Essential reading for students and scholars of philosophy of language and mind, Reading Brandom is also an excellent companion volume to Reading McDowell: On ...

What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons (...) for action only insofar as they are dispositions to have affective experiences. On this account, affective experience has a central role to play in explaining how desires provide reasons for action. (shrink)

Both Brandom and Wittgenstein see meaning and content as emerging from normative social practices. Wittgenstein says little about the constitution of such norms, other than that they are exhibited in practitioners’ judgements of correctness. In addition, they appear already to be content involving, since the moves whose correctness is in question are moves such as asserting that such and such. In contrast, Brandom says a good deal about the constitution of the norms and promises a reductive programme. The norms are (...) essentially inferential and are instituted in the social practice of attributing commitments and entitlements. In particular, we are urged to see the norm-bound move of assertion as capable of being understood in terms of the normative statuses of commitments and entitlements. Jeremy Wanderer calls this Brandom’s bold conjecture. In this paper I use Wittgenstein’s thinking about normativity to reflect on the defensibility of Brandom’s bold conjecture. (shrink)

This paper evaluates the claim that some desires provide reasons in virtue of their connection with conscious affective experiences like feelings of attraction or aversion. I clarify the nature of affective desires and several distinct ways in which affective desires might provide reasons. Against accounts proposed by Ruth Chang, Declan Smithies and Jeremy Weiss, I motivate doubts that it is the phenomenology of affective experiences that explains their normative or rational significance. I outline an alternative approach that centralises (...) the function of such experiences. (shrink)

If social, political, and material transformation is to have a lasting impact on individuals and society, it must be integrated within ordinary experience. Refiguring the Ordinary examines the ways in which individuals' bodies, habits, environments, and abilities function as horizons that underpin their understandings of the ordinary. These features of experience, according to Gail Weiss, are never neutral, but are always affected by gender, race, social class, ethnicity, nationality, and perceptions of bodily normality. While no two people will experience (...) the ordinary in exactly the same way, the multiplicities, possibilities, overlaps, and limitations of day-to-day horizons are always intersubjectively constituted. Weiss turns her attention to changing the conditions and experiences of oppression from ordinary to extraordinary. This book is an impressive phenomenological, feminist reading of the complexities of human experience.M. V. Marder, University of Toronto, Feb. 2009. (shrink)

In Socrates Dissatisfied, Weiss argues against the prevailing view that the personified Laws in the latter part of the Crito are Socrates' spokesmen. She reveals and explores many indications that Socrates and the Laws are, both in style and in substance, adversaries. Deft, provocative, and compelling, with new translations providing groundbreaking interpretations of key passages, Socrates Dissatisfied challenges the standard conception of the history of political thought.

This paper considers the philosophical foundations of the law relating to migration. It examines the kinds of reasons that might justify the restriction of liberty as people move about on the face of the earth—something humans have done since time immemorial. The paper also examines the various interests that might be at stake in moral calculations regarding migration: economic interests, cultural interests, religious interests, or just sheer preferences. Drawing on the work of Locke, Kant, and Sidgwick, it considers conceptions like (...) common ownership of the earth, the right of hospitality, and the difference between defending property and restricting access to economic interaction. The paper also considers the ambiguity of the commonly heard slogan that states by definition have a right to control their borders. (shrink)

Many psychological studies of categorization and reasoning use undergraduates to make claims about human conceptualization. Generalizability of findings to other populations is often assumed but rarely tested. Even when comparative studies are conducted, it may be challenging to interpret differences. As a partial remedy, in the present studies we adopt a 'triangulation strategy' to evaluate the ways expertise and culturally different belief systems can lead to different ways of conceptualizing the biological world. We use three groups (US bird experts, US (...) undergraduates, and ordinary Itza' Maya) and two sets of birds (North American and Central American). Categorization tasks show considerable similarity among the three groups' taxonomic sorts, but also systematic differences. Notably, US expert categorization is more similar to Itza' than to US novice categorization. The differences are magnified on inductive reasoning tasks where only undergraduates show patterns of judgment that are largely consistent with current models of category-based taxonomic inference. The Maya commonly employ causal and ecological reasoning rather than taxonomic reasoning. Experts use a mixture of strategies (including causal and ecological reasoning), only some of which current models explain. US and Itza' informants differed markedly when reasoning about passerines (songbirds), reflecting the somewhat different role that songbirds play in the two cultures. The results call into question the importance of similarity-based notions of typicality and central tendency in natural categorization and reasoning. These findings also show that relative expertise leads to a convergence of thought that transcends cultural boundaries and shared experiences. (shrink)

