konspekt wykładów w roku akademickim 1972/1973.

Jan Popiel urodził się dnia 28 I 1914 r. w Brodnicy k. Śremu w Wielkopolsce w głęboko religijnej rodzinie ziemiańskiej. Był synem Michała i Jadwigi z Mańkowskich. Młodość spędził wraz z pięciorgiem rodzeństwa w majątku rodzinnym w Wójczy k. Pacanowa. Dwie jego siostry obrały zakonny stan życia w Zgromadzeniu Sióstr Urszulanek Serca Jezusa Konającego. Pierwszą i drugą klasę gimnazjalną Jan przerabiał prywatnie w latach 1923-1925 i pod koniec roku zdawał egzaminy w Gimnazjum św. Anny w Krakowie. Następne kilka miesięcy (...) wykorzystał na naukę języka niemieckiego. Od 1926 do 1932 r. kształcił się w prowadzonym przez jezuitów zakładzie naukowo-wychowawczym Stella Matutina w Feldkirch, Vorarlberg, w Austrii. Osiem klas gimnazjum klasycznego zakończył egzaminem maturalnym w 1932 r. Maturę nostryfikował przed Komisją Kuratorium Okręgu Szkolnego Krakowskiego. (shrink)

This paper explores the fact that linear opinion pooling can be represented as a Bayesian update on the opinions of others. It uses this fact to propose a new interpretation of the pooling weights. Relative to certain modelling assumptions the weights can be equated with the so-called truth-conduciveness known from the context of Condorcet's jury theorem. This suggests a novel way to elicit the weights.

Of all the attitudes and theories associated with or identified as "pacifism," only the doctrine that everyone ought not to resist violence with force is of philosophical interest, And it is logically incoherent. Pacifism's popularity rests on confusions about what the doctrine really is. If we have rights, We have the right to prevent infringements upon them. We have the right to use force to protect our rights, And in the degree necessary to accomplish that end. (staff).

Miguel de Unamuno was profoundly influenced by Søren Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works at a time when Kierkegaard was virtually unknown in Southern Europe. This book explores the scope and character of that influence, clarifies misconceptions in the relationship between the authors, and offers an original, Kierkegaardian reading of three of Unamuno's best known novels: Niebla, San Manuel Bueno, mártir, and Abel Sánchez.

Bastiat's great contribution to economics, in his own view, was his identification of service as the source of economic value. What is anything worth to anybody? In the cases where we are not dealing with what our fellow men do for us, the answer is to be found in its utility - how much the thing contributes to our satisfaction. In the case where we deal with our fellows, we are interested specifically in what they can do for us, that (...) is, how much service they can render us - how much they can or could, by their actions, contribute to the purchaser's satisfactions. If the providers are free beings, then the recipient will obtain those satisfactions only by agreement with that provider. It is to be assumed that the purchaser will get the best outcome he can: he will pay the lowest price feasible, for the option that is better than any known alternative. (shrink)

While the tradition of Locke scholarship holds that both Locke and Boyle are species anti-realists, there is evidence that this interpretation is false. Specifically, there has been some recent work on Boyle showing that he is, unlike Locke, a species realist. In this paper I argue that once we see Boyle as a realist about natural species, it is plausible to read some of Locke’s most formidable anti-realist arguments as directed specifically at Boyle’s account of natural species. This is a (...) break from the tradition because no one in the literature has yet suggested that some of Locke’s arguments in Book III of the Essay include a criticism of Boyle’s doctrine of species. Moreover, identifying Boyle as Locke’s intended target illuminates some of the more vexing passages in the Essay concerning real essences. (shrink)

This paper discusses ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας, which later Epicureans are supposed to have elevated to a fourth criterion of truth to complement perceptions, preconceptions and feelings. By examining Epicurus’ extant writings, the paper distinguishes three different senses of the term: ‘thought in general’, ‘act of attention’ and ‘mental perception’. It is argued that only the sense ‘mental perception’ yields a plausible reading of ἐπιβολαί as a criterion of truth. The paper then turns to the textual evidence on ἐπιβολαί in later (...) authors. While the term ἐπιβολή is not used by Cicero, Lucretius and Philodemus in the sense of mental perception, it is argued that this still is the most plausible way of understanding ἐπιβολή as a criterion of truth. (shrink)

Stať rekapituluje život a hlavní práce Jiřiny Popelové, významné české filozofky 20. století. Hlavní pozornost věnuje třem sborníkům, které vyšly k její poctě – Sborník k šedesátým naro­zeninám Jiřiny Popelové (1964), Jiřina Popelová, filozofka a učitelka filozofie (1984) a Filosofka Jiřina Popelová (2005). Podrobněji jsou připomenuty statě M. Sobotky, R. Kalivody, J. Peško­vé, P. Flosse a J. Gabriela. Ukazují přínos J. Popelové pro filozofii dějin, komeniologii, etiku, filozofii kultury a historiografii evropské a české filozofie.

