Regulating affective responses to acute stress has the potential to improve health, performance, and well-being outcomes. Using the biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat as an organizing framework, we review how appraisals inform affective responses and highlight research that demonstrates how appraisals can be used as regulatory tools. Arousal reappraisal, specifically, instructs individuals on the adaptive benefits of stress arousal so that arousal is conceptualized as a coping resource. By reframing the meaning of signs of arousal that accompany stress, it (...) is possible to break the link between stressful situations, and malignant physiological responses and experiences of negative affect. Applications of arousal reappraisal for academic contexts and clinical science, and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

The biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat posits that resource and demand appraisals interact in situations of acute stress to determine affective responses, and concomitant physiological responses, motivation, and decisions/behaviors. Regulatory approaches that alter appraisals to regulate challenge and threat affective states have the potential to facilitate coping. This reply clarifies the conceptualization of one such regulatory approach, arousal reappraisal, and suggests avenues for future research. However, it is important to note that arousal reappraisal is not a “silver bullet” for (...) improving stress outcomes, nor should this strategy be expected to positively impact all individuals. More work is needed to better elucidate how psychological and biological stress processes interact to shape health. (shrink)

Defenders of two Rationality Views of love—the Qualities View and the Personhood View—have drawn on Iris Murdoch's philosophical writings to highlight a connection between love and a “realistic” perspective on the beloved. Murdoch does not inform the basic structure of these views—she is rather introduced as a supplement who shows that in love, we pay accurate, nuanced, unguarded, and unflinching attention to the other. In this paper, I contend that these authors have failed to see that Murdoch offers a distinct (...) view of love and is inappropriate to enlist as an ally. This is in large part because they have missed the full sense of what Murdoch means by connecting love and realism. I contend that for Murdoch, to love someone means seeing them in light of a realistic vision of what it means to be human; this includes an appreciation of the limits of freedom, the formative influence of personal history, and the nature and extent of our differences from one another. This helps us to see why Murdoch variously describes loving attention as realistic, compassionate, tolerant, and extremely difficult. It also sheds light on some important and familiar ways that we criticize one another's grounds for love. (shrink)

This book explores Iris Murdoch as a philosopher who, through her distinctive methodology, exploits the advantages of having a mind on the borders of literature and politics in her early career writings (pre-The Sovereignty of Good). By focusing on a single decade of Murdoch’s early career, Jamieson tracks connections between her views on the state of literature and politics in postwar Britain and her approach to the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. Furthermore, this close study reveals that, far from (...) a stylistic quirk, Murdoch’s use of metaphors, analogies, and other literary devices is internal to her methodology. Finally, rather than asking what Murdoch’s views are, this work will ask “what is Murdoch trying to achieve with her writings and public lectures, and how does she go about this?” By answering the latter question, we will have a new strategy for interpreting her writings more generally. The book contributes to the growing body of scholarship focusing on Iris Murdoch’s philosophical writings, and on women in the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The twenty-two papers here are invigoratingly diverse, but together tell a unified story about various aspects of the morality of our relationships to animals and to nature.

While the contemporary problem of the criterion raises similar epistemological issues as Agrippa’s Trilemma in ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism, the consideration of such epistemological questions has served two different purposes. On one hand, there is the purely practical purpose of Pyrrhonism, in which such questions are a means to reach suspension of judgment, and on the other hand, there is the theoretical purpose of contemporary epistemologists, in which these issues raise theoretical problems that drive the search for theoretical resolution. In (...) classical India, similar issues arise in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī, but it is not entirely clear what Nāgārjuna’s purpose is. Contrary to the theoretical interpretations of several recent scholars such as Jan Westerhoff according to which Nāgārjuna is proffering a contextualist epistemological theory, I argue that Nāgārjuna as well as the later Madhyamaka Candrakīrti, much like Pyrrhonian skeptics, employed concerns about epistemic criteria in service of purely practical purposes. There is no positive epistemological theory to be found in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī and Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā; furthermore a putative thesis of universal emptiness is self-undermining, a conclusion which itself can be seen as part of a therapeutic program. Nonetheless, the historical persistence of these epistemological issues shows that they ought to continue to be areas of theoretical inquiry for epistemologists today. I end with reflections on the wider relevance of my conclusions, particularly with regard to demonstrating the value of philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I challenge standard views of the moral badness of sentimentality defended by art critics and philosophers. Accounts based on untruthfulness and self-indulgence lack the resources to both explain the badness of bad sentimentality and to allow that there are benign instances. We are sometimes permitted to be sentimental even though it is self-serving. A non-moralistic account should allow for this. To provide such an account, I first outline a substantive view of the ideal of unsentimentality by turning (...) to Rainer Maria Rilke’s Letters on Cézanne. Rilke celebrates the artist for his unsentimental love of his subjects and “untiring objective wakefulness” to them. I then turn to Iris Murdoch’s ethics of attention (itself influenced by Rilke) to explain why this ideal is so difficult to live up to in practice, the various ways that we fall short, and what our failures mean. What Murdoch contributes is both a sense that the lovingly attentive attitude that Rilke describes is morally—and not just artistically—important and a compassionate account of the human egocentrism that inhibits it. By thinking of sentimentality as a failure of moral attention, we can appreciate how particular instances differ from one another. Sentimentality can console us in difficult times or can gratify our egos; it can be a form of escapism or can rigidly enclose reality; and it can be harmlessly self-serving or a selfish failure to morally attend to the other when it counts. I conclude by outlining some ways that being seen with Cézanne-like moral attention can matter to us. (shrink)

