On the life and works of the Indian philosopher Aurobindo Ghose, 1872-1950.

Aristotle's definition of time as 'a number of motion with respect to the before and after' has been branded as patently circular by commentators ranging from Simplicius to W. D. Ross. In this book Tony Roark presents an interpretation of the definition that renders it not only non-circular, but also worthy of serious philosophical scrutiny. He shows how Aristotle developed an account of the nature of time that is inspired by Plato while also thoroughly bound up with Aristotle's sophisticated analyses (...) of motion and perception. When Aristotle's view is properly understood, Roark argues, it is immune to devastating objections against the possibility of temporal passage articulated by McTaggart and other 20th century philosophers. Roark's novel and fascinating interpretation of Aristotle's temporal theory will appeal to those interested in Aristotle, ancient philosophy and the philosophy of time. (shrink)

Removing the Commons defends a Lockean Left-Libertarian account of the moral conditions in which people may remove, either via use or appropriation, natural resources from the commons. I conclude that self-owning agents may remove natural resources from the commons just so long as they leave others the competitive value of their removal in a way that best affords others an equal opportunity for welfare.

Gyula Klima maintains that Anselm's ontological argument is best understood in terms of a theory of reference that was made fully explicit only by later medievals. I accept the interpretative claim but offer here two objections to the argument so interpreted. The first points up a certain ambiguity in Klima's formulation of the argument, the correction of which requires a substantive revision of the argument's conclusion. The second exploits the notion of semantic closure introduced by Tarski. Klima offers the atheist (...) an ?out? by drawing a distinction between constitutive and parasitic reference. I argue that using Klima's preferred description (?the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater?) to refer constitutively to God results in conceptual closure, a condition analogous to semantic closure that renders the instant conceptual scheme inconsistent and subject to paradox. Although the proof ultimately fails, Klima's development of the notions of constitutive and parasitic reference has important and far-reaching implications. (shrink)

Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are (...) merely expressing our emotions. Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it. In the second half of the book, he turns to a defense of moral relativism. Moral facts depend on emotional responses, and emotional responses vary from culture to culture. Prinz surveys the anthropological record to establish moral variation, and he draws on cultural history to show how attitudes toward practices such as cannibalism and marriage change over time. He also criticizes evidence from animal behavior and child development that has been taken to support the claim that moral attitudes are hard-wired by natural selection. Prinz concludes that there is no single true morality, but he also argues that some moral values are better than others; moral progress is possible. Throughout the book, Prinz relates his views to contemporary and historical work in philosophical ethics. His views echo themes in the writings of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche, but Prinz supports, extends, and revises these classic theories using the resources of cutting-edge cognitive science. The Emotional Construction of Morals will stimulate and challenge anyone who is curious about the nature and origin of moral values. (shrink)

So serious a matter is capital punishment that we must consider very carefully any claim regarding its justification. Brian Calvert has offered a new version of the “argument from arbitrariness,” according to which a retributivist cannot consistently hold that some, but not all, first-degree murderers may justifiably receive the death penalty, when it is conceived to be a unique form of punishment. At the heart of this argument is the line-drawing problem, and I am inclined to think that it is (...) a genuine challenge for the retributivist. I respond on behalf of the retributivist by formulating a line-drawing method that relies on the distinction between clearly deserving and not clearly deserving and is justified by a version of the lex talionis modified with an epistemic constraint. (shrink)

In Furnishing the Mind, Jesse Prinz attempts to swing the pendulum back toward empiricism.

