With the expansion of artificial intelligence and advanced technologies, theworld in the 21st century is rapidly changing and imposing new living dynamics. Althoughsuch changes affect all age groups, younger generations accept them faster andreact more positively. The new cohorts - Generation Z and Alpha - live in a digital worldthat affect their lifestyle, interpersonal relations, quality of mental health, psychologicalwell-being and everyday challenges. The presence of the so called “Frankenstein effect”in some adults provoked by the fast development of artificial (...) intelligence and robotics,reflects a “humans versus machines” position, viewing artificial intelligence as athreat to humanity. However, the reality is that digital and human world are not inconflict, since many people are already using artificial intelligence tools on daily basis.It is implemented in certain aspects of medicine, education, business, law, agriculture,industry, space technology and in many other fields. With this in mind, the aspect ofmorality pops up as a very important one. A frequently asked question is: Does artificialintelligence have the capacity to make moral decisions independently? Therefore, integratingmorality into AI algorithms is one of the priorities that interdisciplinary teamsfrom engineering and computer sciences, psychology, philosophy, sociology, law, etc.are intensively working on. This paper addresses this issue by presenting findings fromrelevant research which discusses the challenges and possibilities for integrating thedimensions of morality and introducing human values into autonomous systems thatperform complex tasks. (shrink)

Scientists no longer accept the existence of a distinct moral organ as phrenologists once did. A generation of young neurologists is using advanced technological medical equipment to unravel specific brain processes enabling moral cognition. In addition, evolutionary psychologists have formulated hypotheses about the origins and nature of our moral architecture. Little by little, the concept of a ‘moral brain’ is reinstated. As the crossover between disciplines focusing on moral cognition was rather limited up to now, this book aims at filling (...) the gap. Which evolutionary biological hypotheses provide a useful framework for starting new neurological research? How can brain imaging be used to corroborate hypotheses concerning the evolutionary background of our species? In this reader, a broad range of prominent scientists and philosophers shed their expert view on the current accomplishments and future challenges in the field of moral cognition and assess how cooperation between neurology and evolutionary psychology can boost research into the field of the moral brain. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to advance, one key challenge is ensuring that AI aligns with certain values. However, in the current diverse and democratic society, reaching a normative consensus is complex. This paper delves into the methodological aspect of how AI ethicists can effectively determine which values AI should uphold. After reviewing the most influential methodologies, we detail an intuitionist research agenda that offers guidelines for aligning AI applications with a limited set of reliable moral intuitions, each (...) underlying a refined cooperative view of AI. We discuss appropriate epistemic tools for collecting, filtering, and justifying moral intuitions with the aim of reducing cognitive and social biases. The proposed methodology facilitates a large collective participation in AI alignment, while ensuring the reliability of the considered moral judgments. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is the following claim: as a purely conceptual matter, the moral truths could be pretty much anything, and we should assume this in assessing our reliability at grasping moral truths. This claim, which I call No Content, plays a key role in an important skeptical argument against realist moral knowledge – the Normative Lottery Argument. In this paper, I argue that moral realists can, and should, reject No Content. My argument centers on the idea of (...) practical intelligibility. I explore different aspects of practical intelligibility, and I argue that such intelligibility sets a constraint on the possibilities we should consider when assessing our reliability at grasping moral truths. (shrink)

From some perspectives, it seems obvious that emotions and feelings must be both reasonable and morally significant: from others, it may seem as obvious that they cannot be. This paper seeks to advance discussion of ethical implications of the currently contested issue of the relationship of reason to feeling and emotion via reflection upon various examples of affectively charged moral dilemma. This discussion also proceeds by way of critical consideration of recent empirical enquiry into these issues in the literature of (...) so-called emotional intelligence. In this regard, despite ambiguities in their accounts of the relationship of reason to emotion, advocates of emotional intelligence generally incline to therapeutic conceptions of emotional health which are not inconsistent with currently fashionable cognitivist accounts of feeling and emotion. All the same, it is arguable that therapeutic or other strategies which overplay the possibility of cognitive or other resolution of emotional conflict are prey to certain difficulties. First, they underemphasise those passive but identity-constitutive aspects of affect which are not obviously rationally accountable. Secondly, they insufficiently recognise the extent to which emotional conflicts can be significantly implicated in moral diversity. In view of either or both of these points, they may fail to appreciate the moral inappropriateness of attempts to resolve certain forms of emotional conflict or tension. (shrink)

Through a detailed reconstruction of the process of moral habituation, which includes both a desiderative and an intellectual aspect, I demonstrate in this essay that Aristotelian practical science does not make people practically wise on a ground and personal level, but teaches moral educators how to produce basically good men in and through practice. In particular, the formation of the correct wish for happiness is the natural culmination of desiderative habituation, and intellectual habituation that develops personal practical wisdom is (...) mainly a process of moral apprenticeship under senior statesmen. My analyses of the aspects of moral habituation should reveal that even in his practical science, that is, in a kind of theory pursued for the sake of practice, Aristotle still maintains the clear distinction between theoretical and practical intelligence and shows deep insights into the peculiarity of the latter. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine why moral exemplars are useful and even necessary in moral education despite several critiques from researchers and educators. To support my point, I review recent AI research demonstrating that exemplar-based learning is superior to rule-based learning in model performance in training neural networks, such as large language models. I particularly focus on why education aiming at promoting the development of multifaceted moral functioning can be done effectively by using exemplars, which is similar to exemplar-based learning (...) in AI model training. Furthermore, I discuss the potential limitations and issues related to exemplar-applied moral education with findings from recent studies in AI research raising concerns about model biases and toxic outcomes. I attempt to propose ways to address the concerns regarding employing moral exemplars as well. As remedies, I suggest that autonomy-supporting deliberative and reflective learning processes should be utilized. Furthermore, based on the discussion, I examine how macroscopic socio-cultural aspects influence the effectiveness of exemplar-applied moral education. Suggestions for moral educators and future directions for research in moral education are briefly discussed. (shrink)

