Despite growing evidence of the benefits to a firm of improving corporate social performance (CSP), many firms vary significantly in terms of their CSP activities. This research investigates how the characteristics of the stakeholder landscape influence a firm’s CSP breadth. Using stakeholder theory, we specifically propose that several factors increase the salience and impact of stakeholders’ demands on the firm and that, in response to these factors, a firm’s CSP will have greater breadth. A firm’s CSP breadth is operationalized as (...) the number of different sub-domains of CSR for which a firm has taken positive actions and is captured using a unique dataset from Kinder, Lydenburg, and Domini (KLD). This data set includes positive and negative firm actions across more than 35 different dimensions of socially responsible behavior. Findings based on a longitudinal, multi-industry sample of 447 US firms during the period from 2000 to 2007 demonstrate that firms which: (1) have greater sensitivity to stakeholder needs as a result of the firm’s strategic emphasis on marketing and/or value creation, (2) face greater diversity of stakeholder demands, and (3) encounter a greater degree of scrutiny or risk from stakeholder action have a greater breadth of CSP in response to the stakeholder landscape that they face. (shrink)

Objectives: To examine associations of changing employment conditions, specifically switching to working from home or job loss, with mental health, using data collected during the COVID-19 pandemic.Methods: Data from 2,301 US adults in employment prior to COVID-19 were collected April 3rd−7th, 2020. Participants reported whether their employment remained unchanged, they were WFH when they had not been before, or they had lost their job due to the pandemic. Outcomes were symptoms of depression, anxiety, stress, loneliness, and positive mental health assessed (...) using validated questionnaires. Linear regression quantified associations of employment changes with mental health outcomes, controlling for age, sex, race, BMI, smoking status, screen time, physical activity, marital status, chronic conditions, and current COVID-19 containment strategies being followed.Results: Compared to participants whose employment remained unchanged, those who switched to WFH did not differ in any measures of mental health. Participants who had lost their job reported higher symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress, and lower PMH. Loneliness did not differ between groups.Conclusion: This study demonstrates that concerns around potential adverse mental health effects, particularly increases in loneliness, should not preclude WFH in the general population, while considering each individual's personal circumstances, and the acute adverse association of job loss with mental health. Tailored and sensitive interventions may be required to prevent deteriorations in mental health associated with job loss during periods of societal stress. (shrink)

Thought-provoking essays on science as an integral part of the culture of our age from a leader in the scientific humanism movement. "A profoundly moving, brilliantly perceptive essay by a truly civilized man."--Scientific American.

Recent artificial intelligence advances, especially those of large language models (LLMs), have increasingly shown glimpses of human-like intelligence. This has led to bold claims that these systems are no longer a mere “it” but now a “who,” a kind of person deserving respect. In this paper, I argue that this view depends on a Cartesian account of personhood, on which identifying someone as a person is based on their cognitive sophistication and ability to address common-sense reasoning problems. I contrast this (...) with a different account of personhood, one where an agent is a person if they are autonomous, responsive to norms, and culpable for their actions. On this latter account, I show that LLMs are not person-like, as evidenced by their propensity for dishonesty, inconsistency, and offensiveness. Moreover, I argue current LLMs, given the way they are designed and trained, cannot be persons—either social or Cartesian. The upshot is that contemporary LLMs are not, and never will be, persons. (shrink)

Surveys the scientific and intellectual history of man and his ideas and inventions.

Close attention to Kant’s comments on animal minds has resulted in radically different readings of key passages in Kant. A major disputed text for understanding Kant on animals is his criticism of G. F. Meier’s view in the 1762 ‘False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’. In this article, I argue that Kant’s criticism of Meier should be read as an intervention into an ongoing debate between Meier and H. S. Reimarus on animal minds. Specifically, while broadly aligning himself with (...) Reimarus, Kant distinguishes himself from both Meier and Reimarus on the role of judgement in human consciousness. (shrink)

