Eliminativism about macroscopic material objects claims that we do not need to include tables in our ontology, and that any job – practical or theoretical – they have to do can be done by 'atoms arranged tablewise'. This way of introducing eliminativism faces the worry that if there are no 'atoms', that is, if there are no simples and the world is 'gunky', there are no suitable entities to be 'arranged tablewise'. In this article, I discuss various strategies the eliminativist (...) can have to face this objection, and I conclude by showing that the objection is actually misdirected and does not threaten eliminativism at all. (shrink)

The main aim of this study is to explain passage 35b4-37a2 of Plato’s Timaeus which deals with three main topics: the mathematization of the world’s soul, its movement, and its binding to the world’s body. First, it is argued that the mathematical structure of the world-soul allows it to participate in and be sensitive to harmony, which is essential for the correct workings of its cognitive capacities. Second, the division of the world-soul to the circle of the same and the (...) circles of the different and its self-motion comes in. This allows it to ‘touch’ and cognize the forms and the material things, as well as rule the movement of the corporeal world and care for it. In this aspect, the world-soul continues the process that started with the original creative act of the demiurge. Third, it is argued that the description of the world-soul’s binding to the world-body entails its conception as a spatially extended entity, which, in turn, explains of the possibility of an interaction between the corporeal world and its soul. (shrink)

Pavel Materna proposed valuable explications of concept and conceptual system. After their introduction, we contrast conceptual systems with (a novel notion of) derivation systems. Derivation systems differ from conceptual systems especially in including derivation rules. This enables us to show close connections among the realms of objects, their concepts, and reasoning with concepts.

In Fechner's psychophysics, the 'mental' and the 'physical' were conceived as two phenomenal domains, connected by functional relations, not as two ontologically different realms. We follow the path from Fechner's foundational ideas and Mach's radical programme of a unitary science to later approaches to primary, psychophysically neutral experience (phenomenology, protophysics). We propose an 'integral psychophysics' as a mathematical study of law-like, invariant structures of primary experience. This approach is illustrated by a reinterpretation of psychophysical experiments in terms of perceptual situations (...) involving a constructed apparatus and an instructed subject. The problematic notion of 'measurement of sensation' is thus eliminated: 'sensations' are merely indices for classes of perceptually equivalent configurations (states of the apparatus) specified by the instruction. The locus of the measured is in the inter-subjectively shared, communicable world—not inside the subject's mind. Finally we discuss the role of integral psychophysics as a scientia prima , logically and methodically preceding physics and psychology. (shrink)

_An Ethical Modernity?_ offers a new view of Hegel’s doctrine of ethical life (_Sittlichkeit_) in relation to modernity. In this collection of essays, the authors investigate various aspects of this relation and its importance for today’s world.

History and the philosophy of science have played a very important role in dialectical materialism; their results have been destined to support the correctness of the ideas of Marxist philosophers, especially in their application in historical materialism.From this point of view, the circumstances of the origin of the works of the Marxist classics cannot be neglected: Engels wrote hisDialectics in Nature in the period of classical physics, and Lenin published hisMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism at the beginning of the 20th century when (...) our modern physics first began: shortly before the publication of Lenin's book, Röntgen and Becquerel discovered new kinds of radiation, Balmer published his ideas concerning the regularity of the hydrogen spectrum, Plank wrote his first articles about the elementary quantum and Einstein published his three famous articles (1905). (shrink)

In this book, Jiri Benovsky defends the view that he doesn't exist. In this book, he also defends the view that this book itself doesn't exist. But this did not prevent him to write the book, and although in Benovsky's view you don't exist either, this does not prevent you to read it. Benovsky defends a brand of non-exceptionalist eliminativism. Some eliminativists, typically focusing on ordinary material objects such as chairs and hammers, make exceptions, for instance for blue whales (that (...) is, living beings) or for persons (that is, conscious organisms). Benovsky takes one by one all types of allegedly existing objects like chairs, whales, and persons and shows that from the metaphysical point of view they are more trouble than they are worth – we are much better off without them. He thus defends an eliminativist view about ordinary objects as well as the 'no-Self' view, where he explores connections between metaphysics, phenomenology, and Buddhist thought. He then also considers the case of aesthetic objects, focusing on musical works and photographs, and shows that the claim of their non-existence solves the many problems that arise when one tries to find an appropriate ontological category for them, and that such an eliminativist view is more natural than what we might have thought. The arguments provided here are always topic-specific: each type of entity is given its own type of treatment, thus proving a varied and solid foundation for a generalized, non-exceptionalist, full-blown eliminativist worldview. (shrink)

