Languages around the world differ in terms of the number of adnominal and pronominal demonstratives they require, as well as the factors that impact on their felicitous use. Given this cross-linguistic variation in deictic demonstrative terms, and the features that determine their felicitous use, an open question is how this is accommodated within bilingual cognition and language. In particular, we were interested in the extent to which bilingual language exposure and practice might alter the way in which a bilingual is (...) using deictic demonstratives in their first language. Recent research on language attrition suggests that L2 learning selectively affects aspects of the native language, with some domains of language competence being more vulnerable than others. If demonstratives are basic, and acquired relatively early, they should be less susceptible to change and attrition. This was the hypothesis we went on to test in the current study. We tested two groups of native Spanish speakers, a control group living in Spain and an experimental group living in Norway using the Memory game paradigm. Contra to our expectations, the results indicate a significant difference between the two groups in use of deictic terms, indicative of a change in the preferred number of terms used. This suggests that deictic referential systems may change over time under pressure from bilingual language exposure. (shrink)

In this volume, leading philosophers of psychiatry examine psychiatric classification systems, including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, asking whether current systems are sufficient for effective diagnosis, treatment, and research. Doing so, they take up the question of whether mental disorders are natural kinds, grounded in something in the outside world. Psychiatric categories based on natural kinds should group phenomena in such a way that they are subject to the same type of causal explanations and respond similarly to (...) the same type of causal interventions. When these categories do not evince such groupings, there is reason to revise existing classifications. The contributors all question current psychiatric classifications systems and the assumptions on which they are based. They differ, however, as to why and to what extent the categories are inadequate and how to address the problem. Topics discussed include taxometric methods for identifying natural kinds, the error and bias inherent in DSM categories, and the complexities involved in classifying such specific mental disorders as "oppositional defiance disorder" and pathological gambling. -/- Contributors George Graham, Nick Haslam, Allan Horwitz, Harold Kincaid, Dominic Murphy, Jeffrey Poland, Nancy Nyquist Potter, Don Ross, Dan Stein, Jacqueline Sullivan, Serife Tekin, Peter Zachar. (shrink)

Cover title: Le salut du la'ic sur Herbert de Cherbury.

Social appropriateness is an important topic – both in the human-human interaction (HHI), and in the human-machine interaction (HMI) context. As sociosensitive and socioactive assistance systems advance, the question arises whether a machine’s behavior should include considerations regarding social appropriateness. However, the concept of social appropriateness is difficult to define, as it is determined by multiple aspects. Thus, to date, a unified perspective, encompassing and combining multidisciplinary findings, is missing. When translating results from HHI to HMI, it remains unclear whether (...) such insights into the dynamics of social appropriateness between humans may in fact apply to sociosensitive and socioactive assistance systems. To shed light on this matter, we propose the Five Factor Model of Social Appropriateness (FASA) which provides a multidisciplinary perspective on the notion of social appropriateness and its implementation into technical systems. Finally, we offer reflections on the applicability and ethics of the FASA Model, highlighting both strengths and limitations of the framework. (shrink)

The progressive introduction of emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology, has created a true testing ground for public engagement initiatives. Widespread experimentation has taken place with public and stakeholder dialogue and inclusive approaches to research and innovation more generally. Against this backdrop, Social Science and Humanities scholars have started to manifest themselves differently. They have taken on new roles in the public engagement field, including more practical and policy-oriented ones that seek to actively open the R&I system to wider public scrutiny. (...) With public engagement gaining prominence, there has been a call for increased reflexivity among SSH scholars about their role in this field. In this paper, we study our own roles and stakes as SSH scholars in a European-funded public engagement project on responsible nanotechnology. We introduce a general role landscape and outline five distinct roles that we—as SSH scholars—inhabited throughout the project. We discuss the synergistic potential of combining these five roles and elaborate on several tensions within the roles that we needed to navigate. We argue that balancing many roles requires explicit role awareness, reflexivity, and new competencies that have not been examined much in the public engagement literature so far. Our role landscape and exemplification of how it can be used to reflexively study one’s own practices may be a useful starting point for scholars who are seeking to better understand, assess, or communicate about their position in the public engagement field. (shrink)