James Ladyman has recently proposed a view according to which all that exists on the level of microphysics are structures "all the way down". By means of a comparative reading of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics as proposed by Stewart Shapiro, I shall present what I believe structures could not be. I shall argue that, if Ladyman is indeed proposing something as strong as suggested here, then he is committed to solving problems that proponents of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics (...) such as Shapiro are trying to solve. Attempting to do so, however, brings out a tacit tension in Ladyman's position. I shall argue that the upshot of this is that the ontological import that Ladyman attributes to structures is rather epistemological import properly understood. (shrink)

There is a current debate about if, and in what sense, machine learning systems used in the medical context need to be explainable. Those arguing in favor contend these systems require post hoc explanations for each individual decision to increase trust and ensure accurate diagnoses. Those arguing against suggest the high accuracy and reliability of the systems is sufficient for providing epistemic justified beliefs without the need for explaining each individual decision. But, as we show, both solutions have limitations—and it (...) is unclear either address the epistemic worries of the medical professionals using these systems. We argue these systems do require an explanation, but an institutional explanation. These types of explanations provide the reasons why the medical professional should rely on the system in practice—that is, they focus on trying to address the epistemic concerns of those using the system in specific contexts and specific occasions. But ensuring that these institutional explanations are fit for purpose means ensuring the institutions designing and deploying these systems are transparent about the assumptions baked into the system. This requires coordination with experts and end-users concerning how it will function in the field, the metrics used to evaluate its accuracy, and the procedures for auditing the system to prevent biases and failures from going unaddressed. We contend this broader explanation is necessary for either post hoc explanations or accuracy scores to be epistemically meaningful to the medical professional, making it possible for them to rely on these systems as effective and useful tools in their practices. (shrink)

As more and more historians acknowledge the central signifcance of science and technology with that of modern society, the need for a good, general history of the achievements of the Scientific Revolution has grown. Scientific Culture and The Making of the Industrial West seeks to explain this historical process by looking at how and why scientific knowledge became such an integral part of the culture of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and how this in turn lead to the (...) Industrial Revolution. This comparative study not only looks at England, and its success, but follows through with the history of France, the Netherlands, and Germany. (shrink)

Enhanced indispensability arguments claim that Scientific Realists are committed to the existence of mathematical entities due to their reliance on Inference to the best explanation. Our central question concerns this purported parity of reasoning: do people who defend the EIA make an appropriate use of the resources of Scientific Realism to achieve platonism? We argue that just because a variety of different inferential strategies can be employed by Scientific Realists does not mean that ontological conclusions concerning which things we should (...) be Scientific Realists about are arrived at by any inferential route which eschews causes, and nor is there any direct pressure for Scientific Realists to change their inferential methods. We suggest that in order to maintain inferential parity with Scientific Realism, proponents of EIA need to give details about how and in what way the presence of mathematical entities directly contribute to explanations. (shrink)

What theory should we accept from the practical point of view, or accept as a basis for guiding our actions, if we don’t know which theory is true, and if there are too many plausible alternative theories for us to take them all into consideration? This question is the theme of the first three parts of this dissertation. I argue that the problem of theory acceptance, so understood, is a problem of practical rationality, and hence that the appropriate grounds for (...) theory acceptance are practical considerations. I argue for a number of principles of theory acceptance, and I explore the implications of these principles for the acceptance both of descriptive theories and evaluative theories. (shrink)

Despite its substantial influence, there is surprisingly little agreement about how to read C.I. Lewis’s Mind and the World Order. Lewis has historically been read as a reductionist attempting to g...

