Does the assumption of a weak form of computational functionalism, according to which the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness, entail that a digital computational simulation of such neural computations is conscious? Or must this computational simulation be implemented in the right way, in order to replicate consciousness? From the perspective of Karl Friston’s free energy principle, self-organising systems (such as living organisms) share a set of properties that could be realised in artificial systems, but are not (...) instantiated by computers with a classical (von Neumann) architecture. I argue that at least one of these properties, viz. a certain kind of causal flow, can be used to draw a distinction between systems that merely simulate, and those that actually replicate consciousness. (shrink)

Paweł Gładziejewski has recently argued that the framework of predictive processing postulates genuine representations. His focus is on establishing that certain structures posited by PP actually play a representational role. The goal of this paper is to promote this discussion by exploring the contents of representations posited by PP. Gładziejewski already points out that structural theories of representational content can successfully be applied to PP. Here, I propose to make the treatment slightly more rigorous by invoking Francis Egan’s distinction between (...) mathematical and cognitive contents. Applying this distinction to representational contents in PP, I first show that cognitive contents in PP are determined by mathematical contents, at least in the sense that computational descriptions in PP put constraints on ascriptions of cognitive contents. After that, I explore to what extent these constraints are specific. I argue that the general mathematical contents posited by PP do not constrain ascriptions of cognitive content in a specific way. However, there are at least three aspects of PP that constrain ascriptions of cognitive contents in more specific ways: formal PP models posit specific mathematical contents that define more specific constraints; PP entails claims about how computational mechanisms underpin cognitive phenomena ; the processing hierarchy posited by PP goes along with more specific constraints. (shrink)

The goal of this short chapter, aimed at philosophers, is to provide an overview and brief explanation of some central concepts involved in predictive processing (PP). Even those who consider themselves experts on the topic may find it helpful to see how the central terms are used in this collection. To keep things simple, we will first informally define a set of features important to predictive processing, supplemented by some short explanations and an alphabetic glossary. -/- The features described here (...) are not shared in all PP accounts. Some may not be necessary for an individual model; others may be contested. Indeed, not even all authors of this collection will accept all of them. To make this transparent, we have encouraged contributors to indicate briefly which of the features are necessary to support the arguments they provide, and which (if any) are incompatible with their account. For the sake of clarity, we provide the complete list here, very roughly ordered by how central we take them to be for “Vanilla PP” (i.e., a formulation of predictive processing that will probably be accepted by most researchers working on this topic). More detailed explanations will be given below. Note that these features do not specify individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of “predictive processing”. All we currently have is a semantic cluster, with perhaps some overlapping sets of jointly sufficient criteria. The framework is still developing, and it is difficult, maybe impossible, to provide theory-neutral explanations of all PP ideas without already introducing strong background assumptions. (shrink)

Die Studien zur Philosophie des Bildes verfolgen eine doppelte Absicht: Sie bemühen sich einerseits um einen Überblick über die grundlegenden Positionen innerhalb der gegenwärtigen Bildwissenschaft und versuchen andererseits stets einen systematischen Hauptgedanken zu verteidigen: Bilder präsentieren; nur Bilder ermöglichen die artifizielle Präsenz von ausschließlich sichtbaren Dingen, die den Gesetzen der Physik enthoben sind. Vor dem Hintergrund dieses Bildbegriffs wird die Verwendung von Bildern als Zeichen aus einer phänomenologischen Sicht beschrieben, Platons Mimesis-Begriff anhand seiner kanonischen Bildvorstellungen rekonstruiert und die besondere Bedeutung (...) extremer Bildtypen - wie die virtuelle Realität, Benutzeroberflächen oder die Abstrakte Fotografie - für die philosophische Arbeit am Bildbegriff vorgeführt. (shrink)

A weak version of the life-mind continuity thesis entails that every living system also has a basic mind (with a non-representational form of intentionality). The strong version entails that the same concepts that are sufficient to explain basic minds (with non-representational states) are also central to understanding non-basic minds (with representational states). We argue that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: (i) there is a strong continuity between life (...) and mind; (ii) all living systems can be described as if they had representational states; (iii) the ’as-if representationality’ entailed by the free energy principle is central to understanding both basic forms of intentionality and intentionality in non-basic minds. In addition to this, we argue that the free energy principle also renders realism about computation and representation compatible with a strong life-mind continuity thesis (although the free energy principle does not entail computational and representational realism). In particular, we show how representationality proper can be grounded in ’as-if representationality’. (shrink)