In recent years, a new scholarly gaze has been cast on four women‒Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch‒who have come to be known as the ‘Wartime Quartet’. During the postwar period, when women were still scarce in the discipline, these four flourished as philosophers. New details about their wartime education give us materials to reflect on what enabled them to develop their unique philosophical voices. Their work dispels widespread philosophical dogmas, especially scientistic interpretations of naturalism that exclude (...) value from the fabric of reality. Through their attention to the details of ordinary life, they avoid flattening the complexities of moral learning, especially where this involves navigating intergenerational differences. The articles in this Suite look to the Wartime Quartet's writings and learning conditions to show that, far from being of purely historical interest, they shed fresh light on the aims and challenges of moral education and offer a critical perspective on current pedagogical practices‒particularly in the teaching of philosophy. (shrink)

Fine (2005, 2006) has presented a ‘trilemma’ concerning the tense-realist idea that reality is constituted by tensed facts. According to Fine, there are only three ways out of the trilemma, consisting in what he takes to be the three main families of tense-realism: ‘presentism’, ‘(external) relativism’, and ‘fragmentalism’. Importantly, although Fine characterises tense-realism as the thesis that reality is constituted (at least in part) by tensed facts, he explicitly claims that tense realists are not committed to their fundamental (...) existence. Recently, Correia and Rosenkranz (2011, 2012) have claimed that Fine’s tripartite map of tense realism is incomplete as it misses a fourth position they call ‘dynamic absolutism’. In this paper, I will argue that dynamic absolutists are committed to the irreducible existence of tensed facts and that, for this reason, they face a similar trilemma concerning the notion of fact-content. I will thus conclude that a generalised version of Fine’s trilemma, concerning both fact-constitution and fact-content, is indeed inescapable. (shrink)

I try to show that Steiner’s theory has very implausible normative consequences since it does not accept the prima facie character or rights. This theory is unable to solve the conflicts of interests in which the only intuitively plausible solution consists in overriding someone’s rights.

Looking at Paul B. Preciado’s relationship to psychoanalysis across texts, but especially the recent book Can the Monster Speak?: A Report to an Academy of Psychoanalysts, I seek to disentangle a possible vision for a new psychoanalysis from Preciado’s concerns, ambivalence and disgust with the professional field. I call this a somato-militant psychoanalysis that leans on Freud’s notion of conversion as the creation of a parasitic traumatic kernel that insists on the side of the body and shows a potential for (...) mutuation, transference, amplified potentia gaudendi, surgical intervention and a radical exteriorization of the subject through access to desire. This somatic archival work runs against an idea of psychoanalysis as merely a privatization and interiorization of the subject, a site for upholding the colonial-patriarchal regime of gender norms and an attempt at therapeutic re-territorialization. In the end, the meeting between Preciado and psychoanalysis is given a name: terminal, meaning both at the very limit, the end point, and incurable. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in Perceptual Intuitionism. A significant portion of the literature on the topic has focused on the ethical perception defense, the supposition seeming to be that one must defend Perceptual Intuitionism by showing that one can have ethical experiences which immediately and non-inferentially justify one’s beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of particular actions. This thesis rejects this thought by proposing an alternative defense of Perceptual Intuitionism which employs the Wittgensteinian concept of (...) criteria and an understanding of principles of prima facie duties as “grammatical propositions”. (shrink)

Rather than squandering our resources on such questionable endeavors as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, we should lift up poor people in the developing world. This is an important message that many Americans need to hear.

