"Open Democracy envisions what true government by mass leadership could look like."—Nathan Heller, New Yorker How a new model of democracy that opens up power to ordinary citizens could strengthen inclusiveness, responsiveness, and accountability in modern societies To the ancient Greeks, democracy meant gathering in public and debating laws set by a randomly selected assembly of several hundred citizens. To the Icelandic Vikings, democracy meant meeting every summer in a field to discuss issues until consensus was reached. Our contemporary representative (...) democracies are very different. Modern parliaments are gated and guarded, and it seems as if only certain people—with the right suit, accent, wealth, and connections—are welcome. Diagnosing what is wrong with representative government and aiming to recover some of the lost openness of ancient democracies, Open Democracy presents a new paradigm of democracy in which power is genuinely accessible to ordinary citizens. Hélène Landemore favors the ideal of “representing and being represented in turn” over direct-democracy approaches. Supporting a fresh nonelectoral understanding of democratic representation, Landemore recommends centering political institutions around the “open mini-public”—a large, jury-like body of randomly selected citizens gathered to define laws and policies for the polity, in connection with the larger public. She also defends five institutional principles as the foundations of an open democracy: participatory rights, deliberation, the majoritarian principle, democratic representation, and transparency. Open Democracy demonstrates that placing ordinary citizens, rather than elites, at the heart of democratic power is not only the true meaning of a government of, by, and for the people, but also feasible and, today more than ever, urgently needed. (shrink)

The maze and the masses -- Democracy as the rule of the dumb many? -- A selective genealogy of the epistemic argument for democracy -- First mechanism of democratic reason: inclusive deliberation -- Epistemic failures of deliberation -- Second mechanism of democratic reason: majority rule.

This paper takes stock of a recent but growing movement within the field of deliberative democracy, which normatively argues for the epistemic dimension of democratic authority and positively defends the truth-tracking properties of democratic procedures. Authors within that movement call themselves epistemic democrats, hence the recognition by many of an ‘epistemic turn’ in democratic theory. The paper argues that this turn is a desirable direction in which the field ought to evolve, taking it beyond the ‘fact of disagreement’ that had (...) previously blocked the conceptual road to acknowledging more than intrinsic properties to democratic decision procedures. The paper shows how two authors in particular – Joshua Cohen and David Estlund – have successfully lifted the Rawlsian requirement of epistemic abstinence and defends epistemic democrats and the implications of the epistemic turn in democratic theory against various misconceptions. (shrink)

Hélène Landemore ,Aude Bandini | : Cet article présente les bases d’un argument épistémique en faveur de la démocratie définie comme procédure de décision collective. Il explore également les implications d’un tel argument épistémique par rapport à d’autres justifications établies de la démocratie, par rapport aux explications scientifiques de ses succès empiriques, et en termes de politiques publiques à mener. En ce qui concerne l’argument épistémique proprement dit, il repose sur le concept de « raison démocratique », autrement dit (...) l’intelligence collective des individus dans le domaine politique, et propose, de manière contre-intuitive, que la raison démocratique est davantage tributaire de la diversitécognitive des individus qui prennent par aux décisions que de leurs aptitudes personnelles. Généralement, l’argument de la raison démocratique complète les arguments procéduraux basés sur l’équité et l’égalité pour offrir une explication fonctionnaliste complète de la démocratie. Pour finir, cet article défend l’idée de réformes institutionnelles favorisant la participation citoyenne dans le processus de prise de décision collective. | : This paper presents the foundations of a systematic epistemic case for democracy as a collective decision-rule and explores the implications of this epistemic claim for normative justifications of democracy, scientific explanations of its empirical success, and policy reforms. As far as the epistemic case is concerned, the paper proposes an account based on the concept of “democratic reason,” or the collective intelligence of the people in politics. The paper argues that, counter-intuitively, democratic reason is more a function of the cognitive diversity of the individuals taking part in the decision than of their individual ability. As an account of democracy’s epistemic benefits, the argument from democratic reason supplements procedural accounts based on fairness and equality to provide a complete functionalist explanation of democracy. Finally, the argument supports policy reforms increasing citizens’ participation in the collective decision-process. (shrink)

