Alfred Tarski frequently declared that his semantic definition of truth was inspired by Aristotle’s views. The present paper discusses this issue in the context of Marian Wesoły’s criticism of the thesis that there is an affinity between Tarski’s views and those of Aristotle. The article concludes with an inquiry into whether Aristotle’s definition of truthfulness can be identified with the correspondence theory of truth.

Aristotle examines emotions in different works and from different perspectives. Ontologically, they are categorized as passing qualitative states of the soul. Yet they have both a bodily and a psychological aspect. While a proper definition of any emotion would need to render both aspects, in his Rhetoric Aristotle merely offers nominal definitions of emotions in general and of single emotions. He produces a sophisticated analysis of anger, which he defines as a response to a perceived slight. The angry (...) person seeks revenge, which consists in his or her regaining his or her superiority. In order to achieve this, it is necessary that the victim, that is the person responsible for the earlier slight, recognizes that she or he is made to suffer the revenge of the angry person. Anger is therefore accompanied by pain and pleasure: pain because of the perceived slight, pleasure because of the hope for revenge. Anger is morally neutral, but there are good and bad ways of being angry. (shrink)

In the discussion at hand I have attempted to pave the way for such a treatment of the principle of contradiction. In a number of respects it seems to me worthwhile to relate my critical exposition to Aristotle's train of thought. Indeed, every critique must be raised against something substantial, otherwise it generally becomes the critic's leisurely game with his own cerebral phantasies. Now Aristotle's intuitions regarding the principle of contradiction are, for the most part and clear down (...) to the present day, the usual and traditional ones; and arguments for and against the principle can be found together in the Stagirite in greater completeness than in any one modern textbook of logic. My investigation will proceed with the Aristotelian text at hand and with regard to the results of symbolic logic. The most important results shall be sketched very briefly in the following. (shrink)

This essay offers an analysis and interpretation of the rarely commented-on chapter I.12 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle’s goal in this chapter is to prove that human happiness belongs to the class of prized goods, also characterized as divine goods, whereas virtue ranks lower, being a merely praiseworthy good. It is not easy to see why this chapter is placed at the end of Aristotle’s general discussion of the highest human good in Book I or why he included (...) it at all. My goal is to show that it does make a contribution to the architecture of the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole by helping to prepare the ground for one of the main argumentative strategies in the treatise X.6–8 on scientific contemplation as the key component of supreme happiness. To this end, I analyze each step of the argumentation in I.12, drawing also on relevant material from other Aristotelian texts, and then demonstrate the connection with some of the arguments in X.6–8. (shrink)

_Argues that Aristotle used the most traditional Greek ideas about the gods to develop and defend his physical, metaphysical, and ethical teachings._.

A study in the best tradition of classical scholarship, showing mastery of commentary and scholarship in eight languages, this book argues that the Ethics is integral to a series of politically oriented philosophical addresses aimed at morally mature political leaders. Bodeus's critical review of the major approaches to Aristotle's texts is an excellent introduction to the subject.

This paper investigates the concept of aletheia in ancient philosophy from the pre-Socratics until Aristotle. The meaning of aletheia in archaic Greek is taken as the starting point. It is followed by remarks about the concept of truth in the Seven Sages. The author discusses this concept as it appears in views and works of philosophers and historians. A special section is devoted to the epistemological and ontological understanding of truth. On this occasion, influential views of Heidegger are examined. (...) The paper is concluded by a review of various meanings of truth in Aristotle. (shrink)

The Czech philosopher Jan Patocka (1907-1977), who studied with Husserl and Heidegger, is widely recognized as the most influential thinker to come from postwar Eastern Europe. Refusing to join the Communist party after World War II, he was banned from academia and publication for the rest of his life, except for a brief time following the liberalizations of the Prague spring of 1968. Joining Vaclav Havel and Jiri Hajek as a spokesman for the Chart 77 human-rights declaration of 1977, Patocka (...) was harassed by authorities, arrested, and finally died of a heart attack during prolonged interrogation. Plato and Europe, arguably Patocka’s most important book, consists of a series of lectures delivered in the homes of friends after his last banishment from the academy just three years before his death. Here, he presents his most mature ideas about the history of Western philosophy, arguing that the idea of the care of the soul is fundamental to the philosophical tradition beginning with the Greeks. Explaining how the care of the soul is elaborated as the problem of how human beings may make their world one of truth and justice, Patocka develops this thesis through a treatment of Plato, Democritus, and Aristotle, showing how considerations about the soul are of central importance in their writings. He demonstrates in vivid fashion how this idea forms the spiritual heritage of Europe. (shrink)

