In recent years, campaigns across the globe have called for the removal of objects symbolic of white supremacy. This paper examines the ethics of altering or removing such objects. Do these strategies sanitize history, destroy heritage and suppress freedom of speech? Or are they important steps towards justice? Does removing monuments and renaming schools reflect a lack of parity and unfairly erase local identities? Or can it sometimes be morally required, as an expression of respect for the memories of people (...) who endured past injustices; a recognition of this history's ongoing legacies; and a repudiation of unjust social hierarchies? (shrink)

The concept of biodiversity has played a central role within conservation biology over the last thirty years. Precisely how it should be understood, however, is a matter of ongoing debate. In this paper we defend what we call a classic multidimensional conception of biodiversity. We begin by introducing two arguments for eliminating the concept of biodiversity from conservation biology, both of which have been put forward in a recent paper by Santana. The first argument is against the concept’s scientific usefulness. (...) The other is against its value as a target of conservation. We show that neither of these objections is successful against the classic multidimensional conception of biodiversity. Biodiversity thus understood is important from a scientific perspective, because it plays important explanatory roles within contemporary ecology. Moreover, although it does not encompass all valuable features of the natural world, this does not show that we should abandon it as a target of conservation. Instead, biodiversity should be conceived as one of many grounds of value associated with ecosystems. This is consistent with concluding that a central aim of conservationists should be to protect biodiversity. (shrink)

Drawing on findings from the study of prejudice and prejudice reduction, we identify a number of mechanisms through which religious communities may influence the intergroup attitudes of their members. We hypothesize that religious participation could in principle either reduce or promote prejudice with respect to any given target group. A religious community’s influence on intergroup attitudes will depend upon the specific beliefs, attitudes, and practices found within the community, as well as on interactions between the religious community and the larger (...) social environment in which it is embedded. Basing our proposals on findings from the literature on prejudice formation and prejudice reduction allows us to outline useful directions for future studies of religion and prejudice. (shrink)

It is recalled that serious doubts can be raised concerning the status of theories such as those pertaining to the rights of future generations, or the constraints imposed on us by theories of intergenerational justice. At the same time, we do have moral obligations to future generations. But these must be based on an appraisal of what are likely to be the main interests that future generations will have and which of these are most likely to be under permanent threat. (...) These, it is argued, will be in the field of human relations rather than in the field of the environment. It is concluded, therefore, that the most important bequest we can make to future generations is to leave them a society in which there is a greater respect for basic human rights than is the case today throughout most of the world. And since the best way of bequeathing a more decent society to future generations is, of course, to improve the respect for human rights today, there is no conflict of interest between the present generation and future generations. Hence, theories of intergenerational distributive justice are not only untenable but are also unnecessary. (shrink)

During the last two or three decades, various developments in the environmental sphere have led to increasing concern with our obligations to posterity and to the non‐human part of the natural world. These developments have exposed gaps in both traditional, moral, and political theory and in conventional economics. Environmental issues have exposed these gaps and have brought to the fore questions such as how far the society, with whose welfare we are concerned, includes future generations or is limited to individual (...) nations or human beings. This book examines these questions as well as related ethical aspects of environmental policy, such as environmental valuation or the equitable allocation among nations of the burden of environmental protection. (shrink)

Another widely suggested principle governing our obligations to future generations is ‘sustainable development’. The first part of this chapter argues that the mainstream interpretations of the concept of sustainable development are open to serious objections on ethical grounds. The chapter also shows that even if intergenerational egalitarianism were a viable objective there is nothing intergenerationally egalitarian about sustainable development.

In his novel “Dolina Radości” [“Valley of Joy”] Stefan Chwin tackles the subject of metamorphoses. In this article I will talk about the issue of transformations in “Dolina radości”. The hero of the novel is a makeup­-artist and that is why metamorphoses are at the center of the action. Noteworthy are also transformations connected with the most important political events and the most important places in Europe in the 20th century for example in the Polish city of Gdańsk which Chwin (...) writes about. The events of December 1970 are described in an episode of the novel but are a very important element of the whole book. This article first presents references to German literary works which are the part of the literature of German­-Polish dialogue. (shrink)