According to active inference, action is enabled by a top-down modulation of sensory signals. Computational models of this mechanism complement ideomotor theories of action representation. Such theories postulate common neural representations for action and perception, without specifying how action is enabled by such representations. In active inference, motor commands are replaced by proprioceptive predictions. In order to initiate action through such predictions, sensory prediction errors have to be attenuated. This paper argues that such top-down modulation involves systematic misrepresentations. More specifically, (...) the paper first argues for the following conditional claim. If active inference provides an accurate computational description of how action is enabled in the brain, then action is enabled by systematic misrepresentations. Furthermore, it is argued that an inference to the best explanation provides reason for believing the antecedent is true: Firstly, active inference provides a crucial extension to ideomotor theories. Secondly, active inference explains otherwise puzzling phenomena related to sensory attenuation, e.g. in force-matching or self-tickling paradigms. Taken together, these reasons support the claim that action is indeed enabled by systematic misrepresentations. The claim casts doubt on the assumption that representations are systematically beneficial to the extent that they are true: if the argument in this paper is sound, systematically beneficial misrepresentations may lie at the heart of our neural architecture. (shrink)

What constitutes our number concept? What makes it possible for us to employ numbers the way we do; which mental faculties contribute to our grasp of numbers? What do we share with other species, and what is specific to humans? How does our language faculty come into the picture? This 2003 book addresses these questions and discusses the relationship between numerical thinking and the human language faculty, providing psychological, linguistic and philosophical perspectives on number, its evolution and its development in (...) children. Heike Wiese argues that language as a human faculty plays a crucial role in the emergence of systematic numerical thinking. She characterises number sequences as powerful and highly flexible mental tools that are unique to humans and shows that it is language that enables us to go beyond the perception of numerosity and to develop such mental tools. (shrink)

Should models of consciousness be detailed _mechanistic_ models of particular types of systems, or should they be _minimal_ models that abstract away from the underlying mechanistic details and provide generalisations? Detailed mechanistic models may afford a complete and precise account of consciousness in human beings and other, physiologically similar mammals. But they do not provide a good model of consciousness in other animals, such as non-vertebrates, let alone artificial systems. Minimal models can be applicable to a wide range of different (...) conscious systems. But do they provide genuine explanations that are autonomous from explanations by detailed mechanistic models? This paper provides a taxonomy of minimal models and measures of consciousness, clarifies their relation to detailed mechanistic models, and highlights benefits of different minimalist approaches to consciousness. (shrink)

This special issue focuses on the core task of phenomenology: the description of concrete phenomena. In particular, this means that it is not primarily historical or meta-theoretical questions about phenomenology that are to be discussed, nor the works of specific phenomenologists. The intention is to practice phenomenology as a special form of philosophy in an exemplary way; descriptions of the most diverse phenomena are to be developed and their validity put up for discussion - and exclusiv...

An interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterizations can be analyzed computationally. How can we account for phenomenal unity? That is, how can we characterize and explain our experience of objects and groups of objects, bodily experiences, successions of events, and the attentional structure of consciousness as wholes? In this book, Wanja Wiese develops an interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterization (...) can be analyzed conceptually as well as computationally. Wiese first addresses how the unity of consciousness can be characterized phenomenologically, discussing what it is like to experience wholes and what is the experiential contribution of phenomenal unity. Considering the associated conceptual and empirical issues, he draws connections to phenomenological accounts and research on Gestalt theory. The results show how the attentional structure of experience, the experience of temporal flow, and different types of experiential wholes contribute to our sense of phenomenal unity. Moreover, characterizing phenomenal unity in terms of the existence of a single global phenomenal state is neither necessary nor sufficient to adequately address the problem of phenomenal unity. Wiese then suggests that the concepts and ideas of predictive processing can be used to analyze phenomenal unity computationally. The result is both a conceptual framework and an interdisciplinary account: the regularity account of phenomenal unity. According to this account, experienced wholes correspond to a hierarchy of connecting regularities. The brain tracks these regularities by hierarchical prediction error minimization, which approximates hierarchical Bayesian inference. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Die Forschungs- und Regulierungsebene bei datenintensiver Forschung in der Medizin liegen auseinander. Ein heterogenes Feld aus regulierenden Institutionen mit regional ungleichen Regelungen, sowohl hinsichtlich der Dichte als auch der Restriktivität von Regelungen, steht einer globalen Entwicklung der Technologien entgegen. Trotz oder gerade wegen mangelnder global-gültiger Regulierungen können auch unverbindliche oder nur bedingt verbindliche normative Vorgaben der Orientierung dienen. Doch wie soll eine solche normative Regulierung angesichts datenintensiver Forschung in der Medizin ausgestaltet werden und woran soll sie sich orientieren? Die (...) Frage, wie konkret und detailliert man eine solche Forschung regulieren sollte, lässt sich nur im Einzelfall für bestimmte Situationen und Institutionen beantworten. Ob dabei neue Normen oder Gewichtungen von Normen vorgenommen werden sollen, oder ob die Normen und deren Gewichtung weiterhin bestehen bleiben sollen, lässt sich nur mit Verweis auf starke normative Argumente beantworten. An zwingenden Argumenten für neue Normen angesichts der datenintensiven medizinischen Forschung mangelt es bisher. Dennoch ist eine Umsetzungsarbeit von Normen, egal ob neue oder alte, und deren Anwendung auf eine neue Methode oder Technologie allemal zu erbringen. Es bedarf daher – wie schon bisher – beider: sowohl etablierter und transparent kommunizierter Normen als auch des unabhängigen Urteils zur Anwendung dieser Normen. Angesichts der besonderen Eignung für diese Aufgabe sollten auch weiterhin Ethik-Kommissionen als prozedurale Instanz bei der Bewilligung von datenintensiver Forschung in der Medizin gefordert und befähigt werden, die als unabhängige Institution ein Urteil im Einzelfall anhand vorgegebener Normen fällen. Nichtsdestotrotz können sich die veränderten Praktiken datenintensiver Forschungsprojekte auch in neuen Anforderungen an Ethik-Kommissionen niederschlagen, denen mit Reformen der Arbeitsweise begegnet werden sollte. (shrink)

