We present two challenges to the fearful ape hypothesis: (1) biobehavioral synchrony precedes and moderates the effects of fear on cooperative care, and (2) cooperative care emerges in a more bidirectional manner than Grossmann acknowledges. We present evidence demonstrating how dyadic differences in co-regulation and individual differences in infants' reactivity shape caregivers' responses to infant affect.

Articles on Islamic ethics and Muslims behaviour of life.

Previous studies on international reconciliation have focused on the security and economic interests of the countries involved, treating reconciliation as an end-goal rather than an ongoing process. This study divides the process of reconciliation into three stages., which refers to the mending of international relations through institutional change, is the most basic. In the phase, the perpetrator provides the victim with economic compensation for inflicting harm. The third stage,, is reached when the perpetrator acknowledges past wrongdoings and when civil and (...) cultural exchanges are carried out smoothly. (shrink)

Collected articles on spiritual life based on the life of Bābu Rāṇapurā, mystic-saint poet from Gujarat; previously published in Kacchamitra, a Gujarati daily.

Erwin Panofsky explicitly states that the first half of the opening chapter of Studies in Iconology—his landmark American publication of 1939—contains ‘the revised content of a methodological article published by the writer in 1932’, which is now translated for the first time in this issue of Critical Inquiry.1 That article, published in the philosophical journal Logos, is among his most important works. First, it marks the apogee of his series of philosophically reflective essays on how to do art history,2 that (...) reach back, via a couple of major pieces on Alois Riegl, to the 1915 essay on Heinrich Wölfflin.3 Under the influence of his colleague at Hamburg Ernst Cassirer, the principal interpreter of Kant in the 1920s, Panofsky from 1915 on exhibits in his work ever more Kantian thinking and language.4 But Logos was not an art-historical review or one dedicated to aesthetics but a principal mainstream journal of the philosophy of culture. So ‘On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts’ has a good claim to be the culmination of Panofsky's philosophical thinking in his German period under the Weimar Republic. · 1. Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance , p. xv; hereafter abbreviated SI. See Panofsky, ‘Zum Problem der Beschreibung und Inhaltsdeutung von Werken der bildenden Kunst’, Logos 21 : 103–19; trans. Jaś Elsner and Katharina Lorenz under the title ‘On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts’, Critical Inquiry 38 : 467–82; hereafter abbreviated ‘P’.· 2. See the discussion in Carlo Ginzburg, ‘From Aby Warburg to E. H. Gombrich: A Problem of Method’, Myths, Emblems, Clues, trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi , pp. 17–59, esp. pp. 36–41.· 3. See Panofsky, ‘Das Problem des Stils in der bildenden Kunst’, Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, ed. Karen Michels and Martin Warnke, 2 vols. , 2:1009–18; ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’,Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, 2:1019–34, trans. Kenneth J. Northcott and Joel Snyder under the title ‘The Concept of Artistic Volition’, Critical Inquiry 8 : 17–33; and ‘Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie: Ein Beitrag zu der Erörterung über die Möglichkeit kunstwissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe’, Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, 2: 1035–63, trans. Lorenz and Elsner under the title ‘On the Relationship of Art History and Art Theory: Towards the Possibility of a Fundamental System of Concepts for a Science of Art’, Critical Inquiry 35 : 43–71.· 4. On neo-Kantianism in pre-Nazi Germany, see Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger , pp. 25–37; Éric Dufour and T. Z. R. Créteil, ‘Le Statue du singulier: Kant et le néokantisme de l’École de Marbourg', Kantstudien 93 : 324–50; Edward Skidelsky, Ernst Cassirer: The Last Philosopher of Culture , pp. 22–51; and Peter E. Gordon, Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos , pp. 52–86. Specifically on the Cassirerian Kantianism of Panofsky, see Michael Podro, The Critical Historians of Art , pp. 181–82; Michael Ann Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History , pp. 91–92, 147–52; Silvia Ferretti, Cassirer, Panofsky, and Warburg: Symbol, Art, and History, trans. Richard Pierce , pp. 174–77, 182–84; David Summers, ‘Meaning in the Visual Arts as a Humanistic Discipline’, in Meaning in the Visual Arts: Views from the Outside, ed. Irving Lavin , pp. 9–24; Mark A. Cheetham, Kant, Art, and Art History: Moments of Discipline , pp. 68–77; Paul Crowther, The Transhistorical Image: Philosophizing Art and Its History , pp. 70–73; Allister Neher, ‘“The Concept of Kunstwollen”, Neo-Kantianism, and Erwin Panofsky's Early Art Theoretical Essays', Word and Image 20 : 41–51; Georges Didi-Huberman,Confronting Images: Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art, trans. John Goodman , pp. 4–6, 90–138; and Lorenz and Elsner, ‘Translators’ Introduction', Critical Inquiry35 : 33–42, esp. pp. 38, 40–42. (shrink)