The treatise De intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias can be divided into four sections. The first is an interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intellect, and especially of the active intellect referred to in Aristotle, De anima 3.5, which differs from the interpretation in Alexander's own De anima, and whose relation to Alexander's De anima, attribution to Alexander, and date are all disputed. The second is an account of the intellect which is broadly similar to A though differing (...) on certain points. The third is an account of someone's response to the problem of how intellect can enter the human being ‘from outside’ if it is incorporeal and hence cannot move at all; in the fourth the writer who reported Cl criticizes that solution and gives his own alternative one. (shrink)

In the paper the author provides a brief sketch of Albert the Great as a scientist. By quoting passages from his works he shows that Albert the Great had a well-elaborated understanding of science. It is argued that in some aspects Albert was not too far from modern criteria that science and its methodology should meet. Accepting Aristotelian model of science, Albert stressed the need for experience and repeated observation in scientific research. While valuing authority, he examined carefully what it (...) was stating and was not afraid to criticize even such an important authority as Aristotle, if his claims contradicted Albert’s observations. Although science was in close relation with theology, it wasn’t limited in its research and on the methodological level Albert was well aware of the need for their mutual independence. He was not afraid of providing science with freedom of inquiry, because he knew that in principle science and theology, if both sound, couldn’t contradict itself, because there is just one truth known from their different perspectives. The article also introduces Albert’s understading of and major contributions to mineralogy, astronomy, astrology, alchemy and other disciplines that were considered scientific in his time. (shrink)

Jan Salamucha was born on the 10th of June 1903 in Warsaw and murdered on the 11th of August 1944 in Warsaw during the Warsaw Uprising very early on in his scholarly career. He is the most original representative of the branch of the Lvov-Warsaw School known as the Cracow Circle. The Circle was a grouping of scholars who were interested in reconstructing scholasticism and Christian philosophy in general by means of mathematical logic. As Jan Lukasiewicz’s successor in the area (...) of logic and Konstanty Michalski’s student in the area of the history of medieval thought, Salamucha had an excellent preparation for this task. His main achievements include a masterful logical analysis of the proof _ex motu _for the existence of God, a modern interpretation of analogical notions and a comprehensive approach to the problem of essence. He also contributed several historical studies: he examined Aristotle’s theory of deduction, he reconstructed William Ockham’s propositional logic and established the authenticity of his treatise on _insolubilia,_ and he identified the historical sources of the antinomies in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. He did not shy away from popularizing philosophy, and in that work he was able to elucidate rather than oversimplify the complexities of philosophy. (shrink)

Building on William G. Lycan’s insight that proper names are paronymous, I pursue two goals in this paper: I argue that Lycan’s insight is not restricted to proper names, but can be extended to include certain general terms, and I aim to demonstrate how this contributes to a better understanding of sentences in the context of scientific discovery. To this end, I first address the question of how to best grasp the largely unknown concept of paronymy by tracing it back (...) to Aristotle, and by exploring recent developments in the philosophy of language and in linguistics. I then focus in greater detail on Lycan’s argument that proper names are paronymous and extend this reasoning to general terms, using analogous examples to show that general terms, like proper names, exhibit paronymy. Shifting the focus to scientific discovery, I show how recognizing the paronymy of general terms enhances our understanding of how scientific terms evolve over time and relate to other terms. My analysis also reveals that the “is” in scientific sentences does not necessarily function as the “is” of identity but can, among others, also be interpreted as the “is” of explication. This allows not only for the resolution of various puzzles, but also for different readings of sentences to coexist peacefully. (shrink)

