“Since the actions I perform as an individual only have an inconsequential effect on the threat of climate change,” a common argument goes, “it cannot be morally wrong for me to take my car to work everyday or refuse to recycle.” This argument has received a lot of scorn from philosophers over the years, but has actually been defended in some recent articles. A more systematic treatment of a central set of related issues shows how maneuvering around these issues is (...) no easy philosophical task. In the end, it appears, the argument from inconsequentialism indeed is correct in typical cases, but there are also important qualificatory considerations. (shrink)

The poetry and journalistic essays of Katherine Tillman often appeared in publications sponsored by the American Methodist church. Collected together for the first time, her works speak to the struggles and triumphs of African-American women.

Reviewing the literature on political participation and civic engagement, the article offers a critical examination of different conceptual frameworks. Drawing on previous definitions and operationalisations, a new typology for political participation and civic engagement is developed, highlighting the multidimensionality of both concepts. In particular, it makes a clear distinction between manifest “political participation” (including formal political behaviour as well as protest or extra-parliamentary political action) and less direct or “latent” forms of participation, conceptualized here as “civic engagement” and “social involvement”. (...) The article argues that the notion of “latent” forms of participation is crucial to understand new forms of political behaviour and the prospects for political participation in different countries. Due to these innovations it contributes to a much-needed theoretical development within the literature on political participation and citizen engagement. (shrink)

Newman’s explicit presentation of the ideal type, “the gentleman,” appears first and foremost in his Oratory papers of 1847 and 1848, and appears only secondarily, and then but partially, four and five years later in his Dublin Discourses of 1852. This essay traces lines of similarity and of difference between these successive portraits and distinguishes both from the attractive, better-known sketch Newman presents as Lord Shaftesbury’s, the “beau ideal” of the man of the world.

The first biography of Kierkegaard's literary muse and one-time fiancée, from the author of the definitive biography of the philosopher Kierkegaard's Muse, the first biography of Regine Olsen, the literary inspiration and one-time fiancée of Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, is a moving portrait of a long romantic fever that had momentous literary consequences. Drawing on more than one hundred previously unknown letters by Regine that acclaimed Kierkegaard biographer Joakim Garff discovered by chance, the book tells the story of Kierkegaard (...) and Regine's mysterious relationship more fully and vividly than ever before, shedding new light on her influence on his life and writings. Like Dante's Beatrice, Regine is one of the great muses of literary history. Kierkegaard proposed to her in 1840, but broke off the engagement a year later. After their break, they saw each other strikingly often, inside dimly lit churches, on the streets of Copenhagen, and on the paths along the old city ramparts, passing by without uttering a word. Despite or because of their separation in life, Kierkegaard made Regine his literary life companion, "that single individual" to whom he dedicated all his works. Garff shows how Regine became a poetic presence in the frequent erotic conflicts found throughout Kierkegaard's writings, from the famous "Seducer's Diary" account of their relationship to diary entries made shortly before his death in 1855. In turn, Regine remained preoccupied with Kierkegaard until her own death almost fifty years later, and her newly discovered letters, written to her sister Cornelia, reveal for the first time a woman of flesh and blood. A psychologically acute narrative that is as gripping as a novel, Kierkegaard's Muse is an unforgettable account of a wild, strange, and poignant romance that made an indelible mark on literary history. Some images inside the book are unavailable due to digital copyright restrictions. (shrink)

In this paper we use the concept of the person to examine person‐centred dialogue and show how person‐centred dialogue is different from and significantly more than transfer of information, which is the dominant notion in health care. A further motivation for the study is that although person‐centredness as an idea has a strong heritage in nursing and the broader healthcare discourse, person‐centred conversation is usually discussed as a distinct and unitary approach to communication, primarily related to the philosophy of dialogue—the (...) philosophy of Martin Buber. In this paper we start with the concept of person to critically reflect on theoretical perspectives on communication to understand person‐centred conversations in the context of nursing and health. We position the concept of the person through the use of Paul Ricoeur's philosophy and follow by distinguishing four theoretical perspectives on communication before reflecting on the relevance of each of these for person‐centred communication. These perspectives are: a linear view of communication as transfer of information, communication as a relation in the sense of philosophy of dialogue, practice‐based communication on constructionist grounds, and communication as a practice to create social community. In relation to the concept of the person, we do not find transfer of information relevant as a theoretical underpinning for person‐centred conversations. From the other three perspectives that are relevant we distinguish five types of person‐centred conversations pertinent to nursing and health: problem identifying conversations, instructive conversations, guiding and supportive conversations, caring and existential conversations, and therapeutic conversations. Through this analysis it is argued that person‐centred communication and conversations are substantially different to transfer of information. We also discuss the significance of communication adjusted to specific situations, including emphasis on how we speak in relation to the aim or topic of a conversation. (shrink)

