"He completed the assignment in two phases: The photographs made during the first phase capture the natural ruggedness of the terrain and establish its relationship to the developed neighboring enclaves. Those made during the second phase not only record the actual construction process but also reveal Deal's personal perspective on the qualities of light and the creation of form. Represented in this book as a selection from the resulting portfolio, Topos, a Greek word meaning place, site, position, and occasion - (...) Deal's artistic legacy to the Gerry Center."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

El debate acerca de la naturaleza de la percepción o aísthēsis en Aristóteles puede rastrearse ya en las obras de los comentadores antiguos. Desde hace un par de siglos, dos interpretaciones rivales se han posicionado como variantes extremas que nos aportan una concepción «literalista», o, por el contrario, «espiritualista», del fenómeno en cuestión. Sin embargo, ambas posturas coinciden en reducir la percepción a un asunto meramente «dado»: bien sea puramente fisiológico, o bien, únicamente intencional. Como consecuencia de ello, el dominio (...) conceptual resultaría separado de lo perceptual, algo que, según la célebre expresión de McDowell, representaría un punto de vista encantado por el «Mito de lo Dado». En este artículo defenderé una visión moderada del problema a través de una consideración sobre lo que podría denominarse el «espacio lógico» de la percepción, poniendo de relieve el papel conjunto y sintético de la diánoia en el discernimiento propio que implica todo proceso sensoperceptivo del alma específica del hombre. Si mi interpretación es correcta, difícilmente podría decirse que Aristóteles incurre en este tipo de mitología. (shrink)

Political liberals typically hold that reasonable citizens should not form political associations (e.g. political parties) with unreasonable citizens. This is because unreasonable citizens are unlikely to conform to the duty of civility—the duty to be able, and willing, to use public reasons in their public political deliberations. Here I argue that a general prohibition on political associations with the unreasonable can undermine the fair value of their political liberties. This is because unreasonable citizens can grow up in epistemic environments that (...) make it difficult to be reasonable, and so to direct citizens to not associate with them can deprive citizens from certain social backgrounds the equal opportunity for political influence. I propose instead that political liberals should distinguish between unreasonable citizens who are disposed to support de re publicly justifiable laws and policies and unreasonable citizens who support illegitimate laws and policies. Reasonable citizens may form political associations with the former group, but not the latter group. (shrink)

This collection assembles Church's referee reports, Fitch's 1963 paper, and nineteen new papers on the knowability paradox.

This Paper argues that to protect at-risk communities — and all Americans — from the deadly effects of environmental racism, Congress must pass the Environmental Justice for All Act. The Act is intended to “restore, reaffirm, and reconcile environmental justice and civil rights.” It does so by restoring an individual’s right to sue in federal court for discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national origin regardless of intent under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, strengthening the National Environmental Policy Act, (...) and providing economic incentives focused on environmental justice. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the anti‐materialist arguments that purport to show that conscious phenomena are genuinely new, nonphysical features of reality. The anti‐materialist claims that zombies are indeed conceivable. To see why this might make trouble for the materialist, the chapter considers again what is supposed to distinguish materialism from property dualism. Given the characterization of the difference between the materialist and the property dualist, it becomes clear why the conceivability of a zombie counts against materialism. One of the most influential (...) anti‐materialist arguments is the one presented by Frank Jackson. Jackson starts by assuming that the thesis of physicalism entails that all information is physical information. The most straightforward physicalist theory is the Central State Identity Theory (CSIT). According to this view (Smart 1959) conscious mental states, such as pains or visual sensations, are identical to certain states of the central nervous system. The principal objection to this view is its inherent “chauvinism”. (shrink)

I argue that normative formal epistemology (NFE) is best understood as modelling, in the sense that this is the reconstruction of its methodology on which NFE is doing best. I focus on Bayesianism and show that it has the characteristics of modelling. But modelling is a scientific enterprise, while NFE is normative. I thus develop an account of normative models on which they are idealised representations put to normative purposes. Normative assumptions, such as the transitivity of comparative credence, are characterised (...) as modelling idealisations motivated normatively. I then survey the landscape of methodological options: what might formal epistemologists be up to? I argue the choice is essentially binary: modelling or theorising. If NFE is theorising it is doing very poorly: generating false claims with no clear methodology for separating out what is to be taken seriously. Modelling, by contrast, is a successful methodology precisely suited to the management of useful falsehoods. Regarding NFE as modelling is not costless, however. First, our normative inferences are less direct and are muddied by the presence of descriptive idealisations. Second, our models are purpose-specific and limited in their scope. I close with suggestions for how to adapt our practice. (shrink)