According to Agrippa's trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads to either infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay examines whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There are various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coherentism, contextualism, infinitism, and German idealism. Examining those responses, the essay shows that the trilemma applies at least to rational justification of contentful moral beliefs. This means that rationalist ethics based on any contentful moral belief are (...) rationally unjustifiable. (shrink)

This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides a brief evaluation of foundationalism, emergent coherentism, and (...) infinitism. (shrink)

While human genetic research promises to deliver a range of health benefits to the population, genetic research that takes place in Indigenous communities has proven controversial. Indigenous peoples have raised concerns, including a lack of benefit to their communities, a diversion of attention and resources from non-genetic causes of health disparities and racism in health care, a reinforcement of “victim-blaming” approaches to health inequalities, and possible misuse of blood and tissue samples. Drawing on the international literature, this article reviews the (...) ethical issues relevant to genetic research in Indigenous populations and considers how some of these have been negotiated in a genomic research project currently under way in a remote Aboriginal community. We consider how the different levels of Indigenous research governance operating in Australia impacted on the research project and discuss whether specific guidelines for the conduct of genetic research in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities are warranted. (shrink)

In his 2013 book Kiku hito (English translation Homo audiens, 2022), composer and musicologist Jo Kondo (近藤譲) outlines his interpretation of music as the interrelationship between notes, each of which ‘has its own entity and life’ and yet is only meaningful in relationship with other notes, an assertion which echoes 15th-century nō (能) composers Zeami’s (世阿弥) and Zenchiku’s (禅竹) writings on the life and death of each note in a nō performance. Though in his own writing Kondo restricts himself to (...) the tradition of western aesthetics, in a 2023 interview he acknowledges that his system of musical interpretation is rooted in the Kegon (華厳) Buddhist concept of Indra’s Net (which illustrates the idea of ultimate reality as the ‘unimpeded interpenetration of phenomena and phenomena’ jiji muge hokkai 事事無礙法界). In this experimental paper, I will explore the aesthetic implications of this idea: is a listener’s interpretation of the relationships between sounds in a musical work (‘work’ defined as broadly as possible, inclusive of all forms of deep, active listening, from contemporary sound art to nō to Dōgen (道元) hearing a sūtra in the voices of monkeys) merely a metaphor for the ‘unimpeded interpenetration of phenomena and phenomena’, or is it an example of it? What are the implications for the interpretation of all types of music and sound art if sounds – like other nonsentient (hijō 非情) phenomena such as water and mountains – have Buddha-nature (busshō 仏性)? And does this interpretative frame have ethical implications for interpreters – listeners, composers, and performers – of music and sound-art in this age of imminent environmental collapse?. (shrink)

Nonfictional field recording is a genre of music which offers a glimpse of art beyond our late-capitalist age. The ongoing ecocide which we, in a state of abject detachment, are witnessing and abetting calls out for artists to reconnect and reengage with the nonhuman world that has been deemed valueless by our civilization. Countering the disenchantment of nature wrought by scientism, human-centrism, and above all capitalism necessitates a dissolving of the barriers we set up between ourselves and our environment, a (...) task which can be only accomplished via religion or art: an art—like field recording—which affords reconnecting its audience with the enchantment of the ignored world surrounding them. In this article, Toshiya Tsunoda’s exemplary Somashikiba —recorded in locations forgotten by civilization—will be examined via interpretive tools adapted from Ueda Shizuteru’s Kyoto School aesthetics and Takahashi Mutsuo’s poetics. Ueda’s philosophy offers a way of understanding perception which eliminates the subject-object division. Takahashi’s project of recovering the spirituality of place through poetry is a model of historically and politically engaged art. Looking, as these contemporary Japanese thinkers have done, to the precapitalist, pre-formalist past to rediscover art’s function as a medium which reconfigures the listener’s perception of reality, I argue for the urgency of sound art such as Tsunoda’s which aids in the re-enchantment of the world to a future beyond capitalist, humanist “civilization.”. (shrink)