This book starts from the proposition that the field of intelligence lacks any systematic ethical review, and then develops a framework based on the notion of harm and the establishment of Just Intelligence Principles. As the professional practice of intelligence collection adapts to the changing environment of the twenty-first century, many academic experts and intelligence professionals have called for a coherent ethical framework that outlines exactly when, by what means and to what ends intelligence is (...) justified. Recent controversies, including reports of abuse at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, allegations of extraordinary rendition programmes and the ever-increasing pervasiveness of the ‘surveillance state’, have all raised concerns regarding the role of intelligence in society. As a result, there is increased debate regarding the question of whether or not intelligence collection can be carried out ethically. _The Ethics of Intelligence_ tackles this question by creating an ethical framework specifically designed for intelligence that is capable of outlining under what circumstances, if any, different intelligence collection activities are ethically permissible. The book examines three of the main collection disciplines in the field of intelligence studies: imagery intelligence, signals intelligence and human intelligence. By applying the ethical framework established at the beginning of the book to these three important intelligence collection disciplines, it is possible to better understand the ethical framework while also demonstrating its real-life applicability. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, ethics, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR. (shrink)

Many reports independently confirm that even more than a quarter of a century after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the results of research and development in those countries that were under its influence are insufficient in comparison to the rest of the world. Given that human intelligence is not distributed unevenly and that science is a powerful driving force for the future of an economy, there is a hidden problem, which, if it can be resolved, may release great (...) economic potential. The first generation of researchers from Armenia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Slovakia and Ukraine, who successfully completed their education after the political revolution, were surveyed. The survey revealed many similarities with regards to ethics, but that there is mounting evidence that the main cause of the current situation is the state of the local legal systems. The conclusion was drawn that a conceptual change in staffing within the relevant legal systems is required to release potential and stimulate wealth creation. (shrink)

The concept of 'artificial intelligence' has been eulogised within science fiction since the early twentieth century, and today, it is accompanied by a tenacious desire to transition this fiction into some kind of reality. AI has become engulfed in hysteria-its expectations have been exaggerated, widely confused, and erroneously distorted. Playing God with Artificial Intelligence dispels the misconceptions surrounding AI and forms a realistic betterment in understanding, as there is an uncensored belief in something not entirely understood. It offers (...) a more accurate and comprehensive notion of what is believed to be AI, what it isn't, and what it might achieve in the future. Playing God controversially presents numerous suppositions as to how to create an intelligent agent that can think and reason independently. With the establishment of a 'freedom of thought,' it considers plagiarising nature and explores the development of an ethical and morally responsible 'being' who will have an innate ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills. The book examines several philosophies to strengthen its conjecture in support of the birth of an intelligent agent, Zavier-who might become humankind's saviour. The book explores the process of shaping and architecting a digital mind, encompassing awareness and a level of consciousness that may one day bestow 'free will' to this creation. This book is for industry analysts, academics, developers, data scientists and, more broadly, anyone with an interest in learning more about artificial intelligence. (shrink)

To assess the intelligence of machines, Alan Turing proposed a test of imitation known as the imitation game, famously known as the Turing test. To assess whether artificial intelligent (AI) systems could be moral or not, Colin Allen et al. developed a test of imitation in the context of morality, a test known as the Moral Turing Test (MTT), which I will, in this paper, call the moral imitation game. There are arguments against developing any type of MTT or (...) moral imitation game. Rather than developing a moral imitation game, this paper proposes a criterion of imitation for AI systems in the moral scenario. To develop a criterion of imitation, I explore the notion of moral attribution in detail. Within the case of moral attribution, I introduce the subject‐ascriber distinction. The notion of moral attribution and the subject‐ascriber distinction is employed to address the following questions: (a) how is the assessment in MTT arranged?, (b) what is the role of the interrogator in the MTT?, and (c) what information is to be concealed from the interrogator? The first question deals with the aspect of assessment, the second question deals with the reordering of the role of the interrogator and the third one deals with the concealment aspect of the imitation game. After that, a criterion of imitation for AI systems is put forward. Using the subject‐ascriber distinction in moral attribution and David Lewis' Mad Pain and Martian Pain cases, it is argued that the notion of sentience is insignificant for the ascriber for moral attributions. (shrink)

The inquiry into the moral status of artificial intelligence (AI) is leading to prolific theoretical discussions. A new entity that does not share the material substrate of human beings begins to show signs of a number of properties that are nuclear to the understanding of moral agency. It makes us wonder whether the properties we associate with moral status need to be revised or whether the new artificial entities deserve to enter within the circle of moral consideration. This raises (...) the foreboding that we are at the gates of an anthropological crisis: the properties bound to moral agency have been exclusively possessed in the past by human beings and have shaped the very definition of being human. In this article, I will argue that AI does not lead us to an anthropological crisis and that, if we adhere to the history and philosophy of technology, we will notice that the debate on the moral status of AI uncritically starts from an anthropology of properties and loses sight of the relational dimension of technology. First, I will articulate three criteria for analyzing different anthropological views in philosophy of technology. Second, I will propose six anthropological models: traditional, industrial, phenomenological, postphenomenological, symmetrical, and cyborg. Third, I will show how the emergence of AI breaks with the dynamics of increased relationality in the history and philosophy of technology. I will argue that this aspect is central to debates about the moral status of AI, since it sheds light on an aspect of moral consideration that has been obscured. Finally, I will reject entirely relational approaches to moral status and propose two hybrid possibilities for rethinking it. (shrink)