Many writers have commented on the heterogeneity of the socially responsible investment (SRI) movement. However, few have actually tried to understand and explain it, and even fewer have discussed whether the opposite – standardisation – is possible and desirable. In this article, we take a broader perspective on the issue of the heterogeneity of SRI. We distinguish between four levels on which heterogeneity can be found: the terminological, definitional, strategic and practical. Whilst there is much talk about the definitional ambiguities (...) of SRI, we suggest that there is actually some agreement on the definitional level. There are at least three explanations which we suggest can account for the heterogeneity on the other levels: cultural and ideological differences between different regions, differences in values, norms and ideology between various SRI stakeholders, and the market setting of SRI. Discussing the implications of the three explanations for the SRI market, we suggest that there is reason to be sceptical about the possibilities of standardisation if not standardisation is imposed top-down. Whether this kind of standardisation is desirable or not, we argue, depends on what the motives for it would be. To the extent that standardisation may facilitate the mainstreaming of SRI, it could be a good thing – but we entertain doubts about whether mainstreaming really requires standardisation. (shrink)

A critical issue for the future growth and impact of socially responsible investment (SRI) is whether institutional investors are legally permitted to engage in it – in particular whether it is compatible with the fiduciary duties of trustees. An ambitious report from the United Nations Environment Programme’s Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), commonly referred to as the ‘Freshfields report’, has recently given rise to considerable optimism on this issue among proponents of SRI. The present article puts the arguments of the Freshfields (...) report into some further both empirical and critical perspective, however, and suggests that its findings do not call for very much optimism. The general argument is that while the understanding of fiduciary duty outlined by the Freshfields report seems to allow institutional investors to at least sometimes take some social or environmental considerations into account, the support it gives for SRI is notably contingent and, furthermore, it rules out exactly the kind of SRI which proponents of social responsibility and environmental sustainability should hold in highest regard – proactive cases and socially effective investment strategies. If SRI is to become an important force for corporate social responsibility through its adoption by institutional investors, then, it is suggested that legal reform is needed. (shrink)

This article analyses international large-scale assessments in education from a temporal perspective. The article discusses and compares the different conceptions of time in the early inter...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Girardian Event and the Literary EventThe Scapegoat and Revelation in Alice Munro's "Runaway"Joakim Wrethed (bio)My critics constantly accuse me of switching back and forth between the representation and the reality of what is being represented. Readers who have been following the text attentively will understand that I do not deserve the reproach or, if I do, we all deserve it equally because we affirm the existence of (...) real victims behind the almost mythological texts of medieval persecutors.—René Girard, The Scapegoat, 57Girardian philosophical and theological thinking is founded on events: mainly the two generic events of mimetic desire and the purifying sacrifice. However, in addition, there is more nuanced cognition of evental structures that becomes highlighted, particularly when engaging with literary texts through Girardian concepts. It is my intent here to probe deeply into Girard's evental layers through the analytic encounter with Alice Munro's short story "Runaway," which clearly indicates the existence of "real victims" in the sense Girard describes it in the epigraph just shown, even though obviously Munro's victims are moved into the context of our times through the use of [End Page 53] literature as a form of myth-making. We shall more closely examine the literary event as such and what it may mean in Munro's work, but then also bring relevant insights back into Girard's evental framework to ponder some conceptual timbres in his thinking about the scapegoat and revelation. In the Canadian author's short story we therefore focus on these interrelated topics of revelation and scapegoating in order to analyze them in close connection with Girard. The central claim is that Girard uses founding events to ground the generic aspects of the theory, but in addition the argument suggests that the engagement with Munro's short story reveals that the literary event "overflows" any theoretical appropriation of evental structures. Thus, the cognition of the event displays a hermeneutical circle that moves events back into narrativity, myth, and religion, out of which Girard once derived his central ideas.There are mainly three different aspects that need to be outlined here from the beginning, which constitute an organizing structure that is useful when exposing Munro's fiction to close analysis, namely, Christian revelation, anthropological revelation, and the capacity of events to generate new meaning through the underlying phenomenon of eventfulness. According to Bernard Perret, Girard has two central principles attached to his usage of the concept of "revelation":When he speaks of "Christian revelation," he gives this term its usual theological meaning: that of a self-revelation by God giving access to truths that human reason is unable to discover through its own forces. In addition to this first meaning, Girard on many occasions uses the word "revelation"—or "unveiling," which is almost synonymous—in the sense of a discovery giving access to a rational understanding of anthropological facts.1This seemingly incompatible usage will be an important distinction when we move into the realm of contemporary fiction. Moreover, Girard also adds yet another aspect of the event that needs to be taken into consideration as well, and this is the third characteristic referred to above. Perret stresses that Girard and Christianity as a whole state "that all human existence is characterized by events creative of new meanings."2 This last claim fits the dominion of creative fiction in a fertile way. As we shall see when we approach Munro's rather complex short story, we will have to engage with issues that are in line with Girard's theological thinking, but also with elements that problematize certain aspects of these phenomena. It should be mentioned that the Girard scholar Perret is mainly used in this analysis, since he provides a clear focus on aspects [End Page 54] of Girardian thinking that are particularly relevant. There are references directly to Girard's writing mainly in the notes.In order to set up a meaningful dialogue, we need to first ponder the literary event per se, partly since it is such a broad term but also since not all literary events can be seen as revelatory in the theological sense. I here outline a set... (shrink)