These phenomenological studies on the philosophy of the image review contemporary image theory while defending the fundamental insight that images alone make the artificial presence of things possible.

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 214-222, April 2022.

The article critically responds to "A Planetary Health Pledge for Health Professionals in the Anthropocene" which was published by Wabnitz et al. in The Lancet in November 2020. It focuses on the different roles and responsibilities of a physician. The pledge is criticised because it neglects the different roles, gives no answers in case of conflicting goals, and contains numerous inconsistencies. The relationship between the Planetary Health Pledge and the Declaration of Geneva is examined. It is argued that the Planetary (...) Health Pledge should have supplemented the Declaration of Geneva instead of changing it. (shrink)

Drawing on recent work in developmental and comparative psychology, this paper argues that demonstratives function to coordinate the interlocutors' joint focus of attention, which is one of the most basic functions of human communication. The communicative importance of demonstratives is reflected in a number of properties that together characterize them as a particular word class: In contrast to other closed-class expressions, demonstratives are universal, they are generally so old that their roots cannot be traced back to other linguistic items, they (...) are among the earliest words that children learn, and they are closely tied to a particular gesture. Moreover, demonstratives play an important role in the organization of discourse and the diachronic evolution of grammar, which arguably is also motivated by their communicative function to establish joint attention. (shrink)

Philosophische Mythen und Modelle. Unzufriedenheit auf höchstem Niveau ; Der Mythenvorwurf in der Philosophie ; Modellierende Philosophie : eine contradictio in adjecto ; Der Mythos des Gegebenen ; Vom Mythos desGegebenen zum Mythos des Mittelbaren ; Interpretationismus und Wahrnehmungsphilosophie ; Transzendentaler Interpretationismus ; Die Verbindung des Mythos des Gegebenen mit dem Mythos des Mittelbaren : Repräsentationalismus ; Das Paradigma des Zugangs -- Phänomenologie : die Philosophie ohne Modell. Phänomenale Gewißheit ; Vom cartesischen Cartesianismus zum phänomenologischen Cartesianimus ; Intentionalität : das (...) fundamentum inconcussum relationalis ; Zu den Sachen und zurück zur Sprache ; Phänomenologische Protreptik ; Eidetische Variation -- Das Mich der Wahrnehmung. Von den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit zu den Folgen der Wirklichkeit ; Vom Primat des Wahrnehmenden zum Primat der Wahrnehmung ; Vom Ich zum Mich der Wahrnehmung ; Die Zumutung dauernder Anwesenheit ; Die Beschreibung der Anwesenheitszumutung : der Gehalt der Wahrnehmung ; Die Qualität der Wahrenmung und der Auffassungssinn ; Sich sicher sein, daß etwas der Fall ist : Wissen und Gewißheit ; Die unmögliche Epoché ; Vom Eindruck zum Ausdruck zur Teilhabe ; Transzendentale Ästhetik und die Unterstellung von Anschauungsformen ; Die Leiblichkeit des Wahrnehmenden : eine folge der Wahrnehmung ; Die Kontinuität des Wahrgenommenen ; Das Wahrgenommene und die Ursache der Wahrnehmung ; Die Zumutung der Öffentlichkeit ; Die Identität des Mich -- Die Partizipationspause. Pause versus Unterbrechung ; Die drei Paradigmen der Bildwahrnehmungstheorie ; Das besondre Objekt der Bildwahrnehmung ; Die besonderen Folgen der Bildwahrnehmung ; Zum Zuschauen gezwungen ; Die optische Entindividualisierung des Mich ; Zur Teilnahme entschieden. (shrink)