The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in Education identifies and confronts key ethical issues generated over years of AI research, development, and deployment in learning contexts. Adaptive, automated, and data-driven education systems are increasingly being implemented in universities, schools, and corporate training worldwide, but the ethical consequences of engaging with these technologies remain unexplored. Featuring expert perspectives from inside and outside the AIED scholarly community, this book provides AI researchers, learning scientists, educational technologists, and others with questions, frameworks, guidelines, policies, (...) and regulations to ensure the positive impact of artificial intelligence in learning. (shrink)

Moral uncertainty surrounding the use of armed drones has been a persistant problem for more than two decades. In response, [this book] provides greater clarity by investigating the ways in which violent drone use is seen as just or unjust in a variety of circumstances. Adopting a broad-based approach to normative inquiry, this book organizes moral ideas around a series of concepts of drone violence, including warfare, violent law enforcement, tele-intimate violence and violence devolved from humans to artificial intelligence (...) (AI) technologies. Christian Enemark assesses these concepts to discern and address teh potential for armed drone systems to support moral progress or to generate injustice. (shrink)

t. 1. Economie politique et philosophie sociale -- t. 2. Economie normative et philosophie morale -- t. 3. Science économique et philosophie des sciences -- t. 4. Leçons de philosophie économique.

Nurses have traditionally been regarded as clinicians that deliver compassionate, safe, and empathetic health care (Nurses again outpace other professions for honesty & ethics, 2018). Caring is a fundamental characteristic, expectation, and moral obligation of the nursing and caregiving professions (Nursing: Scope and standards of practice, American Nurses Association, Silver Spring, MD, 2015). Along with caring, nurses are expected to undertake ever‐expanding duties and complex tasks. In part because of the growing physical, intellectual and emotional demandingness, of nursing as well (...) as technological advances, artificial intelligence (AI) and AI care robots are rapidly changing the healthcare landscape. As technology becomes more advanced, efficient, and economical, opportunities and pressure to introduce AI into nursing care will only increase. In the first part of the article, we review recent and existing applications of AI in nursing and speculate on future use. Second, situate our project within the recent literature on the ethics of nursing and AI. Third, we explore three dominant theories of caring and the two paradigmatic expressions of caring (touch and presence) and conclude that AI—at least for the foreseeable future—is incapable of caring in the sense central to nursing and caregiving ethics. We conclude that for AI to be implemented ethically, it cannot transgress the core values of nursing, usurp aspects of caring that can only meaningfully be carried out by human beings, and it must support, open, or improve opportunities for nurses to provide the uniquely human aspects of care. (shrink)

This paper looks at philosophical questions that arise in the context of AI alignment. It defends three propositions. First, normative and technical aspects of the AI alignment problem are interrelated, creating space for productive engagement between people working in both domains. Second, it is important to be clear about the goal of alignment. There are significant differences between AI that aligns with instructions, intentions, revealed preferences, ideal preferences, interests and values. A principle-based approach to AI alignment, which combines these elements (...) in a systematic way, has considerable advantages in this context. Third, the central challenge for theorists is not to identify ‘true’ moral principles for AI; rather, it is to identify fair principles for alignment that receive reflective endorsement despite widespread variation in people’s moral beliefs. The final part of the paper explores three ways in which fair principles for AI alignment could potentially be identified. (shrink)

Bringing together literary scholars, computer scientists, ethicists, philosophers of mind, and scholars from affiliated disciplines, this collection of essays offers important and timely insights into the pasts, presents, and, above all, possible futures of Artificial Intelligence. This book covers topics such as ethics and morality, identity and selfhood, and broader issues about AI, addressing questions about the individual, social, and existential impacts of such technologies. Through the works of science fiction authors such as Isaac Asimov, Stanislaw Lem, Ann Leckie, (...) Iain M. Banks, and Martha Wells, alongside key visual productions such as Ex Machina, Westworld, and Her, contributions illustrate how science fiction might inform potential futures as well as acting as a springboard to bring disciplinary knowledge to bear on significant developments of Artificial Intelligence. Addressing a broad, interdisciplinary audience, both expert and non-expert readers gain an in-depth understanding of the wide range of pressing issues to which Artificial Intelligence gives rise, and the ways in which science fiction narratives have been used to represent them. Using science fiction in this manner enables readers to see how even fictional worlds and imagined futures have very real impacts on how we understand these technologies. As such, readers are introduced to theoretical positions on Artificial Intelligence through fictional works as well as encouraged to reflect on the diverse aspects of Artificial Intelligence through its many philosophical, social, legal, scientific, and cultural ramifications. (shrink)

The pressure to obey : what would you do? -- Obedience and disobedience : when is which right? -- Breaking the habit : it takes more than you think -- Finding your voice : saying "no" so you are heard -- Understanding the true risks of saying "yes" -- The dynamics of authority and obedience -- Changing the dynamics -- The crucial lessons from guide dog training -- The price of teaching obedience too well -- Teaching intelligent disobedience : where (...) do the lessons begin? -- Doing right at work : saving lives and accomplishing missions. (shrink)

Morality as we know it seems inextricably involved with notions of responsibility, desert, and blame. But a number of philosophers (e.g., Pereboom, G. Strawson) have concluded that responsibility in the desert-supporting sense rests upon metaphysical presuppositions that are unsatisfiable whether or not determinism is true. Some of these philosophers go on to argue that we ought - morally ought - to discard the idea of moral responsibility. Is this proposal coherent? Could morality intelligibly be practiced in a way that dispenses (...) altogether with praise, blame, resentment, and desert - the concepts that constitute what we understand as holding agents morally responsible for their deeds? I distinguish three aspects of moral practice, which I term "naming," "shaming," and "blaming." Of the three, only the last, blaming, implicates the idea of moral - as opposed to merely causal - responsibility. I defend what I term the "Enlightened View" that accepts naming and shaming as essential to morality, but holds blaming to be inessential. I distinguish the Enlightened View from the "Abolitionist View" that holds blaming to be not merely inessential to morality but undesirable and unworthy. Crucial to the defense of the Enlightened View is an account of moral guidance restricted to the devices of naming and shaming. This discussion uncovers a very weak sense of blame and desert implicit in the practice of morality - one too weak to require any major qualification of the Enlightened and Abolitionist Views. I conclude by defending the Enlightened View against the charge (by e.g. Smilansky) that it would diminish our conception of ourselves as persons. (shrink)