Growing demand for direct care workers to assist care-dependent elderly people has created an opening for migrant workers from low- income nations to sell their services to middle and high-income nations. Using Singapore as a case example, we draw on capability theory to make the case that receiving nations that import direct care workers should be held to global justice standards that protect workers’ floor level human capabilities. Specifically, we (1) show that Singapore and other receiving nations fail to protect (...) human capabilities at a threshold level required by dignity; (2) identify specific human capabilities placed at risk; and (3) recommend standards for receiving nations that support central capabilities. As populations in both developed and developing nations are rapidly aging, these concerns could not be timelier. (shrink)

Purpose – This aim of this paper was to highlight the awareness of ethical issues across the group of information systems professionals from a range of geographical regions. Design/methodology/approach – An initial survey was conducted that informed in-depth interviews with 26 IS professionals from across the globe. The study identified that around 70 per cent of the sample were over 50 years old. This provided an opportunity to consider age-related differences in perception regarding ethical awareness of both current and emerging (...) technologies. Findings – The project revealed that the more mature IS professionals had a significantly higher level of awareness and perceived understanding regarding the importance of ethical issues than the younger IS professionals. Research limitations/implications – The research was limited to IS professionals and so the findings do not generalise further. Future research would be beneficial to find out if the higher level of ethical awareness is also evident across older people in general or whether it is specific to technology professionals. Practical implications – IS professionals need to be exposed to high standards and expectations of ethical behaviour from senior colleagues, as well as embedding this within technical education. Social implications – Caution with regards to youth culture and youthitisation of the workforce needs to be exerted to avoid rash decision-making and short-termism, which could undermine progress and development. A change in the view of employers to older workers will also require a change in attitudes across Western society, particularly as demographics continue to skew towards an aging population. Originality/value – This paper provides new insight into the ethical awareness of older employees and goes some way to dispel the myths surrounding stereotypes of older workers as being fearful of technology and resistant to change. (shrink)

This study investigates the role of “moral” emotional traits—guilt proneness, shame proneness, empathic concern, and perspective taking—as predictors of workplace bullying perpetration. We also test and find support for a model derived from moral emotions literature and the sociometer theory of self-esteem in which the tendency to take reparative action following interpersonal transgressions mediates the buffering effect of guilt proneness on bullying. Data were obtained from working MBA students and advanced undergraduates during 2 survey sessions, 4 to 6 weeks apart. (...) Findings indicate that moral emotional traits may be useful to consider in personnel selection as a means to reduce workplace bullying. (shrink)

"Here is an excerpt. If you like where Collier goes with this you'll like the rest of the book: "I believe we make a mistake if we think that modern man is a rational creature. While it is a mark of primitive man to respond directly to the non logical and less rationally defensible images projected by the psyche, similar primitive or elemental responses lurk behind the civilized faced of which we are so proud. For example, we might be (...) somewhat amused by the cave dweller's belief that because he possessed the image of an animal he had gained some power capable of controlling the creature's life. But do we not believe something of the sort when we cherish the photograph of someone important to us and think carefully as to where it should be placed - where is the place we can contemplate it the most effectively? Can we honestly say that in possessing this image of a person we do not feel that some intangible link exists between us and them? And could we willfully and with passion deface the photograph without the irrational thought overtaking us that we had done some harm to the relationship and to the person concerned?"" -- customer review, Amazon.com. (shrink)

