading. And via this offloading, music can (at least potentially) scaffold various (...) forms of thought, experience, and behavior. To develop this idea, I consider the “material” and “worldmaking” character of music, and I apply these considerations to two cases studies: music as a tool for religious worship, and music as a weapon for torture. (shrink)

Physical processes manifest an objective order that science manages to discover. Commonly, it is considered that these processes obey the “laws of nature.” Bergson disputes this idea which ultimately constitutes a kind of Platonism. In contrast, he develops the idea that physical processes are a particular case of automatic behaviors. In this sense, they imply a motor memory immanent to matter, whose actions are triggered by some perceptions. This approach is obviously panpsychist. It gives matter a certain consciousness, even if (...) the latter is different in nature from our consciousness. In some respects, this approach is similar to contemporary panpsychism because it claims that the psychic is a fundamental characteristic of nature, causally active. But it is also original because it does not constitute a theory of the origin of mind in nature. (shrink)

This volume is a comprehensive collection of critical essays on The Taming of the Shrew, and includes extensive discussions of the play's various printed versions and its theatrical productions. Aspinall has included only those essays that offer the most influential and controversial arguments surrounding the play. The issues discussed include gender, authority, female autonomy and unruliness, courtship and marriage, language and speech, and performance and theatricality.

Neste artigo apresenta-se o significado do conceito de sociabilidade insociável e de sua importância para a filosofia histórico-política de Kant. Defendem-se aqui duas teses importantes: primeira, que esse conceito se insere essencialmente num paradigma biológicoteleológico em vez de físico-mecânico; segunda, que a insociabilidade deve ser compreendida como se referindo a inclinações e não a paixões, o que, por sua vez, permite pensá-la em concordância com um progresso moral também dos indivíduo.

Neste artigo faz-se uma comparação entre a perspectiva metodológica e epistemológica desenvolvida por Bacon no Novum Organum e por Kant na Crítica da razão pura. Nesse sentido, defende-se que apesar de não se poder ignorar as divergências com relação ao modo como cada filósofo desenvolve a delimitação dos seus conceitos de conhecimento e de ciência, ainda assim é possível encontrar importantes elementos de convergência tanto com relação à ilusão transcendental e outras formas de erros no que concerne a teoria dos (...) ídolos, quanto com relação à perspectiva metodológica subjacente ao conceito de experiência e experimento. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that the idea of a universal history is systematically legitimized in Kant’s transcendental system of philosophy by way of the concept of a need [Bedürfnis] for pure practical reason. In this sense, the idea of a universal history is a fundamental part of the moral image of the world that emerges from Kant’s whole philosophy, and it is crucial for understanding both the possibility of the system of pure reason, as well the full development (...) of Kant’s moral philosophy, especially for political philosophy. RESUMO Nesse artigo eu argumento que a ideia de uma história universal é sistematicamente legitimada no sistema da filosofia transcendental de Kant por meio do conceito de precisão [Bedürfnis] da razão pura prática. Nesse sentido, a ideia de uma história universal é uma parte fundamental da imagem moral do mundo que emerge da totalidade da filosofia de Kant e é crucial para o entendimento tanto da possibilidade de um sistema da razão pura, quanto para um desenvolvimento completo da filosofia moral, particularmente para a filosofia política. (shrink)

Why is listening to sad music pleasurable? Eerola et al. convincingly argue that we should adopt an integrative framework — encompassing biological, psycho-social, and cultural levels of explanation — to answer this question. I agree. The authors have done a great service in providing the outline of such an integrative account. But in their otherwise rich discussion of the psycho-social level of engagements with sad music, they say little about the phenomenology of such experiences — including features that may help (...) shed further light on this question. I suggest that emerging enactive perspectives on music and emotion can offer some useful resources. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta os aspectos liberais e republicanos da filosofia política de Rousseau e defende que eles devem ser interpretados como complementares. Entretanto, essa complementaridade pode ser caracterizada num sentido específico, qual seja, como sendo um liberalismo republicano.

