Članak predstavlja prikaz obilježavanja 50. obljetnice Hrvatskog filozofskog društva, koje se održalo u Zagrebu od 6. do 8. prosinca 2007., a uključivalo je simpozij Suvremena hrvatska filozofija, predstavljanje novih knjiga u izdanju Hrvatskog filozofskog društva, godišnju skupštinu Hrvatskog filozofskog društva, svečanu akademiju u povodu 50. obljetnice Hrvatskog filozofskog društva, te okrugli stol o Vladimiru Filipoviću, prvom predsjedniku Hrvatskog filozofskog društva.The paper outlines the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Croatian Philosophical Society that took place in Zagreb 6–8 December, 2007. (...) The event incorporated the symposium entitled Contemporary Croatian Philosophy, the presentation of books published by the Society, the annual assembly of the Society, the formal academy to mark the 50th anniversary, and the round table on Vladimir Filipović, the first president of the Croatian Philosophical Society. (shrink)

Naïve realists have a motive to but have thus far been unable to offer compelling reasons for positing an external constraint on the occurrence of the consciousness involved in perfect hallucinations. If the occurrences of such consciousness were confined to abnormal perceptual contexts, the possibility of perfect hallucinations would have no bearing on the nature of the consciousness involved in cases of perception. On the other hand, it is unclear why the character of the perceptual context should matter constitutively to (...) the occurrence of the sort of consciousness involved in perfect hallucinations. Supposing (reasonably) that such consciousness does not consist in an awareness of the environment, it is puzzling why the latter should be a certain way for the former to occur. I propose a solution to this puzzle, which helps secure the naïve realist approach to perception. Perfect hallucinatory experiences issue from exercises of the perceptual system operating in a second, defective mode – complementary to the normal one, whose exercises issue in an awareness of the environment. (shrink)

Is property-awareness constituted by representation or not? If it were, merely being aware of the qualities of physical objects would involve being in a representational state. This would have considerable implications for a prominent view of the nature of successful perceptual experiences. According to naïve realism, any such experience—or more specifically its character—is fundamentally a relation of awareness to concrete items in the environment. Naïve realists take their view to be a genuine alternative to representationalism, the view on which the (...) character of such experiences is constituted by representation. But naïve realists must admit qualities or property instances as items of awareness if they are to remain wedded to common sense, and the nature of property-awareness may smuggle constitutive representation into the naïve realist account of character. I argue that whether property-awareness involves representation, and consequently whether naïve realism is distinct from representationalism or not, depends on what qualities are fundamentally. On universalist and nominalist accounts, property-awareness turns out to involve representation. Not so under tropism. (shrink)

How do we come to like the things that we do? Each one of us starts from a relatively similar state at birth, yet we end up with vastly different sets of aesthetic preferences. These preferences go on to define us both as individuals and as members of our cultures. Therefore, it is important to understand how aesthetic preferences form over our lifetimes. This poses a challenging problem: to understand this process, one must account for the many factors at play (...) in the formation of aesthetic values and how these factors influence each other over time. A general framework based on basic neuroscientific principles that can also account for this process is needed. Here, we present such a framework and illustrate it through a model that accounts for the trajectories of aesthetic values over time. Our framework is inspired by meta-analytic data of neuroimaging studies of aesthetic appraisal. This framework incorporates effects of sensory inputs, rewards, and motivational states. Crucially, each one of these effects is probabilistic. We model their interactions under a reinforcement-learning circuitry. Simulations of this model and mathematical analysis of the framework lead to three main findings. First, different people may develop distinct weighing of aesthetic variables because of individual variability in motivation. Second, individuals from different cultures and environments may develop different aesthetic values because of unique sensory inputs and social rewards. Third, because learning is stochastic stemming from probabilistic sensory inputs, motivations, and rewards, aesthetic values vary in time. These three theoretical findings account for different lines of empirical research. Through our study, we hope to provide a general and unifying framework for understanding the various aspects involved in the formation of aesthetic values over time. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Schopenhauer on the Inevitability of Suffering Criticisms of Schopenhauer's Thesis that to Desire Is to Suffer The Unattainability of True Satisfaction The Inevitability of Boredom The Negative Nature of Pleasure and Satisfaction Happiness and Well‐Being Degrees of Unhappiness: The Possibility of Amelioration The Paradox of the Suspension or Negation of the Will The Inevitability of Unhappiness References Further Reading.

