Economic methodologists most often study the relations between models and reality while focusing on the issues of the model's epistemic relevance in terms of its relation to the ‘real world’ and representing the real world in a model. We complement the discussion by bringing the model's constructive mechanisms or self-implementing technologies in play. By this, we mean the elements of the economic model that are aimed at ‘implementing’ it by envisaging the ways to change the reality in order to bring (...) it more in line with the model. We are thus concerned mainly not with the ways to change the model to ‘fit’ the reality, but rather with the model's own armature that is supposed to transform the world along theoretical lines. The case we study is Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie general equilibrium model. In particular, we show the following: gradient methods and stability could be regarded as constructive mechanisms of general equilibrium modeling in the context of market socialism debates; the obsession of general eq.. (shrink)

The main focus of acquaintance theorists has been the nature and mechanism of perceptual acquaintance with particulars. Generally, one’s view of perceptual acquaintance with general features has taken its bearings from one’s view of perceptual acquaintance with particulars. This has led to the glossing over of significant differences in the mechanisms of perceptual acquaintance with particulars and with general features. The difference in mechanisms suggests a difference in the sort of epistemic state at play in the two kinds of cases. (...) While the existence of such a difference might initially seem to spell trouble for acquaintance theorists, it can be made palatable by being traced back to the distinct basic functions concepts of particulars and of general features serve in thought. (shrink)

The philosopher Jorge J. E. Gracia engages fifteen prominent scholars on race, ethnicity, nationality, and Hispanic/Latino identity in the United States. Their discussion joins two distinct traditions: the philosophy of race begun by African Americans in the nineteenth century, and the search for an understanding of identity initiated by Latin American philosophers in the sixteenth century. Participants include Linda M. Alcoff, K. Anthony Appiah, Richard J. Bernstein, Lawrence Blum, Robert Gooding-Williams, Eduardo Mendieta, and Lucius T. Outlaw Jr., and their dialogue (...) reflects the analytic, Aristotelian, Continental, literary, Marxist, and pragmatic schools of thought. These intellectuals start with the philosophy of Hispanics/Latinos in the United States and then move to the philosophy of African Americans and Anglo Americans in the United States and the philosophy of Latin Americans in Latin America. Gracia and his interlocutors debate the nature of race and ethnicity and their relation to nationality, linguistic rights, matters of identity, and Affirmative Action, binding the concepts of race and ethnicity together in ways that open new paths of inquiry. Gracia's Familial-Historical View of ethnic and Hispanic/Latino identity operates at the center of each of these discussions, providing vivid access to the philosopher's provocative arguments while adding unique depth to issues that each of us struggles to understand. (shrink)

I propose that the fundamental challenge Berkeley left realists is to account for experiences’ ability to present items as mind-independent, consistent with the claim that experiences always present themselves among the items of awareness. By exploring two ways of responding to this challenge, and ruling out the second, I hope to show that realists aiming to secure a role for experiences in grounding our grasp of mind-independence need to adopt a specific view of perceptual experience. They must take experiences to (...) have translucent aspects, and accord such aspects an essential role in presenting us with a mind-independent world. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that (...) our perceptual experiences have composites-presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness. (shrink)

This paper considers in detail the ontological and normative presuppositions of the state-contingent approach to pricing commodities first introduced by Arrow in his model of general equilibrium under uncertainty, which became a milestone in the theory of finance. By contextualizing Arrow’s fundamental contribution and subsequent developments in finance, it demonstrates how this new conceptual framework implied certain technologies—both intellectual and financial. In showing how theoretical thinking about finance was underlying institutional developments in finance, this paper complements the familiar narrative of (...) the performativity of economics. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that (...) our perceptual experiences have composites-presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness. (shrink)

El presente artículo trata de inscribir el fenómeno de la técnica en el marco de una antropología filosófica que nos permita aproximarnos a una comprensión del momento histórico del siglo XX. Para ello se analiza en primer lugar la noción de técnica propugnada por Friedrich Dessauer, esclareciéndola como un fenómeno totalizador que guarda con el hombre una relación fundamental. Posteriormente se trata la noción de técnica propuesta por Günther Anders, para quien la condición del hombre contemporáneo, inseparable del acontecer técnico, (...) se ha visto sujeta a trasformaciones esenciales. (shrink)

The text reveals the approaches of the philosopher as a thinker to be in the being. Two possible paradigms for achieving the absolute as a form of philosophizing are presented. One is related to the school-academic historicalphilosophical approach, and the other is related to metaphysical experience as an act. The thesis is asserted that the metaphysical goal is achievable only as an individual practical experience of transcendence through the action of the thinker conceived as a precedent. The understanding is argued (...) that it is in the metaphysical act that the thinker objectifies philosophical wisdom, not just the love of philosophy. (shrink)

Considering a fixed language of propositional calculus and the class of formulas with n propositional indeterminates, the evaluation of these formulas with respect to a given truth-values assignment for these indeterminates and with respect to the usual worst-case analysis is proved to belong to the O-class.

WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN: Carl Schmitt: The End of Law, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, Boulder, Nueva York y Oxford, 1999. 345 páginas.GOPAL BALAKRISHNAN: The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, Verso, Londres y Nueva York, 2000. 312 páginas.ARIEL H. COLOMBO: Democracias sin fundamento, Trama Editorial/ Prometeo libros, Buenos Aires, 2001. 159 páginas.ARIEL H. COLOMBO: Tiempo, justicia y validez. Replanteos de teoría política, Trama Editorial/ Prometeo libros, Buenos Aires, 1999. 80 páginas.

In the research we focus on the construction of the sexual lifestyles of young people—undergraduates—in Slovakia and ask “which cultural sources are used?” and “which cultural demands exert pressures on these constructions?” The analysis was based on the answers respondents provided to a questionnaire relating to the preferences of values, aspirations regarding partner and sexual life as well as the socio-economic background of respondents. On the basis of the factor analysis and other steps, we obtained five groups of respondents with (...) different lifestyles: 1. Liberal—free, 2. Partner—monogamous, 3. Natural—instinctive, 4. Hedonistic—free, 5. Submissive—partner. The research proves that while constructing their sexual lifestyles, young people experience confusion as to their personal interests, preferences, internal orientation of partner relationships, and culturally prescribed norms of monogamous relationships. (shrink)

When we talk about creation, we use the progressive and verbs of creation as in ‘Mary is building a house’. The modal account of the progressive says that a sentence such as ‘Mary is building a house’ is true just in case Mary eventually builds a house in all worlds in which her house-building proceeds normally. Recently, the modal account has come under fire from those who claim that it over-generates modal entailments and those who think the progressive should be (...) treated as a predicate of events. By properly situating the modal account within a contemporary semantic framework for natural language modals, I argue that it gives the best semantic treatment of the progressive. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse higher-order risky choices by the representative cumulative prospect theory (CPT) decision maker from three alternative reference points. These are the status quo, average payout and maxmin. The choice tasks we consider in our analysis include binary risks, and are the ones employed in the experimental literature on higher order risk preferences. We demonstrate that the choices made by the representative subject depend on the reference point. If the reference point is the status quo and the (...) lottery choices exhibit symmetric risk, we demonstrate that there is no third order reflection effect of lottery choices but there is a fourth order reflection effect. When the average payout is the reference point, we demonstrate that any third or fourth order lottery choice is possible dependent upon the lottery payoffs. However, under the assumption of maxmin reference point, the risky choices are prudent and temperate. In addition to these results, our analysis reveals that the representative CPT subject can choose combinations of second with third and fourth order risky options that differ from those in other major models of decision under risk. We contrast our theoretical predictions with the empirical results reported in the literature on higher order risk preferences and are able to reconcile some conflicting experimental evidence. (shrink)

Članak predstavlja prikaz obilježavanja 50. obljetnice Hrvatskog filozofskog društva, koje se održalo u Zagrebu od 6. do 8. prosinca 2007., a uključivalo je simpozij Suvremena hrvatska filozofija, predstavljanje novih knjiga u izdanju Hrvatskog filozofskog društva, godišnju skupštinu Hrvatskog filozofskog društva, svečanu akademiju u povodu 50. obljetnice Hrvatskog filozofskog društva, te okrugli stol o Vladimiru Filipoviću, prvom predsjedniku Hrvatskog filozofskog društva.The paper outlines the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Croatian Philosophical Society that took place in Zagreb 6–8 December, 2007. (...) The event incorporated the symposium entitled Contemporary Croatian Philosophy, the presentation of books published by the Society, the annual assembly of the Society, the formal academy to mark the 50th anniversary, and the round table on Vladimir Filipović, the first president of the Croatian Philosophical Society. (shrink)

This paper attempts to compare the positions of Jan Patočka and Pavel Kouba concerning Friedrich Nietzsche and thus to show the role of his philosophy in the Czech phenomenology. The difference between Patočka and Kouba is that Patočka (in a similar way as Heidegger) understands Nietzsche still as a representative of traditional metaphysics (although brought to the utmost frontier), whereas Kouba succeeds to incorporate Nietzsche in the corpus of phenomenological thought and adopt his basic ideas for the specific understanding of (...) the world and of the position of Man in the world. In Kouba’s concept, Nietzsche is not just a figure from the history of philosophy, but an interesting focus around which phenomenological self-reflection can gravitate. (shrink)

