The neurobiological systems that mediate the basic emotions are beginning to be understood. They appear to be constituted of genetically coded, but experientially refined executive circuits situated in subcortical areas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral, physiological and psychological processes that need to be recruited to cope with a variety of primal survival needs (i.e., they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birthrights allow newborn organisms to begin navigating the complexities of the world and to learn about the values (...) and contingencies of the environment. Some of these systems have been identified and characterized using modern neuroscientific and psychobiological tools. The fundamental emotional systems can now be defined by the functional psychobiological characteristics of the underlying circuitries ? characteristics which help coordinate behavioral, physiological and psychological aspects of emotionality, including the valenced affective feeling states that provide fundamental values for the guidance of behavior. The various emotional circuits are coordinated by different neuropeptides, and the arousal of each system may generate distinct affective/neurodynamic states and imbalances may lead to various psychiatric disorders. The aim of this essay is to discuss the underlying conceptual issues that must be addressed for additional progress in understanding the nature of primary process affective consciousness. (shrink)

In this landmark volume, editor Jaak Panksepp assembles the perspectives of top scientists and clinicians who apply contemporary neuroscience to psychiatric ...

The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain–mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill (...) acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic , albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems—including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones—effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain. (shrink)

Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of those (...) feelings. Likewise, the basic brain mechanisms for thirst and hunger exist in brain regions typically not damaged by PVS. If affective feelings can exist without cognitive awareness of those feelings, then it is possible that the instinctual emotional actions and pain "reflexes" often exhibited by PVS patients may indicate some level of mentality remaining in PVS patients. Indeed, it is possible such raw affective feelings are intensified when PVS patients are removed from life-supports. They may still experience a variety of primary-process affective states that could constitute forms of suffering. If so, withdrawal of life-support may violate the principle of nonmaleficence and be tantamount to inflicting inadvertent "cruel and unusual punishment" on patients whose potential distress, during the process of dying, needs to be considered in ethical decision-making about how such individuals should be treated, especially when their lives are ended by termination of life-supports. Medical wisdom may dictate the use of more rapid pharmacological forms of euthanasia that minimize distress than the de facto euthanasia of life-support termination that may lead to excruciating feelings of pure thirst and other negative affective feelings in the absence of any reflective awareness. (shrink)

The nature of “the self” has been one of the central problems in philosophy and more recently in neuroscience. This raises various questions: Can we attribute a self to animals? Do animals and humans share certain aspects of their core selves, yielding a trans-species concept of self? What are the neural processes that underlie a possible trans-species concept of self? What are the developmental aspects and do they result in various levels of self-representation? Drawing on recent literature from both human (...) and animal research, we suggest a trans-species concept of self that is based upon what has been called a “core-self” which can be described by self-related processing as a specific mode of interaction between organism and environment. When we refer to specific neural networks, we will here refer to the underlying system as the “core-SELF.” The core-SELF provides primordial neural coordinates that represent organisms as living creatures—at the lowest level this elaborates interoceptive states along with raw emotional feelings while higher medial cortical levels facilitate affective-cognitive integration . Developmentally, SRP allows stimuli from the environment to be related and linked to organismic needs, signaled and processed within core-self structures within subcorical-cortical midline structures that provide the foundation for epigenetic emergence of ecologically framed, higher idiographic forms of selfhood across different individuals within a species. These functions ultimately operate as a coordinated network. We postulate that core SRP operates automatically, is deeply affective, and is developmentally and epigenetically connected to sensory-motor and higher cognitive abilities. This core-self is mediated by SCMS, embedded in visceral and instinctual representations of the body that are well integrated with basic attentional, emotional and motivational functions that are apparently shared between humans, non-human mammals, and perhaps in a proto-SELF form, other vertebrates. Such a trans-species concept of organismic coherence is thoroughly biological and affective at the lowest levels of a complex neural network, and culturally and ecologically molded at higher levels of neural processing. It allows organisms to selectively adapt to and integrate with physical and social environments. Such a psychobiologically universal, but environmentally diversified, concept may promote novel trans-species studies of the core-self across mammalian species. (shrink)

Basic affects reflect the diversity of satisfactions and discomforts that are inherited tools for living from our ancestral past. Affects are neurobiologically-ingrained potentials of the nervous system, which are triggered, moulded and refined by life experiences. Cognitive, information- processing approaches and computational metaphors cannot penetrate foundational affective processes. Animal models allow us to empirically analyse the large-scale neural ensembles that generate emotional-action dynamics that are critically important for creating emotional feelings. Such approaches offer robust neuro-epistemological strategies to decode the fundamental (...) nature of affects in all mammals, including humans, but they remain to be widely implemented. Here I summarize how we can develop a cross-species affective neuroscience that probes the neural nature of emotional affective states by studying the instinctual emotional apparatus of the mammalian body and brain. Affective feelings and emotional actions may reflect the dynamics of the primal viscero-somatic homunculus of SELF-representation. (shrink)