We show that under the proper forcing axiom the class of all Aronszajn lines behave like [Formula: see text]-scattered orders under the embeddability relation. In particular, we are able to show that the class of better-quasi-order labeled fragmented Aronszajn lines is itself a better-quasi-order. Moreover, we show that every better-quasi-order labeled Aronszajn line can be expressed as a finite sum of labeled types which are algebraically indecomposable. By encoding lines with finite labeled trees, we are also able to deduce a (...) decomposition result, that for every Aronszajn line [Formula: see text] there is an integer [Formula: see text] such that for any finite coloring of [Formula: see text] there is subset [Formula: see text] of [Formula: see text] isomorphic to [Formula: see text] which uses no more than [Formula: see text] colors. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno—philosopher, cultural critic, sociologist, and music theorist—was one of the most important German intellectuals of the twentieth century. This concise, readable life is the first attempt to look at his philosophical and literary work in its essential political context. Central to Adorno’s intellectual development were his musical training, his father’s Jewish roots, and the rise of National Socialism in Germany, which forced him to emigrate to the United States. While in exile, he and Max Horkheimer wrote Dialectic of (...) Enlightenment, a bold attempt to illuminate the dark side of modernity, and on his own Adorno wrote a series of connected essays on the “culture industry”—his indictment of mass culture. A co-founder of the famous Frankfurt School, Adorno returned to head it after the war, assuming a key role in the intellectual life of postwar West Germany until his untimely death in 1969. Ja;ger’s biography sheds new light on many aspects of Adorno’s life and writings and on his relationships with such figures as Paul Celan, Bertolt Brecht, and Walter Benjamin. (shrink)

Collected articles on spiritual life based on Bābubhāī Raṇapurā, 1940, Hindu saint; previously published in Kacchamitra, a Gujarati daily.

