In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hermeneutical Injustice and Best PracticeAlasdair Coles, PhD, MRCP (bio)To a doctor who routinely sees people with psychosis and neurological conditions causing strange experiences, José Porcher’s paper is challenging and troubling.Challenging, because the accusation of hermeneutical injustice is accurate. In the hurly burly of the emergency department or a government outpatient clinic, doctors resort to reductionism, for the sake of urgent efficiency. A person becomes a “case of (...) psychosis” and the immediate questions are: “Should they be admitted? Are they fit to make their own decisions? What medication should we prescribe?” In that context, spending time on analyzing the contents of the delusions, and acknowledging their meaning to the individual, is a luxury. Most doctors, burnt out by COVID and struggling to get people basic healthcare, will probably be unconcerned about hermeneutical injustice. But, disdain for the experience of psychosis leads to loss of trust between patient and doctor, as nicely illustrated by Heriot-Maitland, Knight, and Peters’ first patient. One consequence is that patients withhold information they imagine will not be well received by the medical profession. In my experience, of studying the rare entity of people with epilepsy that causes pleasurable or even religious experience, the patients have usually not discussed this with their doctor (Coles & Collicut, 2019) A tangible medical consequence is that their doctors are not aware of the risk of non-compliance with anticonvulsant drugs, so that they are at risk of serial seizures or even sudden death.Porcher’s uncritical appreciation of the Avraham case worries me. Although one of the two therapists is described as “particularly well-versed in Jewish custom and lore” (Bilu et al., 1990), they are not believers. Yet, they take on priestly roles. For instance, after identifying Avraham’s “the Black” as a demon (“which the patient did not belie” [Bilu et al., p. 110]), they prescribe incantations based on Jewish exorcism rites. And, once Avraham was better, he and his wife attributed his “miraculous cure” to the therapists who they regarded as “pious and pure hearted” (Bilu et al., p. 116). Not only are Avraham’s secular therapists being disingenuous, it is dangerous for seculars to appropriate religious language, concepts, and customs. In particular, clumsy use of exorcism rituals can lead to long-term spiritual distress. Those ministers of religion who practice deliverance [exorcism] are highly trained, not least to respect the importance of asking for psychiatric [End Page 239] help. It is unwise not to return the professional favor. Avraham’s therapists should have called in a Jewish minister, trained in clinical pastoral care, to assist them.Key issues are raised by Porcher’s analysis of the Femi case. Femi presented with a psychosis that included religious content. This is common (Sofou et al., 2021): religious imagery is present in 5% to 50% of cases of psychosis, assessed by repeated studies across multiple cultures. The medical team concluded Femi had a psychosis, because his symptoms caused him harm (social isolation, absence from work). Porcher rightly condemns Femi’s therapists because they undermined his dignity, by invalidating his experience of God. And Porcher goes on to state the “both–and” view, that something can be psychopathology and a religious experience. So far so good. But what Porcher does not allow is that some people experience psychoses with very harmful and dark religious imagery, invalidation of which is therapeutic. So, when Porcher asks “what could ever justify someone in the judgment that someone’s religious experiences are illegitimate?” the answer is: compassion. Schizophrenia is not fun. And the disease causes hallucinations that have no relation to reality; to the person I saw recently who believed her clothes were eating her, how helpful would it be to validate the nonsense of clothes with teeth? It follows that some religious delusions may be just that. And people are helped by knowing that. That is the reality of care of the deluded patient. For those therapists who just assume all religious content is inauthentic, Porcher’s article stands as a useful corrective. But assuming the opposite may be as harmful or more. There has to be judgement somewhere along the line. Best practice is that this is done... (shrink)

Considering the absence of any ancient systematic approach to the reading of the novel, this paper turns to ancient dream hermeneutics as a valuable field of reference that can provide the theoretical framework for studying the ancient novel within its own cultural context. In introducing dream interpretation as one of the ancient novel's creative sources, this essay focuses on Apuleius' Metamorphoses. It explores the dream logic in Apuleius' novel by turning to such authorities as Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero, Artemidorus, and Macrobius, (...) whose characterization of the phenomenon of dreaming sheds light on specific narratological trtaits of the Metamorphoses. It argues that the lower dream category, the insomnium , provides a notion of textuality that can clarify the traditional status of the Metamorphoses as a marginal work of art. In contrast to divinely sent symbolic dreams, it is primarily the insomnium—conceived as a by-product of the lower functions of the soul—that lends psychological force to Apuleius' fiction. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s cardinal ideas - God is Dead, Übermensch and Eternal Return of the Same - are approached here from the perspective of psychiatric phenomenology rather than that of philosophy. A revised diagnosis of the philosopher’s mental illness as manic-depressive psychosis forms the premise for discussion. Nietzsche conceived the above thoughts in close proximity to his first manic psychotic episode, in the summer of 1881, while staying in Sils-Maria (Swiss Alps). It was the anniversary of his father’s death, and also of (...) the break-up of his friendship with Wagner, the most important relationship in his life. Despite having been acquainted with these ideas from reading philosophy and literature, Nietzsche created them de novo and imbued them with very personal meaning. Surprisingly, he never defined or explained his cardinal thoughts in his published writings, perhaps because rationally he could not. A resultant hermeneutic vacuum provoked an avalanche of interpretations in secondary literature. But could these ideas be delusions? A current definition of delusion is challenged, and an attempt is made at a limited comparison between delusion, scientific/philosophical doctrine and poetic creation. It is also argued that psychosis is a way of re-living trauma, and delusions can therefore be seen as a form of reasoning that helps to make sense of the world in a state of psychotic disintegration. Far from being false beliefs, delusions are a true expression of one’s innermost feelings and pain, albeit indirectly. The relationship between early parental loss and repeated trauma, psychosis and creativity is also explored. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 8, Edition 1 May 2008. (shrink)

