A large body of literature looks at how firms develop and maintain their reputation. Little is known, however, about factors leading to a damaged corporate reputation. In this article, the authors compare two sets of predictors of reputational damage following a reported breach of norms: the characteristics of the breach and the characteristics of the actor reporting the breach. Theoretically, the authors argue that the latter is likely to prevail over the former. The authors test this proposition in the highly (...) normative context of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Building on a global data set of over 8,600 CSR-related norm breaches, directed against 451 firms on the Fortune ranking reputation over the 2006-2009 period, the authors find empirical support for the idea that reputation damage is not really driven by the severity and novelty of the allegation, but by the type of source reporting the issue as well as the credibility of this source. Hence, these results lend some support to a socially constructed view of reputational damage, in which being portrayed by prominent actors as deviating from the norm is more important than the actual deviation from the goal of the norm itself. (shrink)

The book will be an indispensable resource for anyone interested in contemporary philosophy and the social sciences.

Our aim is to analyze the position of the leader in relation to the ethical dimension of truth-telling within the organization under his/her control. Based on Michel Foucault’s study of truth-telling, we demonstrate that the role of the leader toward the corporation and the imperative of organizational performance place the leader in an ambiguous position: he/she is obliged to take the lead in “telling the truth” internally and externally, but also to bear the consequences of this “truth-telling” for the organization (...) and for himself/herself. In this process of construction and implementing the truth, the leader is organizer and figurehead of the corporation’s truth-telling practices: determining the frontiers between truth that can be said and that which should remain hidden, both inside and outside the corporation; establishing a dialogue based on truth ; guaranteeing that the rules of truth-telling are respected; and offering a truth which is compatible with the firm’s economic and ethical interest. Invested with the authority—the office—of managing truth within the corporation, the leader can be considered to be the “Chief Truth Officer.” From this perspective, we demonstrate that this role requires specific skills, like courage and practical wisdom. (shrink)

This article briefly presents some of the main features of the notion of “centrality of work” within the framework of the “psychodynamic” approach to work developed by Christophe Dejours. The paper argues that we should distinguish between at least four separate but related ways in which work can be said to be central: psychologically, in terms of gender relations, social-politically and epistemically.

La bioéthique est animée par la volonté d’une reprise en main de la question des fins sur celle des moyens du soin. Ainsi, la bioéthique peut-elle se comprendre comme une tentative de juguler le discours de la rationalité instrumentale qui déferle dans le champ de la maîtrise du vivant et du monde vécu, en y altérant ou détruisant les fragiles liens de soins mutuels. À cet endroit arrivent les interrogations. La gravité de situations inouïes impose-t-elle une éthique inédite? N’encourage-t-elle pas (...) une idéologie bioéthique qui instrumentalise l’éthique, dérive allant d’une attention à l’action vers une science de l’action dans une approche procédurale de la décision? Si la bioéthique s’est bien souvent concentrée sur l’éthique médicale et ne l’a pas toujours articulée avec une réflexion plus générale sur la vie vulnérable considérant la vie en nous, entre et en dehors de nous, peut-elle nous dispenser d’une réflexion plus en amont sur la nature de la raison pratique déployée elle-même sur l’assise d’une anthropologie du soin et de la vulnérabilité? (shrink)

L’article se propose, à partir de l’expérience de la construction et de l’exploitation des bases de données dialectales de la BDLC (corse) et du THESOC (occitan), de cerner ce qu’un grand corpus est susceptible d’apporter à la phonologie. La réponse, appuyée sur quelques cas d’espèces, fait intervenir trois niveaux : celui de l’établissement des faits à soumettre à l’analyse, celui de la validation des hypothèses émises, celui de la valeur heuristique des données prises en compte. Les faits aléatoirement rassemblés dans (...) un grand corpus et donc non nécessairement pris en compte dans l’analyse initiale sont en effet de nature à transformer la vision de la clôture du corpus, à confirmer (ou infirmer ce qui, in fine, est aussi important) les hypothèses avancées, à suggérer d’autres solutions aux problèmes rencontrés que celles initialement envisagées. Un des points saillants, en outre, est, au plan théorique, la mise en discussion de la notion d’entité discrète, tant en matière d’unités phonologiques (de type phonème) que d’unités systémiques (de type idiome localisé) tant il est vrai qu’en matière de langue il n’existe qu’un continuum. L’idiolecte est déjà composite, l’idiome local n’est qu’un chaînon dans le continuum aréal. Les unités discrètes constituent donc l’instrument d’analyse incontournable du fait linguistique, une réalité dans la représentation qu’un locuteur a de son système ; mais l’observable est un continuum, un ensemble de cellules perméables les unes aux autres, si c’est bien dans la conscience collective que se trouve (déposée) la langue, conformément au dire saussurien. (shrink)