We investigated whether (a) people positively reevaluate the characters of recently dead others and (b) supernatural primes concerning an ambient dead agent serve to curb selfish intentions. In Study 1, participants made trait attributions to three strangers depicted in photographs; one week later, they returned to do the same but were informed that one of the strangers had died over the weekend. Participants rated the decedent target more favorably after learning of his death whereas ratings for the control targets remained (...) unchanged between sessions. This effect was especially pronounced for traits dealing with the decedent’s prosocial tendencies (e.g., ethical, kind). In Study 2, a content analysis of obituaries revealed a similar emphasis on decedents’ prosocial attributes over other personality dimensions (e.g., achievement-relatedness, social skills). Finally, in Study 3, participants who were told of an alleged ghost in the laboratory were less likely to cheat on a competitive task than those who did not receive this supernatural prime. The findings are interpreted as evidence suggestive of adaptive design. (shrink)

The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the (...) internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality. (shrink)

It is often claimed that principles of individuation imply essential properties of the things individuated. For example, sets are individuated by their members, hence sets have their members essentially. But how does this inference work? First I discuss the form of such inferences, and conclude that the essentialist inference is not a purely formal matter: although there is a form which all principles of individuation have in common, it is not true that any statement of that form is a principle (...) of individuation, and hence there is no valid inference based purely on that form. However, I argue that there is a viable version of the essentialist inference nonetheless. The resources for a proper reconstruction of this type of inference can be gathered from reflections upon the role principles of individuation play in the project of the ontologist: such principles turn out to carry a modal weight similar to that of definitions or conceptual truths. It follows that, no matter how austere the ontology, some portion of essentialist modality is inevitable. (shrink)

The Emotional Construction of Morals is a book about moral judgements – the kinds of mental states we might express by sentences such as, ‘It's bad to flash your neighbors’, or ‘You ought not eat your pets’. There are three basic questions that get addressed: what are the psychological states that constitute such judgements? What kinds of properties do such judgements refer to? And, where do these judgements come from? The first question concerns moral psychology, the second metaethics and the (...) third is best construed as belonging to a domain that has been neglected in analytic value theory: the genealogy of morals. These are all separate branches of ethics, but they are interconnected. The thesis of the book is that moral judgements are emotional attitudes that refer to response-dependent properties, and that these responses have been shaped by cultural history. I call the view Constructive Sentimentalism. The first half of the book deals with sentiments, and the second half with construction. The second half also deals with relativism, because I argue that moral values are constructed differently across cultures and across individuals.Thus described, The Emotional Construction of Morals is a conventional contribution to analytic moral philosophy, taking on some of the core questions in that field and defending positions that have a long philosophical pedigree. Indeed, the theory I defend has roots in Hume and Nietzsche, though it departs from both in various ways. What makes the book somewhat unusual is that it seeks to defend traditional theories by appeal to recent work in psychology, neuroscience, anthropology and related fields. It is an exercise in methodological naturalism and committed to the view that we can answer traditional philosophical questions while treating ethics as a social science. Ethics and naturalism are hard to reconcile because ethics is a normative domain, …. (shrink)

Char et al. aspire to provide “a systematic approach to identifying … ethical concerns” around machine learning healthcare applications, which includes artificial intelligence and...

This monograph treats the important topic of the epistemology of diagrams in Euclidean geometry. Norman argues that diagrams play a genuine justificatory role in traditional Euclidean arguments, and he aims to account for these roles from a modified Kantian perspective. Norman considers himself a semi-Kantian in the following broad sense: he believes that Kant was right that ostensive constructions are necessary in order to follow traditional Euclidean proofs, but he wants to avoid appealing to Kantian a priori intuition as the (...) epistemological background for these constructions.Norman's main argument is limited to the thesis that certain Euclidean arguments—in particular, that of Proposition 1.32, the internal-angle-sum theorem—require inferences from diagrams. Interestingly, Norman is not committed to the view that these arguments are proofs. This becomes clear only quite late in the book, when he distinguishes argument from proofs, remarking that the argument he has been focusing on is not rigorous, and so is not a proof. Norman does not, however, explicitly classify all Euclidean arguments as non-proofs. His view is that diagrammatic reasoning can in principle feature in rigorous proofs, but he is not committed to the thesis that any particular argument, Euclidean or otherwise, provides an example of this. Rather than proofs in particular, Norman is more interested in the general issue of justification in mathematics.The argument has three components. First, Norman argues against competing accounts of Euclidean arguments such as empiricism, and ‘Leibnizianism’—the view that diagrams play only a heuristic role. Second, he provides a more direct, or positive, argument that the way we actually follow the standard argument for 1.32 does appeal to the diagram. This is an appeal to the phenomenology of following the argument. Third, he articulates and defends his semi-Kantian position against some objections.The book has a very careful and …. (shrink)