In an article entitled “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft,” Myles Burnyeat suggested that we might do “what the seventeenth century did . . . [with the Aristotelian concept of the mind] . . . junk it.” Burnyeat buttressed this controversial claim, in large part, on the premise that it is difficult to believe that mental facts are not supervenient on physical facts in the wake of post-enlightenment thinking. Various valiant attempts to save Aristotle’s philosophy of (...) mind from being junked soon followed. One strategy that found favor among some scholars was that of arguing that Aristotle’s physics really is not in conflict with the idea that mental facts supervene upon physical facts. Scholars such as Michael Wedin and Victor Caston read Aristotle as maintaining a supervenience thesis in Physics 7.3. I disagree with the view that ascribes supervenience physicalism to Aristotle. The general strategy for providing support for my view is as follows: I first aim to discredit the view that ascribes supervenience physicalism to Aristotle on the basis of Physics 7.3. Thereafter, I turn to more psychological and biological texts to argue that Aristotle’s central views therein are unfriendly to supervenience physicalism. (shrink)

After an introduction to the major issues confronting intellectuals, this book explores the various aspects of the intellectual's role including: * philosophers and academics who have tried to define the function of the intellectual * how intellectuals have assumed the status of the conscience of the nation and the voice of the oppressed * the interaction of intellectuals with Marxism * the place of the intellectual in American society Covering regions as diverse as Israel, Algeria, Britain, Ireland, central Europe and (...) America, this collection considers the question of whether the intellectual can still lay claim to the language of truth. In answering, this study tells us much about the modern world in which we live. _Coverage includes the following thinkers:_ Gramsci, Weber, Yeats, Auden, Levy, Mailer, Walzer, Marx and many more. (shrink)

This essay considers the special character of mathematical reasoning, and draws on observations from interactive theorem proving and the history of mathematics to clarify the nature of formal and informal mathematical language. It proposes that we view mathematics as a system of conventions and norms that is designed to help us make sense of the world and reason efficiently. Like any designed system, it can perform well or poorly, and the philosophy of mathematics has a role to play in helping (...) us understand the general principles by which it serves its purposes well. (shrink)

Although the Cambridge Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic James Ward was once one of Britain's most highly regarded Psychologists and Philosophers, today his work is unjustly neglected. This is because his philosophy is frequently misrepresented as a reactionary anti-naturalistic idealist theism. In this article, I argue, first, that this reading is false, and that by viewing Ward through the lens of pragmatism we obtain a fresh interpretation of his work that highlights the scientific nature of his philosophy and his (...) original and promising theory of ‘evolutionary Kantianism’, with its applications to the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics. Second, I show that reading Ward as a pragmatist provides us with (1) a more complex history of the reception of pragmatism at Cambridge at the turn of the twentieth century than the straightforwardly hostile one traditionally told; and (2) a more detailed understanding of the wide range of philosophical problems to which pragmatism was deemed at this time to have an appropriate application. (shrink)

Through a close re-examination of Eugene O'Neill's oeuvre, from minor plays to his Pulitzer-winning works, this study proposes that O'Neill's vision of tragedy privileges a particular emotional response over a more "rational" one among his audience members. In addition to offering a new paradigm through which to interpret O'Neill's work, this book argues that O'Neill's theory of tragedy is a robust account of the value of difficult theatre as a whole, with more explanatory scope and power than its cognitivist counterparts. (...) This paradigm reshapes our understanding of live theatrical tragedy's impact and significance for our lives. The book enters the discussion of tragic value by way of the plays of Eugene O'Neill, and through this study, Killian makes the case that O'Neill has refused to allow Plato to define the terms of tragedy's merit, as the cognitivists have. He argues that O'Neill's theory of tragedy is non-cognitive and locates the value of a play in its ability to trigger certain emotional responses from the audience. This would be of great interest to students and scholars of performance studies, literature and philosophy. (shrink)

A God would have the wisdom, power and concern to do all that must be done to supplement man's activities in such a way that only good is done, and this everywhere. If we could count on his existence, concern and aid, we could be sure of getting the right help and to the right degree. Only a God is both powerful and wise enough to provide all the help that would be needed, and only a God is good and (...) wise enough to give it always at the right time and in the right way. He alone can guarantee the perfect production of whatever was distorted and left undone because of man's impotence, ignorance and folly. It is tempting therefore to claim that men always do, or that they always should look to a God for the aid they need if good is to be fully realized. (shrink)

When men interplay with nature, they constitute with it the distinctive public time of a human realm. And when, as members of that realm, they combine with the nature that still remains outside the human realm, they constitute with it the distinctive public time of objective history. The time of history is thus less delimited, less specialized, and more inclusive than the time of the human realm.

