Philosophical analysis was the central preoccupation of 20th-century analytic philosophy. In the contemporary methodological debate, however, it faces a number of pressing external and internal challenges. While external challenges, like those from experimental philosophy or semantic externalism, have been extensively discussed, internal challenges to philosophical analysis have received much less attention. One especially vexing internal challenge is that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are deeply unclear. According to the standard textbook view, a philosophical analysis aims at a strict biconditional (...) that captures the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the relevant category. The textbook view arguably identifies a necessary condition on successful philosophical analyses, but understood as a sufficient condition it is untenable, as I will argue in this paper. To this end, I first uncover eight conditions of adequacy on successful philosophical analyses, some of which have rarely been spelled out in detail. As we shall see, even sophisticated alternatives to the textbook view fail to accommodate some of these conditions. I then propose the concept grounding view as a more promising account of philosophical analysis. According to this view, successful philosophical analyses require necessary biconditionals that are constrained by grounding relations among the concepts involved. Apart from providing a satisfactory account of philosophical analysis in its own right, the concept grounding view is also able to meet the challenge that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are problematically unclear. (shrink)

Should we remain neutral between our interests and those of future generations? Or are we ethically permitted or even required to depart from neutrality and engage in some measure of intergenerational discounting? This Article addresses the problem of intergenerational discounting by drawing on two different intellectual traditions: the social welfare function (“SWF”) tradition in welfare economics, and scholarship on “prioritarianism” in moral philosophy. Unlike utilitarians, prioritarians are sensitive to the distribution of well-being. They give greater weight to well-being changes affecting (...) worse-off individuals. Prioritarianism can be captured, formally, through an SWF which sums a concave transformation of individual utility, rather than simply summing unweighted utilities in utilitarian fashion. The Article considers the appropriate structure of a prioritarian SWF in intergenerational cases. The simplest case involves a fixed and finite intertemporal population. In that case, I argue, policymakers can and should maintain full neutrality between present and future generations. No discount factor should be attached to the utility of future individuals. Neutrality becomes trickier when we depart from this simple case, meaning: (1) “non-identity” problems, where current choices change the identity of future individuals; (2) population-size variation, where current choices affect not merely the identity of future individuals, but the size of the world’s future population (this case raises the specter of what Derek Parfit terms “the repugnant conclusion,” i.e., that dramatic reductions in the average level of individual well-being might be compensated for by increases in population size); or (3) an infinite population. The Article grapples with the difficult question of outfitting a prioritarian SWF to handle non-identity problems, population-size variation, and infinite populations. It tentatively suggests that a measure of neutrality can be maintained even in these cases. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction What is Chemistry about? Is Chemistry Reducible to Physics? Are There Fundamental Limits to Chemical Knowledge? Is Chemical Research Ethically Neutral? Conclusion References.

Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 1971): (...) Although your lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movies because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow. (1971: 57) I argue that Conductive Arguments are not possible—the “ought” conclusion only holds if countervailing considerations are nullified. (shrink)

The unique problem of lost territory poses one of the most important and complex challenges of compensating for loss and damage due to anthropogenic climate change. Anthropogenic climate change will cause a significant increase in the sea level for centuries to come. A rising sea level endangers many low‐lying coastal areas but also entire states. However, the inundation of an entire state will remain a rare event. Partial loss of territory will be far more pervasive. As measured by the number (...) of states, the area of land, and, in particular, the number of people affected, the phenomenon of partial territorial loss is much more significant. I address this from the perspective of compensatory justice. In particular, I offer (i) background on basic concepts, (ii) an overview and critique of existing accounts, and propose (iii) a novel interpretation of territory as well as (iv) a corresponding criterion of a duty to compensate before (v) I flesh out the overall theory, (vi) take into consideration implications and details of application, and (vii) respond to potential objections. (shrink)

Part I presents a quantitative-empirical outline of chemistry, esp. preparative chemistry, concerning its dominant role in today's science, its dynamics, and its methods and aims. Emphasis is laid on the poietical character of chemistry for which a methodological model is derived. Part II discusses standard distinction between science and technology, from Aristotle (whose theses are reconsidered in the light of modern sciences) to modern philosophy of technology. Against the background of results of Part I, it is argued that all these (...) distinctions fail, because the underlying concepts of science are either out-dated, one-sided, or arbitrary. A deeper understanding of today's sciences requires, in particular, a philosopical investigation of chemistry. (shrink)

National governments have failed spectacularly to mitigate anthropogenic climate change and a sustainable approach to mitigation remains out of sight. This circumstance alone demonstrates t...