Two central questions concerning the role that persistent disagreements about philosophical, ethical, and religious issues in liberal societies are raised in this paper: (i) whether the state’s authority may be justified on the basis of controversial views and (ii) whether the state may rely on controversial views when exercising authority. Many assume whatever motivates philosophers to respect disagreement in justifying the state—answering “no” to (i)—seems to also require the state to respect disagreement when it acts—answering “no” to (ii). Here I (...) defend the consistency of answering “no” to (i) and “yes” to (ii), a position I call “political perfectionism.” I argue, first, that one prominent reason for answering “no” to (i)—that citizens should be able to endorse the authority of the state—is consistent with answering “yes” to (ii) and, second, that the intuitions underlying why political liberals want citizens to be able to endorse the authority of the state can motivate answering “yes” to (ii). (shrink)

Most business ethicists maintain that corporate actors are subject to a variety of moral obligations. However, there is a persistent and underappreciated concern that the competitive pressures of the market somehow provide corporate actors with a far-reaching excuse from meeting these obligations. Here, we assess this concern. Blending resources from the history of philosophy and strategic management, we demonstrate the assumptions required for and limits of this excuse. Applying the idea of ‘the state of nature’ from Thomas Hobbes, we suggest (...) that corporate actors would be excused from duties if complying with them threatened their vital interests. We show how this excuse is not available for most individuals within firms; instead, it is an excuse perhaps available to firms themselves, but only given substantive assumptions about corporate personhood. For those willing to make these assumptions, we apply the competitive advantage construct to delimit the scope of this excuse. We suggest that firms are excused from fulfilling an obligation when complying leads to a competitive disadvantage, as this imperils the firm’s vital interests. After revealing why this excuse does not generalize, we conclude by considering when we should reform the market to avoid the legitimacy of this excuse. (shrink)

In this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue that, while it might (...) look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both. (shrink)

Seeking beauty in education -- The meanings of beauty: a brief history -- Beauty as educational experience -- Beauty, education and the good society -- Beauty and creativity: examples from an arts curriculum -- Beauty in science and maths education -- Awakening beauty in education.

In this review of Matthew DeCoursey’s book on the aesthetics of drama education, I acknowledge the originality and usefulness of the theoretical framework he provides and attempt to summarize its key features. In applying them to an example of my own practice, I make use of the conceptual terminology DeCoursey has introduced and argue that it is both effective and illuminating to the practitioner. In tracing the trajectory of DeCoursey’s subsequent analysis of key theorists in the field, the study of (...) scripted drama, and the extensive use of drama across the curriculum, I attempt to do justice to the strengths of his argument, as well as pointing out what I perceive as some of its inherent weaknesses. I conclude by indicating some gaps in his attention to both historical and current practices in the field while still commending the book for its much-needed contribution. (shrink)

We use a lab experiment to examine whether and how leaders influence workers’ (un)ethical behavior through financial reporting choices. We randomly assign the role of leaders or workers to subjects, who can choose to report an outcome via automatic or self-reporting. Self-reporting allows for profitable and undetectable earnings manipulation. We vary the leaders’ ability to choose the reporting method and to punish workers. We show that workers are more likely to choose automatic reporting when their leader voluntarily does so and (...) can assign punishment. Even workers who choose self-reporting tend to cheat less when their leader chooses automatic reporting. Nonetheless, most leaders do not opt for automatic reporting in the first place: they often choose self-reporting and punish workers who rather choose automatic reporting. Collectively, our results reveal a dual effect of leadership on ethical behaviors in organizations: workers behave more ethically if their leader makes ethical choices, but often leaders do not make ethical choices in the first place. Hence, leading by example can backfire. (shrink)

The answer is surprising, and what we're about to learn will wake us up to a reality most of us never knew existed.The reason we're so oblivious is because we've all been operating at human speed, relying on our own physical power and our five senses. But there is something extremely important we've all been missing. It holds the key to everything good--the key to life, success, happiness, peace of mind, and understanding beyond our wildest imagination. It's perhaps the best-kept (...) secret in the history of mankind and it packs a staggering, invigorating message that can change your life for the better--improving understanding, eliminating anxiety, and helping to extend your living years indefinitely. All we have to do is open our eyes and ears.We're all inundated with this secret at all times. It's present in our favorite songs and movies, the stories we tell our children, and even in every commercial campaign! The secret is broadcast in famous news stories including the coronavirus pandemic, the sinking of the Titanic, or the collapse of the World Trade Center on 9/11. It's in ordinary life activities such as breathing, sleeping, waking up, traveling, sex, and getting married and changing one's name.Now, bestselling author and award-winning journalist Joe Kovacs reveals the solution--cracking the divine code that shifts our minds from operating at slow, human speed and making the jump to the incredibly quick "God speed."Hundreds of ancient mysteries and prophecies are instantly unsealed as the master key that unlocks the mystery of everything is now in your hands. (shrink)