The main focus of the paper is the role of listeners’ emotion-relevant characteristics and musical expertise in the granularity of affective responses to music. Another objective of the study is to test the consistency of the granularity of affect that is perceived in music and/or experienced in response to it. In Experiment 1, 91 musicians and nonmusicians listened to musical excerpts and grouped them according to the similarity of the affects they experienced while listening. Finer grouping granularity was found in (...) musicians and high rumination scorers. Male musicians with above-median scores in rumination produced a larger number of clusters than the other male participants. Experiment 2 that engaged 23 participants demonstrated moderate consistency with which listeners grouped affects that they perceived in music and affects they experienced while listening to music. The study suggests that affective responses to music are subject to individual differences in musical expertise and rumination. Affects perceived in music and felt in response to it seem to be categorized with reference to the common principles. However, the cues that are used in such instances of categorization seem to be different. The paper encourages further research on the importance of listeners’ personal characteristics for the affective responses to music. (shrink)

Gregory Bateson said that we are “governed by epistemologies that we know to be wrong” back in 1972. In the same book Bateson wrote: “the organism that destroys its environment destroys itself.” Almost forty years later, global ecological systems are in steep decline and converging crises make a deep evaluation of the underlying premises of our philosophical traditions an urgent imperative. This paper will suggest that the roots of the economic crisis are epistemological and that, to correct this error, whole (...) systems thinking and ecological literacy will become increasingly important in business management as well as in other disciplines. It will also suggest that the economic crisis opened new political space and has provided an opportunity for intervention. If we are brave enough to examine the roots of our problems there is possibility for renewal. (shrink)

A Professor of Medical Ethics and a theatre director, also mother and daughter, talk about health, illness, suffering, performance and practice. Using the lenses of ethical and performance theory, they explore what it means to be a patient, a spectator and a practitioner and cover many plays, texts and productions: Samuel Beckett’s Not I and All That Fall, Sarah Kane’s Crave, Tim Crouch’s An Oak Tree, Enda Walsh’s Ballyturk, Annie Ryan’s adaptation of Eimear McBride’s novel A Girl Is a Half-Formed (...) Thing, Duncan MacMillan’s People, Place and Things and Henrik Ibsen’s Hedda Gabler. These were selected because first we have seen, studied or worked with each and they have continued to inspire us. Second, they offer rich and revealing insights into the ways in which meaning is/are both negotiated and contested in relation to health and illness. It is the iterative negotiation of meaning that, it is argued, is the essence of narrative practice, be it in medicine or in the theatre. The difference and divergence of perception, response and interpretation to dramatic performance can test relationships, be they professional, creative or familial. Yet, the capacity to understand, and embrace, disagreement and uncertainty is vital; fundamental to a flourishing life. For it is by recognising our part in creating narratives, broken and otherwise, that we can begin to recognise the necessary interactionism and humanity of both medicine and theatre. (shrink)

I emphasize the general character of the central claim made by Terrence Deacon about the necessity of complementary description of evolving cognitive systems. Next, I clarify and augment one of the claims made in the paper about the tools offered by information theory. Finally, I point to the need of further clarification of some central notions, which should help to make connections across discourses.

The idea of state education developed by activists associated with the governments that ruled in Poland after the May Coup which they put into practice was to educate citizens to be strongly attached to the Polish state, regardless of nationality and religion. All educational factors, including religious education, were to serve this purpose. Based on this assumption, the educational authorities aspired to have a decisive influence on the appointment of religious teachers, determining their qualifications, establishing the curricula and the choice (...) of textbooks. This led to conflicts with Catholic bishops, generally concerned with autonomy and exclusivity in setting rules on these issues. Ecclesiastical autonomy in matters of communicating the faith, formally accepted by law and church authorities, presupposed that the Church determines the content of religious instruction, the scope and shape of religious education, and selects teachers to communicate the principles of the faith to Catholics on its behalf. The bishops could not give the state a casting vote, for to do so would be to misappropriate their own duties, which stem from the nature of the episcopal mission. This was not understood by the state authorities who were unwilling to compromise in any way between the May Coup and the beginning of 1937 and wanted to have a decisive voice in the appointment and qualifications of religious teachers, in the scope and shape of religious curricula and textbooks, as well as complete control over church organizations allowed to function in schools. While church authorities, Catholic columnists and educators, as well as the activists of church organizations spoke out and discussed and even protested publicly about coeducation, the presence of non-Catholic teachers in mainstream schools, and the anti-religious attitude of teachers affiliated with left-wing trade unions, the issues of the appointment and qualifications of religious teachers, curricula and textbooks, on top of the control of church organizations in schools were raised only during discussions and correspondence between the church and school authorities. Except for one statement by the School Committee published in the diocesan journals intended for the clergy, these disputes were not publicized on a national scale by either the Church or the state side. (shrink)