Numerous labor-management issues possess ethical dimensions and pose ethical questions. In this article, the authors discuss four labor-management issues that present important contemporary problems: union organizing, labor-management negotiations, employee involvement programs, and union obligations of fair representation. In the authors view, labor and management too often view their ethical obligations as beginning and ending at the law''s boundaries. Contemporary business realities suggest that cooperative and enlightened modes of interaction between labor and management seem appropriate.

:Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. ‘Ideal-advisor’ accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, (...) what are the moral facts when the advisors do diverge? These questions are investigated here using the tools of Arrovian social choice theory. (shrink)

By comparing chemistry to art, chemists have recently made claims to the aesthetic value, even beauty, of some of their products. This paper takes these claims seriously and turns them into a systematic investigation of the aesthetics of chemical products. I distinguish three types of chemical products - materials, molecules, and molecular models - and use a wide variety of aesthetic theories suitable for an investigation of the corresponding sorts of objects. These include aesthetics of materials, idealistic aesthetics from Plato (...) to Kant and Schopenhauer, psychological approaches of Ernst Gombrich and Rudolf Arnheim, and semiotic aesthetics of Nelson Goodman and Umberto Eco. Although the investigation does not support recent claims, I point out where aesthetics does and can play an import role in chemistry. Particularly, Eco's approach helps us understand that and how aesthetic experience can be a driving force in chemical research. (shrink)

Philosophie ist konkret und abstrakt. Sie ist konkret im Gespür für Probleme, die jeden – oder jeden in einem bestimmten Bereich – betreffen. Sie ist abstrakt in der kritischen Formulierung und Lösung von Problemen, indem sie von besonderen Bedingungen und Voreingenommenheiten abstrahiert. Philosophie erfordert Kreativität, Phantasie und die Bereitschaft zu Unkonventionellem in der Wahl der Problemzugangsweisen. Wie alle Wissenschaften ist sie als Methode lehr- und entwickelbar, sofern ein gewisses Talent vorhanden ist. Philosophie beginnt dort, wo Wissenschaftler nicht mehr weiter fragen. (...) Was heute Philosophie ist, kann morgen Wissenschaft sein – Naturwissenschaft, Sozialwissenschaft oder Geisteswissenschaft –, Philosophie hat keine Vorlieben. (shrink)

Die folgende Untersuchung ist eine Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Ort des 'Irrationalisten' Johann Gottfried Herder innerhalb des Kontinuums der Aufklärung. Aus dem Inhalt: I. Ästhetik als Desiderat der Gnoseologie A. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz B. Christian Wolff C. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten II. Herders Ästhetik-Kritik A. Herders Kritik der Philosophie der "Wortwelten" B. Herders Auseinandersetzung mit Baumgarten III. Herders Ästhetik-Entwurf A. Zum Konzept der Prägnanz B. Haptik und Skulptur, Optik und Malerei C. Poesie - Phantasie und Dichtungsvermögen IV. Herders Entwurf (...) einer Geschichtsphilosophie A. Der Status der Geschichtsphilosophie B. Aisthesis und Geschichte. (shrink)

Man ist sie fast schon leid, die Rede vom „Chaos“, mit der wissenschaftspublizistisch versierte Forscher bemüht sind, sich ihren Anteil am hart umkämpften Markt der Forschungsmittel und -reputation zu sichern. Die inflationäre Verkündigung von „wissenschaftlichen Revolutionen“, „Paradigmenwechseln“ und „postmoderner Wissenschaft“ mag manchem Philosophen zwar insgeheim noch schmeicheln wegen der Gebrauchs- und Marktfähigkeit - und Autorität - philosophischer Termini. So recht zu glauben sind solche Botschaften jedoch selten. Aber welcher Philosoph wollte sich da ein sachgerechtes und kritisches Urteil erlauben, ob die (...) Inanspruchnahme philosophischer Begriffe an diversen aktuellen Forschungsfronten überhaupt angemesen ist? Wer könnte es andererseits besser, als jemand, der wie Theodor Leiber sowohl in Physik als auch in Philosophie promoviert ist und dessen überarbeitete Philosophiedisseration hier zur Diskussion steht? (shrink)

Sunstein aims to provide a nonsectarian account of moral heuristics, yet the account rests on a controversial meta-ethical view. Further, moral theorists who reject act consequentialism may deny that Sunstein's examples involve moral mistakes. But so what? Within a theory that counts consequences as a morally weighty feature of actions, the moral judgments that Sunstein points to are indeed mistaken, and the fact that governmental action at odds with these judgments will be controversial doesn't bar such action.