The Gratitude Questionnaire-Six Item Form (GQ-6; McCullough et al., 2002) is a well-established instrument for measuring gratitude. Recently, the Multi-Component Gratitude Measure (MCGM) was developed as a more holistic approach (Morgan et al., 2017). While the GQ-6 mainly focuses on the emotional component of gratitude, the MCGM encompasses conceptual, attitudinal and behavioral aspects. As of today, there is no validated German measure for gratitude. In order to close that research gap, the present study focused on validating the German versions of (...) the GQ-6 (GQ-6-G) and of the MCGM (MCGM-G). In addition, multi-group comparisons were conducted to test for cultural measurement invariance. Construct validity was tested similar to original validation studies of the two scales focusing on affect, well-being, empathy, anxiety and depression. The online survey was completed in random order by 508 participants. The one-factor model of the GQ-6-G and the hierarchical structure of the MCGM-G could be replicated. However, model fit of the Gratitude Questionnaire was significantly better after eliminating one item (GQ-5-G). Multi-group comparisons revealed cultural measurement invariance was established for the GQ-5-G and partial measurement invariance for five of six factors of the MCGM-G, respectively. Reliability analyses revealed good internal consistency for both instruments and measures for criterion-related and discriminant validity have shown hypothesized relationships. Thus, the GQ-5-G and the MCGM-G are two instruments with good reliability and validity for measuring gratitude in Germany. (shrink)

This paper is about our experience of change and movement, and thus about our experience of time – at least under the reasonable assumption that we (can only) experience time by having experiences of change. This assumption is shared by Locke, whose view on temporal experience, expounded in Book II, Chap.14 of his Essay, will be the main focal point of my paper. Some of the most influential accounts of temporal experience embrace the notion of a "specious present" as an (...) explanatory tool in order to account for the continuous and unfolding aspect of our experiences. In this article, I will raise some points of dissatisfaction with the very notion of the specious present, and while I shall not reject the specious present theories, I will argue that more is needed in order to have a proper understanding and explanation of our temporal experience. I will then discuss and defend a view of temporal experience whose basis can be found in Locke's Essay, and which, given some amendments and further development within a contemporary framework, provides us with a very good analysis of our experience of movement, change, and time – a view that helps us to avoid some burdensome commitments incurred by specious present theories and that can be fruitfully combined with these theories in order to yield a complete and more informative picture of the phenomenon of temporal experience. (shrink)

The successful early acquisition of reading literacy represents a crucial learning process determining the further course of academic development (Stanovich, 2009). During this process, interactions between children and their proximal social environment are of utmost importance. Therefore, we introduce a systemic framework for the development of learning potential (e.g., Mudrak et al., 2015, 2019, 2019b; Ziegler & Stoeger, 2017) and explore the interactions between the social and motivational processes associated with reading literacy development in school-age children. We base our analysis (...) on a representative Czech sample of fourth-grade pupils involved in the Progress in International Reading Literacy study (PIRLS, Martin et al., 2016). On the basis of the systemic framework, we hypothesized hierarchical relationships among family socioeconomic status, related developmental resources (including parental support, expectations, and reading resources), children’s reading motivation (including reading engagement and reading confidence), and manifested learning outcomes (including school grades and reading competence). We implemented three structural equation models to test the hypothesized relationships. The first model tested the direct effect of developmental resources on reading competence. The second model included the motivational variables as mediators between resources and competence. The third model included school grades as mediators between resources and motivational variables. Our analyses indicated the good fit of the proposed models. The final model explained 37.8 % of the variance in children’s school grades and 46.5 % of the variance in reading literacy test scores (compared to 34.8 % in the first model). Moreover, parental socioeconomic status was strongly associated with parental expectations, which were associated with reading confidence, partially through the effect of parental expectations on children’s school grades. Reading confidence was the main predictor of reading literacy within the model, followed by the direct effects of parental resources. The results illustrate complex processes through which the family environment affects the development of learning competencies such as reading literacy by providing children with the relevant social and material resources associated with their motivation and school outcomes. We discuss some of the reasons that these relationships may take place and consider their implications for educational practice. (shrink)