Le dialogue de Paul Ricœur a été constant avec les sciences humaines et sociales, mais peu avec l'économie. Ce silence ricœurien sur l’économie est relatif. Sans faire une épistémologie des sciences économiques, il manifesta une préoccupation constante pour la condition ouvrière (cf. Simone Weil) et les effets pratiques de l’aliénation économique. Il n’a cessé de porter son attention sur le travail plutôt que sur l’économie, sur les échanges plutôt que sur la modélisation de l’économie mathématique oublieuse de l’économie comme science (...) sociale. Son anthropologie est une anthropologie de l’homme capable plutôt que celle de l’homme comptable. En effet, son souci éthique réinstalle sur le plan des évaluations une activité économique, non seulement uniformisante mais unidimentionnalisante, qui résorbe le plan de la valeur dans celui du prix. Son anthropologie de l’homme capable réévalue la figure de l’agent économique. Ainsi chez Ricœur, le souci éthique est-il instruit épistémologiquement par les sciences sociales. Il pense ensemble éthique et économie via les médiations symboliques des institutions et des structures qui rendent possibles les échanges. D'où une approche fine des thèses de Marx sur l’aliénation économique, et plus tardivement une rencontre des travaux de l’économiste Amartya Sen, non sans liens, avec les travaux de Martha Nussbaum sur les capabilités. (shrink)

Dans ce texte, j’analyse l’échange entre Socrate et Calliclès pour défendre la thèse selon laquelle Socrate ne réussit qu’à réfuter les paroles de Calliclès. À la fin de la joute dialectique, Socrate finit par aider Calliclès à renforcer sa position en lui montrant pourquoi il doit rejeter l’hédonisme. Pour établir cette thèse, j’analyse en premier lieu le premier discours de Calliclès (Gorg. 482c-486a). En second lieu, j’examine certains éléments formels de l’ἔλεγχος socratique pour rendre compte de la stratégie argumentative de (...) Socrate. En troisième lieu, j’examine l’échange au sujet de la tempérance et de l’hédonisme. Enfin, je termine mon texte en suggérant pourquoi Platon fait cette mise en scène. -/- In this article, I analyse the debate between Socrates and Callicles to argue that Socrates only succeeds in refuting Callicles’ words,. In the end, Socrates helps Callicles solidify his position by showing him why he must reject hedonism. To make this claim, I first analyse Callicles’ great speech (Gorg. 482c- 486a). Second, I examine certain formal elements of the Socratic elenchus to make sense of Socrates’ argumentative strategy. Third, I examine the debate about temperance and hedonism. Finally, I end by suggesting why Plato stages the dialectical exchange as he does. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider succinctly the main Marxist objections to Honneth’s model of critical social theory, and Honneth’s key objections to Marx-inspired models. I then seek to outline a rapprochement between the two positions, by showing how Honneth’s normative concept of recognition is not antithetical to functionalist arguments, but in fact contains a social-theoretical dimension, the idea that social reproduction and social evolution revolve around struggles around the interpretation of core societal norms. By highlighting the social theoretical side of (...) recognition, one can outline a model of critical social theory that in fact corresponds to the descriptive and normative features outlined by Marx himself. However, the price of this rapprochement for Honnethian critical theory is a greater emphasis on the division of labour as the central mechanism of social reproduction. (shrink)

