Building on and partially refining previous theoretical work, this paper presents an extended simulation model of ancestral warfare. This model (1) disentangles attack and defense, (2) tries to differentiate more strictly between selfish and altruistic efforts during war, (3) incorporates risk aversion and deterrence, and (4) pays special attention to the role of brutality. Modeling refinements and simulation results yield a differentiated picture of possible evolutionary dynamics. The main observations are: (i) Altruism in this model is (...) more likely to evolve for defenses than for attacks. (ii) Risk aversion, deterrence and the interplay of migration levels and brutality can change evolutionary dynamics substantially. (iii) Unexpectedly, one occasional simulation outcome is a dynamically stable state of ‘tolerated intergroup theft’, raising the question if corresponding patterns also exist in real intergroup conflicts. Finally, possible implications for theories of the co-evolution of bellicosity and altruism in humans are discussed. (shrink)

The socio-religious panorama of the African religion deserves a close observation of its foundation and function. The perception of the spirit world is dominant in Africa. Similarly, spiritual warfare in the African context is prevalent in the mind and worldview of an African. Spiritual warfare derives its framework from African Traditional Religion (ATR). Hence, understanding ATR’s complexity helps us with the understanding of spiritual warfare. Some essential questions to understand would be what is spiritual warfare from (...) an ATR perspective? How do Africans perceive spiritual warfare? And how do Africans engage in spiritual warfare? What is the place of ATR in spiritual warfare? African Traditional Religion acknowledges the reality and functionality of witchcraft. The perception of the reality of evil forces in Africa attracts all forms of spiritual rites, seeking more extraordinary spiritual powers for defensive and offensive spiritual warfare. This article argues that the effectual Christian response to spiritual warfare with witchcraft practices in Africa is ‘the classical model’ of spiritual warfare. The article provides a synopsis of the models of spiritual warfare, that is, the classical model (CW), world systems model (WSM), ground-level deliverance model (GLDM), and strategic-level deliverance model (SLSW). Subsequently, the article provides the framework for African spiritual warfare and witchcraft practices from traditional and contemporary perspectives. Lastly, the article argues that the Evangelical Christian Response to witchcraft practices is rooted in ‘the classical model’ of spiritual warfare. Contribution: The article contributes to African religiosity within the African context. It reveals the ongoing argument about the continuity and discontinuity of the ATR beliefs and practices in Christianity. The article adds to the evangelical or classical arguments in support of the discontinuity of ATR beliefs and practices in Christianity. (shrink)

The origins and consequences of warfare or largescale intergroup violence have been subject of long debate. Based on exhaustive surveys of skeletal remains for prehistoric hunter-gatherers and agriculturists in Japan, the present study examines levels of inferred violence and their implications for two different evolutionary models, i.e., parochial altruism model and subsistence model. The former assumes that frequent warfare played an important role in the evolution of altruism and the latter sees warfare as promoted by (...) social changes induced by agriculture. Our results are inconsistent with the parochial altruism model but consistent with the subsistence model, although the mortality values attributable to violence between hunter-gatherers and agriculturists were comparable. (shrink)

In order to address whether states can ever have the proper authority to militarily punish other international agents, I examine three attempts to justify punitive warfare from Augustine, Grotius and Locke for their relevance to both our contemporary international legal and political order and our contemporary security threats from sporadic terrorist or militant violence. Once a plausible model for a state’s valid authority to punish international agents is found, I will consider what punitive aims it can support and (...) what challenges such punitive warfare would have in satisfying the remaining jus ad bellum conditions. (shrink)

Ibn Khaldun and Ernest Gellner have both developed comprehensive yet very different theories of social cohesion. Whereas Ibn Khaldun traces the development of intense group solidarity to the ascetic lifestyles of nomadic warriors, for Gellner social cohesion is a product of different material conditions. In contrast to Ibn Khaldun?s theory, where all social ties are generated through similar social processes, in Gellner?s model the patterns of collective solidarity change through time, that is, different societies produce different forms of social (...) cohesion. While Ibn Khaldun argues that asbiyyah is the backbone of group unity in all social orders, Gellner insists that modern societies are underpinned by very different type of collective solidarity than their premodern counterparts. In this paper I offer a critique of Ibn Khaldun?s and Gellner?s theories of social cohesion and develop an alternative explanation, which situates the social dynamics of group solidarity in the organisational and ideological legacies of warfare. (shrink)

In order to address whether states can ever have the proper authority to militarily punish other international agents, I examine three attempts to justify punitive warfare from Augustine, Grotius and Locke for their relevance to both our contemporary international legal and political order and our contemporary security threats from sporadic terrorist or militant violence. Once a plausible model for a state’s valid authority to punish international agents is found, I will consider what punitive aims it can support and (...) what challenges such punitive warfare would have in satisfying the remaining jus ad bellum conditions. (shrink)

The evolution of altruism in human societies has been intensively investigated in social and natural sciences. A widely acknowledged recent idea is the “parochial altruism model,” which suggests that inter- group hostility and intragroup altruism can coevolve through lethal intergroup conflicts. The current article critically examines this idea by reviewing research relevant to intergroup conflicts in human evolutionary history from evolutionary biology, psychology, cultural anthropology, and archaeology. After a brief intro- duction, section 2 illustrates the mathematical model of (...) parochial altruism and some critiques of the model and its interpretation, primarily from an evolutionary biology point of view. Section 3 delves into the archaeological evidence of prehistoric intergroup conflicts in the Japanese archipelago’s Jomon and Yayoi periods, Europe’s Mesolithic period, and North America’s Pacific period as counter examples of the paro- chial altruism model. In section 4, the ethnographies of intergroup relationships and conflicts reveal that intergroup relationships in many ethnic groups are not as simple as the assumption in the mathematical model of parochial altruism. In section 5, we outline psychological research on intergroup conflicts which suggest that intergroup hostility and ingroup altruism are not necessarily correlated. In conclusion, we argue that the assumption and parameter settings of the parochial altruism model are inconsistent with empirical data. (shrink)

