Evaluating clinical ethics support services has been hailed as important research task. At the same time, there is considerable debate about how to evaluate CESS appropriately. The criticism, which has been aired, refers to normative as well as empirical aspects of evaluating CESS. In this paper, we argue that a first necessary step for progress is to better understand the intervention in CESS. Tools of complex intervention research methodology may provide relevant means in this respect. In a first step, we (...) introduce principles of “complex intervention research” and show how CESS fulfil the criteria of “complex interventions”. In a second step, we develop a generic “conceptual framework” for “ethics consultation on request” as standard for many forms of ethics consultation in clinical ethics practice. We apply this conceptual framework to the model of “bioethics mediation” to make explicit the specific structural and procedural elements of this form of ethics consultation on request. In a final step we conduct a comparative analysis of two different types of CESS, which have been subject to evaluation research: “proactive ethics consultation” and “moral case deliberation” and discuss implications for evaluating both types of CESS. To make explicit different premises of implemented CESS interventions by means of conceptual frameworks can inform the search for sound empirical evaluation of CESS. In addition, such work provides a starting point for further reflection about what it means to offer “good” CESS. (shrink)

Inleidend overzicht van visies van wetenschapsfilosofen op wetenschap en technologie.

Many scholars have argued that the distinction between the natural and the unnatural does not have any moral relevance, either because the distinction does not make sense or because, even if it does make sense, it does not make any moral sense. Before we can decide on the latter, we must therefore determine first whether a semantic distinction can be made. In this article, I argue that the distinction can be maintained. In spite of the fact that the categories of (...) the natural and the unnatural are blurred as no unnatural things are completely unnatural, I argue that we can meaningfully distinguish between different types of unnaturalness along the natural-unnatural spectrum. To my knowledge, this article is the first publication to distinguish between three types of unnaturalness. (shrink)

Bastiat's great contribution to economics, in his own view, was his identification of service as the source of economic value. What is anything worth to anybody? In the cases where we are not dealing with what our fellow men do for us, the answer is to be found in its utility - how much the thing contributes to our satisfaction. In the case where we deal with our fellows, we are interested specifically in what they can do for us, that (...) is, how much service they can render us - how much they can or could, by their actions, contribute to the purchaser's satisfactions. If the providers are free beings, then the recipient will obtain those satisfactions only by agreement with that provider. It is to be assumed that the purchaser will get the best outcome he can: he will pay the lowest price feasible, for the option that is better than any known alternative. (shrink)

Hilbert's axiomatization program of physical theories met an interesting challenge when it confronted the rise of quantum mechanics in the mid-twenties. The novelty of the mathematical apparatus of the then newly born theory was to be matched only by its substantial lack of any definite physical interpretation. The early attempts at axiomatization, which are described here, reflect all the difficulty of the task faced by Jordan, Hilbert, von Neumann and others. The role of von Neumann is examined in considerable detail (...) as he can be viewed here as the most outstanding of Hilbert's heirs. Von Neumann, especially in his work devoted to the proof of the impossibility of hidden variables, not only continued Hilbert's program but pushed it to its very limits, blending axiomatic rigor and interpretative commitment. (shrink)

This paper explores the fact that linear opinion pooling can be represented as a Bayesian update on the opinions of others. It uses this fact to propose a new interpretation of the pooling weights. Relative to certain modelling assumptions the weights can be equated with the so-called truth-conduciveness known from the context of Condorcet's jury theorem. This suggests a novel way to elicit the weights.

While the tradition of Locke scholarship holds that both Locke and Boyle are species anti-realists, there is evidence that this interpretation is false. Specifically, there has been some recent work on Boyle showing that he is, unlike Locke, a species realist. In this paper I argue that once we see Boyle as a realist about natural species, it is plausible to read some of Locke’s most formidable anti-realist arguments as directed specifically at Boyle’s account of natural species. This is a (...) break from the tradition because no one in the literature has yet suggested that some of Locke’s arguments in Book III of the Essay include a criticism of Boyle’s doctrine of species. Moreover, identifying Boyle as Locke’s intended target illuminates some of the more vexing passages in the Essay concerning real essences. (shrink)

This paper discusses ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας, which later Epicureans are supposed to have elevated to a fourth criterion of truth to complement perceptions, preconceptions and feelings. By examining Epicurus’ extant writings, the paper distinguishes three different senses of the term: ‘thought in general’, ‘act of attention’ and ‘mental perception’. It is argued that only the sense ‘mental perception’ yields a plausible reading of ἐπιβολαί as a criterion of truth. The paper then turns to the textual evidence on ἐπιβολαί in later (...) authors. While the term ἐπιβολή is not used by Cicero, Lucretius and Philodemus in the sense of mental perception, it is argued that this still is the most plausible way of understanding ἐπιβολή as a criterion of truth. (shrink)

Stať rekapituluje život a hlavní práce Jiřiny Popelové, významné české filozofky 20. století. Hlavní pozornost věnuje třem sborníkům, které vyšly k její poctě – Sborník k šedesátým naro­zeninám Jiřiny Popelové (1964), Jiřina Popelová, filozofka a učitelka filozofie (1984) a Filosofka Jiřina Popelová (2005). Podrobněji jsou připomenuty statě M. Sobotky, R. Kalivody, J. Peško­vé, P. Flosse a J. Gabriela. Ukazují přínos J. Popelové pro filozofii dějin, komeniologii, etiku, filozofii kultury a historiografii evropské a české filozofie.