This article seeks to re-evaluate the importance of the political in the thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The article first shows that Sartre’s description of Merleau-Ponty’s intellectual trajectory as one of increasing political apathy from the 1950s onwards is inaccurate. The article then demonstrates that throughout the post-war period, including in his project for a new ontology, Merleau-Ponty believed that a revised version of Marxism would provide the methodological framework within which philosophical work could address the political challenges of the present. (...) This revised Marxism was to be a direct alternative to the reifying uses of Marx’s thinking. It would rely upon the latter’s self-reflexive historicism, which meant its very failures showed how philosophy might transform itself in connection with its own time. Cet article tente souligner la place du politique dans la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. On contestera d’abord la description faite par Sartre de sa trajectoire intellectuelle, selon laquelle il aurait fait preuve d’une apathie croissante, à partir des années cinquante, vis-à-vis des questions politiques. On montrera ensuite que durant toute la période d’après-guerre, jusque dans les recherches ontologiques ultimes, Merleau-Ponty a pensé qu’un usage renouvelé du marxisme permettrait au travail philosophique de répondre aux défis politiques du présent. Une telle révision du marxisme représentait une alternative directe aux usages réifiant de la pensée de Marx. Cette révision serait rendue possible par la réflexivité historiciste de cette pensée, qui fait que, dans ses erreurs mêmes, celle-ci révèle la capacité de la philosophie à se transformer au contact de son temps. (shrink)

Axel Honneth’s philosophical reflections always had significant historical dimensions, but it is only recently, in Recognition. A Chapter in the History of European Ideas, that he has attended to the history of recognition as a concept. This essay examines the cogency and the implications of this turn to intellectual history in the theory of recognition. The first section summarises the main historical claims put forward by Honneth. Section two raises critical doubts regarding three aspects of his narrative: the cultural contexts (...) that are said to have influenced particular conceptions of recognition; the conceptions of recognition that are supposed to be tied to national cultures; and the method of linking particular meanings of recognition to national cultures. The third section broadens the scope and attempts to show why this turn to intellectual history, despite some shortcomings, raises tantalising questions for recognition theory, and beyond it, for critical theory. (shrink)

In this essay, I take up James Conant and Cora Diamond’s suggestion that “to take the difference between saying and showing deeply enough is not to give up on showing but to give up on picturing it as a ‘what’ ”. I try to establish that the Tractatus’s talk of “showing” is more coherent than is usually appreciated, that it is indeed a key to the internal unity of the book, and that it positively helps us to work our way (...) into the practice of philosophy, which its author understood as a practice of logical clarification. Thus, it is not a stretch of latent nonsense whose sole function is to conjure up an illusion of sense for the sake of displaying its disintegration. While Wittgenstein’s concept of showing is not meant to “make up for” the impossibility of saying certain things, neither does it stand in need of being “redeemed.” Whether or not it is to prove ultimately coherent, the Tractatus’s talk of “showing,” I shall argue, is certainly not to be “thrown away” in the name of the Tractarian conception of logic, for the simple reason that it essentially belongs with it. (shrink)

In the following, I want to examine the structure and the significance of the notion of value in Hegel’s philosophy of right. In the first part, I use the 1817 version to define the category itself. Hegel sees the concept of value as a formal conceptual scheme, which can be applied with full justification to the most diverse contexts. It is striking that he should use the same word, in the same structural sense, in fields as diverse as economic exchange, (...) crime and its punishment, indi-vidual action, individual worth, the social recognition of the person, and general social–cultural beliefs. Hegel deliberately exploits the full extent of the homonymy of “value,” to suggest the synonymy of its logical meaning in all these different contexts. This, however, has profound implications for the concept of value. My claim is that the homonymy of value rests on Hegel’s understanding of value as grounded in sociality. Before substantiating this claim in the conclusion, I will attempt to show, in the second part, how the definition of value found in the 1817 lectures is the counterpart in the social–philosophical of the Measure category analyzed in the Logic. In the third part, I study the different occurrences of value in the 1820 "Philosophy of Right" in order to highlight the extent of the homonymy and synonymy of the concept in Hegel’s mature thinking. (shrink)

This paper analyses the model of interaction at the heart of Axel Honneth's social philosophy. It argues that interaction in his mature ethics of recognition has been reduced to intercourse between human persons and that the role of nature is now missing from it. The ethics of recognition takes into account neither the material dimensions of individual and social action, nor the normative meaning of non-human persons and natural environments. The loss of nature in the mature ethics of recognition is (...) made visible through a comparison with Honneth's initial formulation of his project. As an anthropology of intersubjectivity combining the teaching of the German philosophical anthropologists and G.H. Mead, his first model sought to ground social theory in the natural preconditions of human action. The last part of the article argues that a return to Mead's theory of practical intersubjectivity informed by Merleau-Ponty's germane theory of intercorporeity provides essential conceptual tools to enable the integration of the natural and the material within the theory of recognition. (shrink)