This article describes the historical emergence of vital systems security, analyzing it as a significant mutation in biopolitical modernity. The story begins in the early 20th century, when planners and policy-makers recognized the increasing dependence of collective life on interlinked systems such as transportation, electricity, and water. Over the following decades, new security mechanisms were invented to mitigate the vulnerability of these vital systems. While these techniques were initially developed as part of Cold War preparedness for nuclear war, they eventually (...) migrated to domains beyond national security to address a range of anticipated emergencies, such as large-scale natural disasters, pandemic disease outbreaks, and disruptions of critical infrastructure. In these various contexts, vital systems security operates as a form of reflexive biopolitics, managing risks that have arisen as the result of modernization processes. This analysis sheds new light on current discussions of the government of emergency and ‘states of exception’. Vital systems security does not require recourse to extraordinary executive powers. Rather, as an anticipatory technology for mitigating vulnerabilities and closing gaps in preparedness, it provides a ready-to-hand toolkit for administering emergencies as a normal part of constitutional government. (shrink)

Jacqueline Rose argues for an expansion of the new boundaries of `English', and for the importance of psychoanalysis to the understanding of our literary and historical lives.

Jacqueline Taylor presents an original reconstruction of Hume's social theory, which examines the passions and imagination in relation to institutions such as government and the economy. She goes on to examine Hume's system of ethics, and argues that the principle of humanity is the central concept of Hume's Enlightenment philosophy.

Over the past two decades, research on neural transplantation in animal models of neurodegeneration has provided provocative in sights into the therapeutic use of grafted tissue for various neurological diseases. Although great strides have been made and functional benefits gained in these animal models, much information is still needed with regard to transplantation in human patients. Several factors are unique to human disease, for example, age of the recipient, duration of disease, and drug interaction with grafted cells; these need to (...) be explored before grafting can be considered a safe and effective therapeutic tool. (shrink)

Descriptive accounts of the nature of explanation in neuroscience and the global goals of such explanation have recently proliferated in the philosophy of neuroscience and with them new understandings of the experimental practices of neuroscientists have emerged. In this paper, I consider two models of such practices; one that takes them to be reductive; another that takes them to be integrative. I investigate those areas of the neuroscience of learning and memory from which the examples used to substantiate these models (...) are culled, and argue that the multiplicity of experimental protocols used in these research areas presents specific challenges for both models. In my view, these challenges have been overlooked largely because philosophers have hitherto failed to pay sufficient attention to fundamental features of experimental practice. I demonstrate that when we do pay attention to such features, evidence for reduction and integrative unity in neuroscience is simply not borne out. I end by suggesting some new directions for the philosophy of neuroscience that pertain to taking a closer look at the nature of neuroscientific experiments. (shrink)

In “Of Personal Identity”, Hume attempts to understand why we ordinarily believe in persistent selves. He proposes that this ontological commitment depends on illusions and fictions: the imagination tricks us into supposing that an unchanging core self remains static through the flux and change of experience. Recent work in cognitive science provides a good deal of support for Hume’s hypothesis that common beliefs about the self are founded on psychological biases rather than rational insight or evidence. We naturally believe in (...) personal persistence, according to this emerging research, because we are prone to categorize the world in terms of hidden essences and structure our lives in terms of whole life stories. (shrink)

This is the only book that examines the theory and data on the development of implicit and explicit memory. It first describes the characteristics of implicit and explicit memory (including conscious recollection) and tasks used with adults to measure them. Next, it reviews the brain mechanisms thought to underlie implicit and explicit memory and the studies with amnesics that initially prompted the search for different neuroanatomically-based memory systems. Two chapters review the Jacksonian (first in, last out) principle and empirical evidence (...) for the hierarchical appearance and dissolution of two memory systems in animal models (rats, nonhuman primates), children, and normal/amnesic adults. Two chapters examine memory tasks used with human infants and evidence of implicit and explicit memory during early infancy. Three final chapters consider structural and processing accounts of adult memory dissociations, their applicability to infant memory dissociations, and implications of infant data for current concepts of implicit and explicit memory. (shrink)