The vision of cooperation between the Catholic Church and the state authorities was firmly established in the consciousness of the Polish society in the interwar period. In the collective memory there is no recollection of sharp disputes between the Church and the political and social activists about the scope of recognition of Catholic principles as the basis for lawmaking. Before 1926, the government officials were not directly involved in the disputes. This changed after the May Coup, which is discussed in (...) the text. The source basis is constituted exclusively by documents produced by the state and Church offices and institutions regarding the presence of religious education and teaching in schools. Of particular cognitive value are the state documents and drafts of legal documents, memoranda of the Polish Episcopate and correspondence between state authorities and the School Committee of the Polish Episcopate and the ordinary bishops of individual dioceses. Programs published by educators and education officials associated with the ruling politicians are also an important element for learning about the views of state officials on the place of religion in the Polish school system. Apart from propaganda works written by communist educators, there is virtually no literature on these issues. Consequently, this text is a source dissertation. Thus, according to a principle accepted in the humanities, it uses the methods of analysis and synthesis. Even a cursory review of the documentation on state-church relations in matters of education and upbringing reveals the change in their character after the May Coup. Without destroying the legal order adopted in Poland, those in power and the officials subordinate to them, through a series of minor changes, tried to subordinate the Church to the state, hoping that it would become a tool for building a new citizen — the subject of the state. The sharpness of the sharpness of disputes was particularly evident in the matters of teaching and education during the 1932 school reform and the enactment of the new constitution in 1935. (shrink)

There is an abundance of enthusiasm and optimism about how governments at all levels can make use of big data, algorithms and artificial intelligence. There is also growing concern about the risks that come with these new systems. This article makes the case for greater government transparency and accountability about uses of big data through a Government of Canada qualitative research case study. Adapting a method from critical cartographers, I employ counter-mapping to map government big data practices and internal discussions (...) of risk and challenge. I do so by drawing on interviews and freedom of information requests. The analysis reveals that there are more concerns and risks than often publicly discussed and that there are significant areas of silence that need greater attention. The article underlines the need for our democratic systems to respond to our new datafied contexts by ensuring that our institutions make changes to better protect citizen rights, uphold democratic principles and ensure means for citizen intervention. (shrink)

How leaders and managers respond to not knowing is highly relevant given the complex, ambiguous, and chaotic business environment of the twenty-first century. Drawing on the literature from a variety of disciplines, the paper explores the dominant, unfavorable conceptualization of not knowing. The authors present some potential ethical implications of a negative view of not knowing and suggest how organizations would benefit from identifying any unhelpful aspects of the culture that may encourage unethical, undesirable, and/or hasty actions in situations of (...) not knowing. The paper specifically illustrates how patience, courage, honesty, integrity, and humility are integral to negative capability in the contexts of not knowing. Finally, the paper calls for deeper inquiry into the role of virtue ethics in preparing managers and leaders for not knowing and urges organizations to embrace negative capability in not knowing rather than engaging in damaging delusion. (shrink)

Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We (...) conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of linguistic phenomena which, as a legacy of the centuries-old tradition of the Roman Empire, are rooted in Polish jurisdictional texts. The study focused on foreign-language expressions and short texts in Latin, used in judicial decisions. The aim of the study was to determine the function of Latinisms as foreign-language expressions in judicial decisions and how their use influences the communicativeness and persuasiveness of argumentation. During the analysis, it was noticed that Latinisms in jurisdictional texts (...) are used on four levels, including: legal maxims, terminology equivalence, linguistic ornaments and the description of taboo phenomena. On the basis of the identified categories, efforts were made to determine the extent to which Latin strengthens or weakens the power of persuasion of judicial decisions. (shrink)

A person who is liable to defensive harm has forfeited his rights against the imposition of the harm, and so is not wronged if that harm is imposed. A number of philosophers, most notably Jeff McMahan, argue for an instrumental account of liability, whereby a person is liable to defensive harm when he is either morally or culpably responsible for an unjust threat of harm to others, and when the imposition of defensive harm is necessary to avert the threatened unjust (...) harm. Others may favour a purely noninstrumental account of liability: one that looks only to the past behaviour of the potentially liable person. We argue that both views are vulnerable to serious objections. Instead we develop and defend a new view of liability to defensive harm: the pluralist account. The pluralist account states that liability to defensive harm has at least two bases. First, if an attacker is morally or culpably responsible for an unjust attack then he has forfeited what we call his agency right, and in doing so he has made himself partially liable to defensive harm. Whether the attacker is fully liable to defensive harm depends, however, on whether the imposition of defensive harm would infringe a different right held by the attacker: his humanitarian right. Humanitarian rights are rights to be provided with urgently needed resources or to be protected from serious harms when others can do so at reasonably low cost. We argue the pluralist account avoids the objections to which the instrumental and noninstrumental views are vulnerable, coheres with our intuitive reactions in a wide range of cases, and sheds new light on the way different rights combine to determine a person's liability to suffer harm. (shrink)