Two fundamentally different conceptions of unity can be found in the philosophical tradition. My thesis is that both of them go back to one text, Plato's Parmenides. Plato argues that if the One is posed as unity (the first hypothesis), the One is unthinkable and unnamable. If the One is posed as being (the second hypothesis), we think a plurality. Plotinus explicitly relates his conception of unity to the Parmenides. The One is the origin of the second hypostasis that is (...) marked by the connection of unity and plurality. The One itself is Apollo, a name that is explained as a polla, that is, the ‘not-many’, is indistinct and beyond being. Characteristic of Neoplatonic thought, for which the term ‘henology’ has been introduced, is the absolute transcendence of the One. According to E. Gilson (Being and Some Philosophers) Neoplatonism is incompatible with ‘the mental universe of Christian thinkers’ on account of its thesis that the One transcends being. Yet two henological moments strongly influenced Christian tradition. The first is the idea of ‘negative theology’. It is perceptible in Nicolaus of Cues, who considers ‘Unity’ the most appropriate name for God. The second moment is the spiritual, mystical idea of ‘the union with the One’ (cf. Master Eckhart). More substantial than Gilson's criticism is the position of Levinas who reproaches classical philosophy with the elimination of plurality. The question is whether unity can be conceived in such a way that the plurality of things is saved. The second conception of unity was developed by Aristotle in his Metaphysics (IV, 2). In a critical reaction to the second hypothesis of the Parmenides he argues that ‘being’ and ‘one’ are identical in reality, but differ conceptually. ‘One’ expresses the undividedness (indivisio) of that which is. What deserves attention is that unity does not deny plurality, but division. Aristotle's exposition became the startingpoint of the 13th century doctrine of the transcendentia. Characteristic of this conception of the one is the transcendentality : the one is a property belonging to every being. The importance of this view is twofold. First, the metaphysical one is clearly distinguished from the mathematical one, that belongs to the category of quantity. Second, from the transcendentality follows that ‘one’ has an analogous character. There is no uniformity in unity. The transcendental one determines being in itself. Is not another type of unity required, that is relational in nature ? Some Dutch philosophers have recently developed a new conception of unity, namely, ‘unity as intersubjectivity’. This conception has a theological root : Thomas Aquinas' interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity. The modern view of unity as an intersubjective unity of a plurality can be understood as a completion of the transcendental conception of the one. The transcendent conception of the One and the transcendental conception have common traits. Thinking of the one is always a transcending movement. Moreover, it implies the task of a union, for it deals with a unity that is not yet, but must be. (shrink)

A many-faceted beast, the metaphysics of relations can be approached from many angles. One could begin with the various ways in which relational states are expressed in natural language. If a more historical treatment is wanted, one could begin with Plato, Aristotle, or Leibniz. In the following, I will approach the topic by first drawing on Russell’s Principles of Mathematics (1903) (still a natural-enough starting point), and then turn to a discussion mainly of positionalism. The closing section contains an (...) overview of the six contributions to this Special Issue. (shrink)

Walter Burley is mostly known for his defense of realism against William of Ockham. The concept of time that he developed in his late literal commentary on Aristotle's Physics has even been labelled 'extremely realistic,' in contrast to William of Ockham's so-called 'extremely subjectivistic' alternative. However, as is shown in this article, when Burley's concept of time is viewed against the background of medieval theories of time, it appears that it is mainly a restatement and further elaboration of opinions (...) held by Averroes. A detailed investigation of Burley's explanation of the reality, definition, and unicity of time, as well as of the relation between time and the intellective soul shows that his realism is certainly far less extreme than it has been believed. (shrink)

Intentionality is a key concept in the phenomenological tradition, but also figures in several other currents of contemporary thought, often as a criteria of consciousness. Husserl adopted the principle of intentionality from Franz Brentano, who was heavily influenced by Aristotle and medieval Aristotelian tradition. Considering that intentionality means a direction of thought or behaviour, it is quite evident that Aristotle remains a major reference in this context : through the idea of natural entelechies, the theory of life, perception (...) and thinking and through the ethical descriptions of dispositions, virtues and decisions. Whatever point of view chosen, it seems obvious that the equivalent of Husserlian intentionality must be something else in Aristotle than a principle of constitution of objects in the sense of modern (Cartesian and Kantian) tradition. What could be called intentionality in Aristotle seems rather to be something like a direction of behaviour, founded on natural tendencies. Such a «physiomorphic» intentionality can shed some light on the contemporary discussions concerning consciousness, knowledge and affectivity and similarly differentiate and situate the «modern» critique of teleology. The present article deals with these questions in relation to phantasia and orexis. (shrink)

The analytic movement advertised its 'linguistic turn' as a radical break from the two-thousand-year-old substance tradition. But this is an illusion. On the fundamental level of ontology, there is enough reformulation and presupposition of traditional 'no entity without identity' themes to analogize Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine to Aristotle as paradigmatic of modified realism. Thus the pace of ontology is glacial. Frege and Russell, not Wittgenstein and Quine, emerge as the true analytic progenitors of 'no entity without identity,' offering (...) between them at least twenty-nine private language arguments and sixty-four 'no entity without identity' theories. (shrink)