Roboethics is a recently developed field of applied ethics which deals with the ethical aspects of technologies such as robots, ambient intelligence, direct neural interfaces and invasive nano-devices and intelligent soft bots. In this article we look specifically at the issue of (moral) responsibility in artificial intelligent systems. We argue for a pragmatic approach, where responsibility is seen as a social regulatory mechanism. We claim that having a system which takes care of certain tasks intelligently, learning from experience and (...) making autonomous decisions gives us reasons to talk about a system (an artifact) as being “responsible” for a task. No doubt, technology is morally significant for humans, so the “responsibility for a task” with moral consequences could be seen as moral responsibility. Intelligent systems can be seen as parts of socio-technological systems with distributed responsibilities, where responsible (moral) agency is a matter of degree. Knowing that all possible abnormal conditions of a system operation can never be predicted, and no system can ever be tested for all possible situations of its use, the responsibility of a producer is to assure proper functioning of a system under reasonably foreseeable circumstances. Additional safety measures must however be in place in order to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The socio-technological system aimed at assuring a beneficial deployment of intelligent systems has several functional responsibility feedback loops which must function properly: the awareness and procedures for handling of risks and responsibilities on the side of designers, producers, implementers and maintenance personnel as well as the understanding of society at large of the values and dangers of intelligent technology. The basic precondition for developing of this socio-technological control system is education of engineers in ethics and keeping alive the democratic debate on the preferences about future society. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence Applications in Higher Education offers direct examples of how artificial intelligence systems can be applied in today's higher education contexts. As use of AI rapidly advances within colleges and universities worldwide, there is a pressing need to showcase the challenges, opportunities, and ethical considerations inherent in deploying these advanced computational tools. This book highlights the multifaceted roles of AI across teaching and learning, institutional administration, student data management, and beyond. Its collected case studies furnish actionable insights (...) into enhancing academic institutions and addressing diverse learning priorities such as motivation, engagement, feedback, and achievement goals. This valuable reference for researchers, designers, administrators, teaching faculty, and graduate students across various university programs offers fresh perspectives on generative AI, adaptive learning, intelligent tutoring systems, chatbots, predictive technologies, remote learning, and more. (shrink)

In this paper I describe the imaginary community of Gullible. Gulliblians are led by moral pressures to believe whatever they are told and, in the scenario that I sketch, this leads to them having widespread contradictory beliefs. This community is nevertheless intelligible to us given what we know about their situation and their moral code. Davidson, however, holds there to be what I call a logicist constraint on interpretation: thinkers can only be interpreted if a good proportion of their beliefs (...) are rational and, for Davidson, rationality entails logical consistency. The possibility of Gullible therefore forces us to reject this logicist aspect of Davidson’s account of interpretation and intelligibility. (shrink)

In such works as A Short History of Ethics, Against the Self-lmages of the Age, and After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the intelligibility of the moral life hinges upon viewing the moral life as essential to the happy life, or eudaimonia. In my article I examine the reasons he gives for saying this, arguing that this thesis is not sufficiently defended by MacIntyre. I also draw connections between this thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life and other (...) aspects of MacIntyre’s thought, such as his communitarianism. In concluding I note that several of MacIntyre’s more significant claims about morality might well be true even if his thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life is false. (shrink)

Evolutionary moral realism is the view that there are moral values with roots in evolution that are both specifically moral and exist independently of human belief systems. In beginning to sketch the outlines of such a view, we examine moral goods like fairness and empathetic caring as valuable and real aspects of the environments of species that are intelligent and social, or at least developing along an evolutionary trajectory that could lead to a level of intelligence that would enable (...) individual members of the species to recognize and respond to such things as the moral goods they in fact are. We suggest that what is most morally interesting and important from a biological perspective is the existence and development of such trajectories, rather than the position of one particular species, such as our own, on one particular trajectory. (shrink)

First published in 1977. Ethics is the most practical branch of philosophy: its immediate concern is with people's actions. Yet most philosophers do little to relate ethics intelligibly to the human situation. In this inquiry into the nature of ethics, William Ash draws on the relevant works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin to present the theory and practice of Marxist ethics. He offers an explanation of the moral aspect of Marx's dictum: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, (...) in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.' The book includes, perhaps for the first time in so considered a form, an assessment of Mao Tsetung's contribution to Marxist moral philosophy, together with the ethical implications of such developments in social practice as the Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The author deals with the question of value by analysing the concept of 'good'; with the question of claims on people and things by analysing the concept of 'right'; with the question of the limits and scope of freedom of choice and action by analysing the concept of 'ought'.' Clearly written in order to 'de-mystify' the subject, the book challenges readers to test the author's enlightened, Marxist approach in terms of the ethical ordering of their own society. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence and Music Ecosystem highlights the opportunities and rewards associated with the application of AI in the creative arts. Featuring an array of voices, including interviews with Jacques Attali, Holly Herndon and Scott Cohen, this book offers interdisciplinary approaches to pressing ethical and technical questions associated with AI. Considering the perspectives of developers, students and artists, as well as the wider themes of law, ethics and philosophy, Artificial Intelligence and Music Ecosystem is an essential introduction for anyone (...) interested in the impact of AI on music, including those studying and working in the creative arts. (shrink)