In the early seventeenth century, the amount of meat available in Rome increased exponentially, with consumption reaching a pound per person per day in the 1630s. There were cultural and political reasons for this surge: in the wake of the Reformation, a series of popes sought to turn the city of Rome into a model “city on a hill,” representing the ideal of a Catholic state under a powerful ruler. However, to bring such large amounts of food from the (...) countryside to Roman tables required enormous efforts on the part of a variety of bureaucrats and local artisans working for the papal regime. This essay will briefly examine the efforts of two of those groups that helped create Rome’s “meat moment”: the contatori who inspected and distributed animals brought from the countryside to Rome and the butchers in the city. In the end, the dramatic increase in supply was not sustainable and would result in both political and ecological upheaval. (shrink)

The early examples of self-directing robots attracted the interest of both scientific and military communities. Biologists regarded these devices as material models of animal tropisms. Engineers envisaged the possibility of turning self-directing robots into new “intelligent” torpedoes during World War I. Starting from World War II, more extensive interactions developed between theoretical inquiry and applied military research on the subject of adaptive and intelligent machinery. Pioneers of Cybernetics were involved in the development of goal-seeking warfare devices. But collaboration occasionally (...) turned into open dissent. Founder of Cybernetics Norbert Wiener, in the aftermath of World War II, argued against military applications of learning machines, by drawing on epistemological appraisals of machine learning techniques. This connection between philosophy of science and techno-ethics is both strengthened and extended here. It is strengthened by an epistemological analysis of contemporary machine learning from examples; it is extended by a reflection on ceteris paribus conditions for models of adaptive behaviours. (shrink)

Predictions about autonomous weapon systems are typically thought to channel fears that drove all the myths about intelligence embodied in matter. One of these is the idea that the technology can get out of control and ultimately lead to horrifi c consequences, as is the case in Mary Shelley’s classic Frankenstein. Given this, predictions about AWS are sometimes dismissed as science-fiction fear-mongering. This paper considers several analogies between AWS and other weapon systems and ultimately offers an argument that nuclear weapons (...) and their effect on the development of modern asymmetrical warfare are the best analogy to the introduction of AWS. The fi nal section focuses on this analogy and offers speculations about the likely consequences of AWS being hacked. These speculations tacitly draw on myths and tropes about technology and AI from popular fi ction, such as Frankenstein, to project a convincing model of the risks and benefi ts of AWS deployment. (shrink)

The text of Ephesians 6:10–20 reframes the sectors of what we know as ‘spiritual warfare’ to tackle demons that menace and disturb people’s daily life. Reading this text from an African perspective helps to understand the text as well as believers in Africa to efficiently use the proposed weapons.Contribution: An approach such as an intercultural criticism with the aid of a four-legged stool model in this research proved to be appropriate.

A Defence of Chemical Warfare J B S Haldane Originally published in 1925 "Mr Haldane’s brilliant study." Times Leading Article "A book to be read by every intelligent adult." Spectator. This volume discusses the use of chemical weapons during the Second World War from the scientific viewpoint of the eminent bio-chemist, J B S Haldane and attempts to predict their use in conflicts of the future. 84pp Paris or the Future of War B H Liddell Hart Originally published in (...) 1925. "…a gem of close-thinking and deduction." Observer Liddell Hart was one of the twentieth century’s most respected military historians. In this volume he analyzes the causes of war, and the future of war, as well as examining the air, naval and army weapon and the evolution of "New Model Armies". 84pp. Janus: The Conquest of War A Psychological Inquiry William McDougall Originally published in 1927 "Among all the volumes in this series, none, I think is so weighty and impressive as this…" Evening Standard This volume covers lessons of the Great War, the Causes of War, Preventives of War, League to Enforce Peace, and International Air Force as a Prevention of War. 132pp Sinon Or the Future of Politics Edgar Ansel Mowrer Originally published in 1930 A striking analysis of politics and their future from a national and international standpoint. 86pp Typhoeus Or the Future of Socialism Arthur Shadwell Originally published in 1929 "Invaluable, a miracle of compression and illumination."Yorkshire Post This volume provides an analysis of the aims and prospects of Socialism, both in its political and economic aspects. 112pp. (shrink)

Evolutionary anthropology has focused on the origins of war, or rather ethnocentricity, because it epitomizes the problem of group selection, and because war may itself have been the main agent of group selection. The neo-Darwinian synthesis in biology has explained how ethnocentricity might evolve by group selection, and the distinction between evoked culture and adopted culture, suggested by the emerging synthesis in evolutionary psychology, has explained how it might be transmitted. Ethnocentric mechanisms could have evolved by genetic selection in ancestral (...) hominids, or through the interaction of genetic and cultural selection in modern humans, or both. The existence of similar behaviors in chimpanzees and the parallel development of early human societies around the globe are arguments for such inherited mechanisms. There may have been some adaptive breakthroughs in purely cultural evolution, but this process does not seem likely to produce long-term Darwinian adaptations because of the prolificity of cultural traits. Warfare may once have been a major agent of group selection, but the rates of extinction among human groups are so slow as to render this improbable since the rise of state-level societies, whose warfare tends to become a cyclical balance-of-power situation. Perhaps the most serious implication of current evolutionary thought is that the individualistic model of culture common in the social sciences and humanities is outmoded, and should be replaced by a new model that recognizes the organismic nature of human societies. (shrink)