Critics have long dismissed paternalistic choice architecture as conceptually muddled at best and oxymoronic at worst. In this article, I argue that this criticism remains true despite recent replies to the contrary. Further, I suggest that a similar conceptual criticism also applies to non-paternalistic choice architecture. This is due to a three-way tension between the effectiveness, avoidability, and distinctiveness of each nudge. To illustrate this tension, I provide a novel explanation of the mechanics of nudging and a taxonomy of these (...) interventions. I then argue that choice architects who defend the distinctiveness of nudging according to how it guides our behaviour via our unreflective intuitive reasoning encounter a trilemma because the distinctiveness of nudging hinges on interventions being both avoidable and effective. Choice architects cannot achieve this aim without harnessing both our automatic and reflective systems of thought in tandem. However, this diminishes the distinctive character of nudging by bringing it closer to other traditional policy interventions. This establishes the choice architect’s trilemma: a nudge is likely to be either ineffective, effective via some morally unacceptable means, or effective in a manner that is conceptually indistinct from other evidence-based policy interventions. (shrink)

What is the environment, and how does it figure in an ethical life? This book is an introduction to the philosophical issues involved in this important question, focussing primarily on ethics but also encompassing questions in aesthetics and political philosophy. Topics discussed include the environment as an ethical question, human morality, meta-ethics, normative ethics, humans and other animals, the value of nature, and nature's future. The discussion is accessible and richly illustrated with examples. The book will be valuable for students (...) taking courses in environmental philosophy, and also for a wider audience in courses in ethics, practical ethics, and environmental studies. It will also appeal to general readers who want a reliable and sophisticated introduction to the field. (shrink)

Part I. Space and Time in the History of Philosophy. The Concept of Space in Antiquity / Max Jammer. -- Aristotle and the Sea Battle / G.E.M. Anscombe. -- Questions About Time / St. Augustine. -- Space and Matter / Renè Descartes. -- Absolute Space and Time / Isaac Newton. -- The Relational Theory of Space and Time / Gottfried Leibniz. -- Place, Extension and Duration / John Locke. -- Transcendental Ideality of Space and Time / Immanuel Kant. -- Mirror (...) Images / Immanuel Kant. -- Newton's Views of Time, Space and Motion / Ernst Mach. -- The Unreality of Space and time / F.H. Bradley. -- Duration and Intuition / Henri Bergson. -- The Problem of Infinity Considered Historically / Bertrand Russell. -- Part II. Geomoetry and Physics. What is Geometry? / A.S. Eddington. -- Space and Geometry / Ernest Nagel. -- Non-Eucledian Spaces / Hans Reichenbach. -- Geometry and Definition of Congruence / Hans Reichenbach. -- Geometry as a Branch of Physics / H.P. Robertson. -- Part III. Space-Time and Relativity. Relativity / R.E. Peierls. -- Autobiographical Notes / Albert Einstein. -- The Four-Dimensional World / Moritz Schlick. -- Space and Time / H. Minkowski. The Philosophical Retention of Absolute Space in Einstein's General Theory of relativity / Adolf Grünbaum. -- Part IV. Recent Philosophical Analyses. Ostensible Temporality / C.D. Croad. -- Time : A Treatment of Some Puzzles / J.N. Findlay. -- Time and Language, and the Passage fo Time / Nelson Goodman. -- Time / W.V. Quine. -- Geometrical Objects / W.V. Quine. -- Spatial and Temporal Ananlogies and the Concept of Identity / Richard Taylor. -- Time, Irreversible Processes, and the Physical Status of Becoming / Adolf Grünbaum. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch's famous case of M and D illustrates the moral importance of learning to see others in a more favourable light through renewed attention. Yet if we do not read this case in the wider context of Murdoch's work, we are liable to overlook the attitudes and transformations involved in coming to change one's mind as M does. Stanley Cavell offers one such reading and denies that the case represents a change in M's sense of herself or the possibilities (...) for her world of the kind exemplified by Nora in Ibsen's A Doll's House. In this essay, I challenge Cavell's reading, suggesting that the case, while it may not be an exemplar of the perfectionist outlook as described by Cavell, can and should be interpreted in perfectionist terms. To see this, I reflect on Murdoch's views on the endless perfectibility of language, the importance of humility, and the role of love and attention in moral learning. I conclude that Murdoch's work uniquely sheds light on how we might cultivate a perfectionist outlook in ourselves and others, and describes the distinctive role that some novels can play in moral education. (shrink)

Erratum to: Bioethical InquiryDOI 10.1007/s11673-012-9391-xLobna Rouhani, University of Melbourne, is a co-author of the article “Genetic Research and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians” (2012, 419–432) that was published in the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry’s 9(4) symposium “Cases and Culture.” Her name was omitted from the publication and she should be credited as the third author of this article.