This paper argues in favor of the epistemic properties of inclusiveness in the context of democratic deliberative assemblies and derives the implications of this argument in terms of the epistemically superior mode of selection of representatives. The paper makes the general case that, all other things being equal and under some reasonable assumptions, more is smarter. When applied to deliberative assemblies of representatives, where there is an upper limit to the number of people that can be included in the group, (...) the argument translates into a defense of a specific selection mode of participants: random selection. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe idea that the crowd could ever be intelligent is a counterintuitive one. Our modern, Western faith in experts and bureaucracies is rooted in the notion that political competence is the purview of the select few. Here, as in my book Democratic Reason, I defend the opposite view: that the diverse many are often smarter than a group of select elites because of the different cognitive tools, perspectives, heuristics, and knowledge they bring to political problem solving and prediction. In this (...) essay I defend my epistemic argument against proceduralist democrats; the value of model thinking against empiricists; the bracketing of fundamental value diversity against critics who see such diversity as an essential feature of politics; the intelligence of the masses in the face of voter ignorance and systematic biases; and the normative priority of democracy over market mechanisms. I also consider challenges to my use of Hong and Page's formal results, the epistemically proper selection method for representatives, and the role of deliberation in problem solving. I finally chart three avenues for further research. (shrink)

Consensus plays an ambiguous role in deliberative democracy. While it formed the horizon of early deliberative theories, many now denounce it as an empirically unachievable outcome, a logically impossible stopping rule, and a normatively undesirable ideal. Deliberative disagreement, by contrast, is celebrated not just as an empirically unavoidable outcome but also as a democratically sound and normatively desirable goal of deliberation. Majority rule has generally displaced unanimity as the ideal way of bringing deliberation to a close. This article offers an (...) epistemic perspective on this question of consensus versus disagreement. For ensuring the production of better decisions, we argue, the normative appeal of consensus varies depending on the deliberative task – whether it entails problem solving or prediction. We argue that in pure problem-solving contexts, consensus retains a strong normative appeal and forms the ideal deliberative outcome of deliberation. In contrast, on predictive tasks, consensus should generally not be used as a stopping rule noris it likely to be epistemically desirable as an outcome. Instead deliberators may be better served by ending the deliberation with a form of deliberative disagreement we call ‘positive dissensus’, which paves the way for more accurate aggregate predictions. (shrink)

This article is another unapologetic contribution to ‘the gentle art of rational choice bashing’. The debate over rational choice theory (RCT) may appear to have tired out; yet RCT is as dominant in political sciences as ever. The reason is that critics typically take aim at the symptoms of RCT’s failings, rather than their root cause: RCT’s very ambition of being the ‘science of choice’. In this article I argue that RCT fails twice, first as a science of choice and (...) then as a science of choice. Both failures suggest that political sciences need an epistemologic (re)conversion away from the Platonic ideal of a deductive and universal science of choice toward a more inductive and pluralist paradigm. While advocates of RCT rightly insist that ‘you can’t beat something with nothing’, I take their advice, with a grain of salt: in order for alternatives to appear, the frame of references needs to be modified. I draw a few perspectives for the political sciences. (shrink)

This paper revisits a debate in epistemic democracy about the value of the Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem (Hong and Page 2004 and Page 2008) in supporting the claims of epistemic democrats in favor of more inclusive decision-making processes in politics. We conduct a systematic review of DTA results and conclude that while they generally support the epistemic claims of deliberative democrats, they also support reintroducing experts in certain contexts. We use these results to complicate Plato’s metaphor of the cave by (...) identifying different areas within it where ordinary citizens, experts, or a mix of both are in a better position to make decisions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Mutz argues that there is an inverse correlation between deliberation and participation. However, the validity of this conclusion partly depends on how one defines deliberation and participation. Mutz's definition of deliberation as ?hearing the other side? or ?cross-cutting exposure? is narrower than a minimal conception of deliberation with which deliberative democrats could agree. First, a minimal conception of deliberation would have to revolve around the principle of a reasoned exchange of arguments, as opposed to mere exposure to dissenting views. (...) Second, Mutz's almost exclusive focus on participation as partisan activism gives the impression of an essential tension between participation and deliberation. But another form of civic participation, which I call ?critical-deliberative involvement,? is perfectly compatible with the incentives for reasoned exchange of arguments with others. We should thus encourage people to participate in politics in ways that engage their reasoning faculty, not just their party loyalty. This also requires teaching people how to disagree constructively. (shrink)