Abstract: There are two traditionally rival views about the nature of time: substantivalism that takes time to be a substance that exists independently of events located in it, and relationism that takes time to be constructed out of events. In this paper, first, I want to make some progress with respect to the debate between these two views, and I do this mainly by examining the strategies they use to face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’. As (...) we shall see, the two allegedly very different rival views are much less different than has been thought: their structure is extremely similar, their strategies are extremely similar, and they can both face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’ in the same way. Thus, I argue in favour of a certain kind of equivalence between the two views; I discuss a Strong and a Weak version of this claim; and I provide reasons for endorsing the former. I also discuss the parallel between this pair of views about the nature of time and another analogous pair of views: the bundle theory and the substratum theory about the nature of material objects, with respect to the problem with Identity of Indiscernibles. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine various theories of persistence through time under presentism. In Part I, I argue that both perdurantist views (namely, the worm view and the stage view) suffer, in combination with presentism, from serious difficulties and should be rejected. In Part II, I discuss the presentist endurantist view, to see that it does avoid the difficulties of the perdurantist views, and consequently that it does work, but at a price that some may consider as being very high: (...) its ontological commitments to platonic universals and to the substratum theory, that as we shall see follow from the combination of endurantism with presentism, will perhaps not be to everyone's taste. (shrink)

Is there an entity such that it can be in two places at the same time ? According to one traditional view, properties can, since they are immanent universals. But what about objects such as a person or a table ? Common sense seems to say that, unlike properties, objects are not multiply locatable. In this paper, I will argue first of all that endurantism entails a consequence that is quite bizarre, namely, that objects are universals, while properties are particulars. (...) I then conclude by examining and rejecting two theories according to which objects can wholly be in two places at the same time. (shrink)

Inferencialismus idealizuje proces získání významu v komunikaci. K tomu snadno najdeme protipříklady. Zcela zde chybí nějaká, zejména pojmová analýza a také nějaké rozhodovací (meta)pravidlo pro získání významu.

This article reinterprets the Kelsen-Schmitt debate in the context of social systems theory and rethinks its major concepts as part of legal and political self-reference and systemic differentiation. In Kelsen?s case, it is the exclusion of sovereignty from juridical logic that opens a way to the self-reference of positive law. Similarly, Schmitt constructed his concept of the political as a self-referential system of political operations protected from the social environment by the medium of power. The author argues that the process (...) of legal and political globalisation rules out the possibility of formulating substantive theories of the state associating this particular social organisation with metaphysical values and a self-validating collective identity. Kelsen and Schmitt continue to inspire current theories of non-metaphysical globalised law and politics. However, the constitutional state and sovereignty need to be reformulated as a meeting point of functionally differentiated and globalised legal and political communications and not as their ultimate end. (shrink)

If S, T are stationary subsets of a regular uncountable cardinal κ, we say that S reflects fully in $T, S , if for almost all α ∈ T (except a nonstationary set) S ∩ α is stationary in α. This relation is known to be a well-founded partial ordering. We say that a given poset P is realized by the reflection ordering if there is a maximal antichain $\langle X_p; p \in P\rangle$ of stationary subsets of $\operatorname{Reg}(\kappa)$ so that (...) $\forall p, q \in P \forall S \subseteq X_p, T \subseteq X_q \text{stationary}: (S We prove that if $V = L\lbrack\overset{\rightarrow\mathscr{U}}\rbrack, o^\mathscr{U} (\kappa) = \kappa^{++}$ , and P is an arbitrary well-founded poset of cardinality ≤ κ + then there is a generic extension where P is realized by the reflection ordering on κ. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to demonstrate the phenomenologically grounded dynamics of hearing and listening as a possible approach to our sonic experience. Its starting point is the studies of contemporary urban spaces devoted to their sonic experience. The results of these studies and their interpretation will serve as a starting point for the introduction of dynamics of hearing and listening. In the next part of this article, I will focus on the elaboration of this relationship with regard to (...) the critique of Husserl’s concept of activity and passivity in his late work Experience and Judgment and Merleau-Ponty’s concept of being-in-the-world. Based on this, in the end, certain common features will be shown, connecting the thematization of activity and passivity with the relationship of hearing and listening. (shrink)

This open access book is about exploring interesting borderline cases of art. It discusses the cases of gustatory and olfactory artworks, proprioceptive artworks, intellectual artworks, as well as the vague limits between painting and photography. The book focuses on the author’s research about what counts as art and what does not, as well as on the nature of these limits. Overall, the author defends a very inclusive view, 'extending' the limits of art, and he argues for its virtues. Some of (...) the limits discussed concern our senses, some concern vagueness and fuzzy boundaries between different types of works of art, some concern the amount of human intention and intervention in the process of creation of an artwork, and some concern the border between art and science. In these various ways, by understanding better such borderline cases, Benovsky suggests that we get a better grip on an understanding of the nature of art. (shrink)