Twenty-first-century biology rejects genetic determinism, yet an exaggerated view of the power of genes in the making of bodies and minds remains a problem. What accounts for such tenacity? This article reports an exploratory study suggesting that the common reliance on Mendelian examples and concepts at the start of teaching in basic genetics is an eliminable source of support for determinism. Undergraduate students who attended a standard ‘Mendelian approach’ university course in introductory genetics on average showed no change in their (...) determinist views about genes. By contrast, students who attended an alternative course which, inspired by the work of a critic of early Mendelism, W. F. R. Weldon, replaced an emphasis on Mendel’s peas with an emphasis on developmental contexts and their role in bringing about phenotypic variability, were less determinist about genes by the end of teaching. Improvements in both the new Weldonian curriculum and the study design are in view for the future. (shrink)

Depersonalization and derealization refer to states of dissociation in which one feels a sense of alienation in relation to one’s self and environment, respectively. Whilst transient episodes often diminish without treatment, chronic experiences of DP and DR may last for years, with common treatments lacking a strong evidence base for their efficacy. We propose a theoretical explanation of DP and DR based on interoceptive predictive coding, and discuss how transient experiences of DP and DR may be induced in the non-clinical (...) population using virtual reality. Further, we review the use of heartbeat evoked potentials in detecting the neural correlates of DP and DR allowing for an objective measure of these experiences in the non-clinical population. Finally, we discuss how the induction and detection of transient experiences of DP and DR in the non-clinical population could shed light on how the brain constructs one’s sense of self and reality. (shrink)

The issue of what is proper to nature, or life itself, is central to critical accounts of biomedicine and its complex interrelations with social, political and economic forces. These engagements, namely biopolitical accounts of medical practices and ethical-political critiques of biomedical discourse, grapple with the indistinction between the political and biological that biomedicine enacts. Making a significant contribution to both literatures, Ed Cohen’s A Body Worth Defending argues that the emergence of the concept of biological immunity signals the entry of (...) politics into life itself and, as such, constitutes a concrete example of biopolitics. This article examines Cohen’s account of how the political becomes biological, and the view of life it assumes. Seeking to open up the question of biology, it draws on the work of Georges Canguilhem, and New Materialist accounts of matter–meaning entanglement, to offer a reading of knowledge and life, or politics and biology, as ontologically entangled. (shrink)

Here I will explore through a literature review three important but different ways in which skepticism has been developed. The first is that of the Gettier problem and its potentially skeptical implications for knowledge. The second is Agrippa’s Trilemma, in which the non-skeptic ostensibly struggles to develop a satisfactory account of epistemic justification. Third and lastly, there are brain-in-a-vat scenarios, as one attempts to meet the skeptic’s challenge of having knowledge of the external world. I conclude that the above (...) are important challenges while still maintaining that the non-skeptic has formulated responses worth our consideration. (shrink)

In his paper, "animal rights" ("analysis" 37.4), R g frey claims to refute "the most important argument" for the view that animals have rights. We show that no prominent defender of the rights of animals has argued, Or should argue, In the way that frey suggests. Furthermore, We show that there is a plausible argument for the view that animals have rights that is left undiscussed by frey.

This volume is a collection of essays in appreciation, analysis and honor of Paul Ziff, one of the leading American philosophers of the post-World War II period. The essays address questions that loomed large in Ziff's own work. Essays by Zeno Vendler, Jay Rosenberg, and Tom Patton address topics in philosophy of language: understanding, misunderstanding, rules, regularities, and proper names. Michael Resnik examines the nature of numbers, Rita Nolan addresses `mutant predicates', and Peter Alexander discusses microscopes and corpuscles. Douglas C. (...) Long ruminates on Ziff's claim that machines can neither think nor feel. The essays of Dale Jamieson, Bill E. Lawson, Douglas Dempster, and Joseph Ullian address various questions in aesthetics: aesthetic appreciation and morality, expression, the scope of appreciation, and the aesthetics of sport. In the spirit of Ziff, Douglas Stalker criticizes some of the `mush' that looms large in our intellectual lives. The volume begins with a reminiscence by Paul Benacerraf, and ends with selections from an unpublished volume of plays by Paul Ziff. The volume should appeal to anyone whose work has been influenced by Ziff, or is interested in central philosophical problems concerning language, mind, and art. (shrink)

I try to show that Steiner's theory has very implausible normative consequences since it does not accept the prima facie character or rights. This theory is unable to solve the conflicts of interests in which the only intuitively plausible solution consists in overriding someone's rights.