On September 3, 2015, the Political Epistemology/ideas, Knowledge, and Politics section of the American Political Science Association sponsored a roundtable on epistemic democracy as part of the APSA’s annual meetings. Chairing the roundtable was Daniel Viehoff, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield. The other participants were Jack Knight, Department of Political Science and the Law School, Duke University; Hélène Landemore, Department of Political Science, Yale University; and Nadia Urbinati, Department of Political Science, Columbia University. We thank the participants for (...) permission to republish their remarks, which they edited for clarity after the fact. (shrink)

Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments (...) during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like-minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level. (shrink)

In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, an important conceptual battleground for democratic theorists ought to be, it would seem, the capitalist firm. We are now painfully aware that the typical model of government in so-called investor-owned companies remains profoundly oligarchic, hierarchical, and unequal. Renewing with the literature of the 1970s and 1980s on workplace democracy, a few political theorists have started to advocate democratic reforms of the workplace by relying on an analogy between firm and state. To (...) the extent that a firm is an organization comparable to the state, it too ought to be ruled along democratic lines. Our paper tests the robustness of the analogy between firm and state by considering six major objections to it: the objection from a difference in ends, the objection from shareholders’ property rights, the objection from worker’s consent, the objection from workers’ exit opportunities, the objection from workers’ expertise, and the objection from the fragility of firms. We find all of these objections wanting. While the paper does not ambition to settle the issue of workplace democracy at once, our goal is to pave the way for a more in-depth study of the ways in which firms and states can be compared and the possible implications this may have for our understanding of the nature of managerial authority and the governance of firms. (shrink)

Bryan Caplan’s Myth of the Rational Voter is deeply ideological and conceptually confused. His book is shaped by pro‐market and pro‐expert biases and anti‐democratic attitudes, leading to one‐sided and conclusion‐driven arguments. His notion that voters are rationally irrational when they hold anti‐market and anti‐trade beliefs is incoherent, as is his idea that sociotropic voting can be explained as the rational purchase of a good self‐image.

Book Review Hélène Landemore : Democratic Reason. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 279 pages. ISBN 978-0691155654. Price: £27.95.

On August 30, 2013, the American Political Science Association sponsored a roundtable on political epistemology as part of its annual meetings. Co-chairing the roundtable were Jeffrey Friedman, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin; and Hélène Landemore, Department of Political Science, Yale University. The other participants were Scott Althaus, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Mark Bevir, Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley; Rogers Smith, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; and (...) Susan Stokes, Department of Political Science, Yale University. We thank the participants for permission to republish their remarks, which they subsequently edited for clarity. (shrink)

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are a new, rapidly-growing class of organizations governed by smart contracts. Here we describe how researchers can contribute to the emerging science of DAOs and other digitally-constituted organizations. From granular privacy primitives to mechanism designs to model laws, we identify high-impact problems in the DAO ecosystem where existing gaps might be tackled through a new data set or by applying tools and ideas from existing research fields such as political science, computer science, economics, law, and organizational (...) science. Our recommendations encompass exciting research questions as well as promising business opportunities. We call on the wider research community to join the global effort to invent the next generation of organizations. (shrink)