The main task of this paper is to understand if and how static images like photographs can represent and/or depict temporal extension (duration). In order to do this, a detour will be necessary to understand some features of the nature of photographic representation and depiction in general. This important detour will enable us to see that photographs (can) have a narrative content, and that the skilled photographer can 'tell a story' in a very clear sense, as well as control and (...) guide the attention of the spectator of the photograph. The understanding and defence of this claim is a secondary aim of this paper, and it will then allow us to provide a good treatment of the particular case of photographic representation and depiction of temporal extension. (shrink)

Model-theoretic concepts of saturation and categoricity are studied in the context of accessible categories. Accessible categories which are categorical in a strong sense are related to categories of $M$-sets ($M$ is a monoid). Typical examples of such categories are categories of $\lambda$-saturated objects.

Is the self a substance, as Descartes thought, or is it 'only' a bundle of perceptions, as Hume thought ? In this paper I will examine these two views, especially with respect to two central features that have played a central role in the discussion, both of which can be quickly and usefully explained if one puts them as an objection to the bundle view. First, friends of the substance view have insisted that only if one conceives of the self (...) as a substance is it possible to account for genuine particularity of selves and genuine persistence through time of them. I will discuss in detail this claim as well as a special case of persistence - the case of a fission of a self - and I will ask, as Shoemaker (1997) did, how such a case can be handled by the two competing theories. The second central point of traditional disagreement concerns independence : it is often said that only a substance, but not a mere bundle, is independent enough of its properties to play properly the role of a self, and I will have something to say about this. Concerning all these points, my thesis will be a meta-theoretical one : contrary to appearances, both views can accommodate all of them (particularity at a time, persistence, fission, independence) in the same way, and I will examine two possible conclusions to be drawn from this : either that the differences between the two views are no more than terminological and that they turn out to be equivalent views, or that the differences are metaphysical but that it is epistemically under-determined which one of the views we should choose. (shrink)

Analogy is taken into consideration by its didactive and heuristic functions. Analogic changes are analyzed in the form of syntactic-semantic graphs. Their recognizable structural similarity corresponds to the syntax or semantics in the analogy. The concept of analogy has subjective and objective aspects. The explanation in analogies is a dynamic transition from one concept structure to another. The possibility of analogy in the world is a statement about the disposition of the world. The possibility of analogy asserts something about the (...) behaviour of the environment. Analogy is considered as a means of explanation and a dynamic method of cognition. (shrink)

In its jurisprudence relating to Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union seems to oscillate between two different approaches. According to the jurisprudential mainstream, the preliminary ruling is an instrument of dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice. This constant dialogue can fulfill the role assigned to the Court to ensure consistency of interpretation and application of Union law. Another line of cases, however, seems to make preliminary rulings means for individuals to ensure their (...) rights which derive from EU law. These two visions of the preliminary references recently have been opposed in discussions about a particular aspect of the preliminary procedure, which is the late withdrawal of the question referred by the national court. In fact, when the national court considered that the response of the Court of Justice was not “necessary to render judgment,” it could, at any time, including both before and after the deliberate publication, date the judgment to the parties and remove this issue. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice became dependent on matters of procedure (dealings between the parties, amicable agreements, etc.) that occurred in extremis before the national court, which sometimes cast doubt on a possible manipulation of the Court by the parties to the main proceedings. It became necessary to find a solution to solve this problem. The two different visions were then compared. If the preliminary ruling is conceived as an additional instrument for the rights that individuals derive from EU law, there is no need for the Court of Justice of the European Union to make a decision when the dispute is resolved before the national court and the defendant has obtained satisfaction. Conversely, if the preliminary ruling is conceived as an instrument to ensure the uniform application and interpretation of EU law, this judgment may be necessary. In fact, without deciding in abstracto, the Court in its judgement will anchor an interpretation that should be applied in all similar cases in the courts of the 27 Member States. In this case, a judgment may still be necessary, even if the dispute before the national court ended off. In order to preserve this approach, the new Rules of Procedure now contain a provision in Article 100 (1) which reads as follows: “The Court shall remain seised of a request for a preliminary ruling for as long as it is not withdrawn by the court or tribunal which made that request to the Court. The withdrawal of a request may be taken into account until notice of the date of delivery of the judgment has been served on the interest persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute”. Thus, the late withdrawal of a request for a preliminary ruling is clearly limited in time and, even if such removal would occur in extremis, the judgment of the Court will be delivered in the interest of interpretation and uniform application of Union law. (shrink)