In 1844, Johann Kaspar Schmidt, under the pen name “Max Stirner”, published a blistering critique of contemporary German philosophy, politics, and society called Der Einzige und sein Eigentum. Although Engels praised the book in private letters to Marx upon its arrival, a year and a half later he and Marx went to work demolishing every sentence in a 350-page unpublished manuscript called Saint Max, eventually edited and compiled a century later into the centerpiece of the German Ideology. Saint Max—perhaps the (...) most bombastic, literary, philosophical, polemical text that Marx ever wrote—is rarely read and almost never commented upon, a fact I hope to rectify here. In this paper, I will reconstruct a key debate between Marx and Stirner that occurred from 1843 to 1846 in four texts: Marx’s On the Jewish Question, Stirner’s The Unique and its Property, Marx’s Saint Max, and Stirner’s Stirner’s Critics. (shrink)

Since the 1950s, philosophers and AI researchers have held that disambiguating natural language sentences depended on common sense. In 2012, the Winograd Schema Challenge was established to evaluate the common-sense reasoning abilities of a machine by testing its ability to disambiguate sentences. The designers argued only a system capable of “thinking in the full-bodied sense” would be able to pass the test. However, by 2023, the original authors concede the test has been soundly defeated by large language models which still (...) seem to lack common sense of full-bodied thinking. In this paper, we argue that disambiguating sentences only seemed like a good test of common-sense based on a certain picture of the relationship between linguistic comprehension and semantic knowledge—one typically associated with the early computational theory of mind and Symbolic AI. If this picture is rejected, as it is by most LLM researchers, then disambiguation ceases to look like a comprehensive test of common-sense and instead appear only to test linguistic competence. The upshot is that any linguistic test, not just disambiguation, is unlikely to tell us much about common sense or genuine intelligence. (shrink)

"A gem of enlightenment.... One rejoices in Bronowski's dedication to the identity of acts of creativity and of imagination, whether in Blake or Yeats or Einstein or Heisenberg."--Kirkus Reviews "According to Bronowski, our account of the world is dictated by our biology: how we perceive, imagine, symbolize, etc. He proposes to explain how we receive and translate our experience of the world so that we achieve knowledge. He examines the mechanisms of our perception; the origin and nature of natural language; (...) formal systems and scientific discourse; and how science, as a systematic attempt to establish closed systems one after another, progresses by exploring its own errors and new but unforeseen connections.... A delightful look at the inquiring mind."--Library Journal "Eminently enjoyable to read, with a good story or 'bon mot' on every page."--Nature "A well-written and brilliantly presented defense of the scientific enterprise which could be especially valuable to scientists and to teachers of science at all levels."--AAAS Science Books & Films Contents 1. The Mind as an Instrument for Understanding 2. The Evolution and Power of Symbolic Language 3. Knowledge as Algorithm and as Metaphor 4. The Laws of Nature and the Nature of Laws 5. Error, Progress, and the Concept of Time 6. Law and Individual Responsibility. (shrink)

We suggest that the hierarchical predictive processing account detailed by Clark can be usefully integrated with narrative psychology by situating personal narratives at the top of an individual's knowledge hierarchy. Narrative representations function as high-level generative models that direct our attention and structure our expectations about unfolding events. Implications for integrating scientific and humanistic views of human experience are discussed.

Recent findings have provided evidence for the existence of non‐vertebrate acquired immunity. We survey these findings and propose that all living organisms must express both innate and acquired immunity. This is opposed to the paradigm that only vertebrates manifest the two forms of immune mechanism; other species are thought to use innate immunity alone. We suggest new definitions of innate and acquired immunity, based on whether immune recognition molecules are encoded in the inherited genome or are generated through somatic processes. (...) We reason that both forms of immunity are similarly ancient, and have co‐evolved in response to lifestyle, cost‐benefit tradeoffs and symbiosis versus parasitism. However, different species have evolved different immune solutions that are not necessarily genetically related, but serve a similar general function – allowing individuals to learn from their own immune experience; survival of species is contingent on the acquired immune experience of its individuals. (shrink)

An emphasis on explanatory contribution is central to a recent formulation of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism. Because scientific realism is argued for by means of inference to the best explanation, it has been further argued that being a scientific realist entails a commitment to IA and thus to mathematical realism. It has, however, gone largely unnoticed that the way that IBE is argued to be truth conducive involves citing successful applications of IBE and tracing this success over time. (...) This in turn involves identifying those constituents of scientific theories that are responsible for their predictive success and showing that these constituents are retained across theory change in science. I argue that even if mathematics can be shown to feature in best explanations, the role of mathematics in scientific theories does not satisfy the condition that mathematics is always retained across theory change. According to a scientific realist, this condition needs to be met for making ontological claims on the basis of explanatory contribution. Thus scientific realists are not committed to mathematical realism on the basis of this recent formulation of IA. (shrink)