In this accessible book, leading scholars Jason Brennan and Hélène Landemore ask, what good is democracy and is there any better alternative? Brennan argues that democracy suffers from built-in systematic flaws. There is no way to fix these flaws--we can only contain them, or jettison democracy for a better system of representative government. Landemore argues that our problem is that we have not been using real democracy. Real democracy--in which citizensexercise more genuine power--can overcome the problems we see (...) in modern republican governments. The book concludes with each author responding to the other's arguments, ultimately helping readers see how their views of justice depend in part on how they think democracy functions. (shrink)

This short piece discusses Hélène Landemore’s proposal of an ‘open democracy’, as outlined in her recent book _Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First Century_. Acknowledging the value of Landemore’s radical and ambitious proposals, I draw attention to a number of shortcomings and blind spots that have to do with how the case for an ‘open democracy’ is made: through an unduly brief and dismissive treatment of political parties; a methodological insensitivity to empirical variations of democratic performance (...) and citizens’ evaluations of the latter; a failure to distinguish between higher and ordinary law-making in the discussion of the central Icelandic case; and, finally, a surprising concession that realising an open democracy is all but infeasible in established constitutional democracies. If open democracy is to be an attractive ideal, these issues must arguably be addressed. (shrink)

O domínio persistente das elites políticas no âmbito de diferentes governos representativos contemporâneos, aliado à descaracterização da natureza programática dos partidos políticos têm levado a uma intensa reflexão, nos últimos anos, acerca dos limites e capacidades da democracia como sistema de governo. Problemas como a persistência de profundas desigualdades sociais e a incapacidade de inclusão das minorias – e até mesmo de maiorias, como no caso brasileiro – apontam para um processo de “oligarquização” das democracias, marcado por uma tentativa de (...) “neutralização política do povo”, em todo incompatível com os valores republicanos e democráticos. Em um caso de tamanha sub-representação, no qual setores majoritários da sociedade são governados sistematicamente por setores minoritários, como garantir que o ideal de não-dominação seja assegurado? Partindo da constatação dos limites práticos dos governos representativos contemporâneos em geral, e do caso brasileiro, em particular, o propósito deste artigo é debater em que medida a proposta de “democracia aberta” de Hélène Landemore, que propõe a recuperação da prática do sorteio como expressão do elemento democrático, é compatível com o pensamento republicano. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore makes an epistemic argument for democracy. She contends that, due to their greater cognitive diversity, democratic groups will engage in superior deliberation and information aggregation than will groups of experts; consequently, the quality of their policies will be better. But the introduction of value diversity into Landemore's model—which is necessary if the argument is to apply to the real world—undermines her argument for the epistemic superiority of democratic deliberation. First, the existence of value (...) diversity threatens to stop deliberation prematurely. This has the effect of making the outcome of group deliberation more dependent on individual ability, which gives groups of experts a distinct advantage. Second, the introduction of value diversity raises the question of how to understand the standard of correctness of an epistemic argument, which Landemore does not adequately answer. (shrink)

In her recent book, Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore argues that, when evaluated epistemically, “a democratic decision procedure is likely to be a better decision procedure than any non-democratic decision procedures, such as a council of experts or a benevolent dictator” (p. 3). Landemore's argument rests heavily on studies of collective intelligence done by Lu Hong and Scott Page. These studies purport to show that cognitive diversity – differences in how people solve problems – is actually more important to (...) overall group performance than average individual ability – how smart the individual members are. Landemore's argument aims to extrapolate from these results to the conclusion that democracy is epistemically better than any non-democratic rival. I argue here that Hong and Page's results actually undermine, rather than support, this conclusion. More specifically, I argue that the results do not show that democracy is better than any non-democratic alternative, and that in fact, they suggest the opposite – that at least some non-democratic alternatives are likely to epistemically outperform democracy. (shrink)

Cognitivist theories of democratic decision-making come in two flavours, which I label transparently and intransparently epistemic. Lafont’s deliberative theory of democracy has strengths in accoun...