This article argues that Iris Murdoch, who was supervised by John Wisdom during her 1947–48 fellowship at Newnham College Cambridge, went on to practice philosophy in a recognizably Wisdomian manner in her earliest paper, “Thinking and Language” (1951). To do so, I first describe how Wisdom understood philosophical perplexity and paradox. One task that linguistic philosophers should take up is to investigate the concrete cases that give paradoxical philosophical statements their sense and to sift the truth they contain from the (...) distortion. I then show how this vision informed his critical reception of Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind as well as his own investigation of the Hidden Stream Paradox. Finally, I trace a similar approach to Murdoch's discussions of a paradox I call the Coarse Net Paradox. Recognizing Murdoch's intellectual inheritance from Wisdom enables us to see a thus‐far overlooked connection between Murdoch and the tradition of linguistic philosophy. (shrink)

An allergy is commonly understood to be an overreaction of the immune system to harmless substances that are misrecognised as foreign. This concept of allergy as an abnormal, misdirected immune response—a biological fault—stems from the idea that the immune system is an inherently defensive operation designed to protect the individual through an innate capacity to discriminate between the benign and toxic, or self and nonself. However, this definition of allergy represents a radical departure from its original formulation. Literally meaning ‘altered (...) reactivity’, the term was coined in 1906 by Austrian paediatrician Clemens von Pirquet, to describe the fundamentally mutable nature of the immune response.This paper argues that the conventional interpretation of allergy-as-pathology derives from specific concepts of ‘organism’, ‘response’, and ‘normal’ immune function that have—for over a century—governed the perception and study of immune phenomena within immunology. Through an examination of Louis Pasteur’s conceptualisation of the host body/microorganism relationship, I argue that immunology is founded on a view of the organism as a discrete, autonomous entity, and on a concomitant notion of the immune response as essentially reactive. Revisiting the concept of ‘altered reactivity’, this paper points to the fact that allergy was initially posited as a general theory of immune responsiveness and, importantly, one that poses a significant challenge to orthodox notions of immunopathology. It suggests that Pirquet’s unique view of immune responsiveness presents an account of organismic or biological identity that encapsulates, rather than reduces, its ecological complexity. (shrink)