Definition of the problem The research and regulatory levels for data-intensive research in medicine are divergent. This results in a heterogeneous global field of regulating institutions with regionally unequal regulations, both in terms of the depth and restrictiveness of regulations. Despite or precisely because of the lack of globally binding regulation, nonbinding or only partially binding normative guidelines can also serve as orientation. But how should such normative regulation be designed in view of data-intensive research in medicine and what should (...) it be based on? Arguments The question of how concrete and in detail such research should be regulated can only be answered on a case-by-case basis for specific situations and institutions. Whether new norms or weightings of norms should be introduced, or whether the norms and their weightings should remain in place, can only be answered with reference to strong normative arguments. So far, there is a lack of compelling arguments in favour of new standards in view of data-intensive medical research. However, it is always necessary to translate norms, whether new or old, and apply them to a new method or technology. As in the past, both established and transparently communicated standards and an independent judgement on the application of these standards are therefore required. Conclusion In view of their particular suitability for this task, ethics committees should continue to be required and qualified as a procedural authority in the approval of data-intensive research in medicine; as an independent institution, they should make a judgement appropriate to the individual case on the basis of existing norms and standards. However, the changing practices of data-intensive research projects can also be reflected in new demands on research ethics committees, which should be addressed with reforms of their operating mode. (shrink)

Robots are increasingly envisaged as our future cohabitants. However, while considerable progress has been made in recent years in terms of their technological realization, the ability of robots to inter-act with humans in an intuitive and social way is still quite limited. An important challenge for social robotics is to determine how to design robots that can perceive the user’s needs, feelings, and intentions, and adapt to users over a broad range of cognitive abilities. It is conceivable that if robots (...) were able to adequately demonstrate this, humans would eventually accept them as social companions. We argue that the best way to achieve this is using a systematic experimental approach based on behavioral and physiological neuroscience methods such as motion/eye tracking, electroencephalography (EEG), or functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) embedded in interactive human-robot paradigms. This approach requires understanding how humans interact with each other, how they perform tasks together and how they develop feelings of social connection over time, and using these insights to formulate design principles that make social robots attuned to the workings of the human brain. In this review, we put forward the argument that the likelihood of artificial agents being perceived as social companions can be increased by designing them in a way that they are perceived as intentional agents that activate areas in the human brain involved in social-cognitive processing. We first review literature related to social-cognitive mechanisms involved in human-human interactions, and high-light the importance of perceiving others as intentional agents to activate these brain areas. We then discuss how attribution of intentionality can positively affect human-robot interaction by (a) fostering feelings of social connection, empathy and prosociality, and by (b) enhancing performance on joint human-robot tasks. Lastly, we describe circumstances under which attribution of intentionality to robot agents might be disadvantageous, and discuss challenges associated with designing social robots that are inspired by neuroscientific principles. (shrink)

Some authors argue that phenomenal unity can be grounded in the attentional structure of consciousness, which endows conscious states with at least a foreground and a background. Accordingly, the phenomenal character of part of a conscious state comprises a content aspect and a structural aspect. This view presents the concern that such a structure does not bring about phenomenal unity, but phenomenal segregation, since the background is separated from the foreground. I argue that attention can still lead to a form (...) of phenomenal unity that connects the foreground with the background. Experiencing oneself as controlling the focus of attention can, at least occasionally, bring about an experienced connection between the attentional foreground and the attentional background of a conscious experience. (shrink)