The chapter begins by establishing the absence of organizations in the organization of philosophy as a specialist academic discipline. The second section highlights the reasons why this gap is detrimental to philosophical inquiries. The third section seeks to clarify how philosophy, as a type of theoretical inquiry, can contribute to the study of organizations. Three basic features are proposed as underpinning the philosophical method. Hegel’s social theory is then put forward as an exemplary model of what a philosophical account of (...) organizations might achieve. The fourth and final section shifts the perspective to focus on the life of individuals in organizations. Following a recent book combining post-Hegelian critical theory and Christophe Dejours’ psychodynamic approach, the paper highlights important aspects of individual and collective work that lead to a cooperative conception of management. (shrink)

This article argues that Axel Honneth’s ethics of recognition offers a robust model for a renewed critical theory of society, provided that it does not shy away from its political dimensions. First, the ethics of recognition needs to clarify its political moment at the conceptual level to remain conceptually sustainable. This requires a clarification of the notion of identity in relation to the three spheres of recognition, and a clarification of its exact place in a politics of recognition. We suggest (...) that a return to Hegel’s mature theory of subjectivity helps specify the relationship between the normative demand for autonomous identity and its realization in and through politics. (shrink)

As social and ecological transition and climate change raise issues that go far beyond individual responses, how can these challenges be balanced with ethical and political responses? This article intends to show that the strength of virtue ethics lies in the fact that it translates these abstract issues into concrete biographical events that shape lifestyles. The search for the good life in these matters then finds in temperance, humility and hospitality three virtues, private and social, to operate this translation. Humility (...) makes explicit the deep interdependencies between the living, while temperance calls for practices that are attentive to these relationships, in the knowledge that our ways of life here have far-reaching consequences on the other side of the globe. This in turn invites us to restore hospitality to its cosmopolitical dimension. (shrink)

This article discusses the meaning of the notion of virtuality in modern physics. To this end, it develops considerations on the introduction and establishment in nuclear physics of two independent concepts at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s: that of the virtual state, used in the context of neutron scattering studies, and that of the virtual transition, useful for the theoretical understanding of strong nuclear forces, which forms the basis of what are now called virtual particles. Their comparative analysis (...) highlights the theoretical nature of virtual entities and processes in modern physics. It also shows how the virtual has been associated with various purely physical attributes, leading to a form of polysemy of the term, from the beginning of the application of these concepts. (shrink)

Although relatively unknown a decade ago, the work of Jacques Ranciere is fast becoming a central reference in the humanities and social sciences. His thinking brings a fresh, innovative approach to many fields, notably the study of work, education, politics, literature, film, art, as well as philosophy. This is the first, full-length introduction to Ranciere's work and covers the full range of his contribution to contemporary thought, presenting in clear, succinct chapters the key concepts Ranciere has developed in his writings (...) over the last forty years. Students new to Ranciere will find this work accessible and comprehensive, an ideal introduction to this major thinker. For readers already familiar with Ranciere, the in-depth analysis of each key concept, written by leading scholars, should provide an ideal reference. (shrink)

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) was born in Landshut, Bavaria, the son of Paul Johann Anselm, a renowned legal theorist who had been called from Jena by the king of Bavaria to modernize the kingdom’s penal code. Feuerbach’s brothers all became distinguished scholars in their fields and his nephew Anselm a renowned classicist painter. After enrolling in theological studies in Heidelberg, Feuerbach became enthralled in Hegel’s philosophy and moved to Berlin to study with him. He presented his dissertation in 1828 at the (...) university of Erlangen and began his career there as a young Privat Dozent. Posterity has associated Feuerbach’s name to his anthropological critique of religion, presented in the 1841 The Essence of Christianity. Yet his writings touched on many other areas of philosophy. His life-long interest in religion arose from his attempt to solve the classical, fundamental questions of philosophy, of the human being’s place in the world, the relationships between thinking and being, reason and nature, mind and body, and the epistemological implications entailed in answering these questions. (shrink)