It is a truism that, due to human weaknesses, human soldiers have yet to have sufficiently ethical warfare. It is arguable that the likelihood of human soldiers to breach the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity, for example, is higher in contrast tosmart soldierswho are emotionally inept. Hence, this paper examines the possibility that the integration of ethics into smart soldiers will help address moral challenges in modern warfare. The approach is to develop and employ smart soldiers that are enhanced (...) with ethical capabilities. Advocates of this approach think that it is more realistic to make competent entities (i.e., smart soldiers) become morally responsible than to enforce moral responsibility on human soldiers with inherent (moral) limitations. This view somewhat seeks a radical transition from the usual anthropocentric warfare to arobocentricwarfare with the belief that the transition has moral advantages. However, the paper defends the claim that despite human limitations, the capacity ofethically enhanced smart soldiersfor moral sensitivity is artificial and unauthentic. There are significant problems with the three models of programming ethics into smart soldiers. Also, there are further challenges from the absence of emotion as a moral gauge, and the problems of apportioning responsibility in case of mishap from the actions or omissions of smart soldiers. Among other reasons, the paper takes the replacement of human soldiers as an extreme approach towards an ethical warfare. This replacement predicates ethical complications that outweigh the benefits from the exclusive use of smart soldiers. (shrink)

Humans continuously delegate and distribute cognitive functions to the environment to lessen their limits. They build models, representations, and other various mediating structures, that are thought to be good to think. The case of scientific innovation is particularly important: the main aim of this paper is to revise and criticize the concept of scientific innovation, reframing it in what I will call an eco-epistemic perspective, taking advantage of recent results coming from the area of distributed cognition (common coding) and abductive (...) cognition (manipulative). Taking advantage of this eco-cognitive perspective the article outlines how innovative scientific modeling activity can be better described taking advantage of the concept of “epistemic warfare”, which sees scientific enterprise as a complicated struggle for rational knowledge in which it is crucial to distinguish epistemic (for example scientific models) from non epistemic (for example fictions, falsities, propaganda) weapons. (shrink)

Historians have long since rejected the dubious assertions of the conflict model, with its narratives of perennial religion versus science combat. Nonetheless, this theory persists in various academic disciplines, and it is still presented to university students as the authoritative historical account of religion–science interactions. Cases of this can be identified within modern anthropology textbooks and reference materials, which often recapitulate claims once made by John W. Draper and Andrew D. White. This article examines 21st-century introductory anthropology publications, demonstrating (...) how such works perpetuate religion–science myths and the notion that history has been replete with inevitable religion versus science warfare. In particular, this study reveals how such introductory materials propagate discord narratives associated with the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. Affiliated with these anecdotes are oversimplified accounts of religious responses to heliocentrism and evolutionary theory, as well as claims that science has invariably led to the usurpation of religious belief and secularization from Galileo onwards. (shrink)

Military drones combine surveillance technology with missile equipment in a far-reaching way. In this article, I argue that military drones could and should be object for a philosophical investigation, referring in particular on Chamayou’s theory of the drone, who also coined the term “an eye turned into a weapon.” Focusing on issues of human self-understanding, agency, and alterity, I examine the intricate human-technology relations in the context of designing and deploying military drones. For that purpose, I am drawing on the (...) postphenomenological approach developed by Don Ihde in order to systematize the manifold aspects of human-technology relations in a four-level model. This inquiry also includes a critical reflection on the normative implications of this technology. In doing so, I do not intent to offer an exhaustive relational ontology of military drones. I rather aim at providing a framework that is able to capture the core dimensions of this technology and their complex interrelations in a systematic way that has been missing in the philosophical debate so far. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Citizens Without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670–1789Patrick HenryCitizens Without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670–1789, by Daniel Gordon; viii & 270 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, $39.50.Under examination here is the early modern period in France from Louis XIV to the French Revolution when kings ruled absolutely and citizens were without sovereignty. Discarding the traditional image of the Enlightenment as the absolute (...) enemy of absolutism, Gordon, in this sense, follows Norbert Elias and Robert Darnton who treat the Enlightenment as part of an elitist and hierarchical establishment. More specifically, as his subtitle indicates, Gordon portrays the invention of a “nonpolitical polis” (p. 6), an ideological social space where, despite political inequality, citizens could practice social equality in a hierarchical régime. The rise of this “nondemocratic egalitarian ethos” (p. 7) brought with it a new cult of sociabilité, a term invented in the eighteenth century to describe the idealization of the private sphere and the practice of social equality.The first chapter, then, ties sociability not to democracy, as in the Habermasian model, but to the absolutism that stimulated it and coexisted with it. A series of five ideal types of sociability depict how men and women, members of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, came together—in commerce, public welfare, scientific academies, salons, cafés, public libraries, and various other social situations not protorevolutionary in character—to create a bond among equals [End Page 279] under the ancien régime. In this framework, progress and modernity are born during the absolute monarchy where sociability suggests conviviality rather than class warfare. Every major French novel of the eighteenth century supports Gordon’s refutation of De Toqueville’s surprising statement that “noblemen and bourgeois never met except by chance in private life “in prerevolutionary France” (p. 27).In chapters two and three, Gordon examines the nature of the rules of sociability found in courtesy literature and their functioning as the imagined basis of the newly invented idealized space called société. In addition to analyzing in great detail the nature and frequency of the vocabulary invented to define and describe sociabilité, Gordon discusses sociabilité in the context of natural law theory in Hobbes, Bossuet, and among others, Pufendorf, who wanted to refute Hobbes by showing that self-interest leads humans to establish stable social relations even before government orders them to do so. Holbach surfaces here too for having amalgamated the older language of politeness and the newer language of natural law. In Holbach, as in the Encyclopédie, sociability, based on egalitarian premises of natural law, is nonetheless fully compatible with the hierarchical regime. Among other things, this shows clearly that the philosophes never preached the French Revolution. Striving to eliminate the abuses of despotism and establish equality in private life was not tantamount to working for political equality and the abolition of all rank. In this same vein, Gordon paints the apolitical essence of the private sphere and, by a rigorous study of the seventeenth-century manuals of polite living, shows convincingly (this time against Elias who saw the court as a model of refined behavior) that the salon was indeed a world unto itself, independent of preexisting social hierarchies. Rejecting Paul Hazard’s conception of absolute rupture between seventeenth-century culture and eighteenth-century thought, Gordon destroys the facile dichotomy between seventeenth-century hierarchy and eighteenth-century equality and, once again, admirably depicts the compatibility of Enlightenment and absolutism.If chapters one to three underscore a certain continuity between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, chapters four and five explain important changes. It is not, for example, the mere preservation of the idea of sociable communication but rather its new use that is germane in understanding the Enlightenment. Now “conversation” and “civility” no longer had meaning only for an urban elite but had in fact become ideals in all philosophical endeavors including the writing of universal history. Sociable communication had become the defining characteristic of modern nations. In the fourth chapter, by analyzing in detail the works of Jean-Baptiste Suard, Gordon demonstrates the meaning that the writing of universal history in Scotland acquired within the French... (shrink)

