Structural realism has been proposed as an epistemological position interpolating between realism and sceptical anti-realism about scientific theories. The structural realist who accepts a scientific theory thinks that is empirically correct, and furthermore is a realist about the ‘structural content’ of . But what exactly is ‘structural content’? One proposal is that the ‘structural content’ of a scientific theory may be associated with its Ramsey sentence (). However, Demopoulos and Friedman have argued, using ideas drawn from Newman's earlier criticism of (...) Russell's structuralism, that this move fails to achieve an interesting intermediate position between realism and anti-realism. Rather, () adds little content beyond the instrumentalistically acceptable claim that the theory is empirically adequate. Here, I formulate carefully the crucial claim of Demopoulos and Friedman, and show that the Ramsey sentence () is true just in case possesses a full model which is empirically correct and satisfies a certain cardinality condition on its theoretical domain. This suggests that structural realism is not a position significantly different from the anti-realism it attempts to distinguish itself from. Introduction Technical framework Ramsification Empirical adequacy Ramsification empirical adequacy + cardinality constraint Conclusion. (shrink)

Creationism is the conjunction of the following theses: (i) fictional individuals (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) actually exist; (ii) fictional names (e.g., 'Holmes') are at least sometimes genuinely referential; (iii) fictional individuals are the creations of the authors who first wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. CA Creationism is the conjunction of (i) - (iii) and the following thesis: (iv) fictional individuals are contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts of our world and various other possible worlds. TakashiYagisawa has recently provided a (...) number of arguments designed to show that Creationism is unjustified. I here critically examine three of his challenges to CA Creationism. I argue that each fails to undermine this version of Creationism. (shrink)

Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion Jeffrey L. Kosky Reveals the interplay of phenomenology and religion in Levinas’s thought. "Kosky examines Levinas’s thought from the perspective of the philosophy of religion and he does so in a way that is attentive to the philosophical nuances of Levinas’s argument.... an insightful, well written, and carefully documented study... that uniquely illuminates Levinas’s work." —John D. Caputo For readers who suspect there is no place for religion and morality in postmodern philosophy, (...) class='Hi'>Jeffrey L. Kosky suggests otherwise in this skillful interpretation of the ethical and religious dimensions of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought. Placing Levinas in relation to Hegel and Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger, Derrida and Marion, Kosky develops religious themes found in Levinas’s work and offers a way to think and speak about ethics and morality within the horizons of contemporary philosophy of religion. Kosky embraces the entire scope of Levinas’s writings, from Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being, contrasting Levinas’s early religious and moral thought with that of his later works while exploring the nature of phenomenological reduction, the relation of religion and philosophy, the question of whether Levinas can be considered a Jewish thinker, and the religious and theological import of Levinas’s phenomenology. Kosky stresses that Levinas is first and foremost a phenomenologist and that the relationship between religion and philosophy in his ethics should cast doubt on the assumption that a natural or inevitable link exists between deconstruction and atheism. Jeffrey L. Kosky is translator of On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism: The Constitution and the Limits of Onto-theo-logy in Cartesian Thought by Jean-Luc Marion. He has taught at Williams College. Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion—Merold Westphal, general editor May 2001 272 pages, 6 1/8 x 9 1/4, bibl., index, append. cloth 0-253-33925-1 $39.95 s / £30.50. (shrink)

water paradox has long served as an argument against the Principle of Indifference. A solution to the paradox is proposed, with a view toward resolving general difficulties in applying the principle.

This is a response to a paper “Paradox without satisfaction”, Analysis 63, 152-6 (2003) by Otavio Bueno and Mark Colyvan on Yablo’s paradox. I argue that this paper makes several substantial mathematical errors which vitiate the paper. (For the technical details, see [12] below.).

Th is article examines the extent to which spaces are structuring influences on, or targets of, action. Two factors and their interactions are presented: the extent to which a space is 1) maintained and 2) used. As these factors increase in strength, the structural influences of a space increase while agential opportunities are diminished. Conversely, as spaces become dilapidated and abandoned, structural forces are weakened and the potential for creative action heightens. These spaces can be conceptualized as elements of the (...) ‘residual landscape’: spaces left behind by socio-historical processes and practices. Special cases are considered where the factors are inversely related and issues of structure and agency are complicated. A brief case study serves to illustrate each type of spaceand the factors which operate therein. (shrink)

Consider a group of people whose preferences satisfy the axioms of one of the current versions of utility theory, such as von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944), Savage (1954), or Bolker-Jeffrey (1965). There are political and economic contexts in which it is of interest to find ways of aggregating these individual preferences into a group preference ranking. The question then arises of whether methods of aggregation exist in which the group’s preferences also satisfy the axioms of the chosen utility theory, and in (...) which at the same time the aggregation process satisfies certain plausible conditions (e.g., the Pareto conditions below). (shrink)