When the indispensability argument for mathematical entities (IA) is spelled out, it would appear confirmational holism is needed for the argument to work. It has been argued that confirmational holism is a dispensable premise in the argument if a construal of naturalism, according to which it is denied that we can take different epistemic attitudes towards different parts of our scientific theories, is adopted. I argue that the suggested variety of naturalism will only appeal to a limited number of philosophers. (...) I then suggest that if we allow for some degree of separation between different component parts of theories, IA can be formulated as an argument aimed at more than a limited number of philosophers, but in implementing this strategy the notion of indispensability needs spelling out. The best way of spelling out indispensability is in terms of theory contribution, but doing so requires adopting inference to the best explanation (IBE). IBE is however sufficient for establishing the conclusion that IA is supposed to establish. Thus, IA is a redundant argument. (shrink)

In Mind and World, John McDowell provided an influential account of how perceptual experience makes knowledge of the world possible. He recommended a view he called “conceptualism”, according to which concepts are intimately involved in perception and there is no non‐conceptual content. In response to criticisms of this view (especially those from Charles Travis), McDowell has more recently proposed a revised account that distinguishes between two kinds of representation: the passive non‐propositional contents of perceptual experience – what he now calls (...) “intuitional content” – and the propositional contents of judgment – what he now calls “discursive content.” In this paper, I criticize McDowell's account of intuitional content. I argue that he equivocates between two different notions of intuitional content. These views propose different, and incompatible, ways of understanding how a perceiver makes a judgment based on perceptual experience. This is because these two views result from an underlying indeterminacy as to what, if anything, McDowell now means by “conceptual” when he makes claims that intuitional content is conceptual. (shrink)

The essential nature of science is revealed in an amplification of the relation between the arts and science.

Abstract: Laudan (1984) distinguishes between two senses of success for scientific theories: (i) that a particular theory is successful, and (ii) that the methods for picking out approximately true theories are successful. These two senses of success are reflected in two different ways that the no miracles argument for scientific realism (NMA) may be set out. First, I set out a (traditional) version of NMA that considers the success of particular theories. I then consider a more recent formulation of NMA (...) (Psillos, 1999). This version of NMA is aimed at making us believe that our methods for picking out approximately true theories are reliable. I shall argue that the success of the latter argument is dependent on the success of the first. Therefore, even though Psillos presents a new formulation of NMA, the evidential support for it is no stronger than the evidential support for the original version. (shrink)

A central issue in debates about Kant and nonconceptualism concerns the nature of intuition. There is sharp disagreement among Kant scholars about both whether, prior to conceptualization, mere intuition can be considered conscious and, if so, how determinate this consciousness is. In this article, I argue that Kant regards pre-synthesized intuition as conscious but indeterminate. To make this case, I contextualize Kant's position through the work of H.S. Reimarus, a predecessor of Kant who influenced his views on animals, infants, and (...) the role of attention. I use Reimarus to clarify Kant's otherwise ambiguous commitments on the determinacy of intuition in animals and newborns, and the role attention, concepts, and judgment play in making intuited contents determinate. This contextualization helps to shed light on Kant's discussion of pre-synthesized intuition in the threefold synthesis of the A-Deduction by demonstrating that Kant's theory of mind in the deduction offers transcendental grounding for empirical accounts of infant development like Kant and Reimarus's. The upshot is a Kant at odds with many recent interpretations of his theory of mind: pre-synthesized intuition is conscious but indeterminate. (shrink)

Wir diskutieren die Zusammenhänge zwischen historischen sowie aktuellen Debatten um Vergesellschaftung und demokratische Wirtschaftsplanung. Anhand der historischen Vergesellschaftungsdebatte wird gezeigt, dass sowohl die Wirtschaftsplanung als auch die Demokratisierung der Ökonomie zentrale Ziele verschiedener Vergesellschaftungskonzepte waren. Während die Vergesellschaftungs- debatte die Transformationsperspektive stärker in den Vordergrund rückt, konkretisiert die Debatte um demokratische Wirtschaftsplanung das Ziel, also die Gestaltung einer gemeinwohlorientierten und radikal-demokratischen Produktionsweise.