What we regard as real are the objects of the phenomenal world which we perceive. We regard those that we see objectively, as in the third person perspective, as real. What then is the mind that pe...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AUTHORITY, PUBLIC DISSENT AND THE NATURE OF THEOLOGICAL THINKING IN A RECENT analysis of the Catholic scene, Lutheran Richard John Neuhaus described the controversy over authority and dissent in the Catholic Church as " theologically debased and ecumenically sterile." My own reading of the literature on dissent inclines me to concur with the substance of this judgment. Broad historical, cultural, and theological contexts have inevitably been neglected as the (...) issues raised by public dissent have come to be narrowly conceived in terms of academic policy and ecclesisastical law and discipline. The objective of this paper is to explore the larger theological context of the topic of public dissent and in particular to consider Neuhruus' judgment that the "present Roman Catholic preoccupation with church authority is... theologically debased because it fixes attention not upon the truth claims derived from God's self-revelation but upon who is authorized to set the rules for addressing such truths, if indeed they are truths." 1 A Perspective on the Current Debate The attitude of " dissent " as such would normally be expected to occupy only a subordinate place in accounts of the nature of theological thinking. Intellectual inquiries are usually undertaken with a view to affirmation and oonstruction rather than critique and dissent. Despite the volume of literature which it has spawned, the current debate in fact reflects this expectation. The theological substance of the issue of dissent qua dissent has been thorough1 Richard John Neuhaus, The OathoUc Moment: The Paradow of the Church in the Postmodern World (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 89. 185 186 J. A. DI NOIA, O.P. ly rehearsed.2 The dissident case for the legitimacy of public dissent has been stated forcefully and exhaustively.3 Important defenses of the classical Catholic position have been advanced by bishops and theologians alike.4 Increasingly the literature on both sides has become repetitive-a sign that, in its present form, the debate has reached something of a theological impasse. What clarity has been achieved in the theological discussion of the specifics of the Curran case continues to be threatened by confusions about the crucial differences between public and private dissent, between an ecclesiastically chartered university and other Catholic institutions of higher learning, and between the withdrawal of the canonical dicense to teach and the imposition of silence upon a theologian.5 The issues have come 2 Bp. Juan Arzubs, "Criteria for Dissent in the Church," Origins 7 (1978), 748-750; Archbp. Joseph L. Bernandin, "Magisterium and Theologians: Steps Towards Dialogue," Ohicago Studies (1978), 151-158; Yves Congar, O.P. The Magisterium and Theologians: A Short History, Theology Digest (1977), 15-20; John Connery, S.J., "The Non-Infallible Moral Teaching of the Church," Thomist 51 (1987); 1-16; Hans Kiing & Jiirgen Moltmann eds., The Right to Dissent: Concilium 158 (1982) ; Archbp. William J. Levada, "Dissent and the Catholic Religion Teacher," Origins 16 (1986), 195-200; Bp. James Malone, "How Bishops and Theologians Relate," Origins 16( 1986), 169-174; Archbp. Daniel Pilarczyk, "The Church and Dissent," Origins 16 (1986), 175178 ; Karl Rahner, "Theology and the Magisterium," Theology Digest 29 (1981)' 257-61. s Charles E. Curran, Faithful Dissent (Sheed & Ward, 1986) ; "Authority and Dissent in the Roman Catholic Church," in William W. May, ed., Vatican Authority and American Oatholie Dissent (New York: Crossroad, 1987), pp. 27-34, and in the same volume essays by Richard McCormick and Anne Patrick. A markedly alarmist collection of essays pressing the dissident case is Hans Kiing and Leonard Swidler, eds., The Ohuroh in Anguish (Harper & Row, 1987). 4 Patrick Granfield The Limits of the Papacy (New York: Crossroad, 1987), esp. pp. 153-168; Archbp. Roger M. Mahony, "The Magisterium and Theological Dissent," in May, pp. 16-26; William E. May, "Catholic Moral Teaching and the Limits of Dissent," ibid., pp. 87-102; Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), Vol. I, pp. 849-856, 871-916; Francis -Sullivan, Magisterium (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist 1983) passim. s Joseph A. O'Hare's "Faith and Freedom in Catholic Universities" points to the significance of the second distinction, while Margaret Farley's "Moral AUTHORITY, PUBLIC DISSENT, THEOLOGICAL THINKING 187 to be framed in an idiom in which... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 126.3 (2005) 461-463 [Access article in PDF] Graham Zanker. Modes of Viewing in Hellenistic Poetry and Art. Wisconsin Studies in Classics. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004. xiv + 223 pp. 34 black-and-white ills. Cloth, $39.95. The underlying contention here is that if a Hellenistic poetic description of a person, an animal, the weather, a scene, or an objet d'art adopts a particular way (...) of viewing, we have independent evidence for the habits of viewing that Hellenistic people would have brought to their contemplation of representational art. (4) So Graham Zanker summarizes the thesis of his new book, the most extensive and detailed account of Hellenistic visuality yet published. This is a carefully worded sentence. Zanker's enumeration of poetic descriptions of "a person, an animal, the weather, a scene or an objet d'art" deliberately exemplifies what he takes to be the scope of ekphrasis and hence reproves those who have taken ekphrasis more narrowly as the description of works of art (cf. 6–10). The target of this disapproval turns out to be especially Simon Goldhill, whom he attacks at 82–83 and in a long endnote (184–85, n. 26). Yet the care to be precise in matters of literary definition goes with such large, even lax, social and cultural generalizations as "Hellenistic people" and "representational art." What Zanker must mean by those whose contemplation of art can be evoked through poetic descriptions is a highly literate and educated social elite—perhaps the court itself—that may have played (Marie-Antoinette-like) at shepherds and fishermen (as in the cup of Theocritus' first Idyll) but surely did so from a much narrower social perspective than the totalizing generalism of "Hellenistic people." The weapon of precision is a dangerous one to use, when it may be turned back on the user.There are, moreover, numerous problems with both the notion of "independent evidence" and that of "habits of viewing." While the literary evidence of ekphrasis (not only in poetry) certainly encompasses viewing, its specially wrought and often spectacular cleverness may signal the exceptional, even the perverse, as much as (or more than) the habitual. Does a revolutionary statue like the Aphrodite of Cnidos (not actually Hellenistic, but nonetheless rightly incorporated at some length in Zanker's book) reflect or elicit the habitual gaze? In what sense? And, if so, when? Was the gaze it enticed at its moment of creation "habitual," or did that gaze only become "habitual" in its numerous—within our surviving material archive of examples, mainly Roman-period—versions and replications? More difficult still is "independent evidence." I am not really sure what that could be in a topic created from critical and interpretative explications of complex images and texts that do not themselves draw explicit or simple conclusions about viewing (or anything) beyond what readers may impute to them. How they may collectively constitute evidence about viewing can only come about as the result of argument. I think a compelling argument based on the critical interpretation of images and texts may be taken as evidence, but is that "independent evidence?" What does this mean? And such a complex argument is a very different kind of evidence from what Zanker seems to mean by any particular viewpoint we may find expressed in an ekphrasis. [End Page 461]Again, I do not think it follows that the evidence for viewing we may entice from a poetic description of a person, an animal, or the weather need necessarily be related to the contemplation of a work of art. Indeed, Zanker's use of the term contemplation (with its Kantian overtones) appears to indicate a specifically aesthetic zone of response. Certainly the Hellenistic period explicitly elevated creativity in the visual arts to a new canonical status with its creation of art-historical narratives and histories devolving on the rise of naturalism and on the genius of particular hallowed artists who are preserved for us by the likes of Quintilian and Pliny. That special aestheticism, marked in the choice of works of... (shrink)

Contributed articles on modern philosophy, Saiva Siddhanta and Cō. Kiruṣṇarājā.