Illness narratives invite practitioners to understand how biomedical and traditional health information is incorporated, integrated, or otherwise internalized into a patient’s own sense of self and social identity. Such narratives also reveal cultural values, underlying patterns in society, and the overall life context of the narrator. Most illness narratives have been examined from the perspective of European-derived genres and literary theory, even though theorists from other parts of the globe have developed locally relevant literary theories. Further, illness narratives typically examine (...) only the experience of illness through acute or chronic suffering (and potential recovery). The advent of biomedical disease prevention methods like post- and pre-exposure prophylaxis (PEP and PrEP) for HIV, which require daily pill consumption or regular injections, complicates the notion of an illness narrative by including illness prevention in narrative accounts. This paper has two aims. First, we aim to rectify the Eurocentrism of existing illness narrative theory by incorporating insights from African literary theorists; second, we complicate the category by examining prevention narratives as a subset of illness narratives. We do this by investigating several narratives of HIV prevention from informants enrolled in an HIV prevention trial in Kenya and Uganda in 2022. (shrink)

Review of Why Music Moves Us by Jeanette Bicknell.

In this article, I examine both the problem of so-called postmodern history as it relates to the Holocaust and suggest the ways that Saul Friedlander's recent work successfully mediates between the somewhat overly polemicized positions of "relativist" and "positivist" history. In this context, I find that in his search for an adequately self-reflexive historical narrative for the Holocaust, Hayden White's proposed notion of "middle-voicedness" may recommend itself more as a process for eyewitness writers than as a style for historians after (...) the fact. From here, I look at the ways Saul Friedlander's reflections on the historian's voice not only mediate between White's notions of the ironic mode and middle-voicedness, but also suggest the basis for an uncanny history in its own right: an anti-redemptory narrative that works through, yet never actually bridges, the gap between a survivor's "deep memory" and historical narrative.For finally, it may be the very idea of "deep memory" and its incompatibility to narrative that constitutes one of the central challenges to Holocaust historiography. What can be done with what Friedlander has termed "deep memory" of the survivor, that which remains essentially unrepresentable? Is it possible to write a history that includes some oblique reference to such deep memory, but which leaves it essentially intact, untouched and thereby deep? In this section, I suggest, after Patrick Hutton, that "What is at issue here is not how history can recover memory, but, rather, what memory will bequeath to history." That is, what shall we do with the living memory of survivors? How will it enter the historical record? Or to paraphrase Hutton again, "How will the past be remembered as it passes from living memory to history?" Will it always be regarded as so overly laden with pathos as to make it unreliable as documentary evidence? Or is there a place for the understanding of the witness, as subjective and skewed as it may be, for our larger historical understanding of events?In partial answer to these questions, I attempt to extend Friedlander's insights toward a narrow kind of history-telling I call "received history"-a double-stranded narrative that tells a survivor-historian's story and my own relationship to it. Such a narrative would chart not just the life of the survivor-historian itself but also the measurable effect of the tellings-both his telling and mine-on my own life's story. Together, they would compose a received history of the Holocaust and its afterlife in the author's mind-my "vicarious past.". (shrink)

(2000). Federal world government at the dawn of the third millennium: Old challenges and new opportunities. World Futures: Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 41-106.

(1994). The rhetoric of science and the challenge of post‐liberal democracy. Social Epistemology: Vol. 8, Public Indifference to Population Issues, pp. 261-271.

Richard’s funeral Mass was celebrated in the Oratory Church, Oxford on 30 October 2024. A church Richard was thoroughly familiar with because of the Latin Masses he attended there. He would often d...

James and Stumpf first met in Prague in 1882. James soon started corresponding with a "colleague with whose persons and whose ideas alike I feel so warm a sympathy." With this, a lifelong epistolary friendship began. For 28 years until James's death in 1910, Stumpf became James's most important European correspondent. Besides psychological themes of great importance, such as the perception of space and of sound, the letters include commentary upon Stumpf's (Tonpsychologie) and James's main (...) books (The Principles of Psychology, The Varieties of Religious Experience), and many other works. The two friends also exchange views concerning other scholars, religious faith and metaphysical topics. The different perspectives of the American and the German (European) way of living, philosophizing and doing science are frequently under discussion. The letters also touch upon personal questions of historical interest. The book offers a critical edition and the English translation of hitherto unpublished primary sources. Historians of psychology and historians of philosophy will welcome the volume as a useful tool for their understanding of some crucial developments of the time. Scholars in the history of pragmatism and of phenomenology will also be interested in the volume. (shrink)

The Possibility of Practical Reason explores the foundational questions of moral psychology: How can any of our behaviour qualify as acting for a reason? How can any considerations qualify as reasons for us to act? David Velleman argues that both possibilities depend on there being aconstitutive aim of action - something that makes for success in action as such, in the same way that truth makes for success in belief. Considerations qualify as reasons for acting by virtue of their relevance (...) to the constitutive aim; and our behavior qualifies as acting for a reason when itresponds to such considerations in pursuit of the aim. The eleven papers that make up this book (two of them previously unpublished) discuss such topics as the relation between value and practical reasoning, the foundations of decision theory, freedom of the will, shared intention, and themotivational role of the imagination. (shrink)

I examine Derek Parfit’s claim that it doesn’t matter whether he survives in the future, if someone survives who is psychologically connected to him by “Relation R.” Thus, were his body to perish and be replaced by an exact duplicate, both physically and psychologically identical to him, this would be just as good as “ordinary” survival. Parfit takes the corollary view that replacement of loved ones by exact duplicates is no loss. In contrast, Peter Unger argues that we place nontransferable (...) value in the lives of individualpersons. I argue that the question of the preferability of Relation R over identity is unanswerable at present, as such hypothetical situations are too far removed from our experience to allow any reliable responses. I contrast cases involving artifacts, where we can make informed judgments concerning whether a given object’s value would be transferred to a duplicate. (shrink)

We apply the author's computational approach to groups to our empirical work studying and modelling riots. We suggest that assigning roles in particular gives insight, and measuring the frequency of bystander behaviour provides a method to understand the dynamic nature of intergroup conflict, allowing social identity to be incorporated into models of riots.

Jonathan Bennett's two interpretations of Kant's Third Paralogism are shown to be inadequate. The Third Paralogism attempts to show that rational psychology provides an inadequate basis for the application of the concepts of "personhood" and "substance". The criteria for the application of "personhood" and "substance" must be empirical, and in the case of "personhood" they are bodily criteria. These criteria are available to each of us but only upon pains of abandoning what Bennett calls the Cartesian basis, i.e. rational psychology.