Against those who dismiss Kant's project in the "Religion" because it provides a Pelagian understanding of salvation, this paper offers an analysis of the deep structure of Kant's views on divine justice and grace showing them not to conflict with an authentically Christian understanding of these concepts. The first part of the paper argues that Kant's analysis of these concepts helps us to understand the necessary conditions of the Christian understanding of grace: unfolding them uncovers intrinsic relations holding between God's (...) justice and grace. Parts two and three provide an analysis of two concepts of grace used by Kant. Getting clear on their differences is the key to understanding why Kant's account is not Pelagian. (shrink)

The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, (...) we encounter numerous responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”, “spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze. (shrink)

First published in 1999, this book brings together the extensive modern evidence for innate imitation in babies. Modern research has shown imitation to be a natural mechanism of learning and communication which deserves to be at centre stage in developmental psychology. Yet the very possibility of imitation in newborn humans has had a controversial history. Defining imitation has proved to be far from straightforward and scientific evidence for its existence in neonates is only now becoming accepted, despite more than a (...) century of enquiry. In this book, some of the world's foremost researchers on imitation and intellectual development review evidence for imitation in newborn babies. They discuss the development of imitation in infancy, in both normal and atypical populations and in comparison with other primate species, stressing the fundamental importance of imitation in human development, as a foundation of communication and a precursor to symbolic processes. (shrink)

Among those sympathetic to Hume''smoral philosophy, a general consensus hasemerged that his first work on the topic,A Treatise of Human Nature, is his best. Hislater work, An Enquiry Concerning thePrinciples of Morals, is regarded as scaleddown in both scope and ambition. In contrastto this standard view, I argue that Hume''slater work offers a more sophisticated theoryof moral evaluation. I begin by reviewing theTreatise theory of moral evaluation tohighlight the reasons why commentators find socompelling Hume''s account of the corrections wemake to (...) our moral sentiments. The method isendorsed by philosophers such as Henry DavidAiken and Annette C. Baier because, theyallege, it shows that moral sentiments reflecta process of judgment that includes thepossibility of corrigibility and ofjustification. But Hume''s method of correctionfalls short and does not establish why thesentiments conforming to the standard of virtueshould count as moral judgments. In the secondEnquiry, Hume lays out a different set ofcriteria, including not only the need forcertain virtues of good judgment but attentionto the particular cultural and historicalorigins of the norms governing the virtues ofgood judgment. Hume''s attention to diversityin evaluative outlook in his more matureposition takes seriously the relation betweenmoral authority and public debate. (shrink)