Over the last thirty years, a group of philosophers associated with the University of Pittsburgh—Robert Brandom, James Conant, John Haugeland, and John McDowell—have developed a novel reading of Kant. Their interest turns on Kant’s problem of objective purport: how can my thoughts be about the world? This paper summarizes the shared reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction by these four philosophers and how it solves the problem of objective purport. But I also show these philosophers radically diverge in how they view (...) Kant’s relevance for contemporary philosophy. I highlight an important distinction between those that hold a quietist response to Kant, evident in Conant and McDowell, and those that hold a constructive response, evident in Brandom and Haugeland. The upshot is that the Pittsburgh Kantians have a distinctive approach to Kant, but also radically different responses to his problem of objective purport. (shrink)

It is argued that claims about personal obligation (of the form "s ought to 0") cannot be reduced to claims about impersonal obligation (of the form "it ought to be the case that p"). The most common attempts at such a reduction are shown to have unacceptable implications in cases involving a plurality of agents. It is then argued that similar problems will face any attempt to reduce personal obligation to impersonal obligation.

Este trabajo se propone recuperar las tesis antropológicas centrales del De natura hominis de Nemesio de Emesa, autor cristiano del siglo V. La perspectiva desde la cual se aborda dicha obra es la filosofía moral, como ha sugerido Telfer. Siguiendo dicha horma, el autor busca poner de realce cómo las características centrales del ser humano que plantea Nemesio se relacionan con las virtudes morales.

Traces the development of thought through historical movements and periods from 1500 to 1830.

Confirmational holism is central to a traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism (IA). I argue that recent strategies for defending scientific realism are incompatible with confirmational holism. Thus a traditional formulation of IA is incompatible with recent strategies for defending scientific realism. As a consequence a traditional formulation of IA will only have limited appeal.

The underdetermination of theory by data argument (UD) is traditionally construed as an argument that tells us that we ought to favour an anti-realist position over a realist position. I argue that when UD is constructed as an argument saying that theory choice is to proceed between theories that are empirically equivalent and adequate to the phenomena up until now, the argument will not favour constructive empiricism over realism. A constructive empiricist cannot account for why scientists are reasonable in expecting (...) one theory to be empirically adequate rather than another, given the criteria he suggests for theory choice. (shrink)

Objective: Deep brain stimulation targeted to the ventral intermediate nucleus of the thalamus is effective for motor symptoms in essential tremor, but there is limited data on cognitive outcomes. We examined cognitive outcomes in a large cohort of ET DBS patients.Methods: In a retrospective analysis, we used repeated-measures ANOVA testing to examine whether the age of tremor onset, age at DBS surgery, hemisphere side implanted with lead, unilateral vs. bilateral implantations, and presence of surgical complications influenced the cognitive outcomes. Neuropsychological (...) outcomes of interest were verbal memory, executive functioning, working memory, language functioning, visuospatial functioning, and general cognitive function.Results: We identified 50 ET DBS patients; 29 males; the mean age of tremor onset was 35.84 years with a median age of 38 years. The mean age at DBS was 68.18 years. There were 37 unilateral 30 left, seven right, and 13 bilateral brain implantations. In the subgroup analysis, there was a significant interaction between assessment and age of tremor onset ; F = 4.47; p = 0.043 for working memory. The post hoc testing found improvements for younger onset ET. Similarly, there was a significant interaction between assessment and complications vs. no complications subgroups; F = 4.34; p = 0.043 for verbal memory with worsening scores seen for ET patients with complications. The remaining tests were not significant.Conclusion: In this large cohort of ET patients with, DBS was not accompanied by a significant decline in many cognitive domains. These outcomes were possibly related to the selection of patients with normal cognitive functioning before surgery, unilateral DBS implantations for the majority, and selection of patients with optimal response to DBS. (shrink)

Two basic theses underlie this work. The first, the specificity theorem, signifies that logic is essentially concerned with specific events and not with universal and transcendent systems. The second, the interbehavioral theorem, implies that no matter how logic is defined, it entails a psychological dimension that must be taken into account.

