Un aspecto poco estudiado del argumento de Michael Sandel en contra del carácter neutral de la justicia como equidad, es el modo en que funda sus conclusiones en el entendimiento que tiene de otros tres aspectos de la concepción rawlsiana de justicia: su carácter deontológico, el equilibrio reflexivo, y la posición original. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que Sandel no ha cometido cuatro errores independientes, sino que poseer un entendimiento equivocado del carácter deontológico de la teoría lo ha llevado a caracterizar (...) mal en qué consiste el equilibrio reflexivo y esto -finalmente- lo ha conducido a una errónea interpretación de lo que se encuentra modelado en la posición original y -en última instancia- a sostener la falta de neutralidad de la concepción de justicia. Concentrarnos en este asunto nos permitirá apreciar cómo se articulan y complementan las distintas réplicas que Brian Barry, Samuel Freeman y el mismo John Rawls han dirigido contra Sandel. One aspect of Michael Sandel´s argument against the neutral character of justice as fairness on which little research has been done is the way in which he founds his conclusions on the basis of the understanding he has about three other aspects of the Rawlsian conception of justice: its deontological character, the reflective equilibrium and the original position. It is my aim to prove that Sandel has not made four independent mistakes but, on the contrary, to have a wrong understanding of the deontological character of the theory has driven him to a wrong characterization of what the reflective equilibrium consists of and this, in turn, has taken him to a wrong interpretation of what is modelled in the original position and, at large, to hold the idea that justice as fairness lacks neutrality. Focusing on this issue will allow us to appreciate how the different responses made by Brian Barry, Samuel Freeman and John Rawls himself against Sandel are articulated and complement one another. (shrink)

Much evidence has accumulated in favor of such a dual view of reasoning. There is however some vagueness in the way the two systems are characterized. Instead of a principled distinction, we are presented with a bundle of contrasting features - slow/fast, automatic/controlled, explicit/implicit, associationist/rule based, modular/central - that, depending on the specific dual process theory, are attributed more or less exclusively to one of the two systems. As Evans states in a recent review, “it would then be helpful to (...) have some clear basis for this distinction”; he also suggests that “we might be better off talking about type 1 and type 2 processes” rather than systems. We share the intuitions that drove the development of dual system theories. Our goal here is to propose in the same spirit a principled distinction between two types of inferences: ‘intuitive inference’ and ‘reflective inference’. We ground this distinction in a massively modular view of the human mind where metarepresentational modules play an important role in explaining the peculiarities of human psychological evolution. We defend the hypothesis that the main function of reflective inference is to produce and evaluate arguments occurring in interpersonal communication. This function, we claim, helps explain important aspects of reasoning. We review some of the existing evidence and argue that it gives support to this approach. (shrink)

Syrien im 1.-7. Jahrhundert nach Christus. Edited by Dmitrij Bumazhnov and Hans Reinhard Seeliger. Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum, vol. 62. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011. Pp. viii + 284. €64.

Marcado desde sempre pela relação entre filosofia e literatura, o pensamento de Eduardo Lourenço (1923-2020) desenvolve-se ao longo de uma vasta produção intelectual – parte ainda inédita – correspondente a uma profunda, atenta e responsável atenção ao seu tempo. Este artigo parte dessa atenção, intentando demonstrar os contornos da sua originalidade, bem como mapear os traços principais do seu relevo filosófico-literário. Passando pelas noções de “heterodoxia”, de “ensaísmo” e de “temporalidade”, pretende-se acompanhar algumas vias percorridas pela obra do pensador, esclarecendo (...) o modo como se constroem a partir de um alargamento da ideia de razão alimentada pela multiplicidade dos desafios do tempo. (shrink)

Resumo: Este texto parte da letra A, da sua importância e da sua centralidade na Desconstrução de Derrida. Em função dessa letra iniciática, indício da “ironia muda” da différance como sincategorema do pensamento de Derrida, tentar-se-á acompanhar o modo como se apresenta à Filosofia Contemporânea como uma espécie de sismo, de abalo e de nova propulsão. Sismografias tenta então reconhecer, na postura e no desenvolvimento dessa letra “A”, a forma como o trabalho de Derrida abala pela base o território dos (...) conceitos, convocando a urgência e a responsabilidade da filosofia, da escrita e do pensamento. Nesse sentido, trata-se aqui de acompanhar as linhas de desenvolvimento de uma letra motriz, que pontuou, do início ao fim e em todas as direções, o pensamento de Derrida como idioma, como revolução filosófica, como sismografia.: This text departs from the letter A, in its importance and its centrality in Derrida’s deconstruction. From this initiatic letter, a sign of différance’s “mute irony” as a syncategorem of Derrida’s thought, we will try to follow the way in which it presents itself to Contemporary Philosophy as a kind of earthquake, a quake and a new propulsion. Seismographies tries therefore to recognise, in the posture and development of this letter “A”, the way in which Derrida’s work shakes up at its base the domain of concepts,, summoning up the urgency and responsibility of philosophy, of writing and of thought. In this sense it is intended to follow the lines of development of a leading letter, which marked, from beginning to end and in all directions, Derrida’s thought as an idiom, as a philosophical revolution, as a seismographie. (shrink)