Most accounts of responsibility focus on one type of responsibility, moral responsibility, or address one particular aspect of moral responsibility such as agency. This article outlines a broader framework to think about responsibility that includes causal responsibility, relational responsibility, and what I call “narrative responsibility” as a form of “hermeneutic responsibility”, connects these notions of responsibility with different kinds of knowledge, disciplines, and perspectives on human being, and shows how this framework is helpful for mapping and analysing how artificial (...) intelligence (AI) challenges human responsibility and sense-making in various ways. Mobilizing recent hermeneutic approaches to technology, the article argues that next to, and interwoven with, other types of responsibility such as moral responsibility, we also have narrative and hermeneutic responsibility—in general and for technology. For example, it is our task as humans to make sense of, with and, if necessary, against AI. While from a posthumanist point of view, technologies also contribute to sense-making, humans are the experiencers and bearers of responsibility and always remain in charge when it comes to this hermeneutic responsibility. Facing and working with a world of data, correlations, and probabilities, we are nevertheless condemned to make sense. Moreover, this also has a normative, sometimes even political aspect: acknowledging and embracing our hermeneutic responsibility is important if we want to avoid that our stories are written elsewhere—through technology. (shrink)

Interactions between humans and machines that include artificial intelligence are increasingly common in nearly all areas of life. Meanwhile, AI-products are increasingly endowed with emotional characteristics. That is, they are designed and trained to elicit emotions in humans, to recognize human emotions and, sometimes, to simulate emotions (EAI). The introduction of such systems in our lives is met with some criticism. There is a rather strong intuition that there is something wrong about getting attached to a machine, about having (...) certain emotions towards it, and about getting involved in a kind of affective relationship with it. In this paper, I want to tackle these worries by focusing on the last aspect: in what sense could it be problematic or even wrong to establish an emotional relationship with EAI-systems? I want to show that the justifications for the widespread intuition concerning the problems are not as strong as they seem at first sight. To do so, I discuss three arguments: the argument from self-deception, the argument from lack of mutuality, and the argument from moral negligence. (shrink)

Defines a new way of thinking about the unprecedented environmental pressures of our day. McCallum offers a compelling argument that we must think differently about ourselves and the earth if we are to take seriously the survival of wilderness areas.

This book starts from the proposition that the field of intelligence lacks any coherent or systematic ethical review, and then develops an ethical framework for intelligence based on the notion of harm and the establishment of the Just Intelligence Principles. This book argues that the most appropriate ethical framework for intelligence collection is one which is able to recognise that intelligence collection does indeed cause harm, but that sometimes this harm is necessary in order to (...) protect the political community. It tackles this tension by creating an ethical framework specifically designed for intelligence that is able to balance the need to limit the damage caused while securing the political community. This is achieved by developing an ethical framework of two parts. The first part is designed to recognise those features of intelligence that might be considered ethically unacceptable by highlighting the 'harm' it can cause. Once the harm is understood, the second part of the ethical framework establishes a set of Just Intelligence Principles that outline if and when the harm caused is justified. These Just Intelligence Principles are developed by drawing upon the just war tradition and its criteria of just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, proportionality and discrimination. By placing the harm that intelligence can cause into context of the Just Intelligence Principles it is possible to ensure that intelligence collection is only carried out when the circumstances demonstrate a suitable level of threat, authorised by a sufficient level of authority, carrying a right intention, that the damage is proportional to the expected information gains, and discriminates between legitimate and illegitimate targets. The main feature of the ethical framework created, however, is that it recognises that different intelligence collection activities can cause different levels of harm and that as a result the circumstances needed to justify them must also change. The book examines three of the main collection disciplines in the field of intelligence studies: imagery intelligence, signals intelligence and human intelligence. By applying the ethical framework established at the beginning of the book to these three important intelligence collection disciplines, it is possible to better understand the ethical framework while also demonstrating its real-life applicability. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, ethics, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR. (shrink)

Important work on the relation of pragmatic ethics and aesthetics, such as Steven Fesmire's _John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics,_ misses an important feature of the entire issue unless non-mimetic representation is invoked to explain the relation between what Dewey would call the "problem" and the "solution" presented in experience. This cannot be elaborated within a Rortyan neo-pragmatism, nor can it be addressed without attending to the "spiritual" aspect of moral agency.

This book offers a critical analysis, both theoretical and practical, of ethics education in the military. In the twenty-first century, it has become increasingly important to ensure that the armed forces of Western and other democracies fight justly and behave ethically. The 'good soldier' has to be not only professionally skilled but morally intelligent. At a time of relentless media scrutiny, the publicising of incidents of morally and legally unacceptable behaviour, such as the gross mistreatment of prisoners and the torture (...) of suspected terrorists, can do much to undermine the credibility of those who claim to hold the moral high ground in any particular conflict. Written by an international team of academic theorists and military practitioners, this volume provides inter-disciplinary insights into the present state, and the future, of ethics education in the militaries of Western democracies. The contributors critically address the central question of whether such education is sufficient to prepare members of the armed forces to face the peculiar challenges of conflict environments that are now primarily 'wars among the people', in which the opposing combatants may have little or no regard for human life and fail to discriminate between soldiers and civilians when choosing their targets. Drawing lessons from recent examples of unethical conduct, this original book offers insightful and constructive advice, both theoretical and practical, as to how situations can be improved and on the means that could and should be employed towards this end. This book will be of much interest to students of military studies, ethics and international relations."--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