Our topic asks for a/the “normative outlook” on “the cultural edifice of the moral mind.” In this essay, I shall attempt to fix a fairly definite meaning for each of these notions, and then argue that our normative outlook insofar as this cultural edifice is moral is very strong approval. By the (or a) “cultural edifice,” I take it, we mean pretty much the whole of society insofar as it is a product of human effort, which in turn is affected, (...) no doubt, by luck – good and bad – and shot through, informed, and constrained by the moralities of the various societies that make it up. But in order to talk coherently of “the moral mind,” we need a clear and strong moral theory, one that presents a basic set of moral principles or ideas, ones which ought, therefore, to impose a coherent shape on the whole. This is vague, to be sure, and will be thought in a basic way to be implausible. I shall try at least briefly to affirm the idea and to insist that it is not after all so implausible. Is there, then, a supreme, overriding morality? Yes, I claim (in the wake, to be sure, of many others, including Aristotle, Kant, David Gauthier, and Nicholas Rescher). It has one supreme idea that nobody is to make their way in the world by imposing costs on other innocent people. (That formulation is a generalization of the ideas of Kant, Hobbes, Socrates, and perhaps that of mankind generally.) The cultural world as we know it includes the accomplishments of the original and the brilliant, plus even more the communal and cooperative efforts of innumerable people, including symphony orchestras and art museums on and on, down to a gathering of friends playing cricket. On the other hand, of course, it contains much violence and evil. What our world would look like in the absence of that evil is very hard to say – but, surely, it would be better. (shrink)

What is logical relevance? Anderson and Belnap say that the “modern classical tradition [,] stemming from Frege and Whitehead-Russell, gave no consideration whatsoever to the classical notion of relevance.” But just what is this classical notion? I argue that the relevance tradition is implicitly most deeply concerned with the containment of truth-grounds, less deeply with the containment of classes, and least of all with variable sharing in the Anderson–Belnap manner. Thus modern classical logicians such as Peirce, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and (...) Quine are implicit relevantists on the deepest level. In showing this, I reunite two fields of logic which, strangely from the traditional point of view, have become basically separated from each other: relevance logic and diagram logic. I argue that there are two main concepts of relevance, intensional and extensional. The first is that of the relevantists, who overlook the presence of the second in modern classical logic. The second is the concept of truth-ground containment as following from in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. I show that this second concept belongs to the diagram tradition of showing that the premisses contain the conclusion by the fact that the conclusion is diagrammed in the very act of diagramming the premisses. I argue that the extensional concept is primary, with at least five usable modern classical filters or constraints and indefinitely many secondary intensional filters or constraints. For the extensional concept is the genus of deductive relevance, and the filters define species. Also following the Tractatus, deductive relevance, or full truth-ground containment, is the limit of inductive relevance, or partial truth-ground containment. Purely extensional inductive or partial relevance has its filters or species too. Thus extensional relevance is more properly a universal concept of relevance or summum genus with modern classical deductive logic, relevantist deductive logic, and inductive logic as its three main domains. (shrink)

This is the first English translation directly based on the original Polish ‘Zasada sprzeczności a logika symboliczna’, the appendix on symbolic logic of Jan Łukasiewicz's 1910 book O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arytotelesa (On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle).

This paper, looking over the life and the texts of the greek philosophers and analyzing the Pythagorean harmony, the two stories of Thales, the outstanding personality of Xenophanes, the humorous sense of Democritus and the Socratic irony, shows that philosophy in the beginning was understood not like an abstract reflection, but like a joyful search of the excellence in the human life.

The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle’s (...) explicit remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child’s affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle’s view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child’s sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child’s behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non-cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman’s primarily cognitive view. (shrink)

Aquinas presents his most complete exposition of the transcendentals inDe veritate 1, 1, that deals with the question What is truth?. The thesis of this paper is that the question of truth is essential for the understanding of his doctrine of the transcendentals.The first part of the paper (sections 1–4) analyzes Thomas''s conception of truth. Two approaches to truth can be found in his work. The first approach, based on Aristotle''s claim that truth is not in things but in (...) the mind, leads to the idea that the proper place of truth is in the intellect. The second approach is ontological: Thomas also acknowledges that there is truth in every being. The famous definition of truth as adequation of thing and intellect enables him to integrate the two approaches. Truth is a relation between two terms, both of which can be called true because both are essential for the conformity between thing and intellect. (shrink)