Nurses facing impediments to what they perceive as moral practice may experience moral distress. The purpose of this descriptive, cross-sectional study was to determine similarities and differences in moral distress and avoidance behavior between critical care nurses and non-critical care nurses. Sixty-eight critical care and 28 non-critical care nurses completed the Moral Distress Scale and Impact of Event Scale (IES). There were no differences in moral distress scores ( F = 0.892, p = 0.347) or impact of event scores ( (...) F = 3.80, p = 0.054) between groups after adjusting for age. There was a small positive correlation between moral distress and avoidance behaviors for both the groups. Moral distress is present in both critical care and noncritical care nurses. It is important that nurses are provided with opportunities to cope with this distress and that retention strategies include ways to reduce suffering and mitigate the effects on professional practice. (shrink)

A cross-species affective neuroscience strategy for understanding the primary-process (basic) emotions is defended. The need for analyzing the brain and mind in terms of evolutionary stratification of functions into at least primary (instinctual), secondary (learned), and tertiary (thought-related) processes is advanced. When viewed in this context, the contentious battles between basic-emotion theorists and dimensional-constructivist approaches can be seen to be largely nonsubstantial differences among investigators working at different levels of analysis.

Sociological research in three Catholic «pillar» organizations indicates that secularization is not followed by a «de-pillarization» or crumbling of the Catholic pillar. Our explanation suggests a process of secularization within the Catholic organizations, with as main components : the development of a social-cultural christianity - which may be considered a secular surrogate for church-religion -, and professionalization by which the christian organizations provide a milieu which ensures job security and social advancement for its loyal members. Thanks to its informal and (...) formal ties with the Christian pillar organizations, the CVP acts on both components, by stressing a specific identity and by defining the interests of the pillar organizations. This explanation may indicate some major aspects of the ties between sociological Catholics and «their» political party - a bond which is certainly not being affected by the secularization processes, rather the contrary is occurring. (shrink)

This paper presents a conceptual model for describing the role of information systems in a Total Quality Management (TQM) organization and contrasts it with one for a traditional business firm. The model, based on systems theory, provides a framework for understanding the principles of TQM and their effects on information systems (IS). This paper suggests that TQM introduces changes in the firm’s feedback loop and creates new requirements for the IS function. The TQM system model is also used for analyzing (...) and comparing TQM with business reengineering. (shrink)

No adequate evidence exists for the evolution of facial pain expression and detection mechanisms, as opposed to social-learning processes. Although brain affective/emotional processes, and resulting whole body action patterns, have surely evolved, we should also aspire to monitor human suffering by direct neural measures rather than by more indirect indices.

Primal emotional feelings are an optimal way to make scientific progress on the neural constitution of consciousness. Such research has revealed the existence of profound neuroanatomical and neurochemical homologies in the systems that control emotionality in mammalian and avian species. Wherever in their brains one applies localized Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), whether electrical or chemical, and obtains coherent instinctual emotional behavior patterns, animals treat these within‐brain state shifts as 'rewards' and 'punishments' in various learning tasks. Humans consistently report desirable and (...) undesirable affective changes to such DBS. These effects serve as gold standards for the detailed scientific study of affective qualia in animal and human brains. (shrink)

A causally efficacious conscious will is a small part of our everyday activities, but a part that deserves to be recognized, studied, and cherished, perhaps as a fundamental, emotion- and conation-related, right hemispheric neuronal process. Such brain functions might be less in doubt if we consider all the pieces of the larger pie, especially those where our passions and desires reside.

The relationships between the political parties and the social movements that emerged in the last part of the previous century has been described as a pillarized form of intermediation. The political parties were built on the major cleavages that divided the Belgium society and the links between each organisational network and the political party were exclusive, stable, and formal. In the so-called new social movements, the links with the political parties are specific, unstable, and informal. A vast and stable support (...) for each network party by the majority of the members of the social organisations that belang to each network is one of the conditions for an adequate functioning of the model of pillarized intermediation. Is that condition still met in Flanders after the General Elections ofNovember 24, 1991?This study, based on a sample of 2,691 Flemish voters, shows strong differences in 'faithful' and stable voting behaviour according to the generation and the kind of involvement in the social organisations. Among the generations that were born after 1945, the proportion of electoral 'movers' is larger than the proportion ofvoters that remain faithful to their network party. In the generations born before 1945, stable and faithful voting behaviour is still dominant in the three traditional political families. The more involvement in the Christian Labour Movement, the higher the degree of stable voting behaviour in favour of the Christian Democratie Party. A logistic regression analysis with church involvement, age category, urban environment, and several organizational variabels shows thatmembership of social organisations still has a substantial effect on stable voting behaviour. The future of the pillarized model of intermediation is discussed in view of these results. (shrink)