Drawing on an idea proposed by Darwin, it has recently been hypothesised that violent intergroup conflict might have played a substantial role in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism. The central notion of this argument, dubbed ‘parochial altruism’, is that the two genetic or cultural traits, aggressiveness against out-groups and cooperativeness towards the in-group, including self-sacrificial altruistic behaviour, might have coevolved in humans. This review assesses the explanatory power of current theories of ‘parochial altruism’. After a brief synopsis of (...) the existing literature, two pitfalls in the interpretation of the most widely used models are discussed: potential direct benefits and high relatedness between group members implicitly induced by assumptions about conflict structure and frequency. Then, a number of simplifying assumptions made in the construction of these models are pointed out which currently limit their explanatory power. Next, relevant empirical evidence from several disciplines which could guide future theoretical extensions is reviewed. Finally, selected alternative accounts of evolutionary links between intergroup conflict and intragroup cooperation are briefly discussed which could be integrated with parochial altruism in the future. (shrink)

Chimpanzee and hunter-gatherer intergroup aggression differ in important ways, including humans having the ability to form peaceful relationships and alliances among groups. This paper nevertheless evaluates the hypothesis that intergroup aggression evolved according to the same functional principles in the two species—selection favoring a tendency to kill members of neighboring groups when killing could be carried out safely. According to this idea chimpanzees and humans are equally risk-averse when fighting. When self-sacrificial war practices are found in humans, therefore, they result (...) from cultural systems of reward, punishment, and coercion rather than evolved adaptations to greater risk-taking. To test this “chimpanzee model,” we review intergroup fighting in chimpanzees and nomadic hunter-gatherers living with other nomadic hunter-gatherers as neighbors. Whether humans have evolved specific psychological adaptations for war is unknown, but current evidence suggests that the chimpanzee model is an appropriate starting point for analyzing the biological and cultural evolution of warfare. (shrink)

Summary In a previous paper (When Valor Isn’t Always Superior to Numbers: homoioi oliganthrôpia Caused by Attrition in Incessant Warfare, KLIO 100, 2018, 626–666) I argued that the population of Ancient Spartan citizens, homoioi, declined predominantly due to attrition in warfare. Here, I revisit the argument and present a more refined model that includes additional samples, directly incorporates information on losses, and improves assumptions. I argue that Sparta may have experienced an initial population plunge in the early (...) 5th century and was unable to recover. The results of this study reaffirm that warfare may have been an integral cause of oliganthrôpia. (shrink)

AI-powered technology can both promote accuracy and hide the standards of measurement and circulation of information. It can also produce models that are opaque and hard to access. As such, the new paradigm of AI asks to pounder about societal values and sets of priorities we want to promote, especially as these technologies are further deployed in times of warfare. The systemic tracking of people’s life and the opaqueness of the models designate a new paradigm in the formation of (...) truth, as censorship is enabled on a new scale. (shrink)

