Biological evolution provides a creative fount of complex and subtle adaptations, often surprising the scientists who discover them. However, because evolution is an algorithmic process that transcends the substrate in which it occurs, evolution’s creativity is not limited to nature. Indeed, many researchers in the field of digital evolution have observed their evolving algorithms and organisms subverting their intentions, exposing unrecognized bugs in their code, producing unexpected adaptations, or exhibiting outcomes uncannily convergent with ones in nature. Such stories routinely reveal (...) creativity by evolution in these digital worlds, but they rarely fit into the standard scientific narrative. Instead they are often treated as mere obstacles to be overcome, rather than results that warrant study in their own right. The stories themselves are traded among researchers through oral tradition, but that mode of information transmission is inefficient and prone to error and outright loss. Moreover, the fact that these stories tend to be shared only among practitioners means that many natural scientists do not realize how interesting and lifelike digital organisms are and how natural their evolution can be. To our knowledge, no collection of such anecdotes has been published before. This paper is the crowd-sourced product of researchers in the fields of artificial life and evolutionary computation who have provided first-hand accounts of such cases. It thus serves as a written, fact-checked collection of scientifically important and even entertaining stories. In doing so we also present here substantial evidence that the existence and importance of evolutionary surprises extends beyond the natural world, and may indeed be a universal property of all complex evolving systems. (shrink)

In this paper I ask how we should treat other beings in cases of uncertainty about sentience. I evaluate three options: an incautionary principle that permits us to treat other beings as non-sentient, a precautionary principle that requires us to treat other beings as sentient, and an expected value principle that requires us to multiply our subjective probability that other beings are sentient by the amount of moral value they would have if they were. I then draw three conclusions. First, (...) the precautionary and expected value principles are more plausible than the incautionary principle. Second, if we accept a precautionary or expected value principle, then we morally ought to treat many beings as having at least partial moral status. Third, if we morally ought to treat many beings as having at least partial moral status, then morality involves more cluelessness and demandingness than we might have thought. (shrink)

This paper considers questions that small animals and AI systems raise for utilitarianism. Specifically, if these beings have more welfare than humans and other large animals, then utilitarianism implies that we should prioritize them, all else equal. This could lead to a ‘rebugnant conclusion’, according to which we should, say, create large populations of small animals rather than small populations of large animals. It could also lead to a ‘Pascal’s bugging’, according to which we should, say, prioritize large populations of (...) small animals even if they have a low chance of being sentient. I suggest that utilitarians should accept these implications in theory but might be able to avoid some of them in practice. (shrink)

While the 'sense of place' is a familiar theme in poetry and art, philosophers have generally given little or no attention to place and the human relation to place. In Place and Experience, Jeff Malpas seeks to remedy this by advancing an account of the nature and significance of place as a complex but unitary structure that encompasses self and other, space and time, subjectivity and objectivity. Drawing on a range of sources from Proust and Wordsworth to Davidson, Strawson (...) and Heidegger, he argues that the significance of place is not to be found in our experience of place so much as in the grounding of experience in place, and that this binding to place is not a contingent feature of human existence, but derives from the very nature of human thought, experience and identity as established in and through place. (shrink)

Should we accept that different moral norms govern our treatment of human and nonhuman animals? In this paper I suggest that the answer is both yes and no. At the theoretical level of morality, a single, unified set of norms governs our treatment of all sentient beings. But at the practical level of morality, different sets of norms can govern our treatment of different groups in different contexts. And whether we accept that we should, say, respect rights or maximize utility (...) at the theoretical level, we might also accept that we should apply a relatively Kantian set of norms to our treatment of humans and a relatively utilitarian set of norms to our treatment of nonhumans in practice, with many caveats. I argue that this moderate “monist in theory, hybrid in practice” view has many advantages over fully monist or hybrid alternatives. (shrink)

The idea of place--topos--runs through Martin Heidegger's thinking almost from the very start. It can be seen not only in his attachment to the famous hut in Todtnauberg but in his constant deployment of topological terms and images and in the situated, "placed" character of his thought and of its major themes and motifs. Heidegger's work, argues Jeff Malpas, exemplifies the practice of "philosophical topology." In Heidegger and the Thinking of Place, Malpas examines the topological aspects of Heidegger's thought (...) and offers a broader elaboration of the philosophical significance of place. Doing so, he provides a distinct and productive approach to Heidegger as well as a new reading of other key figures--notably Kant, Aristotle, Gadamer, and Davidson, but also Benjamin, Arendt, and Camus. Malpas, expanding arguments he made in his earlier book _Heidegger's Topology_, discusses such topics as the role of place in philosophical thinking, the topological character of the transcendental, the convergence of Heideggerian topology with Davidsonian triangulation, the necessity of mortality in the possibility of human life, the role of materiality in the working of art, the significance of nostalgia, and the nature of philosophy as beginning in wonder. Philosophy, Malpas argues, begins in wonder and begins in place and the experience of place. The place of wonder, of philosophy, of questioning, he writes, is the very topos of thinking. (shrink)

I argue for developing a unified moral framework for assessing human and nonhuman subjects research. At present, our standards for human subjects research involve treating humans with respect, compassion, and justice, whereas our ethical standards for nonhuman subjects research merely involve (half-heartedly) aspiring to replace, reduce, and confine our use of nonhuman animals. This creates an unacceptable double standard and leads to pseudo-problems, for example regarding how to treat human-nonhuman chimeras. I discuss general features that a more integrated moral framework (...) might have, assess the pros and cons of this kind of this framework, and suggest that the pros decisively outweigh the cons. (shrink)

For more than a quarter of a century, Hubert L. Dreyfus has been the leading voice in American philosophy for the continuing relevance of phenomenology, particularly as developed by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Dreyfus has influenced a generation of students and a wide range of colleagues, and these volumes are an excellent representation of the extent and depth of that influence.In keeping with Dreyfus's openness to others' ideas, many of the essays in this volume take the form (...) of arguments with various of his positions. The essays focus on the dialogue with the continental philosophical tradition, in particular the work of Heidegger, that has played a foundational role in Dreyfus's thinking. The sections are Philosophy and Authenticity; Modernity, Self, and the World; and Heideggerian Encounters. The book concludes with Dreyfus's responses to the essays.Contributors : William D. Blattner, Taylor Carman, David R. Cerbone, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Charles Guignon, Michel Haar, Beatrice Han, Alastair Hannay, John Haugeland, Randall Havas, Jeff Malpas, Mark Okrent, Richard Rorty, Julian Young, Michael E. Zimmerman. (shrink)

In our paper, we argue for three necessary conditions for morally permissible animal research: (1) an assertion (or expectation) of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition. We argue that these conditions are necessary, without taking a position on whether they are jointly sufficient. In their excellent commentary on our paper, Matthias Eggel, Carolyn Neuhaus, and Herwig Grimm (hereafter, the authors) argue for a friendly amendment to one of our three conditions. In particular, they argue (...) for replacing the first condition—expectation of sufficient net benefit (ESNB)—with an expectation of knowledge production (EKP). In this reply, we will explain why we are open to this proposed amendment, but not yet convinced. (shrink)

Human-nonhuman chimeric research—research on nonhuman animals who contain human cells—is being used to understand human disease and development and to create potential human treatments such as transplantable organs. A proposed advantage of chimeric models is that they can approximate human biology and therefore allow scientists to learn about and improve human health without risking harms to humans. Among the emerging ethical issues being explored is the question of at what point chimeras are “human enough” to have human rights and thus (...) be owed higher standards of research protection than that currently afforded to nonhuman animals. However, this question and other related questions assume that the ethics of experimenting on nonhuman animals have been settled, which they have not. In this essay, we argue that it is imperative to give adequate attention to familiar questions about nonhuman animal research as well as new questions about chimera research and that failure to do so will result in a distorted understanding of the ethics of chimera research. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to lay out a number of theses which are very widely held in contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and to argue that, given some extra theses for which I’ll argue, they are inconsistent. Some of this will involve going through some very well-trodden territory—my hope is that presenting this familiar ground in the way that I do will help to make plain the problem that I aim to identify.

In this paper I do four things. (1) I explain one clear thing that ‘the problem of the unity of the proposition’ might mean. (2) I lay out a few different versions of the theory of propositions as cognitive acts, and explain why this problem arises for the version of that theory which has been defended in different forms by Peter Hanks and Scott Soames. (3) I argue that the natural ways in which the act theorist might try to solve (...) the problem fail to solve it; (4) I propose a way to fix the problem, and then I explain how the problem re-emerges in the act theorist’s treatment of propositional attitude relations. (shrink)

Gambling on God brings together a superb collection of new and classic essays that provide the first sustained analysis of Pascal's Wager and the idea of an infinite utility as well as the first in-depth look at moral objections to the Wager.

In this paper, I present a new account of akrasia based on the idea that human psychology and self-narrativity are more complex and layered than we have traditionally thought. I begin by arguing that, if we have at least some different beliefs, desires, preferences, etc. in different situations, then we can rationally do what we think, at the time of action, is best for, or from the standpoint of, “part of me” while acting contrary to what we think, at the (...) time of action, is best for, or from the more comprehensive standpoint of, “me.” I then argue that many of us do, in fact, think and act this way in everyday life, and that this kind of action satisfies all the criteria for akrasia. Finally, I briefly argue that on my account of akrasia, akratic actions are not necessarily irrational or blameworthy, though they often will be. (shrink)

In Felicitous Underspecification, Jeffrey King draws our attention to a rich and underexplored collection of linguistic data. These are uses of context-sensitive expressions which seem perfectly felicitous despite being such that, on plausible assumptions, the context in which they are used falls short of securing for them a unique semantic value. This raises an immediate puzzle: if, as King argues, these uses of expressions really do lack unique semantic values in context, how can they—as they manifestly do—make contributions to the (...) conversations in which they occur? King answers this question with a novel theory of conversational updating. Here I focus less on this theory than on King’s examples, and consider some ways of accommodating them without positing felicitous underspecification. In some cases I give some reasons for thinking that the alternative explanation is superior. But my aim is less to establish this conclusion than to suggest some new options for thinking about these examples, and hopefully by so doing to advance the conversation about the data to which King has drawn our attention. (shrink)

At the Le Thor Seminar in 1969, Heidegger characterises his thinking as taking the form of what he calls a ‘topology of being’ (Topologie des Seins) and as thereby giving a key role to place (topos, Ort/Ortschaft). Much of my work over the last 25 years has been devoted to exploring how such a topology is indeed present in Heidegger’s thinking, both early and late, and so to showing how place figures in that thinking – to showing, in effect, how (...) the questioning of being is also the thinking of place. The aim here is to provide a summary introduction to the topology that this exploration has aimed at uncovering, but to do so in a way that is focussed on the early work, especially Being and Time. To this end, the discussion proceeds through an explication of the topological elements that are present in the form of key terms and ideas such as facticity, questionability, being-in, existential spatiality, and there-being or Dasein. There is also a brief exploration of the way the term Dasein figures in German philosophical discourse prior to Heidegger in ways that are not only reflected in Heidegger’s early work, but also draw directly upon that term’s topological connotations. (shrink)

Some linguistic phenomena can occur in uses of language in thought, whereas others only occur in uses of language in communication. I argue that this distinction can be used as a test for whether a linguistic phenomenon can be explained via Grice’s theory of conversational implicature. I argue further, on the basis of this test, that conversational implicature cannot be used to explain quantifier domain restriction or apparent substitution failures involving coreferential names, but that it must be used to explain (...) the phenomenon of referential uses of definite descriptions. I conclude with a brief discussion of the relevance of this point to the semantics/pragmatics distinction. (shrink)

Universal basic income (UBI) has become the rallying cry for a growing international movement seeking redistribution and equality through direct cash payments by governments to all its citizens. Advocates have promoted UBI on multiple grounds: efficiency, equality, as an alternative to traditional anti-poverty aid programs in very poor countries, or even as the foundation for small “c” communist societies. Numerous small-scale experiments of cash transfers have been conducted across the globe purporting to test UBI’s plausibility. In this essay, I explore (...) the multiple agendas of UBI, and consider whether recent scholarship suggests that it might provide a superior path to achieving the historical goals of the political left than that of social democracy and contemporary welfare states. I also raise questions about the political foundations of a movement seeking to end mandatory work, while noting the future possibility of massive job losses that might alter the social, economic, and political possibilities for UBI. (shrink)