In Metaphysical Themes, Robert Pasnau interprets Thomas Hobbes as an anti-realist about all accidents in general. In opposition to Pasnau, we argue that Hobbes is a realist about some accidents (e.g., motion and magnitude). Section One presents Pasnau’s position on Hobbes; namely, that Hobbes is an unqualified anti-realist of the eliminativist sort. Section Two offers reasons to reject Pasnau’s interpretation. Hobbes explains that magnitude is mind-independent, and he offers an account of perception in terms of motion (understood as a mind-independent (...) feature of body). Therefore, it seems incorrect to call Hobbes an anti-realist about all accidents. Section Three considers Pasnau’s hypothetical response: he might claim that for Hobbes, motion reduces to body and does not exist in its own right. Section Four notes that reductionism about all accidents does not entail anti-realism about all accidents. Even granting Pasnau’s anticipated response, his anti-realist reading does not follow. Contra Pasnau, Hobbes is best understood as claiming that motion and magnitude exist mind-independently. (shrink)

This paper will examine the transformative possibilities of liminal space as described by Victor Turner and Isabel Clark in the musical experience. It draws on the author's previous phenomenography of musical experience an analytical frame based on the liminality of musical experience using the notion of difference-in-relationship drawing on Martin Buber's "I-Thou experience" and including theorists such as Dewey, Maslow, Levinas, Derrida, Noddings and Shore, M and I. S. Csikszentmihalyi, and Custodero. It will examine the implications of the use of (...) a liminal music space for cultural and personal transformation including its relationship between this space and the everyday world, the loss of boundaries, collective vulnerability, the opportunity to try out new personas, the handing over of responsibility to a higher power and the capacity for joyful play and the possibility of empowerment. It draws on Shakespeare's play Midsummer Night's Dream (drawing, as it does on Ovid's Metamorphoses) to illuminate the nature of transformation. (shrink)

I den moderna straffrättsliga diskussionen framhålls det ofta att straff ska utdömas på rationella och inte emotionella grunder. Rättssystemet ska sålunda inte hänge sig åt “primitiva hämndaktioner” utan systematiskt arbeta för att förebygga brott och mänskligt lidande. Förutom att ett sådant synsätt har tydliga utilitaristiska förtecken så innehåller det också starka retoriska inslag eftersom det sätts likhetstecken mellan brottsprevention och rationalitet, medan moralisk indignation och krav på rättvisa endast beskrivs i termer av primitiva, emotionella hämndbegär. I den här artikeln har (...) jag för avsikt att genom en analys av vedergällningsbegreppet visa att vedergällningens logik är rotad i vårt sätt att förhålla oss moraliskt till varandra – att den är ett uttryck för vår livsform. Jag kommer vidare att försöka åskådliggöra att vedergällningen är moraliskt sofistikerad snarare än primitiv. Slutligen kommer jag att framhålla att vedergällningens logik är en viktig komponent i vårt straffbegrepp, men att vedergällning och straff ändå måste särskiljas. Jag vill redan nu klargöra att jag i artikeln utgår från en analys av vår “vardagliga” användning av begreppsom ‘hämnd’, ‘vedergällning’ och ‘straff’. Det betyder att jag högst medvetet har valt att inte utgå från en teoretisk filosofisk diskussion om straffets rättfärdigande. Jag vill heller intepresentera någon ny form av retributivistisk teori, utan nöjer mig med att göra anmärkningar om hur vi faktiskt använder de begrepp som här särskådas. (shrink)