In Ernst Friedrich's Krieg dem Kriege there is a large section of photographs of survivors of World War I with the most hideous disfigurements of the face: jaws are missing, gaping slashes stare out where mouths should be. Friedrich leaves this gallery of ‘untouchables’ to the end of the book as if to achieve the maximum debasement of military glory and heroism. The head and face are obviously the most vulnerable part of the body in warfare – brutal wounds (...) to the face and decapitations are common. In World War I, a number of hospitals were set up to deal solely with head-wounds, developing the basis of what we now know as plastic surgery. Yet, in the representation of combat on screen, even in the most candid and unsentimental of war films, such as Hamburger Hill and Platoon, injuries to the face are rare or nonexistent. This absence has something to do with the difficulty of producing convincing prosthetic wound-cavities on the head; blown-off limbs can obviously be created with ease through covering up the actor's extant limb with padded clothing; bloody disembowellings can be simulated with the judicious use of imitation innards and the illusionistic application of broken flesh, and so on. But the problems of modelling head-wounds clearly only half-explain the consistency of the absence. (shrink)

In spite of his deep insights, Hegel fails to grasp the specific character of the war waged by the French Revolution and the Empire. His theory of limited warfare turns out to be a peculiar Sollen, but it is precisely this gap between rationality and reality what makes his classical model an appealing antithesis to postmodern violence. Keywords.

Our aim is to point out the role of scientific research in contemporary technological developments. Interactions between science and technology in the context of application-driven research projects of the 20th century are discussed. We define science and technology as two separate domains, and provide elementary models for their interaction by the means of applied and engineering sciences. These elementary models constitute linear and cascade models of science-technology interaction. We apply these elementary models for the purpose of further methodological analysis of (...) Soviet nuclear warfare project. The special role of organization and management in research and development activities is being emphasized. The new science-technology interaction model is devised in the course of nuclear project. This new interaction model is referred as non-linear or spiral. The model is seen as more collaborative and risk aware than linear and cascade interaction models present in twentieth century. The conclusion is the new model was of great impact to modern social forms in which research is carried out in the present. (shrink)

Revolutionary developments in both science and theology are moving the relation between the two far beyond the nineteenth‐century “warfare” model. Both scientists and theologians are engaged in a common search for shared understanding. Eight models of interaction are outlined: scientism, scientific imperialism, ecclesiastical authoritarianism, scientific creationism, the two‐language theory, hypothetical consonance, ethical overlap, and New Age spirituality. Developments in hypothetical consonance are explored in the work of various scholars, including Ian Barbour, Philip Clayton, Paul Davies, Willem Drees, Langdon (...) Gilkey, Philip Hefner, Nancey Murphy, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, Robert John Russell, Thomas Torrence and Wenzel van Huyssteen. (shrink)

The concept of Umwertung, central to Ecce Homo, is marked by discrepancies and incongruities that seem to defy philosophical comprehension. This paper focuses on the problem of Yes-saying and No-saying at the core of Umwertung. How can total affirmation be combined with radical critique, as Nietzsche claims? Nietzsche's favoured idiom of warfare exhibits the incommensurability of these positions, but it also points to a deeper problem: in waging war against idealism, Nietzsche risks repeating idealism, conceived as a war to (...) the death against other forms of life and thought. In §2 idealist warfare is analysed more closely, and in §3 it is contrasted with Nietzschean warfare, cinceived as an agonal form of oppositional thinking that avoids repeating idealism. This model of warfare is, however, undermined by the affirmative and destructive excesses of Nietzsche's text, and §4 proposes a different approach to the problem of Yes- and No-saying. On this approach, the affirmation of reality as war or conflictual multiplicity demands 1. the adoption of antagonistic positions with destructive intent against life-negating positions , but also 2. the overcoming of every antagonistic position in favour of an 'impossible' or fictional standpoint in the relation between antagonists; this alone allows all antagonistic positions to be affirmed. This approach is proposed as a general way to make sense of the fictional qualities of Ecce homo, its excesses and incongruities, and in §5 it is applied as a corrective to the account of Umwertung as a comparative practice proposed by Gerd Schank. (shrink)

Virtue ethics can be practical if we give it a new start, working from Socrates' approach to ethics as represented in Plato. This approach is more promising than that of most recent virtue ethicists, who begin from Aristotle. It is also more practical than modern ethical theories. Socrates asks us to nurture the moral health of our souls all our lives, whereas Aristotle teaches us to acquire virtues as traits. Traits are not reliable however, and false confidence in one's virtue (...) is a major cause of moral error and the moral injury that results from error. I must never think with any certainty that I have a virtue. It is especially dangerous for me to think that I have the wisdom or moral knowledge that would keep me on the right path. Socrates sets an example by recognizing his ignorance through self-examination and by making that recognition a cornerstone of human wisdom. But Socrates does not explain how we can seek virtue when we do not know for sure what it is. This book goes beyond what we know of Socrates in order to show how we can seek virtue without having knowledge. Using real-life examples, some of them from warfare, the book shows how we can nurture our souls and avoid moral injury so far as possible. The outcome of a life on this Socratic model is beauty of soul and a special kind of happiness. (shrink)

If one is allowed to speak of progress in historical research, one may note with satisfaction the growing sophistication with which the relationship between science and religion has been examined in recent years. The "warfare" model, the "separation" paradigm, and the "partnership" ideal have been subjected to critical scrutiny and the glaring light of historical evidence. As John Hedley Brooke has so astutely noted, "Serious scholarship in the history of science has revealed so extraordinarily rich and complex a (...) relationship between science and religion in the past that general theses are difficult to sustain. Unfortunately, this more nuanced approach has not been as evident in studies of Islam and science. Though there has been some serious scholarship on the relation between science and religion in Islam, such work has made barely a dent in either the general accounts or the general perceptions of that relationship. These latter continue to be characterized by reductionism, essentialism, apologetics, and barely masked agendas. (shrink)