In this roundtable discussion, early-career researchers working in the field of law, gender, and sexuality discuss international and trans-national developments to legal gender. ‘The Future of Legal Gender’ research project focused on the legislative framework of England and Wales to develop a prototype for decertification. The domestic legislation, however, was situated within a wider international context throughout the project. This roundtable discussion, therefore, provided an opportunity for reflection on the transnational issues raised by decertification, with a particular focus on developments (...) arising in the jurisdiction(s) studied by the early career researchers. The roundtable began with a brief outline of these recent developments before moving to an open discussion on key themes including the value of reform on wider society, changes on-the-ground by non-state actors, and alternative processes for tackling gender inequalities without certifying legal gender. The online conversation took place on 28 June 2021 and has been transcribed and edited for continuity, clarity, and referencing. (shrink)

Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.

This work of 'systematic parapsychology' aims to construct a framework and system of parapsychology, taking a comprehensive approach to the field. The book states that parapsychology has a different philosophical background from the existing science and religions, and posits that pantheism could be the theoretical basis of parapsychology.

Five studies examined the extent to which autobiographical memory retrieval is hierarchical, whether a hierarchical search depends on central executive resources, and whether retrieving memories that are “higher” in the hierarchy impairs problem‐solving ability. The first study found that random generation (assessed using a button‐pressing task) was sensitive to changes in memory load (digit span). The second study showed that when participants fail to retrieve a target event, they respond with a memory that is higher up the hierarchy. The third (...) study showed that memory is more generic only when participants use low imageable cues under cognitive load. The final two experiments showed that experimental manipulation of memory specificity affects problem solving (MEPS performance). The data are consistent with Conway and Pleydell‐Pearce's hierarchical retrieval model of autobiographical memory, and suggest that overgeneral memory in nonclinical participants is associated with reduced executive capacity only when retrieval is “top‐down” (generative). (shrink)

Two years ago, the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics published volume 28, number 4, devoted to a symposium entitled Human Subjects Research and the Role of Institutional Review Boards - Conflicts and Challenges. I had the good fortune to be asked to serve as editor of that issue. In her introduction to the symposium, the then editor-in-chief of the journal, Ellen Wright Clayton, observed that the country is currently undergoing a major reexamination of how biomedical research is conducted. While (...) that reexamination has continued in the interim, some very recent events raise questions about the extent to which this will continue, at least in the short run, with equal vigor. The intervening years have witnessed a variety of new directions and events. The federal Office of Human Research Protections, directed by Dr. Greg Koski, who wrote a brief commentary for the last symposium,L has taken a new direction, strongly stressing the need for institutions and their institutional review boards ORBS) to engage in extensive educational and quality improvement efforts with both researchers and their own member. (shrink)

The authors found that the feeling of authorship for mental actions such as solving problems is enhanced by effort cues experienced during mental activity; misattribution of effort cues resulted in inadvertent plagiarism. Pairs of participants took turns solving anagrams as they exerted effort on an unrelated task. People inadvertently plagiarized their partners’ answers more often when they experienced high incidental effort while working on the problem and reduced effort as the solution appeared. This result was found for efforts produced when (...) participants squeezed a handgrip during the task (Experiment 1) or when the anagram was displayed in a font that was difficult to read (Experiments 2, 3a, and 3b). Plagiarism declined, however, when participants attended to the source of the effort cues (Experiments 3a and 3b). These results suggest that effort misattribution can influence authorship processing for mental activities. (shrink)

Numerous examples have been offered that purportedly show that God cannot be omnipotent. I argue that a common response to such examples (i.e., that failure to do the impossible does not indicate a lack of power) does not preserve God’s omnipotence in the face of some of these examples. I consider another possible strategy for preserving God’s omnipotence in the face of these examples and find it wanting.

A series of interviews with people from various backgrounds, showing how people's personal experiences influences their politics.