The emergence of collective intelligence has been studied in much greater detail in small groups than in larger ones. Nevertheless, in groups of several hundreds or thousands of members, it is well-known that the social environment exerts a considerable influence on individual behavior. A few recent papers have dealt with some aspects of large group situations, but have not provided an in-depth analysis of the role of interactions among the members of a group in the creation of ideas, as (...) well as the group’s overall performance. In this study, we report an experiment where a large set of individuals, i.e., 789 high-school students, cooperated online in real time to solve two different examinations on a specifically designed platform (Thinkhub). Our goal of this paper 6 to describe the specific mechanisms of idea creation we were able to observe and to measure the group’s performance as a whole. When we deal with communication networks featuring a large number of interacting entities, it seems natural to model the set as a complex system by resorting to the tools of statistical mechanics. Our experiment shows how an interaction in small groups that increase in size over several phases, leading to a final phase where the students are confronted with the most popular answers of the previous phases, is capable of producing high-quality answers to all examination questions, whereby the last phase plays a crucial role. Our experiment likewise shows that a group’s performance in such a task progresses in a linear manner in parallel with the size of the group. Finally, we show that the controlled interaction and dynamics foreseen in the system can reduce the spread of “fake news” within the group. (shrink)

The notion of “responsibility gap” with artificial intelligence (AI) was originally introduced in the philosophical debate to indicate the concern that “learning automata” may make more difficult or impossible to attribute moral culpability to persons for untoward events. Building on literature in moral and legal philosophy, and ethics of technology, the paper proposes a broader and more comprehensive analysis of the responsibility gap. The responsibility gap, it is argued, is not one problem but a set of at least four (...) interconnected problems – gaps in culpability, moral and public accountability, active responsibility—caused by different sources, some technical, other organisational, legal, ethical, and societal. Responsibility gaps may also happen with non-learning systems. The paper clarifies which aspect of AI may cause which gap in which form of responsibility, and why each of these gaps matter. It proposes a critical review of partial and non-satisfactory attempts to address the responsibility gap: those which present it as a new and intractable problem (“fatalism”), those which dismiss it as a false problem (“deflationism”), and those which reduce it to only one of its dimensions or sources and/or present it as a problem that can be solved by simply introducing new technical and/or legal tools (“solutionism”). The paper also outlines a more comprehensive approach to address the responsibility gaps with AI in their entirety, based on the idea of designing socio-technical systems for “meaningful human control", that is systems aligned with the relevant human reasons and capacities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 29.2 (2005) 379-393 [Access article in PDF] Love, Self-Deception, and the Moral "Must" Randy Ramal Claremont Graduate University I One significant impact that conceptual relativism has had on current discussions in moral philosophy is the denial of intelligibility to discourses that affirm moral absolutism. The denial is typically based on two allied arguments. The first argument entails that the justification of absolute moral laws and values (...) presupposes the existence of an Archimedean standpoint, but since such viewpoint is unintelligible, a "view from nowhere" as it has been called, then affirming moral absolutism could only be the result of a confused temptation for metaphysical universality and objectivity. The second argument states that since all moral values and concepts are the products of particular cultural-linguistic contexts, it would not make sense to speak of absolute values that have application in other cultural-linguistic contexts.I sympathize with the critical spirit in which this dual argument is made. The unintelligibility of a neutral standpoint and the obvious contextuality of all moral discourses render meaningless any attempt to affirm metaphysically-based moral absolutes. But what this argument fails to acknowledge is that the ordinary language of moral absoluteness is not only infinitely distant from the metaphysical claims to Olympian grounds but also internally related to the absolute moral judgments and principles it invokes. Furthermore, it is doubtful that one could speak at all of moral discourse as needing metaphysical justification. It would not make sense to speak of moral discourse as either needing or not needing metaphysical backing because both notions ignore the ordinary contexts of moral discourse, where the issue of philosophical justification does not arise. The point here is not simply to reject the [End Page 379] metaphysical need for justifying moral discourse but to question the intelligibility of the attempt itself.1In what follows I argue that the ordinary claims to moral absoluteness, be it to give moral advice, to justify personal beliefs and actions, or to judge and criticize the conduct of other people, are perfectly intelligible practices that embody ordinary moral judgments and values. I elucidate the intelligibility of these moral claims by discussing Leo Tolstoy's "The Death of Ivan Ilych," Proust's Remembrance of Things Past, and Ann Beattie's "Learning to Fall." These works, I argue, portray an ethical notion of "need" that expresses natural, and intelligible, affirmations of moral necessity. The context of this affirmation concerns the ethical call to end all self-deception about one's love life.Traditionally, the relationship between love and self-deception has been interpreted to suggest that people often deceive themselves about love in order to fulfill a deep need in them to give meaning to their lives. This interpretation is often invoked to explain, on the one hand, why people who are in love might claim otherwise and, on the other hand, why those who are not in love at all convince themselves of the opposite. Although this interpretation is not philosophical in nature and does not necessarily entail the denial of all discourses of moral necessity, the idea that self-deception fulfils a deep need in people is often invoked as a philosophical explanation of the notion of "need." One example of such philosophical explanation is Martha Nussbaum's Love's Knowledge, where she endorses the traditional interpretation of the relation between love and self-deception through a discussion, among other works, of the above mentioned works by Proust and Beattie.There is no doubt that self-deception, whether in regards to one's love life or other aspects of it, could sometimes arise as a result of a need in people to give their existence some meaningful stability. But this interpretation cannot apply to all cases of love and self deception because the radical plurality of our notions of love prevents such explanatory reductionism. The insistence on this type of reductionism, it seems to me, rests on a common tendency among moral philosophers, Nussbaum included, to read into literature personal ethical views that are not intended by it. The task of the moral philosopher... (shrink)