Modern societies depend on a growing production of scientific knowledge, which is based on the functional differentiation of science into still more specialised scientific disciplines and subdisciplines. This is the basis for the paradox of scientific expertise: The growth of science leads to a fragmentation of scientific expertise. To resolve this paradox, the present paper investigates three hypotheses: 1) All scientific knowledge is perspectival. 2) The perspectival structure of science leads to specific forms of knowledge asymmetries. 3) Such perspectival knowledge (...) asymmetries must be handled through second order perspectives. We substantiate these hypotheses on the basis of a perspectivist philosophy of science grounded in Peircean semiotics and autopoietic systems theory. Perspectival knowledge asymmetries are an unavoidable and necessary part of the growth of scientific knowledge, and more awareness of this fact can help avoid blind and futile struggles between scientific perspectives, and direct efforts toward more appropriate ways of handling these fundamental knowledge asymmetries. Concretely, we show how different kinds of scientific knowledge, expertise, disagreement and learning can be correlated to the perspectival structure of science, and propose how polyocular communication based on observations of the observations made by specialised perspectives can be used to handle such perspectival knowledge asymmetries. This can help overcome the observed problems in carrying out cross-disciplinary research and in the collective use of different kinds of scientific expertise, and thereby make society better able to solve complex, real-world problems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER HUGO MEYNELL University of Calgary Calgary, Alberta IN THE FOLLOWING essay I w;ant to examine some of rthe ba1Sic ~deas of Heidegger from SIOmething of a " transcendiental Thomist " pevspective, 1 as represented by Bernard Lonergian's " generalized empirical method." I believe that there are a nlllmber of important insights :to be gained from Heidegger's work but that it contains a (...) fow very perilous oversights as well. To my mind, Heidegger shows with more conviction and power than any other thinker how our anxieties and our trivi1al everyday concerns are apt to shut us out from 1apprehending the deep my;stery of things, and how great art :and poetry, together with a,sustained thinking-through of the nmbure of consciousness :and of the woJ.'11d 1 wihich it reveals, have the power of opening up this mystery to us again.. I ailso agree with Heidegger when he says that the technicaiL fanguages of the scieDJoes and of traditional metaphysics as weH al'le, to a consiiew, one has to dismantle the conceptual appa- :vaitus which we take for granted, an appara;bus wherein the answers are given or presuppos,ed, but the questions al'e never e1q>erienced any more-least of all those aborut orur own nature, desbiny, and state in the wol'l1d. In asking these questions, we must be constantly ·aware of the limitations which aiccrue mom our particular historical sitruation.5 These were not sufficiently taken account of in the dassicaJ. phenomenology of Husserl, with its "transcendental subjectivity " based on an allegedly "d!isintel'ested observer." For all. its determination to 11eturn :to" the things themselves," this phenomerno~ogy did not attend sufficiently to the manner in which its own aims :and IJ[>ocedures we:ve determined historicaUy.6 Husserl, as he himself aJC1knowledged, was very much in the tradition of Descartes, who was trying to find an uns:hakabJe basis for the practice of phll.osophy. But it is just this basis which Heidegger seeks to prut into qruestion.7 We have to a.sk what is the decisiY.e matter for,thinking: "Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and concealment?" 8 Access to the things themselves is best thought of in true Greek fashion as " aletheia, the unoonceaJ.edness of what is present, iits being revealed, its showing itself." 9 (A,s he quite often does, Heidegger is here making capital out of ·an etymological point; " aletheia," the Greek word for """.t-1.,, • • 1 " i-th. " cealm t),..,ruuu, iI.S eqwv:a1ent to a- e ei,a, non~con · en. So what is basic to truth, irt must be inferred, is not the 00['rectness of assertions, or their cor11espondence with states of a:fiaim, or the :agreement of subjoot and object express1 ed by them; it is the self-showing which is necessary for things if 5 Cf. Krell, "Introduction," 21. 6 Ibid., 13. 7 Cf. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 8-9; Krell, 31. On the alleged errors of Descartes, see BT 123-33. sHeidegger, On Tflrne and Bemg (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 79; Krell, 14. oHeidegger, loc. cit., Krell, 13. 616 HUGO MEYNELL they 1arie to become objects of assertions.at all.10 The £.act is that.rulil (lO!l'respondence, " rudequation "11 or whatev. (shrink)