Dependencies are identified in two recently proposed first-order axiom systems for plane hyperbolic geometry. Since the dependencies do not specifically concern hyperbolic geometry, our results yield two simpler axiom systems for absolute geometry.

Newborn infants are among those most severely affected by humanitarian crises. Aid organisations increasingly recognise the necessity to provide for the medical needs of newborns, however, this may generate distinctive ethical questions for those providing humanitarian medical care. Medical ethical approaches to neonatal care familiar in other settings may not be appropriate given the diversity and volatility of humanitarian disasters, and the extreme resource limitations commonly faced by humanitarian aid missions.In this paper, we first systematically review existing guidelines relating to (...) the treatment and resuscitation of newborns in humanitarian crises, finding little substantive ethical guidance for those providing humanitarian healthcare. We next draw on paradigm cases and published literature to identify and describe some of the major ethical questions common to these settings. We divide these questions into quality of life considerations, allocation of limited resources, and conflicting cultural norms and values. We finally suggest some preliminary recommendations to guide ethical decision‐making around resuscitation of newborns and withdrawal of treatment in humanitarian settings. (shrink)

Advocates of biomimicry encourage a new industrial paradigm that ostensibly leaves behind the crude violence of Francis Bacon, the domination of nature-as-machine, and a history of toxic production processes that have given rise to a present and coming climate crisis. As part of a broader trend towards the conceptualization and development of a ‘bioeconomy’, we argue here that biomimicry produces ‘nature’ in new ways. At face value, these new approaches to valuing nature may seem less violent and exploitative. Yet, new (...) natures can and are tortured in new ways. We argue that biomimicry produces ‘nature’ through well-worn logics of resource enclosure and privatization, focusing upon two fundamental shifts in how nonhuman life is figured and put to work: (1) the production of nature as intellectual property (as opposed to raw materials); (2) the production of nature as an active subject (as opposed to a passive receptacle or vehicle). (shrink)

The title of this paper is intended as a provocative reference to Ursula Coope 's recent article 'Why Does Aristotle Say That There Is No Time Without Change?', which provides much of the impetus for the present paper.1 For although Coope 's strategy in answering this question is admirable, and although I think that her criticisms of the standard interpretation of the argument that opens Physics IV 11 hit their mark, I believe that her own interpretation fails and that something (...) rather like the standard interpretation is correct. In the first section, I rehearse Coope 's treatment of the standard interpretation and critically evaluate her alternative to it. In the second section, I present an interpretation of the argument that seems to me to succeed where the others fail and also to hold the promise of being quite fruitful in reconstructing the rest of Aristotle's temporal theory. While such a reconstruction lies well beyond the scope of this paper, I shall conclude by mentioning a few of the more significant points that fall out of the interpretation developed here. (shrink)

Empathy can be characterized as a vicarious emotion that one person experiences when reflecting on the emotion of another. So characterized, empathy is sometimes regarded as a precondition on moral judgment. This seems to have been Hume's view. I review various ways in which empathy might be regarded as a precondition and argue against each of them: empathy is not a component, a necessary cause, a reliable epistemic guide, a foundation for justification, or the motivating force behind our moral judgments. (...) In fact, empathy is prone to biases that render it potentially harmful. Another construct—concern—fares somewhat better, but it is also of limited use. I argue that, instead of empathy, moral judgments involve emotions such as anger, disgust, guilt, and admiration. These, not empathy, provide the sentimental foundation for morality. (shrink)