Content note: This paper discusses rape throughout.Abstract. In this paper, I consider arguments in favor of jury trials. While I find these generally persuasive, I argue that there can be cases where juries are not fit for purpose. In those cases, I argue that they should be replaced by judge-only trials. In doing so, I propose a framework for determining whether a type of case is unsuitable for jury trials. Partly in response to low conviction rates, there have been recent (...) suggestions that rape trials should be conducted without juries. I suggest that there is strong evidence that these offences qualify under the criteria I have described. As a result, I argue that judge-only trials should be adopted for trying rape cases. (shrink)

In their attempt to provide a reason to be moral, contractarians such as David Gauthier are concerned with situations allowing a group of agents the chance of mutual benefit, so long as at least some of them are prepared to constrain their maximising behaviour. But what justifies this constraint? Gauthier argues that it could be rational (because maximising) to intend to constrain one's behaviour, and in certain circumstances to act on this intention. The purpose of this paper is to examine (...) the conditions under which it is rational to form, and to act on, intentions. I introduce and examine in detail what Gauthier has to say on these issues, argue that it suffers from various problems, and propose an alternative account which I claim avoids them. (shrink)

Lewis/Stalnaker semantics has it that all counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are vacuously true. Non-vacuism, by contrast, says the truth-values of counterpossibles are affected by the truth-values of the consequents. Some counterpossibles are true, some false. Williamson objects to non-vacuism. He asks us to consider someone who answered ‘11’ to ‘What is 5 + 7?’ but who mistakenly believes that he answered ‘13’. For the non-vacuist, (1) is false, (2) true: (1) If 5 + 7 were 13, x (...) would have got that sum right (2) If 5 + 7 were 13, x would have got that sum wrong Williamson is not persuaded by the initial intuitiveness of such examples: ... they tend to fall apart when thought through. For example, if 5 + 7 were 13 then 5 + 6 would be 12, and so (by another eleven steps) 0 would be 1, so if the number of right answers I gave were 0, the number of right answers I gave would be 1. (2006) That’s the whole argument—much of it implicit. Alan Baker’s critique (2007) of Brogaard and Salerno (2007) prompts us to say something less abbreviated about a less abbreviated form of Wiliamson’s argument. Then we further develop our (2007) counterfactual analysis of essense. (shrink)

Adam Smith writes history to teach people how a plurality of forces informs our moral and economic actions. He employs the stadial theory—prevalent in his day—to explore four different states, or kinds of society, but he does not intend to use these to write a simple, linear history of the ‘stages’ of human progress. This article employs Smith’s typological method for writing history to create a four-fold typo­lo­gy of how contemporary scholars have interpreted Smith’s use of history. By using an (...) approach, drawn from Smith’s historiography, to understand his later interpreters, this article demonstrates that Smith’s approach to history is about telling a story that embraces plurality, holds differences in tension, and resists simplification. (shrink)

Responsible data management is a multifaceted topic involving standards within the research community regarding research design and the sharing of data as well as the collection, selection, analysis and interpretation of data. Transparency in the manipulation of images is increasingly important in order to avoid misrepresentation of research findings, and research oversight is also critical in helping to assure the integrity of the research process. Intellectual property issues both unite and divide academe and industry in their approaches to data management. (...) Central to the realization and promulgation of responsible data management is clear and careful communication of standards and expectations within the research community to trainees as well as among colleagues. These topics are examined and explored in depth in a special issue of Science and Engineering Ethics on responsible data management. (shrink)

This article explores the way that senile dementia is represented in contemporary culture, with particular reference to texts which narrate the experience of caring for a parent or spouse with one form of the illness. These narratives raise problematic issues about the materiality of the body and its relation to individual identity, and the unstable relationship between memory and identity in postmodern culture, by drawing on the actual experience of bodily dependency and disorientating memory loss in dementia patients. These speculations (...) about the body, memory and the self are ultimately related in narratives of dementia to the inevitable process of aging and dying and the cultural meanings attached to it. The article places the representation of dementing illnesses within a Foucauldian narrative of surveillance and control in the discourse of aging and death in modern Western societies, redemptive views of illness in western culture and arguments about death in contemporary theory. (shrink)

Readers will learn what logic is, use truth tables and truth trees, make sense of complex arguments, and use logic every day.