Delayed responses are a common phenomenon in experience sampling studies. Yet no consensus exists on whether they should be excluded from the analysis or what the threshold for exclusion should be. Delayed responses could introduce bias, but previous investigations of systematic differences between delayed and timely responses have offered unclear results. To investigate differences as a function of delay, we conducted secondary analyses of nine paper and pencil based experience sampling studies including 1,528 individuals with different clinical statuses. In all (...) participants, there were significant decreases in positive and increases in negative affect as a function of delay. In addition, delayed answers of participants without depression showed higher within-person variability and an initial strengthening in the relationships between contextual stress and affect. Participants with depression mostly showed the opposite pattern. Delayed responses seem qualitatively different from timely responses. Further research is needed to understand the mechanisms underlying these differences. (shrink)

Wir sind Teil einer Natur, die uns übersteigt - Grund genug, die Natur wieder zum Gegenstand philosophischer Reflexionen zu machen. Durch den Essentialismus-Verdacht schien der Begriff bereits für die Philosophie disqualifiziert. Doch Robert Hugo Ziegler zeigt, gestützt unter anderem auf Lukrez und Spinoza, dass die Natur, sobald man sie ernsthaft ins Auge fasst, alles andere als essentialistisch ist. Er ordnet das philosophische Problem der Natur damit in eine Wiederentdeckung metaphysischer Fragestellungen ein, die er originell vorantreibt - und beweist, dass (...) sich die Philosophie dadurch nicht nur zur bloßen Kommentatorin der Naturwissenschaften machen muss. (shrink)

The situation-dependent lateralization of sympathetic electrodermal arousal during real-life stress (Picard, Fedor, & Ayzenberg, 2016) may challenge a unitary notion of arousal, and call into question the practice of unilateral electrodermal recording, but there are broader implications. Here we consider a potential relationship between stress-induced lateralized shifts in electrodermal activity, and a theory concerning lateralized emotion-induced cardiac arrhythmia.

Trata-se de um breve e parcial recenseamento do paradigma naturalista em desenvolvimentos clássicos e recentes da filosofia fenomenológica. Em um primeiro momento, tentar-se-á estabelecer elementos mínimos acerca do que pode ser considerado um “paradigma filosófico”. Em seguida, será mostrada uma presença improvável e discreta da física enquanto imaginário privilegiado na ontologia fenomenológica de Jean-Paul Sartre. Também será explorada a resistência de Paul Ricoeur ao reducionismo neurobiológico, bem como uma improvável presença de um enquadramento naturalista na base de sua antropologia filosófica. (...) Por fim, serão apresentados indícios, na literatura recente, da possibilidade de uma relação fecunda e amigável entre a fenomenologia hermenêutica de Heidegger e as ciências naturais. Palavras-chave: Fenomenologia. Hermenêutica. Naturalismo. Paradigma. (shrink)

We are witnessing a return of the real which philosophy seems illequipped to handle. I argue (1) that this return of the real must be read as a rejection of those philosophical tendencies which were prevalent in the past decades and which I call philosophies of mediation: They supplanted all references to something real by the sole reference to those processes in which reality was supposed to be given or shaped (in interpretations, linguistic structures, historical or social conditions, media…). The (...) current urgency of the question of the real indicates that those philosophies have lost credibility. On the other hand (2), the contemporary attempts to resuscitate philosophical realism cannot be considered satisfactory either. It is curiously the real itself they fail to fully appreciate. All in all (3), the return of the real has to be interpreted as the effect of an event that has little to do with philosophy, namely the return of politics. (shrink)

Nous reproduisons ici, avec l’aimable autorisation de la Hofbibliothek Aschaffenburg (Allemagne), la courte correspondance inédite entre Dingler et Henri Poincaré. Cette correspondance, conservée aux Archives Dingler dans la Hofbibliothek Aschaffenburg (et mentionnée dans le catalogue du Nachlass de Dingler [Wolters & Schroeder-Heister 1979]), consiste en trois documents : un brouillon en allemand de la main de Dingler, sa traduction française par une autre plume, mais avec des corrections ef...