Szkolnictwo elementarne prowadzone przez parafie i zakony katolickie obrządku łacińskiego na ziemiach polskich przyłączonych do Rosji w latach 1772–1795 aż do reformy systemu edukacyjnego wprowadzonej w 1803 r. nie były kontrolowane przez władze państwowe. Prowadziły one działalność na podstawie dawnego prawa polskiego lub zgodnie z zasadami wywodzącymi się z tradycji staropolskich, akceptowanymi przez władze kościelne i rodziców posyłających dzieci na naukę. Jedyną instytucją nadzorującą były władze kościelne, które zbierały informacje o stanie szkolnictwa oraz starały się wpływać na plebanów i władze (...) zakonne, by organizowały szkoły elementarne przy każdej parafii i każdym klasztorze. Jesienią 1797 r. w niekanonicznej diecezji pińskiej funkcjonowało 147 szkółek parafialnych lub zakonnych. Szkoły te zorganizowano w 120 miejscowościach (72% ze 166 miejscowości, w których istniała świątynia parafialna lub zakonna nieparafialna). W porównaniu do stanu szkolnictwa elementarnego w ostatnich latach niepodległości Rzeczpospolitej liczba szkół znacznie wzrosła. Należy jednak pamiętać, że raporty z 1797 r. odnotowują każdą formę prowadzonego nauczania. W czasach Komisji Edukacji Narodowej nauczanie przy parafii i w klasztorach sierot i dzieci z ubogich rodzin, a także nauka prowadzona według starych wzorców traktowane byłyby jako nauczanie prywatne, nie szkoła formalna. Zwykle nie odnotowywano takich miejsc nauczania w spisach szkół. Jeśli za szkołę formalną działacze oświatowi uznawali tylko taką, której program pokrywał się z treściami zawartymi w elementarzu wydanym przez Komisję Edukacji Narodowej (nauka pisania i czytania, rachunki, katechizm i nauka powinności moralnych), to tak uczono tylko w 21 szkołach diecezji pińskiej (18%). Widoczne jest także trzymanie się przez duchowieństwo zasady, że szkoła elementarna, przeznaczona z zasady dla dzieci szlacheckich, powinna przygotowywać do nauki w szkołach wyżej zorganizowanych. Świadczy o tym prowadzenie w aż 47 placówkach nauczania języka łacińskiego (39%). W 140 szkółkach elementarnych rządcy parafii lub przełożeni zakonni odnotowali w raportach liczbę dzieci uczących się w szkołach. Jesienią 1797 r. w diecezji pińskiej uczyło się 1669 dzieci, w znakomitej większości chłopców. Do większości szkół uczęszczało kilku lub kilkunastu uczniów. Przeciętnie w szkole elementarnej diecezji pińskiej uczyło się wówczas 11,9 uczniów, czyli niewiele więcej niż w latach poprzedzających trzeci rozbiór Polski (wówczas średnio na szkołę przypadało 11,2 uczniów). Dziewczęta kształcono w 7 konwiktach prowadzonych przez zakony żeńskie, w których uczyło się 122 uczennic, według takich samych zasad jak w Polsce przedrozbiorowej. Wychowaniem i nauczaniem w nich zajmowało się 148 osób, 67 księży i zakonników oraz 81 pedagogów świeckich. Duchowni z zasady nie pobierali wynagrodzenia, uczyli bowiem w ramach obowiązków duszpasterskich. Nauczyciele świeccy za naukę w szkole byli wynagradzani przez plebanów, przełożonych zakonnych, rodziców, właścicieli ziemskich lub pobierali opłatę z funduszu kościelnego z tytułu posługi organisty lub kantora. Wynagrodzeniem za naukę mogła być pensja, dochody fundacyjne, akcydensy (opłaty okazyjne), użytkowanie ziemi ornej, sadu i ogrodu, opłaty uczniowskie, legaty pieniężne i naturalia. (shrink)