Ricœur n’a cessé d’explorer les liens de la littérature et de la philosophie, du poétique entendu au sens large et de la philosophie pratique. Ces réflexions ont fécondé ses analyses de façon majeure, le concept d’identité narrative – l’adjectif s’entendant aussi dans sa dimension littéraire – en étant un des centres. Mais cette valorisation de la linéarité du récit a parfois donné l’impression d’avoir davantage mis en avant l’importance du roman, délaissant le rôle de la poésie et du théâtre. Cet (...) article se propose d’explorer les liens mutuels entre la sagesse poétique et la sagesse pratique en leur redonnant toute leur place. Il le fait en suivant la manière dont le philosophe a donné une place à la poésie, singulièrement celle de Rilke, et en mettant au jour les différentes stratégies argumentatives (l’exergue, la correspondance, le commentaire) par lesquelles la poésie, et surtout le psaume, éclaire et enrichit la compréhension de ce/celui qui s’engage dans l’action. (shrink)

Axel Honneth, célèbre théoricien allemand de la reconnaissance qui s’inscrit dans la filiation de l’École de Francfort et notamment de Jürgen Habermas, et Jacques Rancière, éminent penseur français de la mésentente qui a rompu avec la tradition althussérienne, sont deux figures centrales du paysage intellectuel contemporain. Leurs pensées se situent dans deux traditions distinctes, mais elles ont toutes deux à voir avec le marxisme pris au sens large, qu’elles considèrent sous un angle critique. Les deux penseurs portent intérêt à des (...) domaines spécifiques au sein de la philosophie et hors d’elle. S’ils partagent tous deux un souci du domaine politique, Axel Honneth se meut dans la philosophie sociale, la philosophie morale et la philosophie du droit ; il fait un usage important et réfléchi des sciences sociales. Jacques Rancière se tourne, pour sa part, vers l’histoire, l’esthétique et la littérature. Mais une confrontation entre leurs deux pensées paraît s’imposer, tant leurs modèles sont influents dans le champ des sciences sociales, de la théorie politique et de la philosophie critique aujourd’hui. Il s’agit de savoir si les paradigmes qu’ils mettent en avant pour critiquer la société, pour rendre raison de son évolution et des transformations qui doivent la rendre plus juste ou plus libre, le paradigme de la reconnaissance et celui de la mésentente, sont concurrents, s’ils sont exclusifs l’un de l’autre, ou s’ils sont compatibles. (shrink)

Two key axes carry the parameters that define Rancière’s approach to poetry. The first axis is constituted by his well-known account of aesthetic modernity as a democratic “regime of the arts”, which breaks with the previous, “representative” one, by allowing all subjects and all genres to be appropriated in expressive gestures. These expressive gestures can no longer rely on the old representational rules and references and therefore require constantly reinvented creative forms. The second axis that emerges from the dismantlement of (...) the old regime of representation is therefore a new mode of expressive creativity inherent in individual and collective action. The combination of these two principles creates the structural conditions and the contradictions of the modern aesthetic field, within which individual poets define their tasks and encounter new limits and difficulties. Viewed as a series of individual, situated attempts at linguistic creation within a field in which the structures of perception and diction are inherently up for grabs, poetry becomes a particularly significant exercise. The great poets provide exemplary models of what saying and doing can mean in the conditions of modernity as a regime of equality; and from their individual exemplarity, profound theoretical implicit lessons can be drawn. Rancière’s writings on poetry as a result always seek to accomplish two aims: provide substantive hermeneutic reconstructions of writing practices, taken as exemplary forms of modern “poiesis”; and critique alternative theoretical uses of poetry and through these, alternative conceptions of modern practice and theory. To review these aspects of Rancière’s approach to poetry, I have adopted a genealogical approach, as it is the simplest way to give a sense of the richness of Rancière’s long engagement with the works of poets. (shrink)

This review seeks to present a comprehensive picture of recent discussions in the social sciences of the anticipated impact of AI on the world of work. Issues covered include: technological unemployment, algorithmic management, platform work and the politics of AI work. The review identifies the major disciplinary and methodological perspectives on AI’s impact on work, and the obstacles they face in making predictions. Two parameters influencing the development and deployment of AI in the economy are highlighted: the capitalist imperative and (...) nationalistic pressures. (shrink)

La thèse de cet ouvrage est qu'il faut prendre soin du monde et qu'une "anthropologie relationnelle" permet de penser ce soin. Une pensée spécifique de la relation devient particulièrement nécessaire en médecine, dans le monde du travail et vis-à-vis de l'environnement. Elle entend s'opposer à une attitude peu soigneuse qui se répand à l'égard des personnes et des différents contextes de vie. L'exigence du soin, se faisant catégorie critique, permet ainsi de relier des domaines souvent envisagés comme distincts où, à (...) rebours de l'exploitation générale du monde, elle invite à porter attention aux relations humaines et aux différentes formes de vulnérabilité. Si la philosophie du care occupe désormais une place importante au sein de la philosophie contemporaine, cet ouvrage fait apparaitre la diversité des philosophies du soin, montre la pluralité des champs qu'elles investissent et l'unité d'une démarche d'attention au monde. (shrink)