The aesthetic skeptic maintains that it is futile to dispute about taste. One and the same work of art might appear beautiful to one person but repellent to another, and we have no reason to prefer one or another of these conflicting verdicts. Hume argues that the skeptic, however, moves too quickly. The crucial question is whether qualified critics will agree on their evaluations. And the skeptic fails to provide sufficient evidence that their verdicts will diverge. We have reason to (...) expect that a consensus will emerge over time, moreover, since aesthetic values are grounded on universal principles of human nature. Skeptics might doubt that there is a natural basis for a standard of taste, but this proposal is supported by recent work in experimental aesthetics and cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of an account of explanatory integration that claims that explanations of cognitive capacities by functional analyses and mechanistic explanations can be seamlessly integrated. It is shown that achieving such explanatory integration requires that the terms designating cognitive capacities in the two forms of explanation are stable but that experimental practice in the mind-brain sciences currently is not directed at achieving such stability. A positive proposal for changing experimental practice so as to promote such stability is (...) put forward and its implications for explanatory integration are briefly considered. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.2 (2003) 148-167 [Access article in PDF] Disciplinary Landscaping, or Contemporary Challenges in the History of Rhetoric Jacqueline Jones Royster Imagine that we have the privilege of viewing a terrain with its mountains, valleys, rivers and streams, with its flora and fauna, with its creatures that fly, walk, swim, and slither. What does it mean to understand such a geographical space in a richly textured, (...) full-bodied way and to recognize the many ways that we might appreciate and showcase dimensions of that view? What we choose to showcase depends materially on where on the landscape we stand and what we have in mind. The imperative is to recognize that the process of showcasing space is an interpretive one, one that acknowledges a view and often re-scopes that view in light of aesthetic sensibilities—values, preferences, beliefs. We landscape. We select, focus, and develop, bringing more clearly and vibrantly into view particular features that we frame and foreground, while simultaneously disregarding or minimizing other features and dimensions that we might have selected, developed, and showcased instead.Highlighting landscaping as an interpretive process underscores the extent to which interpretive enterprises are contingent more generally on perception and more specifically on the limitations of perception. In order to make sense of what is before us, we select, focus, and fine-tune the view that we are perceiving or imagining, and we assign to those perceptions value and meaning. We are limited by the choices we make and by the mechanisms and processes we use in shaping them into something that we care about and can persuade others to care about as well.Using landscaping as a metaphor for disciplinary knowledge-making offers a mechanism for understanding two provocative challenges. One is to recognize that whatever we currently know about rhetorical history as a disciplinary landscape is situated on a larger terrain of developed and undeveloped possibilities. A second challenge is to understand on an operational [End Page 148] level, rather than just a theoretical one, that knowledge is less truth for all time, space, and conditions than it is interpretation. In other words, scholars such as Burke, Foucault, Geertz, 1 and so on have helped us to see more clearly over the last few decades that we actually create and filter meaning from more elaborate perceptive possibilities, making sense of what we see based on ideological frameworks and social practices. In recognizing knowledge as an interpretive enterprise, a social construction, the imperative becomes the task of connecting theory with scholarly action in order to both theorize and engage in other scholarly activities more systematically. We are well challenged, thereby, to articulate the limitations of historical and current practices and the scholarship produced by such practices; to sustain perspectives that assume, rather than minimize, a fuller terrain where other views participate kaleidoscopically in the knowledge-making process; and to establish a more generous accreditation system capable of accounting for a more richly endowed rhetorical landscape and for more dynamic possibilities for understanding that landscape.How do we demonstrate in the history of rhetoric that we are cognizant of and informed by the knowledge that a territory, even an abstracted and often stylized domain of an intellectual territory, is endowed by various contingencies, as well as various dimensions of materiality? How do we make evident an understanding that the textures created by such variability can be brought to dynamic relief, enhanced, appreciated, and flexibly configured and reconfigured in valuation processes and in knowledge-making processes? Further, how do we bring such an understanding to bear in an academic domain such as rhetorical history where there is a deeply entrenched habit of standing in one place (that is, in territories deemed Western), shaping inquiries with a particular set of interests in mind (for example, the desires and experiences of elite males), and interestingly disregarding some features even within its own scope (for example, the desires and experiences of women or people from non-elite classes)? How do we engage in such endeavors with Western rhetorics, when these traditions of theory and... (shrink)