A disconnect remains between theories about responsible management and application in real-life organizations. Part of the reason is due to the complexity and holistic nature of the field, and the fact that many of the benefits of aligning business objectives with changing societal conditions are of an intangible nature. Human resource management is an increasingly important part of the field with benefits including talent retention, higher levels of motivation, and improvements in organizational cohesion. This paper sets out an experiment run (...) at a large Spanish university to try to analyze the impact on worker productivity of a responsible management stance by an employer. Based on the Corporate Social Performance model, the paper examines the issue from the point of view of responsibilities, responsiveness, and outcomes, and considers the cost/benefit effect of incorporating a social responsibility variable into the wage structure to measure the impact on productivity. (shrink)

This paper makes explicit the basic problem perfect hallucinations pose for perceptual naive realists, more fundamental than the well‐trodden Screening‐off Problem. The deeper problem offers the basis for an overarching classification of the available naive‐ realist‐friendly approaches to perfect hallucinations. In the course of laying out the challenges to the different types of response, the paper makes a case for the superiority of a particular approach to perfect hallucinations, on which they would be understood as a special kind of perceptual (...) anomaly—arising from a secondary mode of perceptual processing. (shrink)

The main result proved in the paper is that on every recursive structure the intrinsically hyperarithmetical sets coincide with the relatively intrinsically hyperarithmetical sets. As a side effect of the proof an effective version of the Kueker's theorem on definability by means of infinitary formulas is obtained.

Epistemicists claim that if it is vague whether p, it is unknowable whether p. Some contest this on epistemic grounds: vague intuitions about vague matters need not fully preclude knowledge, if those intuitions are response-dependent in some special sense of enabling vague knowledge. This paper defends the epistemicist principle that vagueness entails ignorance against such objections. I argue that not only is response-dependence an implausible characterization of actual vague matters, its mere possibility poses no threat to epistemicism and is properly (...) accounted for by the epistemicist’s own principles. (shrink)

Stewart Shapiro has objected to the epistemicist theory of vagueness on grounds that it gives counterintuitive predictions about cases involving conditional obligation. This paper details a response on the epistemicist’s behalf. I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the objection is unsuccessful as an argument against epistemicism. I then reconstruct and offer two alternative arguments inspired by Shapiro’s considerations, and argue that these fail too, given the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligations.

This chapter contains sections titled: Respecting Sacred Objects: Some Difficulties Alternative Grounds for Respect: The Historical and Aesthetic Properties of an Object.

While agreeing with Bernard Reginster that Nietzsche's advocacy of the will to power as a psychological thesis is much more fundamental than his extension of it as a cosmological or metaphysical thesis, I criticize him for failing to support this interpretation, and I attempt to supply an analysis that does support it. Then, I take issue with the common tendency to sanitize Nietzsche's theory of the will to power, to make it more palatable—and with Reginster's treatment of this issue. This (...) leads me to an examination of Nietzsche's conception of power—and a critique of Reginster's account of it. (shrink)

I propose that the fundamental challenge Berkeley left realists is to account for experiences’ ability to present items as mind-independent, consistent with the claim that experiences always present themselves among the items of awareness. By exploring two ways of responding to this challenge, and ruling out the second, I hope to show that realists aiming to secure a role for experiences in grounding our grasp of mind-independence need to adopt a specific view of perceptual experience. They must take experiences to (...) have translucent aspects, and accord such aspects an essential role in presenting us with a mind-independent world. (shrink)

¿Estuvo la cultura de autoría impresa fuera del alcance de las mujeres antes de 1887 en Costa Rica? El propósito principal de este artículo es ofrecer una primera respuesta a dicha pregunta con base en una revisión preliminar de periódicos y revistas quepermiten considerar el problema planteado desde una perspectiva más amplia. En breve, el argumento central que se va a desarrollar es que la construcción de esa autoría pasó por tres etapas: en la primera, durante las décadas de 1840 (...) y 1850, tal proceso se basó en la redacción de anuncios comerciales; en la segunda, centradaen los decenios de 1860 y 1870, predominaron los discursos de alumnas y maestras relacionados con actividades de enseñanza; y en la tercera, ubicada a partir de 1885, se dieron dos tendencias paralelas. Por un lado, algunas docentes comenzaron a dar a conocer sus producciones literarias; y por el otro, el Estado, en vísperas de la reforma educativa de 1886, implementó una política para que las educadoras elaboraran informes de sus actividades escolares y los enviaran a una revista especializada para ser publicados. (shrink)

In 1976, Richard Dawkins coined the term meme as a way to metaphorically project bio-evolutionary principles upon the processes of cultural and social development. The works of Dawkins and of some other enthusiasts had contributed to a rise in popularity of the concept of memetics (“study of memes”), but the interest to this new field started to decline quite soon. The conceptual apparatus of memetics was based on a number of quasi-biological terms, but the emerging discipline failed to go beyond (...) those initial metaphors. This article is an attempt to rebuild the toolkit of memetics with the help of the more fundamental concepts taken from semiotics and to propose a synthetic conceptual framework connecting genetics and memetics, in which semiotics is used as the transdisciplinary methodology for both disciplines. The concept of sign is used as the meta-lingual equivalent for both the concepts of gene and meme. In the most general understanding, sign is a thing which stands for another thing. In genetics, this translates into gene that is a section of DNA that stands for the algorithm of how a particular biomolecule is built. In memetics, the similar principle works in meme that is a thing that stands for the rules of how a particular cultural practice is performed. (shrink)

The relation between philosophy and theology in Martin Heidegger’s thought is multilayered and tense. On the one hand, he admits that his theological origin, i.e. his Christian-Catholic rootedness, determines the direction of his thought, while on the other hand, he has been fighting against theology that is too much tinted with philosophy. At the same time, he opposes that his thought be called theistic or atheistic. In the analytic of Dasein he wants to create assumptions that would enable him to (...) talk about God, gods or divine in general. This brings him close to mysticism, and even more so to mythology, which is revealed in his interpretation of Hölderlin. Nietzsche’s talk about God’s death helps him in this context. However, neither with Nietzsche nor with Heidegger does this death look like real death. Both thinkers hold that death strikes that God who has in philosophy and theology been made a being. After the thinking of the Being had thrown light upon their thought, God of Biblical theology and above all God whose coming is expected according to Heidegger cannot be left to death, because he evades human comprehension, especially one in the form of philosophy and theology. (shrink)

An external characterization of the inductive sets on countable abstract structures is presented. The main result is an abstract version of the classical Suslin-Kleene characterization of the hyperarithmetical sets.

While the history of Cold War social and human sciences has become an immensely productive line of inquiry and has generated some exciting research, a lot remains still to be done in studying more deeply the known stories, venturing into the unknown ones and, in particular, looking in greater detail at the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain. In our expository introduction to this special issue, we demonstrate how its articles enhance our understanding of the postwar social and human sciences. (...) The special issue invites us to rethink the role of the local intellectual and disciplinary contexts in the postwar cultures of knowledge; to pay more attention to the networks and institutions that fostered communication across the Iron Curtain; to trace various asymmetries at work in the divided academic world and the ambiguous status of many actors who enable the East–West contacts despite the general hostility and ideological cleavages; and finally to arrive at a more differentiated and complex view of the whole intellectual landscape in the history of social and human sciences opening up once all the Cold War protagonists, including the countries of the eastern bloc, are subject to a detailed study. This project, we believe, is worthwhile not just for the sake of historical accuracy but also for understanding and changing the societies we live in, which are often still contaminated by the maladies of the Cold War. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that (...) our perceptual experiences have composites-presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that (...) our perceptual experiences have composites-presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness. (shrink)

Three partners founded the Grenada Chocolate Company in 1999: Mott Green, Doug Browne and Edmond Brown. Several years ago Doug passed away of cancer and in June 2013 Mott suffered a fatal electrocution while repairing a piece of equipment. Edmond was now thrust into the leadership position and left to decide what direction GCC should take. The GCC product line was becoming increasingly popular both on the island and internationally and demand was high,but the original vision for the company was (...) to produce bean-to-bar chocolates while providing a fair wage to the local employees and farmers. Expansion could be an option for Edmond and GCC, but was it possible to expand and stay true to the ideas on which GCC was founded? (shrink)

Hartry Field's formulation of an epistemological argument against platonism is only valid if knowledge is constrained by a causal clause. Contrary to recent claims (e.g. in Liggins (2006), Liggins (2010)), Field's argument therefore fails the very same criterion usually taken to discredit Benacerraf's earlier version.

The following article presents how the first Czech phenomenologist Jan Patoèka became a student of Edmund Husserl and how he motivated in the 70s a small group of Czech phenomenologists to begin the translation of Sein und Zeit, which started after his death in 1977. The article then describes how this translation was secretly “published” in the 80s, under the circumstances of the communist totalitarian regime, as successive installments. It then discusses examples of how the linguistic translation difficulties were solved (...) and how the entire book was finally and officially published in the middle of the 90s. (shrink)