Emotions normally include elements of feeling, motivation, and also intentionality; but the argument of this essay is that there can be emotion without feeling, emotion without corresponding motivation, and emotion without an intentional relation to an object such that the emotion is (among other things) a belief about or construal of it. Many recent writers have claimed that some form of intentionality is essential to emotion, and then have created lines of defence for this thesis. Thus, what look like troublesome (...) cases of emotions can be regarded as having a global intentionality or as being “mood-like”. Alternatively surges of non-intentional joy or ecstasy can be regarded as merely feelings rather than as emotions, and what people experience in response to absolute music can be treated similarly. A clear view of how we normally talk about moods, emotions, and feelings however undermines these defences; and in particular we can understand the role of emotions in relation to absolute music once we become clear about the way in which musical content stands in for intentional objects. (shrink)

The essay has two purposes. One is to point out connections and parallels between, On one hand, The debates of metaphysical realists and anti-Realists, And on the other hand, The debates surrounding moral realism. The second is to provide the outlines of a case for a kind of position that would generally be classified as moral realism. One feature of this position is that it emerges as parallel to, And compatible with, A metaphysical position that would generally be classified as (...) anti-Realism. (shrink)

Principles can seem as entrenched in moral experience as Kant thinks space, time, and the categories are in human experience of the world. However not all cultures have such a view. Classical Indian and Chinese philosophies treat modification of the self as central to ethics. Decisions in particular cases and underlying principles are much less discussed. Ethics needs comparative philosophy in order not to be narrow in its concerns. A broader view can give weight to how people sometimes can change (...) who they are, in order to lead better lives. (shrink)

For the “respectable” part of society there can be a presumption of virtuousness, rather like the presumption of innocence in the law. In both cases, the presumption can be defeated, as we learn more and get into specifics. We still might insist that to be genuinely virtuous is to be able to pass the more familiar sorts of tests of virtue, and to be reliably virtuous also in the ordinary business of life, especially in things that really matter. Something like (...) this is a necessary condition for virtue. Factors of motivation, especially those related to what a person's basic concerns are, can vary enormously. Imagine an extreme case. Someone might be inherently indifferent to what happens to other people, and have no sense of the inherent dignity or worthiness of moral principles, but also be totally convinced that God is watching his or her every move, and that the prospects of heaven or hell depend heavily on one's following accepted morality at every step. (shrink)

Charles Taylor em suas abordagens sobre o fenômeno da secularização nos oferece uma descrição, analítico-genealógica, das atuais condições de crença e ceticismo radical das sociedades modernas. Buscamos a partir disto, fazer um estudo que vise entender algumas das motivações referentes ao lugar e uso da razão pública pelas religiões na vida social democrática. Para tanto, abordamos a noção de redefinição do significado político da secularização. É inegável que as crenças religiosas e laicas estão vivas e atuantes na esfera pública. Por (...) esta razão, temos que averiguar algo do fenômeno da secularização como projeto de expansão dos axiomas revolucionários da liberdade, igualdade e fraternidade modernas. Logo, vamos seguir nossa argumentação dando atenção para alguns elementos referentes ao pano de fundo histórico-filosófico que contribuíram para a redefinição do significado político deste fenômeno. Todavia, temos que fazer uma articulação teleológica em termos do que seja a soberania popular da ação dos novos sujeitos no limiar das modernas democracias. Ademais, o dado relevante da comunicação e das tensões que envolve o estabelecimento dos consensos sobrepostos, refletem no influxo moral das religiões na esfera pública democrática como um problema conflitivo. Por fim, cotejamos algo referente as epistemologias da suspeição diante da facticidade aporética dos conteúdos religiosos. Isto tem sérias implicações para a construção da identidade do agente humano no devir histórico desta era chamada secular. (shrink)

Probably the most influential critique of social theorizing about the non-West in recent years has been one emanating from a `subalternist' perspective, by which I mean a critique mounted if not by, then in the name of, peoples/cultures/modes of thought that have been dominated culturally by `the West'. The rapid rise to prominence - economic, political, strategic and cultural - of an increasingly large number of nation states in the Asia-Pacific region poses a rather different kind of challenge to western (...) perspectives on the project of modernity, a challenge to which social theory has yet to formulate an adequate response. Focusing on Malaysia, this paper examines the claims advanced by certain members of the new Asian political elite and intellectuals that Asian countries have discovered divergent trajectories of modernization, and argues that attempts on the part of contemporary western observers to dismiss these claims have so far been unconvincing. This suggests that social theorists need in future to give more serious consideration to the possibility that the `rise of Asia' represents a new kind of modernization. (shrink)

This article provides some reflections on the problem posed by ostensibly perverse phenomena like political patronage, corruption and crony capitalism for modernising narratives, which are currently enjoying a renewed popularity. In the light of an ethnographic example from Indonesia, it is argued that the continual attempt to relocate such phenomena to terrains not properly modern precludes the possibility of serious analysis or moral/political assessment of these phenomena. The starting point for any genuine engagement with these issues is the recognition that (...) these phenomena are as internal to modernity as the modernist discourses that seek to externalise them. (shrink)