This doctrine is sound, I think, but not entirely adequate. If each thing is concerned with all the rest, no two things could have exactly the same object of concern. There will then be no reason why any two of them, contemporaries at any one moment, should be contemporaries at the next. Each will face a future distinct from that of any other, into which it will go in its own way and at its own pace. It was rightly remarked (...) in Reality that the different futures share a number of features, making it possible to deal with individuals as members of various classes. But since no individuals act in terms of those features, and since those features exert no controlling power, those features cannot keep contemporary beings in temporal accord. (shrink)

The Bloomsbury Handbook of Chinese Philosophy Methodologies is the third entry of the Bloomsbury Research Handbook in Asian Philosophy series. Editor Sor-hoon Tan begins the Handbook with a historical journey starting from Hegel's insistence that "Chinese philosophy" is not really philosophy; through Hu Shih's and Fung Yulan's groundbreaking attempts in the early twentieth century to revise traditional Chinese thought using Western methods; and up to more current discussions on the question of whether there is such a thing as "Chinese philosophy." (...) Methodology, Tan insists, lies at the center of this debate, and being committed to the employment of sound methods can be of existential importance for the field of... (shrink)

Belief is typically understood to be the success‐neutral counterpart of knowledge. But there is no success‐neutral counterpart of knowledge.

Fogelin’s Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement as allowing no rational resolution has been criticized from both argumentation theoretic and epistemological perspectives. These criticisms typically do not recognize how his point applies to the very argumentative resources on which they rely. Additionally, more extremely than Fogelin himself argues, the conditions of deep disagreement make each position literally unintelligible to the other, again disallowing rational resolution. In turn, however, this failure of sense is so extreme that it partly cancels its own meaning (...) as a failure of sense. Consequently, it paradoxically opens new possibilities for sense and therefore rationally unexpected resolutions. (shrink)

For historians of psychology, Hugo Münsterberg is best remembered as William James’ successor as director of the Harvard Psychological Laboratory and a pioneer of applied psychology. By contrast, f...

This paper generalises and complements the work on combining temporal logics started by Finger and Gabbay [11, 10]. We present proofs of transference of soundness, completeness and decidability for the temporalisation of logics T for any flow of time, eliminating the original restriction that required linear time for the transference of those properties through logic combination. We also generalise such results to the external application of a multi-modal system containing any number of connectives with arbitrary arity, that respect normality.This generalisation (...) over generic flows of time propagates to other combinations of logics that can be interpreted in terms of temporalisations. In this way, the independent combination of temporal logics is studied over generic flows of time. We show the transfer of soundness, completeness and decidability for independent combination of temporal logics. Finally, we also discuss the independent combination of any finite number of normal multi-modal logics. (shrink)

In this interview with the Austrian journalist Alexia Weiss, I outline how Austrians missed several chances to confront their political guilt. I then clarify how individual and collective guilt are interconnected, and I explain how the argument that our grandfathers and mothers only "did their duty" echoes the defense mechanisms Austrian perpetrators used in the postwar trials. I also show that attempts in Austria to derail the staging of Thomas Bernhard's Heldenplatz play in the eighties parallel today's attempts to (...) dissuade the building of a House of History. In both instances, Austrians aimed to fend off unconscious guilt feelings. In addition, not dealing with guilt led to the survival of Anti-Semitic elements in Austrian society, which today's Far Right in Austria has manipulated for its purposes. Finally, I explain that my living in the United States allowed me to remain a "subject-in-outline." This subjectivity implies that I am identified with Austria, which was necessary to feel political guilt. However, I am not wholly identified with my country of origin, which was essential to confront the complex subject of Austria's failed dealing with guilt. (shrink)

COVID-19 presents many challenges, both clinical and philosophical. In this paper we discuss a major lacuna that COVID-19 revealed in our philosophy and understanding of medicine. Whereas we have some understanding of how physician-scientists interrogate the world to learn more about medicine, we do not understand the epistemological costs and benefits of the various ways clinicians acquire new knowledge in their fields. We will also identify reasons this topic is important both when the world is facing a pandemic and when (...) it is not. (shrink)

We describe a formalization of asymptotic O notation using the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant.