Galacticism, thought-relativism, quasi-internalism

Philosophical Studies 178 (9):3037-3047 (2020)
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Abstract

In Narrow Content, Hawthorne & Yli-Vakkuri provide an admirably clear and precise framework for understanding the debate between internalist and externalist theories of mental content. They also present a series of arguments against internalism. They identify two views — which they call 'thought-relativism' and 'quasi-internalism' — which seem to avoid their main line of argument. I discuss Hawthorne & Yli-Vakkuri's arguments against these two views, and explore a few different ways in which they might be developed.

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Jeff Speaks
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Reply to Speaks.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):3061-3065.

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References found in this work

Constructing the World.David Chalmers (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Phenomenal Structuralism.David J. Chalmers - 2012 - In David Chalmers, Constructing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 412-422.
Epistemic Modals in Context.Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter, Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 131-168.
Epistemic Modals in Context.Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter, Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 131-168.
Narrow Content.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Hawthorne.

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