Notes on the life of Adolf Lindenbaum, a complete bibliography of his published works, and selected references to his unpublished results.

The focus of this article is a question that has been neglected in debates about digitalization: Could machines replace human scientists? To provide an intelligible answer to it, we need to answer a further question: What is it that makes (or constitutes) a scientist? I offer an answer to this question by proposing a new demarcation criterion for science which I call “the discoverability criterion”. I proceed as follows: (1) I explain why the target question of this article is important, (...) and (2) show that it leads to a variant of the demarcation problem of science. (3) By arguing that it is probably an essential feature of science that we can make scientific discoveries, I suggest a novel way of dealing with this problem by proposing a new demarcation criterion. Before introducing it, (4) I analyze an exemplary case of a real scientific discovery, and (5) argue that scientific discovery processes have a general underlying structure. (6) I introduce my discoverability criterion for science and present my master argument that helps us understand which criteria have to be fulfilled in order to decide whether machines can replace human scientists or not. (7) I conclude by answering the article’s target question and bringing forward a take-home message. (shrink)

Die leitende These der Untersuchung lautet, dass der von Berkeley inaugurierte und uneingeschränkt verteidigte Idealismus bei Kant und Schopenhauer eine spannungsreiche Bewegung der Problematisierung und Kritik freisetzt. In der bisherigen Forschung wurden die Positionen George Berkeleys, Immanuel Kants und Arthur Schopenhauers noch nicht systematisch miteinander verglichen. Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Idealismus erstmals anhand dieser drei Referenzautoren zu dokumentieren, bildet das zentrale Thema der Untersuchung, das die detaillierten Einzeluntersuchungen organisch verbindet. Darüber hinaus ist es ein eminentes Beweisziel der vorliegenden Monographie, Berkeley als (...) einen beeindruckend konsequenten Denker zu erschließen, dessen Immaterialismus sowohl argumentationstheoretisch wie historisch rekonstruiert wird. Insgesamt möchte die Monographie dazu beitragen, die gängige Oppositionsbildung zwischen dem britischen Empirismus auf der einen Seite und der deutschsprachigen Transzendentalphilosophie auf der anderen Seite zu hinterfragen. Die Relevanz und Originalität des Buches beruht dabei nicht nur in der Zusammenführung dieser bislang separat behandelten Traditionslinien, sondern zugleich in der Profilierung einer idealistischen Metaphysik. (shrink)

In the literature, regress arguments often take one of two different forms: either they conclude that a given solution fails to solve any problem of a certain kind (the strong conclusion), or they conclude that a given solution fails to solve all problems of a certain kind (the weaker conclusion). This gives rise to a logical problem: do regresses entail the strong or the weaker conclusion, or none? In this paper I demonstrate that regress arguments can in fact take both (...) forms, and clearly set out the logical difference between them. Throughout the paper, I confine myself to metaphysical examples from the early Russell. Only now that we know they are valid can we start to discuss whether they are sound. (shrink)

Non-invasive brain stimulation promises innovative experimental possibilities for psychology and neurosci- ence as well as new therapeutic and palliative measures in medicine. Because of its good risk–benefit ratio, non-invasiveness and reversibility as well as its low effort and cost it has good chances of becoming a wide- spread tool in science, medicine and even in lay use. While most issues in medical and research ethics such as informed consent, safety, and potential for misuse can be handled with manageable effort, the (...) real promise of brain stimulation does raise one prominent moral worry: it may lay the foundation of reliable, precise and stable manipulations of the mind. This article addresses this worry and concludes that it is not the possibility of manipulation, but the shift in our understanding of our mind which stands in need of careful consideration. (shrink)

Some modern philosophers have retrieved the old idea that the identification of facts and events is dependent on language. For instance, Davidson holds that ...

There is a wide spectrum in reading Michael Ondaatje’s novel Anil’s Ghost, ranging from thinkers who explore literary, historical, to ethico-ontological and political aspects. I confine the study by strictly retrieving the subjectivity of the human rights victim as not rested in its being a subject and victim, hence as a specter that haunts or ‘retaliates’ into exposing its victimization. This article attempts to read the spectral nature of this victim using Derrida and Žižek. The Derridean reading grounds the central (...) spectrality on his hauntology and what it says about the victim’s ghostly character. Later, I expound on the act of haunting from a Žižekean standpoint by hinging on the notion of ‘drive’ that exposes the nature of victimization as depoliticizing the subject. (shrink)

The main goal of this dissertation is to provide a solid foundation for a formalization of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). This foundation consists of three major components. First, an intuitively adequate and formally precise model of causal explanation. Secondly, an intuitively adequate and formally precise measure of (causal) explanatory power. And third, an intuitively adequate and formally precise criterion of proportionality that is able to identify the most appropriate level of specificity for a causal explanation. While the first (...) component makes it possible to generate and identify causal explanations reliably, the second and third components make it possible to evaluate the strength or quality of causal explanations, which is crucial for identifying the best of a set of competing causal explanations. (shrink)