Death and Philosophy presents a wide ranging and fascinating variety of different philosophical, aesthetic and literary perspectives on death. Death raises key questions such as whether life has meaning of life in the face of death, what the meaning of "life after death" might be and whether death is part of a narrative that can be retold in different ways, and considers the various types of death, such as brain death, that challenge mind-body dualism. The essays also include explorations of (...) Chinese, Japanese and Tibetan perspectives on death and why death in some cultures, such as in Mexico's day of the dead, is celebrated. (shrink)

Foreword to the new edition Acknowledgements Introduction: radically interpreting Davidson I. From translation to interpretation 1. The Quinean background 1.1 Radical translation and naturalized epistemology 1.2 Meaning and indeterminacy 1.3 Analytical hypotheses and charity 2. The Davidsonian project 2.1 The development of a theory of meaning 2.2 The project of radical interpretation 2.3 From charity to triangulation..

Global Cumulative Treatment Analysis is a novel clinical research model combining expert knowledge, and treatment coordination based upon global information-gain, to treat every patient optimally while efficiently searching the vast space that is the realm of cancer research.

The preoccupation with "depth" and its relevance to cinema and media studies.

Michael Walzer presents the theory of the just war that he develops in Just and Unjust Wars as a set of principles governing the initiation and conduct of war that are entailed by respect for the moral rights of individuals. I argue in this essay that some of the principles he defends do not and cannot derive from the basic moral rights of individuals and indeed, in some cases, explicitly permit the violation of those rights. I argue, further, that it (...) does not follow, at least in some cases, that the principles are false. Even if some of the principles are not adaptations of a theory of rights to the problems of war, they may still be rational, pragmatic accommodations to epistemic and institutional constraints under which we must now act. Yet I also argue that respect for the rights that Walzer claims that individuals have requires us to try to overcome the epistemic and institutional impediments that restrict us at present. As those impediments are removed, the reasons for acknowledging and following some of the central principles Walzer espouses will diminish and, perhaps, disappear. (shrink)

In the paper it is argued that the conceptual resources of Christianity topple the hiddenness argument. According to the author, the variability of the divine love cast doubt on the soundness of Schellenberg’s reasoning. If we understood a perfect love as a maximal and equal concern and identification with all and for all, then a divine love would entail divine impartiality, but because of conflicts of interest between human beings the perfect, divine love cannot be maximal.

In Narrow Content, Hawthorne & Yli-Vakkuri provide an admirably clear and precise framework for understanding the debate between internalist and externalist theories of mental content. They also present a series of arguments against internalism. They identify two views — which they call 'thought-relativism' and 'quasi-internalism' — which seem to avoid their main line of argument. I discuss Hawthorne & Yli-Vakkuri's arguments against these two views, and explore a few different ways in which they might be developed.

Despite its prominence in Peirce’s best-known works, the notion of fixed, stable, or settled belief (I will follow Peirce in using these terms more or less interchangeably) has received relatively little explicit attention. Need a belief be permanently stable in order to count as fixed? Or, to take the other extreme, does a belief count as fixed as long as it is currently stable? More fundamentally, what is involved in predicating stability of a belief? Talk of stability suggests a disposition (...) to resist being undermined, and so the question arises of how resistant to what sorts of undermining influences a belief needs to be in order to count as fixed in Peirce’s sense. Does Peirce, especially in “The Fixation of.. (shrink)

Consider the proposition that: A: "while it is impermissible, epistemically or morally, to believe the propositions of theism as they lack sufficient evidence, it is permissible, epistemically or morally, to hope that those propositions are true and thereby to act as if they are true." I examine a problem facing anyone who endorses (A), and advocates erecting the superstructure of theistic commitment on a base of theistic hope. Concisely put, those who endorse (A) will very likely violate the evidentialist standards (...) which drove them toward (A) in the first place. This problem is in many respects a simple one, but even so, an intractable problem rendering conformity to (A) problematic. (shrink)