Dans son beau discours sur M. Henri Poincaré, Émile Picard nous a rappelé une expression de J.-B. Dumas sur le fameux physiologiste Claude Bernard, et a employé cette expression pour Poincaré lui-même : « On pourrait dire pareillement d’Henri Poincaré qu’il ne fut pas seulement un grand mathéma­ticien, maïs la mathématique elle-même. » Et comme Poincaré, d’après l’expression que nous venons de dire, a com­pris et développé la mathématique dans toutes ses profondeurs, il est clair qu’il devait...

Giorgio Agamben plantea que mediante el estado de excepción se logra vincular, por medio de la violencia, dos dimensiones carentes en principio de vínculo entre sí: nuda vida y normatividad. El estado de excepción parece encarnar así una racionalidad manipuladora. En contraste, en el pensamiento de Schmitt hay una permanente preocupación por el problema de la técnica, a la cual devela como racionalidad manipuladora. En este artículo se intenta determinar los alcances y límites de la teoría del estado de excepción (...) de Schmitt, a partir de un análisis de su comprensión de la racionalidad técnica. (shrink)

This paper explores and rehabilitates the value of decisional privacy as a conceptual tool, complementary to informational privacy, for critiquing personalized choice architectures employed by self-tracking technologies. Self-tracking technologies are promoted and used as a means to self-improvement. Based on large aggregates of personal data and the data of other users, self-tracking technologies offer personalized feedback that nudges the user into behavioral change. The real-time personalization of choice architectures requires continuous surveillance and is a very powerful technology, recently coined as (...) “hypernudging.” While users celebrate the increased personalization of their coaching devices, “hypernudging” technologies raise concerns about manipulation. This paper addresses that intuition by claiming that decisional privacy is at stake. It thus counters the trend to solely focus on informational privacy when evaluating information and communication technologies. It proposes that decisional privacy and informational privacy are often part of a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Hypernudging is used as a key example to illustrate that the two dimensions should not be treated separately. Hypernudging self-tracking technologies compromise autonomy because they violate informational and decisional privacy. In order to effectively judge whether technologies that use hypernudges empower users, we need both privacy dimensions as conceptual tools. (shrink)

The role of artificial intelligence (AI) in organizations has fundamentally changed from performing routine tasks to supervising human employees. While prior studies focused on normative perceptions of such AI supervisors, employees’ behavioral reactions towards them remained largely unexplored. We draw from theories on AI aversion and appreciation to tackle the ambiguity within this field and investigate if and why employees might adhere to unethical instructions either from a human or an AI supervisor. In addition, we identify employee characteristics affecting this (...) relationship. To inform this debate, we conducted four experiments (total N = 1701) and used two state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms (causal forest and transformers). We consistently find that employees adhere less to unethical instructions from an AI than a human supervisor. Further, individual characteristics such as the tendency to comply without dissent or age constitute important boundary conditions. In addition, Study 1 identified that the perceived mind of the supervisors serves as an explanatory mechanism. We generate further insights on this mediator via experimental manipulations in two pre-registered studies by manipulating mind between two AI (Study 2) and two human supervisors (Study 3). In (pre-registered) Study 4, we replicate the resistance to unethical instructions from AI supervisors in an incentivized experimental setting. Our research generates insights into the ‘black box’ of human behavior toward AI supervisors, particularly in the moral domain, and showcases how organizational researchers can use machine learning methods as powerful tools to complement experimental research for the generation of more fine-grained insights. (shrink)

This paper critically engages with new self-tracking technologies. In particular, it focuses on a conceptual tension between the idea that disclosing personal information increases one’s autonomy and the idea that informational privacy is a condition for autonomous personhood. I argue that while self-tracking may sometimes prove to be an adequate method to shed light on particular aspects of oneself and can be used to strengthen one’s autonomy, self-tracking technologies often cancel out these benefits by exposing too much about oneself to (...) an unspecified audience, thus undermining the informational privacy boundaries necessary for living an autonomous life. (shrink)

This research statement presents a roadmap for the ethical evaluation of contact tracing apps. Assuming the possible development of an effective and secure contact tracing app, this roadmap explores three ethical concerns—privacy, data monopolists and coercion- based on three scenarios. The first scenario envisions and critically evaluates an app that is built on the conceptualization of privacy as anonymity and a mere individual right rather than a social value. The second scenario sketches and critically discusses an app that adequately addresses (...) privacy concerns but is facilitated by data monopolists such as Google and Apple. The final scenario discusses the coerced installation and use of a privacy-friendly, independently developed contact tracing app. The main worry is coercion through societal exclusion and limited societal participation. The statement concludes with three suggestions for designing an ethical contact tracing app and a research agenda. (shrink)

"A book from the Park Ridge Center for the Study of Health, Faith, and Ethics." Includes bibliographical references (p. [141]-195) and index.