Introductory Note: This commentary developed out of an informal discussion of Part I (2000) of Jarvilehto?s two-part Consciousness & Emotion series with Ralph Ellis at the recent Amsterdam Symposium on Feelings and Emotions (June 13?16, 2001). Part II of Jarvilehto?s series appears in the present issue. Ellis asked me to share my critical concerns with Jarvilehto?s Part I in this commentary, with an advance copy supplied to Jarvilehto, who will reply in the next issue of Consciousness & Emotion. I think (...) most of us recognize the need for pluralism in the study of complex processes such as consciousness and emotions, but to place emotions and feelings so strongly into the environment as does Jarvilehto strikes me simply as a category mistake. I acknowledge that my commentary comes from my own unique (and by some standards radical) perspective on how the field might best move forward empirically. I believe an honest understanding of how natural psychological kinds emerge from specifiable brain functions, which are obviously modulated by environmental events, is presently the most important and most poorly studied aspect of modern mind-science. I felt that Jarvilehto?s holistic approach would only further serve to discourage investigators from pursuing those important issues neuro-empirically. (shrink)

Disregard of primary-process consciousness is endemic in mind science. Most neuroscientists subscribe to ruthless reductionism whereby mental qualities are discarded in preference for neuronal functions. Such ideas often lead to envisioning other animals, and all too often other humans, as unfeeling zombies. Merker correctly highlights how the roots of consciousness exist in ancient neural territories we share, remarkably homologously, with all the other vertebrates. (Published Online May 1 2007).

In recent years there has been an expansion of scientific work on consciousness. However, there is an increasing necessity to integrate evolutionary and interdisciplinary perspectives and to bring affective feelings more centrally into the overall discussion. Pursuant especially to the theorizing of Endel Tulving , Panksepp and Vandekerckhove we will look at the phenomena starting with primary-process consciousness, namely the rudimentary state of autonomic awareness or unknowing consciousness, with a fundamental form of first-person ‘self-experience’ which relies on affective experiential states (...) and raw sensory and perceptual mental existences, to higher forms of knowing and self-aware consciousness. Since current scientific approaches are most concerned with the understanding of higher declarative states of consciousness, we will focus on these vastly underestimated primary forms of consciousness which may be foundational for all forms of higher ‘knowing consciousness’. (shrink)

Studies about the Flemish voter's perceptions and attitudes revealed that the ecologist party "Agalev" and the radical right-wingparty "Vlaams Blok" were each other's antipodes. These two parties were perceived by the voters as extreme poles on dimensions that were mainly formed by the parties' viewpoint about the rights of immigrants, about Flemish political autonomy, and about materialistic versus postmaterialistic policy alternatives. According to the voters' attitudes, the two electorates were polarized by their attitudes towards immigrants, materialism, economic conservatism, and Flemish (...) nationalism. The electorates of these two 'extreme' parties were very similar in age composition, urban/rural environment, and church involvement. The voters of the ecologist party were more likely to have finished higher education and to have a high occupational status. Blue collar workers with little educational formation were over-represented among the electorate of the right-wing party.Using the data collected among 2,691 Flemisch voters after the 1991 General Elections, this study analyses relevant attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics within one global logistic-regression model. The focus is on the Vlaams Blok versus Agalev with the other electorates as reference category. Controlled for social characteristics, four attitudinal variables still show significant net effects on the likelihood of votingfor Agalev or for the Vlaams Blok and not for the other parties: the attitude towards immigrants, Belgian/Flemish nationalism, materialism, and readiness to make efforts for the preservation of the physical environment. This findings support Swyngedouw's thesis about the emergence of two new cleavages: the so called universalistic/particularistic and postmaterialistic/materialistic cleavages that are capable tocatch about 20% of the Belgian-Flemish voters in the early 90s. (shrink)

In the domain of survey research, it is well known and documented that the structure, wording, and context of questions may affect the distributions of the responses to choice questions. Surprisingly, the application of the knowledge about these effects is not often made in the domain of referendums. Only few studies deal with the effects of question characteristics in referendums, although in the field, there are many discussions about the results obtained by problematic questions. In this study, a number of (...) wording effects that can be expected in referendums are discussed in the context of the actual state of theory and knowledge in the research on question wording effects in surveys. Some are well known and others are new, but also very relevant. The expected problems deal with: the choice between real alternatives; the decision about the majority in the case of multiple choice questions; the ambiguity in the choice between "yes" and "no"; the bidden response scale behind "yes-no" questions and the selection of the of verbs or qualifiers; the use of"double barrelled questions"; the suggestive wordings in the question text or in the introduction; the context of the questions when several questions are asked response sets. The importance and seriousness of each ofthese effects is evaluated, and reflections are made on the quality of the questions in referendums. Consequently suggestions are made about the kind of questions that can be used in referendums. (shrink)