Ethical investment (also known as social investment, socially responsible investment [SRI], or sustainable investment) typically refers to the practice of integrating putatively ethical, social, or environmental considerations into a financial investment process – for instance, a pension fund's process of deciding what stocks or bonds to buy or sell. Whereas conventional or mainstream investment focuses solely upon financial risk and return, ethical investment thus also includes various nonfinancial goals or constraints in typical investment decisions. This type of investment has grown (...) to be a well-established feature of many stock markets in the past two decades or so. A recurring point of debate, however, is to what extent this phenomenon indeed constitutes a more ethical alternative to conventional types of financial behavior. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 12.2 (2004) 102-125 [Access article in PDF] Towards an Ecology of Music Education June Boyce-Tillman King Alfred's College, England Western culture has developed a concept of knowledge as divided into discrete categories, which are reflected in the disconnected subjects of our school curricula and the titles of our university faculties. However, music should be intimately bound up with the wider curriculum, particularly in (...) the areas of personal, social, cultural, moral, and spiritual education. From an examination of the values that are implicit in the musical traditions that dominate music education in Western culture, in this paper I will set out some pointers towards a more ecological understanding of music education, drawing on experiences I have had with music and music education in a variety of settings. I will examine how musicology has concentrated only on certain aspects of the musical experience, ignoring areas such as expressive character, value systems, and spirituality, which are the areas that link the musical experience to the fabric of life as lived beyond the confines of the classroom and academe. This paper seeks to re-establish a notion of connectedness both within the musical experience and also beyond it and through it to other areas of knowledge and understanding. For this I have adopted the term "ecology." To explicate this notion of ecology, I have developed a model which incorporates the values that are both usually associated with Western culture and are subjugated by it, drawing on the experience of music itself. [End Page 102] Ways of Knowing The first of these models deals with the social construction of knowledge. Stan Gooch defines two systems of thought embodied in various cultures in the world. He identifies the favored characteristics of one system (Type A) as activity leading to products; objectivity; impersonal logic; thinking and thought; detachment; and discrete categories of knowledge that are based on proof and scientific evidence. The other system (Type B) favors being; subjectivity; personal feeling; emotion; magic; involvement; associative ways of knowing; and belief and non-causal knowledge.1Gooch suggests that the Western world has chosen to value the first of these systems and neglect the other. This is done by a process of devaluation that can be carried out in various ways. In the Western media this devaluation can be manifested as public ridicule or by simply ignoring those events that reflect Type B values. Community-building activities based on associative ways of knowing and acknowledgement of people's feelings and sensibilities are not reported, while a considerable amount of space is given to the essentially dehumanizing practices of warfare and the dissociative practices of violence and crime. For example, reports and articles on holistic, associative approaches to health based on belief systems that defy rational explanation often end with throw-away comments like "If you believe that, then you will believe anything!" Public figures sometimes indulge in similar practices in their pronouncements by initiating policies to outlaw health practices that cannot be supported by scientific methodologies and appealing to the grounds of public safety. People who wish to embrace the values of Type B can easily be pathologized or criminalized as the dominant culture seeks to reinforce the validity of its Type A values. Academic, medical, psychological, and even sociological research concentrates on so-called objective methodologies associated with scientific ways of knowing and the use of numbers in some shape or form. Qualitative methodologies that collect people's stories are often regarded with suspicion because of the alleged subjectivity of the approach.So the values of Type B have become hidden or repressed by Western culture. I have therefore called the ways of knowing that characterize Type B "subjugated ways of knowing,"2 following the work of Michel Foucault and his notion of subjugated knowledges.3 This paper will concentrate on how the ideas of the subjugated ways of knowing can be used to understand where we are in music education, drawing on my experience in the UK. I shall look at ways of bringing the two ways of knowing-Type A and... (shrink)

As one of the more progressive facets of the socially responsible investment (SRI) movement, shareholder activism is generally recommended or justified on the grounds that it can create social change. But how effective are different kinds of activist campaigns likely to be in this regard? This article outlines the full range of different ways in which shareholder activism could make a difference by carefully going through, first, all the more specific lines of action typically included under the shareholder activism umbrella (...) and, second, all of the different ways in which it has been suggested that these could influence the activities of commercial companies. It is argued that – although much more empirical research is needed in the area – there are at least theoretical reasons for thinking that it will be difficult to influence companies through the standard actions of filing or voting on shareholder resolutions. However, some alternative strategies open to activists may allow them to increase their efficacy. It is specifically argued that even individual investors could be able to push for corporate change through devising a radically selfsacrificial campaign that manages to get the attention of powerful forces outside the corporate sphere. (shrink)