Childhood obesity is in important respects a result of legal policies that influence both dietary intake and physical activity. The law must shift focus away from individual risk factors alone and seek instead to promote situational and environmental influences that create an atmosphere conducive to health. To attain this goal, advocates should embrace a population-wide model of public health, and policymakers must critically examine the fashionable rhetoric of consumer choice.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jesse Kai.in THE INTENT OF ROMANTICISM: KANT, WORDSWORTH, AND TWO FILMS Great Kant, As a believer calls to his God, I call upon you for help, for solace, or for counsel to prepare me for death. The reasons you gave in your books were sufficient to convince me of a future existence — that is why I have recourse to you — only I found nothing at all (...) for this life, nothing that could replace the good I have lost.... my heart splits into a thousand pieces. If I hadn't read so much of your work I would certainly have taken my own life by now. But the conclusion I had to draw from your theory stops me — it is wrong for me to die because my life is tormented, and I am instead supposed to live because of my being. Now put yourself in my place and either damn me or give me solace. Maria von Herbert, August, 1791 ' This ESSAY is an attempt to describe a kind of thoughtfulness that has its origins in the beginnings of the Romantic movement and is of ethical relevance today. I will first locate the moral problematic that this thoughtfulness responds to as it arises within the framework established by Kant's moral philosophy. It is that of despair in the face of life and, while this is a problematic Kant himself would consider invalid, the solution it calls for, were he to try to provide it, involves the kind of thinking he considers in the Critique of Judgement, though not in quite the way he understands it. I will then suggest that the Wordsworth of the 1802 "Preface" can be taken as sketching out the sort of response to this problematic that Kant himself refuses to give or even recognize as philosophically needed. This will be a kind of artwork which is at the same time a certain process of thinking. The intent of Romanticism referred to in my title is thus both the concern to resolve this Kantian problem and the goal of achieving this Wordsworthian artwork. What I shall finally propose is that this kind of artwork is ofcurrent interest to moral philosophy and will 121 122Philosophy and Literature elaborate this claim through the discussion of two recent instances, both films — Margarethe von Trotta's The SecondAwakening ofChrista Klages and J.J. Murphy's Print Generation. I Kant sets a complicated and multifaceted background for both Romanticism and modern moral philosophy. His positions are complex and even convoluted and some of his most important ideas are both obscure and presented only obliquely. The problem ofdespair which comes to be at the heart of Romanticism develops out of the two Kantian themes of thoughtful autonomy (enlightenment) and the purposive unity of man and the world. Kant argues that practical reason must affirm these ideas as the Postulates of Freedom and God. In taking this position, however, Kant is implicitly committed to the existence of things good in themselves other than, and finally coordinate to, the Good Will, though he gives no direct account of such goods. Despair in the face of life is grounded in the inability or failure to appreciate these goods, and while Kant provides hints, he is never able to recognize or articulate a means of evidential access to them. Both the need of such goods and the appropriation of them remain submerged and latent themes in his writings. Let us begin with the question ofGod and the wholeness of all things. It would be a disaster, Kant says, if we could not, no matter how hard we tried, accomplish the purpose set for us by the Moral Law which is happiness in accord with virtue. It would be intolerable if the virtuous were always to be unhappy, or the vicious always to have their peace. However, since happiness is only marginally in our control, we need to postulate both immortality of the soul and existence of God as moral author of the world to assure that this purpose, or the summum bonum, can be achieved. What we cannot do, God will. This is the so-called moral argument for the existence of God and its outcome... (shrink)

In noise we hear the possibility of a signal, indeed different signals, and in the multiplicity of signals we hear noise. With variation and selection comes dynamic evolution, a contingent state, one that could be otherwise. The term ‘polemogenous’ (from the French, polémogène) means that which generates polemics. And polemics are creative. If everyone, every system, were to reason in the same way, there would be silence. Every remark would be redundant, having no informational value. Thus noise is not bad. (...) The essence of finance economics, like all that is social in nature, is a forming of meaning. Whatever cannot be formed meaningfully is not available to the system. This unavailability, as ‘noise’, is the dynamic difference (noise/information) that scintillates the system. Information, like morality, is polemogenous – it stirs contention. Without noise and the possibility of its conversion to information there would be no opportunities to exploit. This paper applies a systems theoretical understanding of observation to conceive of finance economics as the economy’s means of observing its noise and capitalizing on that polemic. Niklas Luhmann’s method is utilized to explicate some ideas on noise by financial economist Fischer Black, who suggests the incomprehensible is computable. This is finance. The fact that logical grounds, absolute deductions, and clear calculations are claimed to be rare in finance is no barrier to understanding it. Rather, this polyphonic and polemogenous information-selection is the ‘ground’ of finance, not as totalizing logic, but as different difference-production for the sake of deriving economic opportunity. (shrink)