This paper examines the first complete Ukrainian translation of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (2022). I discuss the consistency of the Ukrainian translator’s decisions in rendering Kant’s terminology in Ukrainian and assess the accuracy of the translation of Kant’s extremely complicated and nuanced syntax. Based on this assessment, I concluded that this translation provides a strong argument in favor of the idea that translations of classical texts of such complexity will not meet academic standards without scholarly editing. (...) An example of a recurring terminological mistake is the translation of Kant’s “Schluß” as “conclusion,” whereas it means “inference” or “syllogism.” The most common syntactical mistakes are misinterpretations of pronouns (demonstrative, personal, possessive) in subordinate clauses. (shrink)

Ovaj članak predstavlja tragove ranoga vedāntskog tumačenja Maitreyī-brāhmane, jednog od najpoznatijih dijelova Brhadāranyaka-upanišadi u Brahma-sūtrama, temeljnom tekstu filozofske škole vedānte. Predmet diskusije je egzegeza Maitreyī-brāhmane prema trima starodrevnim komentatorima Āśmarathyi, Audulomiu i Kāśakrtsni. Cilj je ovog rada pokazati kakve se metode tumačenja upanišadskih tekstova koriste u različitim vedāntskim školama. Također možemo vidjeti tehnike tumačenja preuzete iz pūrva-mīmāmse, škole tumačenja vedskih tekstova, koje su preoblikovane za tumačenje upanišadi. Članak također pokazuje kako filozofsko stajalište o odnosu sopstva i apsoluta služi egzegetskoj svrsi (...) pomirenja različitih upanišadskih učenja. Učenje BS i starodrevnih komentatora je bhedābhedavāda, istodobna različitost i nerazličitost sopstva i apsoluta. Śankara tumači sūtre kao da poučavaju monistički iluzionizam. On na dvije razine istine razlikuje niži brahman i najviši brahman. Na ovaj je način mogao pomiriti sva upanišadska učenja, bilo da naginjuteizmu ili monizmu. Važna je i hermeneutička rasprava Śankarina s bhedābhedavādinom Bhartrprapañcom o prirodi znanja i djelovanja, odnosno prvenstvu upanišadi koje se bave znanjem brahmana nad brāhmanama koje se bave obrednim djelovanjem.This article presents some traces of early vedāntic interpretations of Maitreyī-brāhmana, one of the most famous parts of Brhadāranyaka-upanishad, in the Brahma-sūtras, the fundamental work of the philosophical school vedānta. Topic under discussion conveys the exegesis of Maitreyī-brāhmana according to three ancient commentators, Āśmarathya, Audulomi and Kāśakrtsna. The purpose of this article is to show the methods of interpretation of upanishadic passages in different vedāntic schools. Also, we can see some techniques of interpretation taken from pūrva-mīmāmsa, the school of vedic interpretation, and adapted for upanishadic interpretation. The article shows how the main philosophical standpoint on the relation of the self and the absolute serves the exegetical purposes. So the standpoint of the BS and the ancient commentators is bhedābhedavāda, teaching of both the difference and non-difference between the self and the absolute, like sparks and fire. Śankara interprets the sūtras as teaching monistic illusionism. He also differentiates between the two levels of truth and accordingly the lower brahman and the highest brahman. In this way he was able to reconcile all upanishadic passages, whether they inclined to theism or monism. There is also an important hermeneutical discussion of Śankara with bhedābhedavādin Bhartrprapañca on the nature of knowledge and action and priority of the upanishads, part of sacred canon dealing with knowledge of brahman over the brāhmanas, which are dealing with ritual action. (shrink)

Es paradójico cómo la vida suele entenderse de manera menos equivocada desde la ficción, la realidad en sí y por sí se convierte en una trampa donde la razón que la justifica termina por dibujarle sus propios barrotes. Tal vez lo que sucede es que la razón no tiene tan completamente asegurada una razón, de la misma manera que la locura no está ausente de razón y de sentido; es evidente que siempre hallaremos una razón en la locura y una (...) locura en cada razón. Exacerbar la razón o la locura nos pondrá siempre en el ojo del huracán, nos hará visibles ante los demás, nos personalizará, es decir, descubrirá en cada uno de nosotros a un personaje. (shrink)

La fundamentación de la física clásica llevó a Descartes a encontrar en el "ego cogito" la condición necesaria de todas las representaciones posibles: los conceptos de materia y de movimiento, tal como los exigía la nueva ciencia fueron concebidos por él inicialmente en una forma extremadamente racionalista, lo cual convirtió al "yo pienso" en el sujeto, en el fundamento de todo lo que puede ser real. Algunos científicos han sostenido que el "yo" según Descartes supone una tal preeminencia de la (...) epistemología, que impide pensar la moral y la situación del hombre frente a la incertidumbre de la vida. Se verá en el artículo que el sujeto hace de la naturaleza un mero objeto, pero mantiene su propia esfera, la de la libertad, hacia la cual estará dirigida toda la admiración después de que Descartes lograra resolver el enigma del universo. (shrink)