The purpose of __Aquinas's Ethics__ is to place Thomas Aquinas's moral theory in its full philosophical and theological context and to do so in a way that makes Aquinas readily accessible to students and interested general readers, including those encountering Aquinas for the first time. Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke begin by explaining Aquinas's theories of the human person and human action, since these ground his moral theory. In their interpretation, Aquinas's theological commitments crucially shape his (...) account of the human person, human capacities for action, and human flourishing. The authors develop a comprehensive picture of Aquinas's thought, which is designed to help students understand how his concept of happiness and the good life are part of a coherent, theologically-informed worldview. Many studies of Aquinas naturally focus on certain areas of his thought and tend to assume a general knowledge of the whole. __Aquinas's Ethics_ _takes the opposite approach: it intentionally links his metaphysics and anthropology to his action theory and ethics to illuminate how the moral theory is built on foundations laid elsewhere. The authors emphasize the integration of concepts of virtue, natural law, and divine grace within Aquinas's ethics, rather than treating such topics in isolation or opposition. Their approach, presented in clear and deliberately non-specialist language, reveals the coherent nature of Aquinas's account of the moral life and of what fulfills us as human beings. The result is a rich and engaging framework for further investigation of Aquinas's thought and its applications. _"___Aquinas’s Ethics_ _is a perfect introduction to one of the most sophisticated and influential ethical systems in Western thought. DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke capture the brilliant clarity of Aquinas’s moral vision, offering an illuminating perspective true to both the theoretical depth and practical richness of Aquinas’s writings. Those new to Aquinas’s ideas will find this book eminently readable. Everyone—students and scholars alike—will appreciate its direct, distinctive voice and clear philosophical intelligence." —_Scott MacDonald, Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies, Cornell University_ "__Aquinas's Ethics_ _is an excellent contribution to the literature on Aquinas and ethics, providing an integrated and robust account of the relationship between a metaphysics of human nature, natural law theory, and virtue theory. Showing these inextricable connections, it is very much like the work of St. Thomas himself, and suggests why so many lesser theories of ethics are unsatisfying for their lack of depth and comprehensive reach." —_John Kavanaugh, S.J., Saint Louis University_ “DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke have written the ideal introduction to Aquinas’s ethics, situating it in the broader context of his thinking about human nature and action. Although Aquinas cared more about—and wrote more about—ethics than about any other philosophical topic, it remains the most unjustly neglected aspect of his thought. I know of no better guide to that territory than this book.” —_Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado at Boulder_. (shrink)

Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation examines the uniquely moral motive of respect in light of Kant’s general metaphysics of agency. Kant refers to respect as a “sui generis” feeling that is both intrinsically cognitive and conative, but also denies that respect is any kind of feeling at all. Guevara convincingly argues that the feelings characteristic of respect are not psychological effects caused by our recognition of the authority of the moral law: rather, such feelings are just the affective aspect (...) of this recognition itself, as it is realized in agents with both an intelligible and a sensible character. Guevara also argues that the affective side of respect is fundamentally “positive” in character, despite Kant’s claims that our immediate experience of the law is one of “humiliation,” in which our pretensions to self-worth independent of morality are struck down. (shrink)

In nearly all aspects of life, humans are crossing lines of no return. Modern science is leading us into vast uncharted territory—far beyond the invention of nuclear weapons or taking us to the moon.Today, in labs all over the world, scientists are performing experiments that threaten to fundamentally alter the practical character and ethical color of our everyday lives. In The End of Life as We Know It, bestselling author Michael Guillen takes a penetrating look at how the scientific community (...) is pushing the boundaries of morality, including: • Scientists who detached the head of a Russian man from his crippled, diseased body, and stitching it onto a healthy new donated body. • Fertility experiments aimed at allowing designer babies to be conceived with the DNA from three or more biological parents. • The unprecedented politicization of science – for example, in the global discussion about climate change that is pitting “deniers” against “alarmists” and inspiring Draconian legislation, censorship, and legal prosecutions. • The integration of Artificial Intelligence into communications and the economy. The End of Life as We Know It takes us into labratories and boardrooms where these troubling advances are taking place and asks the question no scientists seem to be asking: What does this mean for the future of humanity? (shrink)

The Neoplatonists have been criticized for giving forced interpretations of Plato. Can this verdict justify modern commentators’ not paying attention to the Neoplatonic views on central Platonic problems, such as the accusation of ‘moral egoism’? The issue of Platonic eros, a proposal for a modus vivendi, serves as a significant test-case in order to answer this challenge. My approach is based on Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades. The Platonic successor approaches Socrates’ relation to Alcibiades as mirroring the structure of (...) the divine realm. From this point of view, which platonically merges ethics with metaphysics, Proclus repeatedly states that it is an essential feature of the divine lover, who patterns himself upon the god Eros, to elevate along with himself his beloved towards the intelligible Beauty. This seems to go against the Symposium, which might suggest that the lover needs his beloved, because the latter constitutes the means for the former to recollect the source of real beauty. In contrast, for Proclus the ideal loving relationship is parallel to the demiurge’s providential relation to the Receptacle, and that of the philosopher-king to his city. Hence, Proclus presents us the quintessence of the erotic way of life and responds to Plato’s critics. (shrink)

A theological treatment of the role of affections such as joy, compassion, and shame in contemporary politics. Hordern discusses what affections are and how they play a role in parts of political life such as representation and law. He shows that affections have an intelligent role to play in fostering loyalty, trust and public moral reasoning.

When machine learning, data and AI are reshaping the human experience, Peter Hershock gives us a new way to think about attention, presence and ethics in our changing lives by balancing Western technology with Asian philosophy. He explains how Confucian and Socratic ethics can make visible what a history of choices about remaking ourselves has rendered invisible, and applies Buddhist ideas to give us an understanding about the self and consciousness. Seamlessly blending ancient Chinese, Indian and Greek philosophy, Hershock responds (...) to the challenge of staying present during the age of technology. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage nous propose une perspective nouvelle sur les questions éthiques que soulève la vie économique et sociale de cette fin de siècle. L'auteur s'interroge sur les garanties morales qu'offre une société qui accepte pleinement l'accroissement considérable de ses ressources matérielles. Un livre qui s'adresse à toute personne responsable du développement de la prospérité de notre société.