Kant wants to show that freedom is possible in the face of natural necessity. Transcendental idealism is his solution, which locates freedom outside of nature. I accept that this makes freedom possible, but object that it precludes the recognition of other rational agents. In making this case, I trace some of the history of Kant’s thoughts on freedom. In several of his earlier works, he argues that we are aware of our own activity. He later abandons this approach, as he (...) worries that any awareness of our activity involves access to the noumenal, and thereby conflicts with the epistemic limits of transcendental idealism. In its place, from the second Critique onwards, Kant argues that we are conscious of the moral law, which tells me that I ought to do something, thus revealing that I can. This is the only proof of freedom consistent with transcendental idealism, but I argue that such an exclusively first-personal approach precludes the recognition of other rational agents. I conclu.. (shrink)

One of the central issues dividing proponents of metaphysical interpretations of transcendental idealism concerns Kant’s views on the distinctness of things in themselves and appearances. Proponents of metaphysical one-object interpretations claim that things in themselves and appearances are related by some kind of one-object grounding relation, through which the grounding and grounded relata are different aspects of the same object. Proponents of metaphysical two-object interpretations, by contrast, claim that things in themselves and appearances are related by some kind of two-object (...) grounding relation, through which the grounding and grounded relata involve distinct objects. By way of investigating Kant’s overarching account of grounding, I will argue that the most plausible metaphysical interpretation of transcendental idealism is one on which we can know that there are things in themselves grounding appearances, but not which specific kind of one- or two-object grounding relation obtain between them. Our ignorance of things in themselves therefore extends to their distinctness from appearances — pace both metaphysical one-object interpretations and metaphysical two-object interpretations. (shrink)

Few fates seem worse than living without cause for hope. Yet what is it to have a cause for hope? And how is it related to having hope? Although these questions have received relatively little philosophical attention, I argue that Kant advances a rationalist account of hope that addresses them. My central thesis has two parts. First, hope is a rational attitude for Kant; certain rational conditions are needed to differentiate hope from other desiderative attitudes (such as mere wishing or (...) fantasizing). Second, these rational conditions involve causal inferences made by the hoping agent. To hope, an agent must make certain inferences about the cause of her desire and the cause of her belief that the object of her desire is possible. In short, to hope requires an agent to take herself to have a cause for hope. (shrink)

abstract: Moral autonomy might seem to harbor inconsistency. Whereas nomos suggests that moral laws are grounded in our essence or nature (and thus are not up to us), autos suggests that they are grounded in some free act of self-legislation or prescription (and thus are up to us). Latter-day Kantians often respond by compromising on autonomy, deflating either nomos or autos. This investigation reconstructs how Christian Wolff, Kant’s great rationalist predecessor, already forged a path for embracing autonomy without compromise. His (...) reconciliation, I argue, rests on distinguishing different respects in which moral laws stand in need of grounding. I further unravel why no parallel reconciliation is found in Kant. This, I conclude, still leaves open that Kant may similarly seek to embrace autonomy without compromise. (shrink)

Let me begin by saying that I am sympathetic to the simulation theory, especially where it is conceived of as a crucial and central addition alongside the theory-theory as the explanation of our capacity to attribute mental states, rather than as an exclusive and exhaustive account by itself.1 I part company with Professor Stueber, however, in that I view the recent simulation theory/theory- theory controversy as subject to resolution primarily through empirical findings. Still, it cannot be denied that Stueber has (...) helped to crystallize elements of the simulation theory/theory-theory debate that have been lurking all along, and has illuminated an important avenue of inquiry into the status of simulation. (shrink)

From the 1950s until the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, there were an untold number of Bible Smuggling organizations. Millions of dollars were raised every month during this period, and there were countless Christian spies who made contact with persecuted Christians and brought them contraband bibles. This paper is an analysis of East European evangelical missions before and after the great transformation of 1989. A few of these missions were able to adjust to the post-Cold War era (...) and have effective ministries in Eastern Europe today. The sources used in this treatment are texts dealing with premillennial eschatology, popular evangelical writings, and interviews with mission leaders, and personal observations based upon author's experience as a former bible courier and leader of one of the largest East European missions. A major source for this paper has been the flagship American evangelical magazine, Christianity Today. (shrink)