It is widely assumed that severe mental disabilities prevent relevant deliberative capacities from developing or persisting. Accordingly, excluding many people with mental disabilities from discourse practices seems justified. Against this common assumption I wish to show that the general exclusion is not justified and amounts to a form of epistemic injustice, as theorised by Miranda Fricker. The received norm of capable deliberators is connected to a specific model of deliberation. I introduce an alternative model of deliberation, which I dub the (...) joint effort model. According to this model, people with minority minds (as I call them) add valuable cognitive diversity to the process of deliberation, which is a relevant element of epistemic improvement. In this part of the argument I rely on empirically informed theoretical work by Hélène Landemore. I scrutinise the minimal requirements of capable deliberators from the perspective of a joint effort model of deliberation, and I highlight specific beneficial contributions people with minority minds can make to discourse practices. I will argue that people with minority minds can be presumptively deemed capable deliberators and that therefore their general exclusion is unjustified. (shrink)

In this article, I critically assess Hélène Landemore's new model of Open Democracy, asking whether it requires of citizens to blindly defer to the decisions of the mini-public. To address this question, I, first, discuss three institutional mechanisms in Open Democracy, all of which can be read to grant citizens democratic control. I argue that neither the capacity to authorize the selection mechanism (random sortition), nor the lottocratic conception of political equality, nor the self-selection mechanisms of Landemore's model (...) deliver the form of control that would insulate Open Democracy from the charge of blind deference. I then discuss the direct democracy mechanisms that Landemore incorporates into her model. Although these devices grant citizens control and, by extension, offer the resources for repudiating the charge of blind deference, they also, I argue, subvert the logic of Landemore's lottocratic model, rendering Open Democracy predictably unstable. Given the deliberative asymmetries between the mini-public and the citizenry, a high frequency of bottom-up challenges is to be expected that would throw the whole system into jeopardy. Thus, the challenge for lottocrats is to show how democratic control can be achieved in a lottocratic system without undermining the benefits of the legislature by lot. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore argues that deliberation and the aggregation of citizens' dispersed knowledge should tend to produce better consequences than rule by the one or the few. However, she pays insufficient attention to the epistemic processes necessary to realize these democratic goods. In particular, she fails to consider the question of where citizens' beliefs and ideas come from, with the result that the democratic decision mechanisms she focuses on are insufficiently powerful to justify her consequentialist defense of (...) mass decision making. If “the few” are technocratic experts, Landemore supplies little reason to resist their rule on epistemic grounds, for she does not secure a knowledge base for the citizens that might compete with the knowledge that is often attributed to such “experts.” Aggregating and deliberating about poor information is no substitute for good information. Her book can therefore be seen as a call for a new phase of epistemic political theory that compares the real-world knowledgeability of ordinary citizens and putative experts, but it does not convincingly deliver on its goal to demonstrate the epistemic superiority of the former. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn “The Politics of Getting It Right,” Russell Muirhead has contended in this journal that democracy is valuable because of its procedural legitimacy rather than because of the epistemic values of “getting things right.” However, pure procedural theories of legitimacy fail. Thus, if democracy is legitimate, it will have to be due partly to its epistemic advantages. There are two ways of thinking about these advantages. One approach, associated most prominently with David Estlund and Hélène Landemore, equates the epistemic (...) advantages of democracy with its ability to approximate a procedure-independent standard of correctness. The other, associated with Fabienne Peter, explicitly rejects that standard. Peter’s view, however, is incapable of answering challenges against pure procedural theories of legitimacy. (shrink)

This paper contributes to growing debates over the decision-making ability of democracy by considering the epistemic value of deliberative democracy. It focuses on the benefits democratic deliberation can derive from its diversity, and the extent to which these benefits can be realised with respect to the complexities of political problems. The paper first calls attention to the issue of complexity through a critique of Hélène Landemore and the Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem. This approach underestimates complexity due to its reliance (...) on an ‘oracle assumption’ and this is shown to highlight more general difficulties for applying the benefits of diversity to the realities of political problems. The paper then develops a new model of deliberation—based on an relationship between cognitive diversity and diminishing returns to cognitive type—which does not involve an oracle assumption and can therefore support the epistemic value of deliberative democracy even for complex problems. The benefits of diversity are also argued to be better realised though sortition than either democratic elections or epistocracy, pointing to the value of deliberation between randomly selected citizens. Finally, and contrary to past work, the new account suggests that diversity cannot alone establish the superiority of democratic deliberation over all non-democratic alternatives, and that it is insufficient to mount a purely epistemic argument for deliberative democracy. The paper therefore furthers our understanding of the epistemic value of deliberative democracy by clarifying when and to what extent diversity is a benefit to political problem solving. (shrink)