In order to maximize human performance, defence forces continue to explore, develop, and apply human performance enhancement (HPE) methods, ranging from pharmaceuticals to (bio)technological enhancement. This raises ethical, legal, and societal concerns and requires organizing a careful reflection and deliberation process, with relevant stakeholders. We discuss a range of ethical, legal, and societal aspects (ELSA), which people involved in the development and deployment of HPE can use for such reflection and deliberation. A realistic military scenario with proposed HPE application can (...) serve as a starting point for such an iterative and participatory process. Stakeholders can discuss this application, modify its features, and design appropriate processes around it – for instance, procedures for informed consent. We propose that organizing aspects into these three categories – ethical, legal, and societal – can help involve appropriate interlocutors at different moments: legal aspects with people in strategy or management roles, from the start of a project; ethical aspects with people in operations and medical roles, during development; and societal aspects with people in communication and personnel roles, during deployment. Notably, we developed and discussed this framework and the three aspects in close collaboration with personnel from the military. (shrink)

This essay introduces this special issue on virtue ethics in relation to military AI. It describes the current situation of military AI ethics as following that of AI ethics in general, caught between consequentialism and deontology. Virtue ethics serves as an alternative that can address some of the weaknesses of these dominant forms of ethics. The essay describes how the articles in the issue exemplify the value of virtue-related approaches for these questions, before ending with thoughts for further research.

Although the criteria of double effect is usually used with issues of warfare and human health, such as abortion and euthanasia, the authors suggest using T. A. Cavanaugh's version of double effect reasoning when deliberating about cases that deal with the social media. With the creation of a modified version of Cavanaugh's three criteria, both social media users and those who evaluate decisions in that medium will have an alternate ethical decision-making model to use. The authors show how (...) one might use this model in the age of anytime, anywhere technology. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the phenomenon of hybrid war. Based on the fact that the military actions can be represented as the particular process, it is proposed to analyze the phenomenon on the technological approach. In addition, the study of the phenomenon does not occur within the traditional "democratic paradigm", and based on the assertion that in modern Ukraine the model of social and political order with an oligarchs in the center was formed. All state institutions and segments (...) of civil society are in a tough financial and economic dependence from the social group of oligarchs. The goals, objectives, principles, directions, forms, methods and techniques of conducting hybrid warfare are discussed. The general and the particular to the phenomena of the conventional war and the hybrid war is determined. Focuses on the complex nature of the phenomenon, its layered structure. In this connection, emphasizes the fact that the main actors of the war at different levels perform different roles, which is fixed by experts who analyze the situation. In particular, Ukraine can be considered as the subject of a hybrid war at the regional level, but it also becomes the purpose and the object as to the subjects of higher geopolitical level. In general, the phenomenon of hybrid war characterized by a lack of principles in building of the technological process. In the specific case of Ukraine, the lack of clear principles in the organization of the process dictated by economic interests of oligarchic clans that joined the struggle for the redistribution model in securing ownership of tools and means of production. Other elements of the process of the hybrid war are serve the implementation of the corporate interests of the oligarchs. In addition, the Ukrainian oligarchic structures are the link, the conductor for the interests of oligarchic structures of higher global level. The main tool in this struggle is the information - the main resource of the era, on which the oligarchs try to win a monopoly. Thus, we can talk about the oligarchic discourse of the hybrid war in Ukraine, as invariably present oligarchic component in all its elements. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionFrom the closing decades of the fourteenth century onwards, reform attempts within the various religious orders gained impetus under the banner of so-called Observant movements. In nearly all orders, these Observant movements advocated a return to the lifestyle of an imagined pristine beginning in the face of a real or perceived crisis.1Within the Clarissan world, there were a number of signs pointing towards such a crisis. Adherence to the (...) rule, as well as a viable form of communal religious life could be conspicuously absent by the later fourteenth century. This was not solely the result of failing religious stamina, due to the interference of lay benefactors or sheer lack of motivation among the choir nuns. From the later 1340s onwards, many religious houses suffered heavily from recurrent Plague epidemics and the effects of prolonged military campaigns.This was particularly visible in some areas in France that were touched by the Plague and the Hundred Years War. In Toulouse, the Clarissan monastic community was reduced from around 80 women in 1330 to just four by 1370. Other houses more or less disappeared altogether because of the Plague, as was the case in Carcassone, Lavaur, Narbonne and Samatan, and had to be refounded. The Clarissan monasteries of Auterive, Béziers, Boisset, Les Cassés, Gourdon, and Le Pouget were heavily damaged or completely destroyed by warfare, and needed rebuilding.2In many cases, surviving nuns from destroyed monasteries extra muros moved into town. They had to restart their community life under very difficult circumstances. To make ends meet, the women sometimes had to engage in forms of economic exploitation of their goods that were not in line with the requirements of their rule. To make up for extreme losses in population and revenue, they also had to resort to recruitment practices that brought in people not equipped to embrace the vows of poverty, abstinence and obedience.There was no uniformity in the ways in which reforms were initiated. Nor did they always have the same results. This becomes clear as soon as we take into account the choice for a specific rule, the implementation of additional reform constitutions and convent statutes, and the role played by nuns and abbesses, secular authorities, secular clergymen and, of course, leading Observant and non-Observant friars of the Franciscan order.The Tordesillas congregationAn early attempt at reform in Castile resulted in a congregation named after the Poor Clare monastery at Tordesillas. This royal foundation had been created around 1363 to perform intercessory prayers on behalf of Pedro I of Castile and his new wife Maria of Padiella. The house was well endowed, and papal privileges freed the house from episcopal oversight, in line with important Urbanist houses elsewhere.3 In 1377, this autonomy was augmented, when Pope Gregory XI, ‘for certain reasons’ , freed the house from control from the Franciscan provincial minister.4 This might have been motivated by thoughts towards religious reform.5In any case, the new Castilian ruler Juan I was not content with the nuns’ intercessory works for the royal family. He obtained several papal bulls from the Avignon Pope Clement VII to entice the monastery to return to its former “observance” of the rule and its prayer obligations. These bulls made the Franciscan confessor of the king, friar Fernando of Illescas, perpetual visitator of the Tordesillas house, with full powers for the duration of his life.6 He could remove the abbess from office and enter the monastic enclosure to correct abuses. He could also absolve nuns and monastic personnel from sins and excommunication, as well as appoint and dismiss confessors and deliver punishments.7From 1410 onwards, the Tordesillas reform model began to attract other monasteries, which coagulated into the reform congregation of Santa Maria la Real or Santa Clara de Tordesillas. By 1447.. (shrink)