The genesis of Axel Honneth's ethics of recognition shows that it represents the attempt to critically rejuvenate historical materialism through an emphasis on the normative dimensions and the anthropological preconditions of social interaction. By making explicit this project to redefine a theory of praxis, the exact theoretical stance and the full practical potential of Honneth's social theory can be stressed. However, by contrast to its initial formulation, the mature theory of recognition appears to have interpreted praxis in a narrow interpersonalist (...) sense. This is especially evident for the spheres of socialisation and labour. The last part of the article argues that the initial definition of the project could have been taken in a more materialist direction. This would define the second marxist horizon of the ethics of recognition, one of fruitful future developments. (shrink)

Work and Experience of Domination in Contemporary Neoliberalism This paper seeks to study the contemporary forms of domination at and through work, by focusing on subjective experiences of work. Against the background of Marx’s analysis of the manyfold nexus between social and political domination in general and domination at work, I begin by drawing in broad strokes the general picture of current experiences of work emerging from the contemporary French sociology and psychology of work. Related to this rich literature but (...) also contrasting with it, the psychodynamic approach developed by Christophe Dejours seems particularly significant, notably because its provides a consistent model explaining the links between subjective experience, social interactions beyond work, material conditions of production, and broad cultural and political factors. From the psychodynamic model arises an original analysis of the current forms of domination and alienation at work, one, I argue in conclusion, which could substantially inform the current attempt to develop a new “social philosophy”. (shrink)

« La méthode est seule capable d’empêcher les jugements précipités, de faire en sorte que l’entendement soit informé comme il se doit, qu’il puisse connaître et affirmer le vrai et le bien, avant que la volonté ne donne son acquiescement. Il faut que d’une grande clarté en l’entendement suive une grande inclination en la volonté pour que nous puissions nous croire plus libres, puisque non assujettis aux pulsions et à la contingence, en obéissant à la détermination rationnelle. ».

This paper seeks to clarify some of the methodological and conceptual stakes involved in the attempt to think about politics from the point of view of "living labour". In order to avoid confusions further down the track, a formal analysis of the different possible meanings of "politics" is proposed. Politics is first defined as the series of problems that arise when separate individual lives attempt to organise a common life in common. Four types of problems can be identified on the (...) basis of this initial definition, beyond the questions concerning the origin and justification of power, or the structure of the institutions of government. Following a brief characterisation of the paradigm of living labour, with reference to key texts by Marx and Dejours, this paradigm is then put into practice to provide initial answers to the questions raised in the preliminary analysis. First, the meaning of the fundamental norms of social life (equality, liberty, solidarity) is transformed from the point of view of living labour. Secondly, the implicit social ontology on the basis of which political questions are raised is also altered if viewed from the perspective of living labour, as social partitioning acquires a more specific dimension once conflicts around work are taken into account. Finally, the experience of living labour is a condition of democratic life as it determines the acquisition of personal dispositions which represent not only a prepolitical foundation of democratic activity, but are in fact directly involved in the actual process of collective decision-making. (shrink)

Neste artigo considerarei as principais objeções marxistas ao modelo de Honneth para uma Teoria Crítica da sociedade e também as objeções centrais de Honneth aos modelos inspirados em Marx. Depois tentarei esboçar uma reaproximação entre ambas posições ao mostrar como o conceito normativo de reconhecimento de Honneth não é oposto a argumentos funcionalistas, e sim que ele contém uma dimensão socioteórica: a ideia de que a reprodução social e a evolução social revolvem ao redor de lutas pela interpretação de normas (...) sociais centrais. Ao iluminar o lado socioteórico do reconhecimento, é possível esboçar um modelo de Teoria Crítica da sociedade que, de fato, corresponda às características descritivas e normativa delineadas pelo próprio Marx. No entanto, o preço desta reaproximação para a Teoria Crítica de Honneth é uma ênfase maior na divisão do trabalho como o mecanismo central da reprodução social. (shrink)