The following inference is valid: There are exactly 101 dalmatians, There are exactly 100 food bowls, Each dalmatian uses exactly one food bowl Hence, at least two dalmatians use the same food bowl. Here, “there are at least 101 dalmatians” is nominalized as, "x1"x2…."x100$y(Dy & y ¹ x1 & y ¹ x2 & … & y ¹ x100) and “there are exactly 101 dalmatians” is nominalized as, "x1"x2…."x100$y(Dy & y ¹ x1 & y ¹ x2 & … & y ¹ (...) x100) & Ø"x1"x2…."x101$y(Dy & y ¹ x1 & y ¹ x2 & … & y ¹ x101). This is abbreviated $101xDx. The validity of the above inference corresponds to the valid formula, PHP(100): [$101xDx & $100xFx & "x(Dx ® Ff(x))] ® $x1$x2(Dx1 & Dx2 & x1 ¹ x2 & f(x1) = f(x2)). More generally, for variable n, the formula PHP(n) is PHP(n): [$n+1xDx & $nxFx & "x(Dx ® Ff(x))] ® $x1$x2(Dx1 & Dx2 & x1 ¹ x2 & f(x1) = f(x2)). A mathematical proof that PHP(n) is valid, for all n > 0, is quite short (less than a page), but refers to numbers, functions and sets. It uses the Pigeonhole Principle. This explains why PHP(n) is valid, for all n>0. However, I estimate that a predicate calculus derivation of PHP(100), using natural deduction, say, would require around 107 symbols. Unfeasibility Problem: nominalism is the radical anti-realist view that there are no numbers, functions or sets. So, how could a nominalist know that PHP(100) is valid, without directly performing the rather long derivation? Can the nominalist “ride piggyback” on the standard mathematical proof? If so, how is this justified? (shrink)

This essay develops our meta-logical interpretation of Leibniz’s formal theory of contingency by taking up two additional issues not fully addressed in our earlier efforts. The first issue concerns the relationship between Leibniz’s formal theory of contingency and his views on species and essentialism. The second issue concerns the relationship between Leibniz’s formal theory of contingency and the modal status of the actual world.

Berkeley held that the moral duty of mankind was to obey God's laws; that--since God was a benevolent Creator--the object of His laws must be to promote the welfare and flourishing of mankind; and that, accordingly, humans could identify their moral duties by asking what system of laws for conduct would in fact tend to promote that object. This position--which is akin to that of 'rule' Utilitarianism--is neither unfamiliar nor manifestly untenable. He was surely mistaken, however, in his further supposition (...) that, if this theory were accepted, the resolution of all (or most) particular moral dilemmas would be simple and straightforward. (shrink)

What would happen if we reimagined the humanities as the superhumanities? If we acknowledged and celebrated the undercurrent of the fantastic within our humanistic disciplines, entirely new cultural worlds and meanings would become possible. That is Jeffrey J. Kripal's vision for the future-to revive the suppressed dimension of the superhumanities, which consists of rare but real altered states of knowledge that have driven the creative processes of many of our most revered authors, artists, and activists. In Kripal's telling, the (...) history of the humanities is filled with superhumanist thought, possession states, and out-of-body experiences. The basic idea of the superhuman, for Kripal, is at the core of who and what the human species has tried to become over millennia and around the planet. After diagnosing the basic malaise of the humanities-that the truth must be depressing-Kripal shows how it can all be done differently. He argues that we have to decolonize reality itself if we are going to take human diversity seriously. Toward this pluralist end, he engages psychoanalytic, Black critical, feminist, postcolonial, queer, and ecocritical theory. He works through objections to the superhumanities while also recognizing the new realities represented by the contemporary sciences. In doing so, he tries to move beyond naysaying practices of critique toward a future that can embrace those critiques within a more holistic view-a view that recognizes the human being as both a social-political animal as well as an evolved cosmic species that understands and experiences itself as something super. (shrink)

We can modify Hume’s Principle in the same manner that George Boolos suggested for modifying Frege’s Basic Law V. This leads to the principle Small Hume. Then, we can show that Small Hume is interderivable with Hume’s Principle.

Dominique Lestel is a French philosopher whose work is significant for the rethinking of animality and human-animal relations. Throughout such important books as _L’Animalité _, _Les Origines animales de la culture _ and _L’Animal singulier_, he offers a fierce critique of reductive, mechanistic models of animal behaviour, as well as a positive contribution to etho-ethnographic and phenomenological methods for understanding animal life. Centred around hybrid human–animal communities of shared interests, affects and meaning, his critical and speculative approach to the animal (...) sciences offers a vision of animals as acting subjects and bearers of culture, who form their own worlds and transform them in concert with human and other partners. In tracing the ways in which we share our lives with animals in the texture of animality, Lestel’s cutting-edge philosophical ethology also contributes to an overarching philosophical anthropology of the human as the most animal of animals. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. _. (shrink)

Anthropology continues to develop both in terms of theory and in relation to the ways in which fieldwork is conducted. Dislocating Anthropology? seeks to capture and represent these developments through a collection of ethnographic essays that are cutting edge, but which do not represent a complete break with what has gone before. In recent years anthropologists have increasingly come to accept that fieldwork in bounded and discrete places is no longer tenable. People can no longer be represented in these static, (...) parochial terms. At the start of the 21st century, and with the possibility of internet connections almost anywhere, we have the potential to move even when we are stationary. Each of the contributors to this collection have identified and attempted to understand sets of relationships that are both temporally and spatially dynamic, that appear to flow into and out of 'the field.' Together, the chapters shed light on a number of methodological conundrums, or dislocations, relating, for example, to locality, identity, fieldwork, and reflexivity. The book is concerned with dislocation as both practice and process, and as such extends a theme that has arguably been central to Anthropology since Malinowski's Trobriand ethnography. (shrink)

Revised and updated, this long-awaited second edition provides a comprehensive introduction to the most important American statesmen, activists, and writers regardless of the historical era or political persuasion.