In the ever-expanding field of nuclear history, studies of ‘nuclear culture’ are becoming increasingly popular. Often situated within national contexts, they typically explore responses to the nuclear condition in the cultural modes of literature, art, music, theatre, film and other media, as well as nuclear imagery more generally. This paper offers a critique of current conceptions of ‘nuclear culture’, and argues that the term has little analytical coherence. It suggests that historians of ‘nuclear culture’ have tended to essentialize the nuclear (...) to the detriment of historical analysis, and that the wide variety of methodological approaches to ‘nuclear culture’ are simultaneously a strength and a more significant weakness, in that they have little shared sense of the meaning of the term, its theoretical underpinnings or its analytical purchase. The paper then offers a study of Ewan MacColl's 1946 playUranium 235, whose career reveals much about the diversity of cultures of the nuclear in post-war Britain. The study moves us away from a single, homogeneous ‘British nuclear culture’ towards a pluralistic critical history of cultural responses to nuclearization. These responses, I conclude, should be seen as collectively constitutive of the nuclear condition rather than as passive reflections of it. (shrink)

Much of the contemporary discussion over the problem of evil is undermined by a violation of a basic conceptual truth: no rational agent would knowingly engage in self-sabotage. The argument of this paper contends that several prominent versions of the Evidential Argument from Evil are undercut as these arguments imply an incentive structure that would generate perverse outcomes. Put another way, these arguments imply that an omniscient agent would knowingly engage in self-sabotage. Interestingly, however, it is not just arguments from (...) evil which run afoul of the principle that no rational being would knowingly engage in self-sabotage. As several prominent theodicies suffer from the flaw of incentivizing perverse outcomes as well. (shrink)

Science is a form of distributed analysis involving both individual work that produces new knowledge and collaborative work to exchange information with the larger community. There are many particular ways in which individual and community can interact in science, and it is difficult to assess how efficient these are, and what the best way might be to support them. This paper reports on a series of experiments in this area and a prototype implementation using a research platform called CACHE. CACHE (...) both supports experimentation with different structures of interaction between individual and community cognition and serves as a prototype for computational support for those structures. We particularly focus on CACHE‐BC, the Bayes community version of CACHE, within which the community can break up analytical tasks into “mind‐sized” units and use provenance tracking to keep track of the relationship between these units. (shrink)

Some opponents of epistemic two-dimensionalism say that the view should be rejected on the grounds that it misclassifies certain a posteriori claims as a priori. Elliott, McQueen, & Weber [2013] have argued that any argument of this form must fail. I argue that this conclusion is mistaken, and defend my argument [Speaks (2010] against their criticisms.

Providing a summary history of the reception of Gadamer's work in English across a range of disciplines from literature to philosophy, this essay also explores elements of both influence and convergence connecting Gadamer's thinking with that of several key figures in twentieth century analytic philosophy.

The most widely accepted and well worked out approaches to the foundations of meaning take facts about the meanings of linguistic expressions at a time to be derivative from the propositional attitudes of speakers of the language at that time. This mentalist strategy takes two principal forms, one which traces meaning to belief, and one which analyzes it in terms of communicative intentions. I argue that either form of mentalism fails, and conclude by suggesting that we can do better by (...) focusing on connections between linguistic meaning and the contents of perceptions (rather than beliefs or intentions), and by (following Kripke's approach to reference) replacing questions about the nature of meaning with questions about the nature of term introduction and meaning transmission. (shrink)

This paper examines Gandhian philosophy and practice to reinterpret UNESCO's educational vision towards establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. The uniqueness of the Gandhian perspective is its ability to withstand the dominant political, philosophical and religious challenges with its contextually rooted, spiritually oriented, socially responsible and human person centred reinterpretations. UNESCO’s educational vision-Learning: The Treasure Within published in 1996 is a catalyst in establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. Consistent changes and challenges in knowledge societies necessitates the reinterpretation of this (...) educational vision. The four pillars of learning in this educational vision are analysed together with four aspects of Gandhian philosophy and practice: ‘learning to know’ and Nai Talim, ‘learning to do’ and ashrams, ‘learning to live together’ and constructive programme and ‘learning to be’ and swaraj. The paper discusses this confluence of the UNESCO’s theoretical approach of four pillars of education with Gandhian pragmatic philosophy and practice to offer a contextually rooted and future-oriented outlook for reinterpreting the educational vision for establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. (shrink)

This is a review of Shelly Kagan's "How to Count Animals, more or less" (2019).

Interdisciplinary perspectives on landscape, from the philosophical to the geographical, with an emphasis on the overarching concept of place.