We explore the social context of mathematical knowledge: Even though, the community of mathematicians may look homogeneous from the outside, it is actually structured into various sub-communities that differ in preferred notations, the choice of basic assumptions, or e.g. in the choice of motivating examples. We contend that we cannot manage mathematical knowledge for human recipients if we do not take these factors into account. As a basis for a future extension of MKM systems, we analyze the social context of (...) information in terms of Communities of Practice (CoP; a concept from learning theory) and present a concrete extensional model for CoPs in mathematics. (shrink)

This article demonstrates a priori cosmopolitan values of restraint and harm limitation exist to establish a cosmopolitan “no-harm” duty in warfare, predating utilitarianism and permeating modern international humanitarian law. In doing so, the author exposes the atemporal and ahistorical nature of utilitarianism which introduces chaos and brutality into the international legal system. Part 2 conceptualises the duty as derived from the “no-harm” principle under international environmental law. Part 3 frames the discussion within legal pluralism and cosmopolitan ethics, arguing that (...) divergent legal jurisdictions without an international authority necessitates a “public international sphere” to mediate differences leading to strong value-commitment norm-creation. One such norm is the “no-harm” duty in warfare. Part 4 traces the duty to the Stoics, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, African traditional culture, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Parts 5 and 6 explain how the duty manifests in principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law. (shrink)

Traxler, Pickering, and Clifton found that ambiguous sentences are read faster than their unambiguous counterparts. This so-called ambiguity advantage has presented a major challenge to classical theories of human sentence comprehension because its most prominent explanation, in the form of the unrestricted race model, assumes that parsing is non-deterministic. Recently, Swets, Desmet, Clifton, and Ferreira have challenged the URM. They argue that readers strategically underspecify the representation of ambiguous sentences to save time, unless disambiguation is required by task demands. (...) When disambiguation is required, however, readers assign sentences full structure—and Swets et al. provide experimental evidence to this end. On the basis of their findings, they argue against the URM and in favor of a model of task-dependent sentence comprehension. We show through simulations that the Swets et al. data do not constitute evidence for task-dependent parsing because they can be explained by the URM. However, we provide decisive evidence from a German self-paced reading study consistent with Swets et al.'s general claim about task-dependent parsing. Specifically, we show that under certain conditions, ambiguous sentences can be read more slowly than their unambiguous counterparts, suggesting that the parser may create several parses, when required. Finally, we present the first quantitative model of task-driven disambiguation that subsumes the URM, and we show that it can explain both Swets et al.'s results and our findings. (shrink)

Emotional dysregulation, age, gender, and obesity are transdiagnostic risk factors for the development and maintenance of eating disorders. Previous studies found that patients with ED had less meaning in life than the non-clinical population, and that meaning in life acted as a buffer in the course of ED; however, to the data, there are no studies about the mediator role of meaning in life in association between the emotional dysregulation and the ED psychopathology.Objective: To analyze the mediating role of meaning (...) in life in the relationship between emotional dysregulation and the ED psychopathology in three samples with diverse risk factors for ED.Method: Sample 1, n = 153 undergraduate young women; sample 2, n = 122 participants with obesity; and sample 3, n = 292 participants with ED. Multiple mediation analysis was performed.Results: Sample 1: meaning in life showed a mediation effect between emotional dysregulation and the ED psychopathology, body satisfaction, and depression symptoms ; sample 2: meaning in life showed a mediation effect between emotional dysregulation and binge eating and purging behaviors and depression symptoms ; sample 3: meaning in life showed a mediation effect between emotional dysregulation and the ED psychopathology, body satisfaction, borderline symptoms, and hopelessness.Conclusions: These studies suggest the importance of considering meaning in life as a variable in the onset and maintenance of ED. (shrink)

The chapter argues that a model‐building methodology like that widespread in contemporary natural and social science already plays a significant role in philosophy. One neglected form of progress in philosophy over the past fifty years has been the development of better and better formal models of significant phenomena. Examples are given from both philosophy of language and epistemology. Philosophy can do still better in the future by applying model‐building methods more systematically and self‐consciously, with consequent readjustments to its (...) methodology. Although it is neither likely nor desirable for model‐building to become the sole or even main philosophical method, its use enhances the power and reliability of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