What role does the concept of representation play in the contexts of experimentation and explanation in cognitive neurobiology? In this article, a distinction is drawn between minimal and substantive roles for representation. It is argued by appeal to a case study that representation currently plays a role in cognitive neurobiology somewhere in between minimal and substantive and that this is problematic given the ultimate explanatory goals of cognitive neurobiological research. It is suggested that what is needed is for representation to (...) instead play a more substantive role. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIV, Number 1, April 1998, pp. 5-30 Justice and the Foundations of Social Morality in Hume's Treatise JACQUELINE TAYLOR Hume famously distinguishes between artificial virtues and natural virtues, or, at one place, between a sense of virtue that is natural and one that is artificial. The most prominent of the artificial virtues are those associated with the practices of justice. Commentators have devoted much attention (...) to Hume's explanation of what motivates us to be just. But his main concern in the Treatise is to explain why we approve morally of just conduct.1 While there surely are complexities surrounding the issue of the motivation to be just, in one sense Hume's explanation is quite straightforward: self-interest motivates us to establish and follow the conventions of justice. The real interest in his account of the establishment of justice lies in his further explanation of how those conventions transform our moral psychology, and lead us to form shareable moral points of view from which we can reach agreement on the value of characters. My reading of Hume's account in the Treatise is as follows. Hume attributes to us a social morality, the central notion of which is a moral sensibility that has its origins in nature, but that must be extended by social artifice in order to accommodate the various virtues important to cooperative living. I will contend that the moral psychology embodied in a cultivated sense of morality depends on the redirection of our evaluative propensities and therefore requires the sorts of convention that Hume associates with justice.2 My thesis helps to make sense of the structure of Book III: Hume has genuine philosophical reasons for introducing the artificial virtues prior to the natural ones.3 Jacqueline Taylor is at the Department of Philosophy, Tufts University, Medford MA 02155-7059 USA. email: [email protected] 6 Jacqueline Taylor The main goal of this paper is to show that Hume's philosophy has the resources to explain our ability to balance our appraisal of the artificial and natural virtues, since we need both sorts of virtue to live well. As a foil for my view, I want to use the argument advanced by Barry Stroud and others that Hume faces a special difficulty in explaining how we sustain our approval of particular just acts that considered in themselves appear harmful to the public good. Stroud argues that Hume fails to explain what recommends justice as a virtue to us in all cases, and thus fails to capture the concern we have for fairness.4 While Stroud finds in the second Enquiry the seeds of a view, based on our sympathetic approval of what tends to the good of mankind, that could provide the materials for developing a naturalistic account of how we come to have a concern for justice and fairness, he argues that Hume's interest lies squarely in the origin of justice and not in how people develop shared social attitudes (Stroud, 216-218). I disagree with Stroud's pronouncement that Hume fails to explain sufficiently our moral approval of justice, but I must leave to one side discussion of the particular social attitudes of justice, such as concern for fairness. My focus will be on how we cultivate a range of shared attitudes of moral appraisal and the relation of these to justice. Stroud misjudges Hume's project, at least in part, because he neglects the historical context in which Hume was writing, and overlooks some important differences between Hume and his contemporary, Francis Hutcheson.5 In Book II of the Treatise, in a discussion of virtue and vice as causes of pride and humility, Hume signals the reader that in the next book he will examine "the controversy...whether these moral distinctions be founded on natural and original principles, or arise from interest and education" (T 295). The controversy to which he refers is that between moral sense theorists, such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, on the one side, and members of the Hobbesian or "selfish" school, which includes Mandeville as well as Hobbes, on the other. As he starts Book III, Hume seems to suggest that his... (shrink)

This article deals with one aspect of imparting criminal justice in the context of various objective and subjective determiners. It provides some indication of the breadth, quality, and value of the empirical research work that has been conducted in this area of the law. It considers the pervasive influence of two broad issues—efficiency and security—on decision-making in criminal justice systems across various jurisdictions. It illustrates the contingent nature of the criminal process and discusses the social and political issues, the institutions (...) of the criminal justice system, legal doctrine, policies, and working practices which are the product of complex reflexive relationships. The frame includes the subjective aspects of the decision-maker, his behavioral subjectivity and the prism through which he perceives the matter at hand. This article ends by suggesting a pressing need for empirical research that reveals how policy and practice are influenced by these concepts. (shrink)

This article examines Djanet Sears’ Afrika Solo (1990), the first published play by an African Canadian woman, as an example of African diasporic writing in Canada. Now one of Canada's most celebrated playwrights, and a leading figure in the recent popularity and success of African Canadian theatre in the last decade, Sears began her dramatic exploration of African Canadian identity in her semi-autobiographical play Afrika Solo, first produced in 1987. As I intend to argue, the play's musical score and its (...) use of stage space problematizes the notion of static cultural origins often associated with the Canadian multicultural discourse of hyphenated identities by pointing to the many cross-cultural and transnational sites that shape constructions of African Canadian identity. In so doing, the play develops an innovative diasporic aesthetic that can be placed within a larger cultural tradition of African diasporic representation theorized by Rinaldo Walcott, Paul Gilroy, and Dionne Brand. (shrink)