Into Jeffrey Tulis’s argument that “the rhetorical presidency signals and constitutes a fundamental transformation of American politics” he inserts parenthetically the question, “Has the rhetorical presidency now given birth to the rhetorical judiciary?” Whether the rhetorical presidency birthed or simply predated the rhetorical judiciary is open to question. The existence of the rhetorical judiciary is not. Since the publication of The Rhetorical Presidency, judges and their interlocutors have ratified one of the insights that grounded Tulis’s question, while challenging another. They (...) have borne out his fear that judges would increasingly respond to attack; his worry about the vacuity of confirmation hearings for those nominated to the Supreme Court, however, has not been similarly confirmed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 12.2 (2007) 125-127MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Whither Environmental Philosophy?Dale JamiesonBy most reasonable standards, environmental philosophy has been an enormous success since its beginnings in the 1970s. Courses in the subject are now taught around the world, there are many opportunities for publishing, there are two dedicated graduate programs, and there are even some jobs in the field.Yet these marks of success mask some problems. Environmental (...) philosophy is fragmented along many dimensions and there are no widely shared standards of competence. The available jobs often go to surprising candidates whose skills and interests are extremely diverse. Too much publication appears in "specialist" journals, unnoticed by anyone but other contributors. Unconstructive debates, often reminiscent in tone, substance, and rancor of the old and new left, linger. In light of all this, I am no longer surprised when I meet people active in environmental studies and causes who claim to be environmental ethicists but who are almost entirely ignorant of the academic field that bears the name.It is well known that the environment suffers because it is not a well-bounded domain (like the economy, for example), but is rather multi-dimensional and implicated in almost every area of human choice and action. This problem is reproduced in environmental philosophy, [End Page 125] which impinges on many fields, disciplines, and areas of inquiry, but is still struggling to find its own boundaries and identity.One of the core challenges for environmental philosophy is to understand its audience and to whom it is responsible. Historically, the field grew out of the discipline of philosophy, but many who consider themselves environmental philosophers are hostile to the discipline as it is currently practiced. They don't read the journals, go to the conferences, or try very hard to integrate their concerns into the discipline as a whole. Another possible home for environmental philosophy is environmental studies which is a self-consciously interdisciplinary field. Trouble is, environmental studies has many of the same problems as environmental philosophy without even a home discipline to secede from or rebel against. It also carries the added burden of delivering a respectable major to large numbers of eager, but often intellectually impatient, undergraduates. Perhaps one day environmental philosophy will be absorbed into an expanded field of bioethics, which increasingly sees itself as concerned not only with medicine, but with health, a concept that many believe applies broadly across the biosphere.Some put their faith in "public philosophy" or the "policy turn." I can hardly object. When pluralism, pragmatism and inherent value were all the rage in environmental philosophy, I was writing about climate change, zoos, and preserving urban landmarks. Yet it must be acknowledged that with the exception of Peter Singer (whom many would not consider an environmental philosopher), those who have touched the public most deeply in recent years have largely been writing about traditional philosophical concerns rather than about applied, practical, or interdisciplinary problems. Some examples: Paul Boghossian's critique of relativism was favorably reviewed in much of the popular press, including The Wall Street Journal. Anthony Appiah's Cosmopolitanism won the Arthur Ross Book Award from the highly influential Council on Foreign Relations. Books on free will and the philosophy of religion are everywhere; Daniel Dennett has almost become a household name. Most strikingly of all is Harry Frankfurt's On Bullshit, originally a critique of deconstruction delivered to a Yale seminar in the 1980s, which beginning in 2005 spent 26 weeks on the New York Times best seller list. It's enough to make you wonder what relevance is and whether it's really relevant.What is to be done? For fear of sounding like a third-rate marriage [End Page 126] counselor, the field needs communication and good will. These are the necessary building blocks for constructing a common sense of identity. The signs are encouraging but equivocal. The June conference in Colorado, now entering its fifth year, has been an important forum for communication, as has the International Society for Environmental Ethics meetings held in conjunction with the divisional meetings of... (shrink)

In their marvelous book, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Sober and Wilson identify two distinct problems of altruism.’ The problem of Evolutionary Altruism (EA) “is to show how behaviors that benefit others at the expense of self can evolve;” (17) group selection is the key to the solution of this problem. The problem of Psychological Altruism (PA) is to determine whether people “have altruistic desires that are psychologically ultimate.” (201) After carefully considering the arguments of both (...) psychologists and philosophers, Sober and Wilson render the verdict “not proven.” But just in the nick of time, evolutionary biology rides to the rescue; it succeeds where psychology and philosophy fail in vindicating our good nature. In this paper, I will discuss Sober and Wilson’s treatment of PA. (shrink)

The regress of reasons threatens an epistemic agent’s right to claim that any beliefs are justified. In response, Peter Klein’s infinitism argues that an infinite series of supporting reasons of the right type not only is not vicious but can make for epistemic justification. In order to resist the sceptic, infinitism needs to provide reason to think that there is at least one justified belief in the world. Under an infinitist conception this involves showing that at least one belief is (...) supported by an infinite series of supporting reasons. This paper argues that showing this makes problems for the infinitist. The finite minds problem that prevents completion of an infinite series is well documented. This paper examines alternative attempts to provide evidence of infinity that the infinitist might take, whether by using a notion of justification without infinite reasons or by altering the notion of evidence. It concludes that both of these fail and consequently infinitism is unable to offer a solution to Agrippa’s trilemma. (shrink)

In this unique volume, some of today's most eminent political philosophers examine the thought of John Rawls, focusing in particular on his most recent work. These original essays explore diverse issues, including the problem of pluralism, the relationship between constitutive commitment and liberal institutions, just treatment of dissident minorities, the constitutional implications of liberalism, international relations, and the structure of international law. The first comprehensive study of Rawls's recent work, The Idea of Political Liberalism will be indispensable for political philosophers (...) and theorists interested in contemporary political thought. (shrink)

