Perceptual Intuitionism without Ethical Perception

Abstract

In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in Perceptual Intuitionism. A significant portion of the literature on the topic has focused on the ethical perception defense, the supposition seeming to be that one must defend Perceptual Intuitionism by showing that one can have ethical experiences which immediately and non-inferentially justify one’s beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of particular actions. This thesis rejects this thought by proposing an alternative defense of Perceptual Intuitionism which employs the Wittgensteinian concept of criteria and an understanding of principles of prima facie duties as “grammatical propositions”

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