After decades of neglect philosophers of physics have discovered gauge theories--arguably the paradigm of modern field physics--as a genuine topic for foundational and philosophical research. Incidentally, in the last couple of years interest from the philosophy of physics in structural realism--in the eyes of its proponents the best suited realist position towards modern physics--has also raised. This paper tries to connect both topics and aims to show that structural realism gains further credence from an ontological analysis of gauge theories--in particular (...) U(1) gauge theory. In the first part of the paper the framework of fiber bundle gauge theories is briefly presented and the interpretation of local gauge symmetry will be examined. In the second part, an ontological underdetermination of gauge theories is carved out by considering the various kinds of non-locality involved in such typical effects as the Aharonov-Bohm effect. The analysis shows that the peculiar form of non-separability figuring in gauge theories is a variant of spatiotemporal holism and can be distinguished from quantum theoretic holism. In the last part of the paper the arguments for a gauge theoretic support of structural realism are laid out and discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a non-reductive variant of the regularity theory of causation proposed in Andreas and Günther (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105: 2–32, 2024). The variant is motivated as a refinement of Lewis’s (Journal of Philosophy 70:556–567, 1973) regularity theory. We do not pursue a reductive theory here because we found a challenge for Baumgartner's (Erkenntnis 78:85–109, 2013) regularity theory which applies to our previous theory as well. The challenge is sidestepped by a framework of law-like propositions resembling structural (...) equations. We furthermore improve the deviancy condition of our previous theory. Finally, we show that the present theory can compete with the most advanced regularity and counterfactual accounts. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim to explore connections between a Carnapian semantics of theoretical terms and an eliminative structuralist approach in the philosophy of mathematics. Specifically, we will interpret the language of Peano arithmetic by applying the modal semantics of theoretical terms introduced in Andreas (Synthese 174(3):367–383, 2010). We will thereby show that the application to Peano arithmetic yields a formal semantics of universal structuralism, i.e., the view that ordinary mathematical statements in arithmetic express general claims about all admissible interpretations (...) of the Peano axioms. Moreover, we compare this application with the modal structuralism by Hellman (Mathematics without numbers: towards a modal-structural interpretation. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1989), arguing that it provides us with an easier epistemology of statements in arithmetic. (shrink)

This is an essay on the understanding of disposition concepts, which exploits the Ramsey test semantics of conditionals for a refined conditional analysis of dispositions. I will show that this semantics allows for a more accurate account of disposition concepts than the standard semantics of conditionals by David Lewis. This includes dealing with the counterexamples to the conditional analysis, which are known as finks, antidotes, and mimics.

In the history of zoology the English anatomist Morrison Watson (1845–1885) is considered to be the discoverer of the masculinized sexual organs of the spotted hyena. Beginning in 1877, Watson had published a series of anatomical studies on the spotted hyena (Watson, 1877, 1878, 1881, Watson and Young, 1879), in which he, in which he for the first time made public the anatomical peculiarities of the female spotted hyena’s genitalia. This scientific achievement is well documented. But now we can also (...) state that a hundred years before Watson the Dutch amateur zoologist Robert Jacob Gordon (1743–1795), while serving in the Scots Brigades at the Cape of Good Hope, had already made the same discovery and merely unfortunate personal circumstances prevented publication. During his stay at the Cape, Gordon had studied spotted hyenas intensively and recorded his observations in accurate drawings and comments. These drawings have been preserved as part of a large collection of animal drawings entitled Gordon Atlas. With his discovery, Gordon actually was the first to provide empirical evidence of a “curious and inexplicable case of dimorphism” (Darwin on a beetle) in mammalians, long before Étienne Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire (Cours de l’histoire naturelle des mammifères, 1829) started examining masculinized sexual organs in the mole or Darwin recognized the importance of sexual dimorphism (Descent of Man, 1871). In this paper we reproduce for the first time all hyena drawings from the Gordon Atlas, including Gordon’s handwritten notes in the margins in the original Dutch and in translation. Additionally, we briefly delineate the knowledge about the South African spotted hyena in Gordon’s time and indicate that we doubt Watson’s explanation for the age-old confusion about the hyena. (shrink)

In his criticism of the ontological proof of God’s existence, Leibniz does not generally reject this type of proof, but only the form it has been given by authors like Descartes and others. Therefore, he introduces the notion of “Ens necessarium”, “necessary being”, into the discussion. Some German authors have interpreted this notion as basis of a new type of ontological proof, whilst among English-writing commentators the same notion has been understood rather as a “simplification” of the classical proof. These (...) different lines of interpretation will be discussed in my contribution, and a solution will be offered which avoids the problems the different approaches to the question have generated so far. (shrink)

Uncertainty is a core issue and – as I would like to argue in this article – also a generative core quality of anthropological sensory practices. Research in particular and epistemologically meaningful endeavours in general are probably not even possible if moments and aspects of uncertainty are excluded or even avoided. Therefore, this article will start in the section ‘The sensory corpus’ with one example of auditory and sensory uncertainty by US-sound artist Maryanne Amacher. This example, the piece ‘Dense Boogie (...) I’, operates directly in the body, in the physical ear of the listeners, and can prove how the listening subject’s idiosyncratic sensibility can be a crucial instrument to proceed in researching and understanding. (shrink)