Philosophy of science arose from debates among scientists about the right method of pursuing true knowledge at times when modern science was only in its infancy. The epistemological heritage is still reflected in the corresponding terms in French, épistémologie, and in German, Wissenschaftstheorie. Another root derives from the meaning of philosophy, as in ‘natural philosophy’, which was used to denote the physical sciences still in the nineteenth century before it was split off and received its particular metaphysical meaning. Yet, besides (...) epistemology and metaphysics, philosophy has many other branches from which reflections on science are useful. One such branch is ethics, such as chemistry is a branch of the sciences. Thus, from a systematical point of view, ethics of chemistry is a proper part of philosophy of science, whether or not any of the nineteenth-century classics said anything meaningful about that. It is that systematical background against which ‘philosophy of chemistry’ receives its full meaning. Since HYLE is devoted to philosophy of chemistry, we open a discussion on ethics of chemistry with this special issue. (For a comprehensive list of topics, see our Call for Papers .). (shrink)

This paper traces the historical roots of the “mad scientist,” a concept that has powerfully shaped the public image of science up to today, by investigating the representations of chemists in nineteenth-century Western literature. I argue that the creation of this literary figure was the strongest of four critical literary responses to the emergence of modern science in general and of chemistry in particular. The role of chemistry in this story is crucial because early nineteenth-century chemistry both exemplified modern experimental (...) laboratory research and induced, due to its rapid growth, a ramification and fragmentation of knowledge that undermined former ideals of the unity of knowledge under the umbrella of metaphysics and religion. Because most writers considered contemporary chemistry an offspring of “wrong alchemy,” all four responses drew on the medieval literary figure of the “mad alchemist” to portray chemists. Whereas early writers considered the quest for scientific knowledge to be altogether in vain, later writers pointed out the narrow-minded goals and views specifically of chemistry. A third response moved that criticism to a metaphysical and religious level, by relating chemistry to materialism, nihilism, atheism and hubris. The fourth response, the “mad scientist,” elaborated on the hubris theme by attaching moral perversion to the “mad alchemist.”. (shrink)

Is chemistry primarily about things or about processes, about chemical substances or about chemical reactions? Is a chemical reaction defined by the change of certain substances, or are substances defined by their characteristic chemical reactions? What appears to be a play on words to the modern scientist, is actually one of the most fundamental ontological question since antiquity, prompted by the most radical change – the chemical change or the ‘coming-to-be and passing-away’ as Aristotle’s treatise on theoretical chemistry came to (...) be known. The question has bothered philosophers ever since, who were not satisfied with the much too simplistic answer of atomism, according to which the basic elements of nature are atoms. (shrink)

Recent research has brought to light substantial fragments in Egyptian demotic, Old Coptic and Greek of manuals of divination by means of drawing lots. Typically, the lots carry a number, and each is attributed to a particular deity. This article presents the documentation known today, including some strips of palm leaf which could have served as the actual lots. It also discusses the degree of variation between the different manuscripts, and possible specific links between the gods and the answers to (...) which they are linked. (shrink)

The following article deals with Alfred Schutz’s contribution to the theory of action and interaction by pointing out the possibly most compelling phenomenological starting position, i.e, the decomposition of the unity of an action. The article stresses that Schutz’s methodical interpretive sociology in thissense has always refused the assimilation of action-events to material occurrences. In contrast to empiricist theories of action which wrongly substantialize actionevents by treating them as material events, the phenomenological account gives reason to the assumption that there (...) must be a systematic gap between at least two subjective estimations of the meaning of action. In other words, the introspective analysis of the subjective constitution of meaning means to take the problem of double contingency seriously. Phenomenology, for its temporal and conceptual resolution, seems much more appropriate to reconstruct the complex structures of “presence,” “identity,” and “intersubjectivity” than empiricist accounts. The article proposes in the end the need for an alternative concept of presence:Instead of confusing levels of cooperation with allegedly “objective” synchronicity, phenomenology reminds us to elaborate an alternative concept of simultaneity, i.e, a simultaneity on the level of performativity and tacit knowledge. The latter could be the warrantor for co-reference. (shrink)