Cet article commence par examiner trois justifications épistémiques de la démocratie, proposées par José Luis Martí, David Estlund et Hélène Landemore. Tous trois cherchent à montrer en quoi la démocratie possède une tendance à engendrer des décisions correctes, mais font face au risque de légitimer une organisation technocratique du politique, en contradiction avec le principe d’égalité politique. Ils estiment donc que l’argument épistémique ne peut pas suffire à justifier des institutions démocratiques. Cependant, si l’on comprend la valeur «épistémique» d’une (...) décision politique à la fois d’un point de vue factuel et normatif, c’est-à-dire qu’on considère à la fois sa rationalité et son impartialité, une justification épistémique de la démocratie beaucoup plus robuste émerge. C’est cette dernière qui est explorée et défendue dans la seconde partie de cet article. (shrink)

This paper argues that (a) civic constitutionalism is a cohesive body of scholarship (b) it offers a detailed challenge to Hélène Landemore’s account of how to fix democratic politics, while at the same time (c) suggesting how to blend compelling features of Landemore’s approach with a more traditionally-grounded approach (d) consequently, democratic theorists of all sorts should consider becoming civic constitutionalists.

ABSTRACTAgainst critics of capacious notions of democratic rule by “the many,” Hélène Landemore vigorously defends what she calls “democratic reason” because of the epistemic value of active deliberation by diverse groups of people. Deliberation is necessary to overcome isolated reasoning, and diversity is necessary to overcome the potential echo chamber created by conversations in a group of “the best and the brightest.” The best way to create optimal democratic rule may involve greater reliance on random selection of decision-making bodies (...) than on standard-model elections. (shrink)

Defenders of epistemic democracy propose that the “wisdom of the many” will result in superior outcomes: in this context, they hold that widespread participation will yield better constitutional norms. While this argument, featured prominently in Hélène Landemore’s recent work, raises significant normative concerns, this essay focuses on the causal mechanism it posits and the evidence adduced for the claim. Drawing on Jeremy Bentham’s critiques of common lawyers’ claims to wisdom, this essay argues it is better to defend inclusivity on (...) the grounds that it will promote the people’s interests, rather than on the epistemic value of popular participation. (shrink)

Over the last several years, democratic citizens and theorists have been grappling with an upsurge in political commentary on the crisis and decline of democratic legitimacy around the world. Increasingly, theoretical attention is turning from the philosophical justification of ambitious moral ideals of democracy, to the interpretation of potentials within existing political practice for democratic renewal and repair. This review article examines three new books at the forefront of this theoretical turn towards engagement with the real-world political dynamics of democratic (...) crisis and revival: Open Democracy by Hélène Landemore; Hope for Democracy by John Gastil and Katherine Knobloch; and Mending Democracy by Carolyn Hendriks, Selen Ercan and John Boswell. It begins by surveying the new contributions of these books – highlighting the importance all attribute to creative political agency as a source of revival in democratic practice. It then discusses several questions left unresolved by these books – concerning the problem of democratic legitimacy, the normativity of democratic standards and the power dynamics undergirding democratic agency – which jointly mark out an important agenda for future theoretical work on pathways out of democratic crisis. (shrink)

This article seeks to contribute to the debate on how political representation can promote democracy by analysing the Chamber in the Square, which is a component of legislative theatre. A set of techniques devised to democratise representative governments, legislative theatre was created by Augusto Boal when he was elected a political representative in 1993. After briefly reviewing Nadia Urbinati’s understanding of democratic representation as a diarchy of will and judgement, I partially endorse Hélène Landemore’s criticism and contend that if (...) representation is to be democratic, citizens’ exchange of opinions in the public sphere should be invested with the power not only to judge, but also to decide political affairs. By opening up a space where the represented can judge, decide, and contest the general terms of the bills representatives present in the assembly, the Chamber in the Square harnesses political representation to democracy. (shrink)