In his recent work, "The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy," Hilary Putnam traces the history of the fact-value dichotomy from Hume to Stevenson and Logical Positivism. The aim of this historical reconstruction is to undermine the foundations of the dichotomy, showing that it is of a piece with the dichotomy - untenable, as we know now - of "analytic" and "synthetic" judgments. Putnam's own thesis is that facts and values are "entangled" in a way that precludes any attempt to draw (...) a sharp distinction between "value judgments" and "matters of fact." The idea of an "entanglement of facts and values" Putnam rightly attributes to John Dewey, who - we should add - made of it the main issue in his controversy with Logical Positivism. Nevertheless, a closer inspection of the problem whose history Putnam summarizes could bring into light important aspects of it that have been neglected. It is worth reading in this connection the intercourse between Dewey and Stevenson. Secondly, it is striking that Putnam's version of the history of the fact-value dichotomy hardly mentions the problem that caused this very dichotomy to arise in the first place: i. e., the problem of insoluble moral disagreements. By contrast, Dewey's attack on the dualism of fact and value can be read as an attempt to redescribe this kind of disagreements in a way that makes room for intelligent inquiry, and consequently for rational expectations of agreement. The "entanglement thesis" surely is a part of this re-description. But then it must have implications - particularly for the analysis of value-justification - which are overlooked, or by-passed, by Putnam. This leaves the question open whether Putnam and Dewey subscribe to different versions of pragmatism with regard to norms and values. (shrink)

The present article aims to discuss the possibility of including the sphere of artificial intelligence production within the domain of artificial intelligence ethics and investigate its moral implications. In the first section, the role of human labour in the artificial intelligence production processes is considered, with particular reference to the distinction between high-skilled and low-skilled jobs, their differential distribution in the production process itself, and the labour conditions of ghost workers, in order to analyse the main ethical (...) issues emerging within the field. In the second section, some aspects of the existing critical literature concerning artificial intelligence and labour are discussed, focusing on Marxist and decolonial scholarship and more precisely on its lack of consideration of the global value chain through which artificial intelligence AI production processes are structured. Finally, the possibility and limits of an ethics of artificial intelligence production are reconsidered by assuming the centrality of workers’ struggles and agency along artificial intelligence's global value chain. (shrink)

This paper considers what liberal philosopher Michael Sandel coins the ‘moral limits of markets’ in relation to the idea of paying people for data about their biometrics and emotions. With Sandel arguing that certain aspects of human life (such as our bodies and body parts) should be beyond monetisation and exchange, others argue that emerging technologies such as Personal Information Management Systems can enable a fairer, paid, data exchange between the individual and the organisation, even regarding highly personal data about (...) our bodies and emotions. With the field of data ethics rarely addressing questions of payment, this paper explores normative questions about data dividends. It does so by conducting a UK-wide, demographically representative online survey to quantitatively assess adults’ views on being paid for personal data about their biometrics and emotions via a Personal Information Management System, producing a data dividend, a premise which sees personal data through the prism of markets and property. The paper finds diverse attitudes based on socio-demographic characteristics, the type of personal data sold, and the type of organisation sold to. It argues that (a) Sandel’s argument regarding the moral limits of markets has value in protecting fundamental freedoms of those in society who are arguably least able to (such as the poor); but (b) that contexts of use, in particular, blur moral limits regarding fundamental freedoms and markets. (shrink)

This valuable resource provides academic and student affairs practitioners with the tools to make informed legal and ethical decisions in their college and university contexts. Law is constantly changing and is interpreted differently from campus to campus based on institutional culture and history. This text provides higher education practitioners with tools to anticipate practical and responsible action, engaging readers in anticipatory and reflective practice. In this text, Boettcher and Salinas introduce the Institutional Intelligence Model, a helpful framework that guides (...) practitioners in examining a wide variety of campus issues. Throughout the book, readers can explore perspectives from current practitioners and utilize case studies to examine specific topics including admissions, academics, student living, confidential resources, and graduate student experiences. By using the strategies in this book, practitioners will be equipped to successfully navigate legal and ethical issues on their campuses. This text is ideal for graduate students, student and academic affairs professionals, and those in leadership positions responsible for working with and supporting students and staff teams. (shrink)

Les modes de vie sont ce qui nous affectent le plus, et pourtant ils sont hors de notre contrôle. Il y a là un paradoxe : nous, individus réputés libres et démocratiques, sommes dans les fers des modes de vie. Ceux-ci nous imposent en effet des attentes de comportement durables (avoir un travail, être consommateur, s'intégrer au monde technologique, au monde administratif, au monde économique...) auxquels nous devons globalement nous adapter. Ce paradoxe démocratique est renforcé par un paradoxe éthique : (...) c'est au moment où l'on assiste à une véritable inflation éthique, par la multiplication des comités, chartes, conseils, règlements, labels éthiques en tout genre, tous censés protéger les droits individuels, que les modes de vie de plus en plus contraignants étendent comme jamais leur emprise sur les individus. Ce qui veut dire que tout ce dispositif éthique sert en réalité à blanchir le système et les modes de vie qui en découlent, qui peuvent ainsi étendre leur emprise en étant éthiquement pasteurisés. Notre éthique ne sert donc pas à critiquer le système ni les modes de vie, mais à les accompagner dans leur marche triomphale. Enrayer cette marche est le défi éthique et politique majeur de notre temps. (shrink)