Notes on the life of Adolf Lindenbaum, a complete bibliography of his published works, and selected references to his unpublished results.

Die leitende These der Untersuchung lautet, dass der von Berkeley inaugurierte und uneingeschränkt verteidigte Idealismus bei Kant und Schopenhauer eine spannungsreiche Bewegung der Problematisierung und Kritik freisetzt. In der bisherigen Forschung wurden die Positionen George Berkeleys, Immanuel Kants und Arthur Schopenhauers noch nicht systematisch miteinander verglichen. Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Idealismus erstmals anhand dieser drei Referenzautoren zu dokumentieren, bildet das zentrale Thema der Untersuchung, das die detaillierten Einzeluntersuchungen organisch verbindet. Darüber hinaus ist es ein eminentes Beweisziel der vorliegenden Monographie, Berkeley als (...) einen beeindruckend konsequenten Denker zu erschließen, dessen Immaterialismus sowohl argumentationstheoretisch wie historisch rekonstruiert wird. Insgesamt möchte die Monographie dazu beitragen, die gängige Oppositionsbildung zwischen dem britischen Empirismus auf der einen Seite und der deutschsprachigen Transzendentalphilosophie auf der anderen Seite zu hinterfragen. Die Relevanz und Originalität des Buches beruht dabei nicht nur in der Zusammenführung dieser bislang separat behandelten Traditionslinien, sondern zugleich in der Profilierung einer idealistischen Metaphysik. (shrink)

To date, much of the work on Responsible Innovation (RI) has focused on the ‘responsible’ part of RI. This has left the ‘innovation’ part in need of conceptual innovation of its own. If such conceptual innovation is to contribute to a coherent conception of RI, however, it is crucial to better understand the relation between responsibility and innovation first. This paper elucidates this relation by locating responsibility and innovation within Emmanuel Levinas’ phenomenology. It structures his work into three ‘stages’, each (...) described in terms of their leading experience and objectivation regime. This analysis identifies a need for constant innovation of political and technological systems, originating from and motivated by our responsibility to others. It also shows the relation between responsibility and innovation to be threefold: foundational, ethical and structural. These insights could help RI to avoid some pitfalls of ‘regular’ innovation, and provide moral grounding for important aspects of RI. (shrink)

The focus of this article is a question that has been neglected in debates about digitalization: Could machines replace human scientists? To provide an intelligible answer to it, we need to answer a further question: What is it that makes (or constitutes) a scientist? I offer an answer to this question by proposing a new demarcation criterion for science which I call “the discoverability criterion”. I proceed as follows: (1) I explain why the target question of this article is important, (...) and (2) show that it leads to a variant of the demarcation problem of science. (3) By arguing that it is probably an essential feature of science that we can make scientific discoveries, I suggest a novel way of dealing with this problem by proposing a new demarcation criterion. Before introducing it, (4) I analyze an exemplary case of a real scientific discovery, and (5) argue that scientific discovery processes have a general underlying structure. (6) I introduce my discoverability criterion for science and present my master argument that helps us understand which criteria have to be fulfilled in order to decide whether machines can replace human scientists or not. (7) I conclude by answering the article’s target question and bringing forward a take-home message. (shrink)

L’inquiétude de la totalité de la vie, qui s’éveille chez certains esprits, les amène à créer des représentations canoniques, types de vie stylisée et unifiée. Les philosophes sont des créateurs de « canons » de vie philosophique ; mais on peut se demander s’il est possible de dresser un tableau idéal du philosophe qui pourrait lui servir en même temps de norme et de critère. Non, car la vie philosophique est un mouvement, un « acte imparfait » dont la fin (...) nous échappe ; nous la poursuivons par des voies profondément personnelles ; c’est pourquoi on ne saurait « canoniser » un philosophe. (shrink)

Some modern philosophers have retrieved the old idea that the identification of facts and events is dependent on language. For instance, Davidson holds that ...

This book interprets and reflects on the conception of God that is implied by the Lord’s Prayer. It explains the epistemic status and ontological implications of the Christian faith in God and proposes a non-essentialist account of central identity-defining attributes of God.