AimWe aimed to investigate whether the 12-item Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS) constitutes a valid and reliable measure of social support for the general adult Australian population.MethodsData were from Australia’s National Survey of Adult Oral Health 2004–2006 and included 3899 participants aged 18 years old and over. The psychometric properties were evaluated with Bayesian confirmatory factor analysis. One-, two-, and three-factor (Significant Other, Family and Friends) structures were tested. Model fit was assessed with the posterior predictivep-value (PPPχ2), Bayesian (...) root mean square error of approximation (BRMSEA), and Bayesian comparative fit index (BCFI). Dimensionality was tested by comparing competing factorial structures with the Bayes factor (BF). Reliability was evaluated with the Bayesian ΩH. Convergent validity was investigated with the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) and discriminant validity with the Perceived Dental Control scale (PDC-3).ResultsThe theoretical three-factor model (Significant Other, Family, and Friends) provided a good fit to the data [PPPχ2< 0.001, BRMSEA = 0.089-95% credible interval (CrI) (0.088, 0.089); BCFI = 0.963-95% CrI (0.963, 0.964)]. The BF provided decisive support for the three-factor structure in relation to the other structures. The SO [BΩH= 0.95 - 95% CrI (0.90, 0.99)], FA (BΩH= 0.92 - 95% CrI (0.87, 0.97), and FR (BΩH= 0.92 - 95% CrI (0.88, 0.97)] subscales displayed excellent reliability. The MSPSS displayed initial evidence of convergent and discriminant validity.ConclusionThe MSPSS demonstrated good psychometric properties and excellent reliability in a large Australian sample. This instrument can be applied in national surveys and provide evidence of the role of social support in the Australian population. (shrink)

Implementing an algorithm on part of our causally-interconnected physical environment requires three choices that are typically considered arbitrary, i.e. no single option is innately privileged without invoking an external observer perspective. First, how to delineate one set of local causal relationships from the environment. Second, within this delineation, which inputs and outputs to designate for attention. Third, what meaning to assign to particular states of the designated inputs and outputs. Having explained these types of arbitrariness, we assess their relevance for (...) algorithms from various computational theories of mind (CTM) seeking to account for phenomenal consciousness. Some CTM accounts can survive some of these arbitrariness challenges, but eventually each one examined faces a trilemma. Each is under pressure to dilute at least one of three important CTM desiderata: its causal relevance, its substrate neutrality, or its assignment discrimination (e.g. ability to avoid near-panpsychism). However, unlike previous research, we suggest the debate cannot be fully settled at the level of principle. Certain complex CTM algorithms may be salvageable, albeit not the algorithms specified to date. The paper specifies three areas of investigative work, as well as further theoretical avenues of research, which computationalists may wish to explore to escape the trilemma. (shrink)

Davidson’s later philosophy of language has been inspired by Wittgenstein’s Investigations, but Davidson by no means sympathizes with the sceptical problem and solution Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. Davidson criticizes the sceptical argument for relying on the rule-following conception of meaning, which is, for him, a highly problematic view. He also casts doubt on the plausibility of the sceptical solution as unjustifiably bringing in shared practices of a speech community. According to Davidson, it is rather success in mutual interpretation that explains (...) success in the practice of meaning something by an utterance. I will argue that Davidson’s objections to the sceptical problem and solution are misplaced as they rely on a misconstrual of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s view. I will also argue that Davidson’s alternative solution to the sceptical problem is implausible, since it fails to block the route to the sceptical problem. I will then offer a problematic trilemma for Davidson. (shrink)

In his Encyclopedia, the late Hegel makes the highest demands on truth and justification from the first paragraph onward. With this, Hegel takes up the skeptical challenge and believes that he can overcome this problem. However, it is not easy to see how Hegel tries to meet this challenge in the Science of Logic, which plays a fundamental role in Hegel’s encyclopedic project. The present article argues that the question of the justification of the claim to truth is a fruitful (...) perspective for the interpretation of the Science of Logic. For this purpose Hegel’s answer to the Agrippan Trilemma is examined, which P. Franks analyzed as a basic problem for Classical German Philosophy. One possible interpretation of Hegel sees him solving the skeptical trilemma at the beginning of the Logic. The article argues against this possibility that the Logic of the Concept contains Hegel’s actual solution. This solution consists in that the concept represents the principle of logic and that the concept itself must be presented in the form of an apagogical argument. Finally, the article gives a reason why Hegel sees an analogy to the ontological argument in this attempt of an ultimate justification. (shrink)