What is the optimal size of a democratic society? While not taking an explicit stand on this issue, Hélène Landemore's model of democracy in Democratic Reason suggests that democracies ought to be small, certainly smaller than many existing states. If, as Landemore argues, we must rely on the random selection of representatives, then we should be concerned about both the size of the population and the way cognitive diversity is distributed within it. Given the realities of party politics (...) and media framing, this means that smaller political societies will yield wiser decisions than very large ones. (shrink)

This paper aims to reframe the debate over the intelligence of democracy by revisiting the classic Dewey/Lippmann debate. I argue that Dewey’s way of addressing this problem is better than both dominant approaches today (as exemplified by Jason Brennan and Hélène Landemore), since it acknowledges the intellectual obstacles democracy faces while keeping faith with democracy as an ethical ideal. I also illustrate how Dewey’s ideas in The Public and its Problems can serve as the foundation for building a response (...) to the challenge thinkers like Lippmann and Brennan pose for democracy. Dewey’s pragmatist orientation toward this challenge, along with his idea of the “Great Community”, offer us a promising path to building an intelligent and empowering democratic society. (shrink)

Would randomly selecting legislators be more democratic than electing them? Lottocrats argue (reasonably) that contemporary regimes are not very democratic and (more questionably) that replacing elections with sortition would mitigate elite capture and improve political decisions. I argue that a lottocracy would, in fact, be likely to perform worse on these metrics than a system of representation that appoints at least some legislators using election – a psephocracy (from psēphizein, to vote). Even today's actually existing psephocracies, which are far from (...) ideally democratic, are better suited than a lottocracy would be to meet the demands of democratic citizenship (politics must be legible to ordinary people, who must have low-cost opportunities to participate) and the demands of democratic leadership (powerful representatives should be specialized and constrained by competitions for popular support). Democrats therefore have weighty instrumental reasons to reject lottocracy and work to democratize psephocracy, instead. (shrink)

LANDEMORE, Hélène. Open Democracy. Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First Century. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2020.

Chronic kidney failure is a serious somatic disease. Addressing the issue of living with a chronic disease means fully considering the patients’ entourage, their families, and those close to them, especially their children and spouses.Objectives: The present paper focuses on the couple’s psychological experience when one of them suffers from a chronic disease, in this instance kidney disease. In particular, how is the spouse affected by the treatment provided? The aim is not only to see how care for sick people (...) can be improved, but also, more specifically, how relatives and especially partners can receive attention.Methodology: A qualitative approach is not only adopted, being based on the psychotherapeutic follow-up of the partners of patients with chronic kidney disease, but also of the patients themselves, addressing the matter of their life as a couple. Three couples were considered, and two case studies are presented here. The issues that cut across these different situations are examined.Results and Discussion: Some couples show considerable resourcefulness. However, over the years, that capacity for adaptation and inventiveness can also be interrupted by the periods of greater suffering and even despair, especially when the somatic pathology becomes chronic. Many spouses talk about how living with a sick partner weighs down on them, causing severe fatigue. Some aspects of the illness can also become traumatic. The disease regularly disrupts the daily life of the couple and the family. This leads to a reworking of family relations. Each couple has its own history with the condition. As it emerges, it can disrupt the bonds of filiation, especially when the illness is hereditary. Making psychological care more accessible to the partners involved constitutes a major challenge for our hospital care systems. (shrink)

In Insister, Hlne Cixous brings a unique mixture of theoretical speculation, breath-taking textual explication and scholarly erudition to an extremely close reading of Derrida's work, always attentive to the details of his thinking. At the same time, Insister is an extraordinarily poetic meditation, a work of literature and of mourning for Jacques Derrida the person, who was a close friend and accomplice of Cixous's from the beginning of their careers.