"A major transformation in thought took place during the Southern Sung (1127-1279). A new version of Confucian teaching, Tao-hsueh Confucianism (what modern scholars sometimes refer to as Neo-Confucianism), became state orthodoxy, a privileged status which it retained until the twentieth century." "Existing studies of the new Confucianism generally depict a single line of development to and from Chu Hsi (1130-1200), the greatest theoretician of the tradition. In this study of unprecedented scope, however, Hoyt Cleveland Tillman offers an integrated intellectual (...) history of the development of Tao-hsueh Confucianism which for the first time places Chu Hsi within the context of his contemporaries. Tillman's methodological strategy allows a rich, complex picture of the Tao-hsueh movement to emerge - one that is sure to transform the field of Sung Confucianism." "To reconstruct the evolution of the Tao-hsueh group, Tillman studies a number of Confucians from four distinct periods, reflecting the basic diversity that existed among them. His discussion is deeply grounded in political and philosophical history and in research on the social networks that joined the members of the Tao-hsueh group. Within this framework, he provides a vivid account of the changing scope of the movement, tracing its development into a "fellowship" and at times a political faction and demonstrating its movement from diversity to gradually increasing exclusiveness, particularly under the influence of Chu Hsi. Close attention is given to confrontational writings and debates within the group, which covered such issues as humaneness, the function of the mind, uses of the Book of Changes, social welfare programs, teaching methods, expediency, and the grounds for knowledge and authority." "A superbly erudite work, Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's Ascendancy is an invaluable contribution to the study of the history of Confucian thought in China."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

The profit motive refers to what is generally taken to be the underlying motivation of business and commercial activity: to collect revenues in excess of costs or, more simply, to make money. While both “profit” and “profit motive” may be given more technical definitions in economics, the latter's meaning is typically broader in philosophical discussions and so, for example, even managers of nonprofit organizations may be accused of sometimes acting from a profit motive. The profit motive is typically the object (...) of ambivalent moral attitudes in present-day society: on the one hand, the plethora of commodities and services made possible by the modern market economy, fuelled to a large extent by the profit motive, are easily recognizable. On the other hand, it is generally regarded as a serious moral criticism to say of a certain commercial agent that he or she is motivated by profit alone, and pecuniary motives are often associated with selfishness and greed (see Egoism). (Compare comments like: “While it perhaps was a good thing that company X supported this social venture, they are not to be trusted – they only did it for the money!”). (shrink)

Many writers in the field of business ethics seem to have accepted R. Edward Freeman’s argument to the effect that what he calls “the separation thesis,” or the idea that business and morality can be separated in certain ways, should be rejected. In this paper, I discuss how this argument should be understood more exactly, and what position “the separation thesis” refers to. I suggest that there are actually many interpretations (or versions) of the separation thesis going around, ranging from (...) semantic, empirical and reformative to some which are straightforwardly normative. While it is generally agreed that the separation thesis should be rejected, then, there is not as much agreement on what this thesis actually says. I suggest that whether or not we should<br>reject the separation thesis, however, ultimately must depend on how we understand it more exactly—on certain interpretations, the thesis comes out as more or less trivially false, but we should demand more evidence or argument to reject it on certain other interpretations. This result presents a challenge for all those writers who are committed to the rejection of the separation thesis. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 20 Heft: 1 Seiten: 321-334.

Following in Joan Scott's anti-foundationalist footsteps, Linda Zerilli argues for a theory of feminist political judgement not framed in terms of epistemological certainty but assimilated to aesthetic judgement. Tani Barlow criticises Zerilli for not taking adequate account of history in her theory. I analyse the implications of Zerilli's ‘abyssal’ approach to political judgement and Barlow's critique of it. Despite their shared concerns, Zerilli's, Barlow's, and Scott's abyssal approaches struggle to effectively ground the validity of historical analysis and political judgement within (...) a context of plurality and historical difference. All three thinkers focus extensively on discursive and imaginative potential for change while marginalising the role of materiality in the creation of new horizons for women. Incorporating a dynamic account of the materiality of human life into their work would allow them to tie politics and history to an explanation of the role material life plays in constituting plurality, factuality, and historicity. (shrink)