Due to the increasing number of people traveling by air, the passenger flow at the airport is increasing, and the problem of passenger drop-off and pickup has a huge impact on urban traffic. The difficulty of taking a taxi at the airport is still a hot issue in the society. Aiming at the problem of optimizing the allocation of taxi resource, this paper is based on the cost-benefit analysis method to determine the factors that affect the taxi driver’s decision-making. The (...) mathematical methods such as function equation, BP neural network algorithm, and queuing theory were used to establish a complete decision-making model for taxi drivers and an optimization model of dispatching efficiency at the airport. A conclusion has been drawn that the allocation of airport taxi resource should be arranged closely related to drivers’ revenue and the layout of airport line. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese ThinkingJeremy E. HenkelA Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking. By François Jullien, translated by Janet Lloyd. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004. Pp. x + 202. $22.00.In A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking François Jullien argues that the different ways Chinese and Western thinkers have dealt with warfare and diplomacy reflect important differences in (...) how the two cultures understand human action in the world. When Chinese texts such as the Sunzi and the Guiguzi are set up as counterpoints to the Europeans Clausewitz and Machiavelli, Jullien argues that the Aristotelian inheritance of the latter pair is shown to be the cause of their inability to provide clean theories with the consistent predictive power they desired. Chinese strategists, by contrast, meet with no such limitations in the realm of human interaction. The basic difference between Western and Chinese thought that Jullien seeks to demonstrate is that "one constructs a model that is then projected onto the situation, which implies that the situation is momentarily 'frozen.' The other relies on the situation as on a disposition that is known to be constantly evolving" (p. 189; italics in original).Jullien's regular use of the generic terms "Western" and "Chinese" in constructing his comparison will likely give many comparative philosophers pause. But this [End Page 347] need not be a source of worry, as he is careful not to essentialize the two world-views. While he is pointing out patterns and tendencies in the thinking of Europe and China, he is not positing an essential incommensurable difference between them. Rather, he is pointing out that "what remains underdeveloped in the one context is more developed in the other" (p. 145). He goes on to say, "The purpose of our foray into China is not to imagine-let alone fabricate-other 'mentalities'.... It is simply to make use of other possible sources of intelligibility" (ibid.).Jullien begins by showing that Western thought regards human action as something that imposes itself on the world in order to bring about a predetermined goal. This is a natural consequence of the belief that the world is created: belief in creation implies something existing outside that creation, thus an intention behind that creation, and thus a transcendent norm toward which things within that creation aim. This two-leveled ontology of creator and creation yields a distinction between theory and practice, wherein practice always aims-and ultimately fails-at implementing an ideal that is established by theory. This worldview has led to demonstrable success in the sciences but meets with frequent frustration in the arena of human interaction. This limitation has been recognized by strategists in the West but has never been successfully resolved.Aristotle was the first to identify and try to resolve this problem. He posited phronesis as the skill that enables an individual to apply a model to the world successfully. For Aristotle such successful action consists of first identifying one's desired end and then reasoning back to one's present situation in order to establish the best means to achieve that end. Jullien's analysis shows that Clausewitz was working with the same model more than two thousand years later. Clausewitz believed that earlier attempts at creating a general theory of warfare had failed to achieve their goal-namely, to provide a model of warfare that a general could use to ensure victory-because the opponent's actions are unpredictable. The system that the military strategist is dealing with, then, is not mechanistic, and consequently plans are easily frustrated by ever-changing circumstances. But Clausewitz was unable to conceive of strategy as based on anything other than plans.For Clausewitz, warfare is composed of distinct engagements, separate moments in time where an army seeks to impose a plan on the world. Seeing warfare as composed of distinct moments means that time is an opponent, for time brings with it change and uncertainty and thus a greater chance that one's plans will be frustrated. Opportunity, then, is something unexpected-a chance happening at a specific moment that can be taken advantage of only... (shrink)

The identity of an academic discipline is essentially tied to production and reproduction of its disciplinary knowledge. This, in turn, determines the criteria of academic achievement for academicians belonging to a particular discipline. The ability of an academician to contribute to the disciplinary knowledge through publication of high-impact papers is considered to be of highest value in academic disciplines. This constitutes an essentialist paradigm of understanding academic disciplines. Such a paradigm, however, undervalues other equally important forms of academic labour, like (...) academic service, which support, develop and repair the academic world through practice of care. In his paper, the essentialist paradigm is critically appraised through Paperwinner’s Model, an adaptation of Breadwinner’s Model. Through the lens of ethics of care, specifically Joan Tronto’s responsibility-based ethics, the paper offers an alternate paradigm, the deflationary perspective on academia, to acknowledge and evaluate the significance of caring practices. The paper concludes with a formative suggestion to institutionally recognize and reward care through service-intensive positions. (shrink)

..............................................................................................101 I. The Idea of a Noncombatant ........................................................104 II. The Moral Shield Protecting Noncombatants.............................106 A. Accommodation.......................................................................107 B. Guilty Past ...............................................................................107 C. Guilty Bystander Trying to Inflict Harm .................................109 D. Guilty Bystander Disposed to Inflict Harm .............................109 E. Guilty Bystander Exulting in Anticipated Evil ........................109 F. Fault Forfeits First Doctrine in Just Warfare ...........................110 III. Noncombatants as Wrongful Trespassers ...................................110 IV. The Noncombatant Status of Captured Soldiers ........................111 V. Guerrilla Combat ..........................................................................116 VI. Morally Innocent Unjust Combatants.........................................118 VII. Should Rights Reflect (...) What We Can Know? ............................121 VIII. Absolute and Moderate Construction of the Revised Right.. (shrink)