The article presents an overview concerning Heidegger's work and life, especially with respect to the contemporary state of publishing of his texts. The article aims at showing a continuity in Heidegger's Thinking of Being on one hand, but, on the other hand, stresses also necessity of a new assessment of his thought, if we take into consideration some recently published manuscripts (especially vol. 65 and 66). The necessity of a new assessment concerns also his personal standpoints during the time of (...) his rectorate in 1933-34. The new documents are presented in volume 16 (published in 2000). The author is convinced that Heidegger is a philosopher of our future. We are still waiting for a truly philosophical assessment and exploiting of his work. (shrink)

The classical liberal approach to deregulation is based on the consecutive elimination of state regulatory activities and their substitution by competitive market structure. Increasing competition accompanied with decreasing arbitrary state agencies’ interventions will undoubtedly cultivate the behaviour of market agents and bring benefits to consumers.The classical liberal approach to deregulation is incompatible with the EU deregulation model, which in case of network industries is still based on the permanent existence of regulatory agencies, Third-Party-Access, public service liability, centralized control of investments (...) and the negative reciprocity. The adoption of these principals will at least delay deregulation process in transition economies but will likely preserve the cartel structure on the utility markets.Economics of regulation and implicitly economics of deregulation is a product of the Chicago School of Economics. Since current “deregulation process” leads to tighter regulation, the adequate term for it should be the reregulation.L’approche libérale classique de la réglementation repose sur l’élimination de la réglementation étatique et leur substitution par des structures marchandes concurrentielles. Une concurrence accrue et une diminution des interventions arbitraires de l’état ne pourront que modifier le comportement des agents sur le marché et engendrer des bénéfices pour les consommateurs.L’approche de la déréglementation du libéralisme classique est incompatible avec le modèle de déréglementation de l’Union Européenne : dans le cas des industries en réseau, ce dernier demeure fondé sur l’existence continue d’agences de réglementation, la responsabilité du service public, le contrôle centralisé des investissements et la réciprocité négative. L’adoption de ces principes aura pour effet au moins de retarder le processus de déréglementation dans les économies en transition et probablement aussi de préserver la structure cartellisée des marchés de services publics.L’économie de la réglementation, et par implication, l’économie de la déréglementation est une contribution émanant de l’Ecole d’Economie de Chicago. Parce que les “processus de déréglemen- tation” en vigueur induisent des réglementations plus drastiques, l’expression appropriée devrait plutôt être la re-réglementation. (shrink)

There are three main traditional accounts of vagueness : one takes it as a genuinely metaphysical phenomenon, one takes it as a phenomenon of ignorance, and one takes it as a linguistic or conceptual phenomenon. In this paper I first very briefly present these views, especially the epistemicist and supervaluationist strategies, and shortly point to some well-known problems that the views carry. I then examine a 'statistical epistemicist' account of vagueness that is designed to avoid precisely these problems – it (...) will be a view that provides an account of the phenomenon of vagueness as coming from our linguistic practices, while insisting that meaning supervenes on use, and that our use of vague terms does yield sharp and precise meanings, which we ignore, thus allowing bivalence to hold. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the nature of photographs by comparing them to hand-made paintings, as well as by comparing traditional film photography with digital photography, and I concentrate on the question of realism. Several different notions can be distinguished here. Are photographs such that they depict the world in a 'realist' or a 'factive' way ? Do they show us the world as it is with accuracy and reliability other types of pictures don't posses ? Do they allow us, (...) as some have suggested, to literally see the world through them ? Below, I will distinguish three kinds of realism about photographs, reject two, and partly endorse one. Indeed, the label "realism", when concerning photographs, can stand for a variety of very different claims. The first (and quite obvious) distinction to start with concerns what the realist thesis is about : the claim that somehow photographs are more accurate or more reliable or that they somehow depict the world better than hand-made pictures can be a claim about the photographic image itself or alternatively a claim about the way in which photographs are produced. In the former case, realism is a thesis about how photographs look and what sort of information they contain, while in the latter case realism is a claim about the process of production of photographs. It is the latter claim that is the most discussed in the philosophical literature about photography. I will concentrate on this type of realism, of which I shall examine two varieties. (shrink)