Traditional scholarly attention to human tragedy has been confined mainly within the artificial world of drama and literature. It has neglected to recognize the significant recurrence of tragedy throughout the entire realm of nature. This book attempts to place tragedy within the larger context of natural events, and to view it against a background of scientific philosophy and psychology.

En este trabajo, el autor se propone exponer y comentar la metafísica de Numenio de Apamea, filósofo neopitagórico del siglo II d. C. En primer término, estudia la ascensión al Ser, que se sitúa más allá de la esencia, Principio de todo aquello que es. Después revisa los niveles de la divinidad en este autor, que resultan ser tres, que vienen a plasmar tres funciones diversas: los Dioses primero (el Bien en sí), segundo (el Demiurgo) y tercero (el alma del (...) mundo). Se propone aquí que en realidad se trata de dos Dioses, siendo el primero totalmente inactivo y el segundo poseyendo dos funciones. Finalmente, se estudian los argumentos numenianos a favor de la inmortalidad del alma. (shrink)

Essays defending the human claim to have a mind.

In this article, the author makes attempts to demonstrate that, from the educational standpoint, the relationship between philosophy and literature cannot be overlooked. Even the most remote cultures testify their transmission of moral teaching through literary accounts. In this sense, the author promotes this methodology hence argues that the axial concept structured by ethics is the concept of acknowledgment. Secondly, the author explains how the concept of acknowledgment has been present in contemporary ethical discourses and proposes which he considers fundamental (...) on the basis of a theory of knowledge which closely relates understanding and will together. He sustains that fundamental acknowledgment is that which is established by the recognition that the other is a person, a thesis which precedes the acknowledgment of the other as a legitimate interlocutor or a responsible subject. Next, the author aims his effort to explain two ways (among many other possible ones) in which literature applies to education as empathy and as paradigm. With respect to empathy, he argues that the self-recognition the reader can establish with a literary character is essential. In this sense, he considers that the empathy attainable can be only analogical, as it can only be partial. Empathy requires a point in common, which the author places in ?humanity?; thus, a certain form of equality between the empathic subject at the subject he attempts to be relate to, becomes possible. As for paradigms, the author sustains that literature is abundant in models and icons of virtue and vice and that such paradigms turn out to be essential for the ethical-moral upbringing of an individual. He takes up the concept of paradigm as analogical representation, that is, as a model-sign of man, and on these grounds, he reassumes some theses which have become recurrent in contemporary moral philosophy, as is the case with Max Scheler, Karol Wojtyla, Luis Pareyson, and Fernando Salmerón, among others. The author argues that the reader can recognize himself in the character; the later can then exert an aspirational force, which allows a connection to be established, by which the reader tries to approach the paradigm. (shrink)

It has recently been suggested by Shaw (2007) that the distinction between voluntary active euthanasia, such as giving a patient a lethal overdose with the intention of ending that patient's life, and voluntary passive euthanasia, such as removing a patient from a ventilator, is much less obvious than is commonly acknowledged in the literature. This is argued by suggesting a new perspective that more accurately reflects the moral features of end-of-life situations. The argument is simply that if we consider the (...) body of a mentally competent patient who wants to die, a kind of ‘unwarranted’ life support, then the distinction collapses. We argue that all Shaw has provided is a perspective that makes the conclusion that there is little distinction between voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive euthanasia only seemingly more palatable. In doing so he has yet to convince us that this perspective is superior to other perspectives and thus more accurately reflects the moral features of the situations pertaining to this issue. (shrink)