The recent interest in exploring whether authoritative figures of the Reformed tradition employed a concept of theōsis or deification in their soteriology continues to grow. However, it is yet unclear how the supposed implicit Reformed doctrine of deification relates to the more explicit concept of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, many of the arguments for theōsis in the theology of John Calvin, Jonathan Edwards, or T. F. Torrance seem to rely on confusing these two soteriological concepts. This makes (...) it almost impossible to assess if it is theōsis or the indwelling of the Holy Spirit (or some interesting combination) that is being appealed to in Reformed thinking. This paper makes a step towards unpicking the knot between the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and theōsis in Reformed theology by offering five possible ways to demarcate these two concepts. It is concluded that the final ‘Mereological Demarcation’ is currently the most acceptable. (shrink)

The author is in essential agreement with Tallis, that when we only deploy one mode of interpretation, ie the scientific mode, we lose the fundamental realities of human experience, including the experience of free will, on which, ironically, scientific practice depends. Tallis’s philosophical stance is compared to that of Owen Barfield and his work on free will is placed within the context of his other books. A sense of wonder is common to all of them.

If one embraces spiritual development as a kind of cognitive and moral development, then an important term here from a cognitive perspective and beyond might be “salvation.” But is it not reserved for the religious sphere? This article shows that it doesn't have to be. A new form of salvation suggested by Francophone philosopher Luc Ferry concerns first of all the resignation from a faith about a transcendent God, which is substituted with an undefined sacrum (what is holy, is highest) (...) in immanence. New form of ethic is becoming a popular alternative to religious spirituality today. However, traditional and new spirituality should not be treated as separate sets, as they do not necessarily compete with each other. Systems of spiritual development related to specific denominations will always provide inspiration even for atheist’s ethic. The latter can indicate that apart from religion, there is also a spirituality that can develop in a person. Nihilism is not the only alternative to religion, as sometimes the defenders of the old religious order try to show. (shrink)

Knowledge about aspects that influence recovery and adaptation in the postacute phase of disabling health events is key to understanding how best to provide appropriate rehabilitation and health services. Qualitative longitudinal research makes it possible to look for patterns, key time points and critical moments that could be vital for interventions and supports. However, strategies that support robust data management and analysis for longitudinal qualitative research in health‐care are not well documented in the literature. This article reviews three challenges encountered (...) in a large longitudinal qualitative descriptive study about experiences of recovery and adaptation after traumatic brain injury in New Zealand, and the strategies and technologies used to address them. These were (i) tracking coding and analysis decisions during an extended analysis period; (ii) navigating interpretations over time and in response to new data; and (iii) exploiting data volume and complexity. Concept mapping during coding review, a considered combination of information technologies, employing both cross‐sectional and narrative analysis, and an expectation that subanalyses would be required for key topics helped us manage the study in a way that facilitated useful and novel insights. These strategies could be applied in other qualitative longitudinal studies in healthcare inquiry to optimise data analysis and stimulate important insights. (shrink)

The David Lewis’s article concerns the issue of penal substitution in the dual context of the contemporary system of criminal law, in which punishment does not perform a compensatory function, and in the context of the Christian interpretation of Christ’s death as Atonement. It may seem that we do not believe in penal substitution, but in fact we do believe in it selectively. There are Christians who believe that Christ’s death is a payment of the debt of punishment owed by (...) the sinners, but do not believe that a murderer’s friend can serve on his behalf a death sentence. Most of us believe in penal substitution with reference to fines but not other kinds of punishment. In both cases the beliefs concerning penal substitution are clearly inconsistent. However, if selective acceptance of penal substitution is so common, perhaps it makes sense after all. (shrink)

The question of whether AI systems such as robots can or should be afforded moral agency or patiency is not one amenable either to discovery or simple reasoning, because we as societies constantly reconstruct our artefacts, including our ethical systems. Consequently, the place of AI systems in society is a matter of normative, not descriptive ethics. Here I start from a functionalist assumption, that ethics is the set of behaviour that maintains a society. This assumption allows me to exploit the (...) theoretical biology of sociality and autonomy to explain our moral intuitions. From this grounding I extend to consider possible ethics for maintaining either human- or of artefact-centred societies. I conclude that while constructing AI systems as either moral agents or patients is possible, neither is desirable. In particular, I argue that we are unlikely to construct a coherent ethics in which it it is ethical to afford AI moral subjectivity. We are therefore obliged not to build AI we are obliged to. (shrink)