Philosophers often rely on sciences of their own time. This is especially true for scientists writing philosophical works. In the case of Ernst Mach, the scientific references are mainly to physics, physiology, evolutionary biology and—in a somewhat different manner—the new discipline of psychology. Like so many authors in the late 19th century, Mach had extreme confidence in the methods of the natural sciences. However, this trait, often called scientism or positivism, can easily be used in polemical accounts that obscure other (...) aspects of Mach’s thought. Mach is well-known for both his analysis of sensations and his evolutionary conception of perception and knowledge. The tension between the ambition to clarify the empirical basis of perception on the one hand and the focus on the natural origins of human perception on the other hand is, however, considerable. A comparison of these two perspectives can contribute to an ontological understanding of experience that sheds new light on the much-discussed topic of sense data and at the same time clarifies the difference between experience and observation and the role of experimental science in this context. In some respects, Mach seems closer to William James than to his followers in the Vienna circle. The accusation of idealism made by Lenin in his influential critique of positivism overlooks the implications of this naturalist approach but offers the occasion to dwell on the ontological implications of something that can be called natural historicity. Comparisons with Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes and Kant situate the empiricist theory of perception. (shrink)

Some early modern scholars believed that Scripture provided more certain knowledge than all secular authorities – even Aristotle – or investigating nature as such. In this paper, I analyse one such attempt to establish the most reliable knowledge of nature: the so-called Mosaic physics proposed by the Reformed encyclopaedist Johann Heinrich Alsted. Although in his early works on Physica Mosaica Alsted declares that his primary aim is proving the harmony that exists between various traditions of natural philosophy, namely between (...) the Mosaic and the Peripatetic approaches, and despite the fact that his biblical encyclopaedia of 1625 was intended to be based on a literal reading of the Bible, he never truly abandoned the Aristotelian framework of physics. What is more, in his mature encyclopaedia of 1630, he eventually openly preferred Aristotle to other natural-philosophical traditions. I argue, therefore, that Alsted’s bold vision of Mosaic physics remained unfulfilled and should be assessed as an unsuccessful project of early modern natural philosophy. (shrink)

This study analyses the theoretical connections between the conception of happiness, the theory of the good, and an ethical-practical conception of human nature in Aristotle's Ethics and his late-Hellenistic followers. The further development of Aristotelian views in the late Hellenistic context is a long-neglected field of research. The Aristotelian view is further developed systematically in the final chapterthrough an exploration of the relationship between prudential and moral rationality.

This article aims to present a detailed analysis of the “Christian natural philosophy” elaborated by the German humanist philosopher and theologian Otto Casmann (1562–1607) in his various works. To this end, Casmann’s general idea of philosophia Christiana is discussed and critically evaluated. Regarding natural philosophy, or physics, attention is paid mainly to topics such as cosmogony and cosmology, which Casmann promised to have developed biblically and independently of the pagan (namely Aristotelian) tradition. However, when Casmann’s natural philosophy is analyzed in (...) detail, his resolute emphasis on the literal reading of the Bible, the cornerstone of his entire concept, turns out to be problematic. Similarly, despite his resolutions, his natural‑philosophical views are, to a considerable extent, still dependent on Aristotelian terms and concepts. (shrink)

This book deals with the history of the problem whether or not time can fully exist without the mind. This has been a vital issue in the philosophy of time, with intriguing arguments and solutions, from Aristotle to the present.

Ve své práci se v rámci aktualizace klasického Aristotelova konceptu morálního charakteru věnuji pojmu zvyku (habit) a otázce automatizace mentálních procesů. Dokazuji, že pojetí ctnosti jako zvyku, chápaného jako rutinní a zautomatizovaná činnost, při které nejsme schopni předložit skutečný důvod pro své jednání, není konzistentní s klasickou Aristotelovou teorií. Můj důkaz vychází z analýzy pojmu záměrná volba (proairésis) a za proponenty kritizovaného směru jsou představeni Bill Pollard a Matt Stichter. Větší část této práce pak věnuji filozofce Nancy Snowové a jejímu (...) komplexnímu konceptu ctnosti, ve kterém mimo jiné navazuje na zvykové pojetí Pollarda a který spojuje s morální odborností (moral expertise). Namítám zde a dokazuji, že její odmítnutí zdůvodnění jednání jako podmínky ctnostného činu není vhodnou aktualizací klasického konceptu morálního charakteru, tj. není vhodným rozvedením ani adekvátní revizí tohoto konceptu. Na základě psychologického výzkumu odbornosti můžeme totiž předložit stejně tak dobré důvody, proč je možné a žádoucí, aby morální odborník svá jednání byl s to zdůvodnit. (shrink)