Heidegger and ethics is a contentious conjunction of terms. Martin Heidegger himself rejected the notion of ethics, while his endorsement of Nazism is widely seen as unethical. This major new study examines the complex and controversial issues involved in bringing them together. By working backwards through his work, from his 1964 claim that philosophy has been completed to _Being and Time_, his first major work, Joanna Hodge questions Heidegger's denial that his enquires were concerned with ethics. She discovers a (...) form of ethics in Heidegger's thinking which elucidates his important distinction between metaphysics and philosophy. Against many contemporary views, she proposes therefore that ethics can be retrieved and questions the relation between ethics and metaphysics that Heidegger had made so pervasive. (shrink)

One of the unmet challenges for risk–benefit assessment in biomedical research is whether there should be an upper limit of risk in non-beneficial studies involving competent and consenting participants, and if yes, how it should be defined. This chapter focuses on this second question. It examines the four dominant regulatory and conceptual approaches to setting a maximal risk threshold in research: no catastrophic harm/risk approach, pure procedural approach, numerical approach, and comparative approach. It then considers the pure procedural approach, which (...) leaves the judgment of risk acceptability to RECs discretion. The approach has significant advantages, but it is not free from certain shortcomings, such as unwarranted diversity and arbitrariness of RECs judgments. The chapter concludes by sketching the outlines of what is referred to as the “ELS procedural approach” that provides RECs with procedural recommendations for identifying an ethically, legally and socially acceptable upper limit of risk in non-beneficial research on volunteers. The ELS procedural approach is an improvement over the pure procedural approach. It is more standardized and accountable, but still context-sensitive and flexible. (shrink)

A blueprint for social change showing how we can reverse the destructive attitudes that threaten our world.

Each year thousands of individuals enrol in clinical trials as healthy volunteers to earn money. Some of them pursue research participation as a full-time or at least a part-time job. They call themselves professional or semiprofessional guinea pigs. The practice of paying healthy volunteers raises numerous ethical concerns. Different payment models have been discussed in literature. Dickert and Grady argue for a wage-payment model. This model gives research subjects a standardised hourly wage, and it is based on an assumption that (...) research participation is morally indistinguishable from other forms of unskilled labour. In this paper, I will challenge this assumption. I will argue that human guinea pigging has particular characteristics which taken together make it significantly different from other forms of labour. Participation in research is skill-independent. Healthy volunteers are valuable not because they are skilful persons, but because they are human bodies. The role of research volunteers is mainly passive. They are not asked to produce goods or deliver services. They are paid for enduring unpleasant, painful and risky interventions performed by investigators. Research volunteering involves inherent risks and uncertainties, and subjects have little or no control over their minimisation and materialisation. I conclude that participation in clinical research is a specific kind of activity. It is more like renting out one’s body to strangers, than working. Thus, research participation should not be treated on par with other forms of employment. (shrink)

Our starting point in this article is the debate between John Harris and Iain Brassington on whether or not there is a duty to take part in scientific research. We consider the arguments that have been put forward based on fairness and a duty to rescue, and suggest an alternative justification grounded in a hypothetical agreement: that is, because effective healthcare cannot be taken for granted, but requires continuous medical research, and nobody knows what kind of healthcare they will need, (...) participating in research should be viewed from the perspective of a social contract, based on our mutual need for medical advances. (shrink)

Unprecedented advances in medicine, genetic engineering, and demographic forecasting raise new questions that strain the categories and assumptions of traditional ethical theories. Heyd's approach resolves many paradoxes in intergenerational justice, while offering a major test case for the profound problems of the limits of ethics and the nature of value.

Social learning is a source of behaviour for many species, but few use it as extensively as they seemingly could. In this article, I attempt to clarify our understanding of why this might be. I discuss the potential computational properties of social learning, then examine the phenomenon in nature through creating a taxonomy of the representations that might underly it. This is achieved by first producing a simplified taxonomy of the established forms of social learning, then describing the primitive capacities (...) necessary to support them, and finally considering which of these capacities we actually have evidence for. I then discuss theoretical limits on cultural evolution, which include having sufficient information transmitted to support robust representations capable of supporting variation for evolution, and the need for limiting the extent of social conformity to avoid ecological fragility. Finally, I show how these arguments can inform several key scientific questions, including the uniqueness of human culture, the long lifespans of cultural species, and the propensity of animals to seemingly have knowledge about a phenomenon well before they will act upon it. (shrink)