The Inherent inseparability of psychopathology and phenomenology is generally a known fact, established and popularised by Karl Jaspers in Allgemeine Psychopathologie. In the following paper, I will show the development of interdisciplinary methodology initiated by Jaspers, and discuss it by combining M. Merleau Ponty`s theory of embodiment, R. D. Laing`s existential-phenomenological approach, and T. Fuchs` concept of brain resonance and integral causality with the hermeneutical thoughts of Paul Ricœur regarding the notion of selfhood. The main thesis proposes that fusion (...) of hermeneutics and phenomenology with psychiatry can play a significant methodological role in the approach to diagnosis and treatment of the psychotic disorders spectre, especially regarding the most complex yet inaccurately defined and evaluated mental disorder – schizophrenia. Due to the fundamental interpretative capacity of both disciplines regarding the understanding of the displacement (translocation) of subject, disembodiment, delusions and consciousness, I am considering them as a prerequisite for the effective expansion of psychiatric practice. (shrink)

Introduction to the special issue about "Ricœur on Conflict".

Introduction to the special issue about "Ricoeur on Conflict".

This article explores a literary tradition situated at the intersection of scientific reports, memoirs, and creative writing, termed “clinical narrative.” This genre offers a profound approach to the painful aspects of conscious experience, particularly the phenomenological states associated with mental illness and brain disease, seen as unsettling landscapes of phenomenal experience. Through case studies providing multifaceted viewpoints – first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives – we argue that clinical narratives are valuable resources for a transepistemic study of consciousness. By examining clinical (...) conundrums such as somatic and nihilistic delusions, and anosognosia, we highlight the importance of detailed phenomenological, hermeneutic, and narrative accounts while acknowledging the significance of subpersonal, mechanistic models from cognitive and affective neuroscience. The tradition embodies the tension between the diverse perspectives in the field of mental health, including stories that directly challenge the medical discourse. However, the narrative arts can act as mediators or even peacemakers, by fostering an understanding between the opposing views. Stories are open to multiple interpretations, preserving the diversity of discourses on human meaning and avoiding the imposition of monolithic versions of our humanness. (shrink)

The hermeneutical model of illusion, just as that of projection, has always been part of the psychoanalytic views of religion. The author presents a brief critical summary on this subject, and underlines that in relational psychoanalysis, the concept of illusion refers not to religion as such, but to the subjective experiences of desire and relatedness, that is, the source of the desire for God in man. Because of personal conflicts and their outcome, besides illusions one encounters also in such (...) experiences, disillusion, disappointment, and even delusion. The author, while challenging the views of many scholars taking part in this debate: a) maintains that psychoanalytic interpretation is not concerned with the question of religious truth but with the formation and transformation of the process of believing; b) calls for special attention to the fact when speaking of religious representation, the focus is on the process rather than on the objects represented; c) raises his criticism at the often used expression, "unconscious representation of God", because according to him, religion gives a name to the object of desire only when placed at the conscious and cultural level. Coherent with his basic distinction between conscious religious behaviour and the deep psychological pre-conditions, the author underlines the differences between the unconscious processes of desire and the religious concepts, particularly, between the representation of God and the concept of God; between the parental imagos and the transcendent God; and between the capacity to "believe in anything at all" and religious faith. The author concludes that in the illusion model, it is suggested that as part of religious maturity, one could construct the representation of God as something that is deeply connected with primary objects, while at the same time, assuming the capacity to take the necessary distance from personal desires and projections. (shrink)

Heidegger attempted a “hermeneutics of human experience” that, by switching from the ontic to the ontological dimension, yet maintaining a phenomenological εποχη would bring to light the true meaning of being and, by the same stroke, ascertain the structures of being in human experience. It is now well known that Heidegger drew from Buddhism. However, in human experience being and its structures appear to be ultimately true, and since Heidegger at nopoint went beyond samsara, he failed to realize the phenomenon (...) of being to be one of the two essential aspects of the most basic of delusive phenomena, which is the threefold apparitional structure produced by the threefold thought structure (Tibetan, ’khor-gsum), and therefore, instead of achieving a genuinely ontological understanding of being and its structures, he came to the wrong view of identifying being (the understanding of which was a priori in a somehow non-Kantian sense that will not be discussed here) with truth and taking the ontological structures of samsara to be somehow given. The problem is that he used the term Being (das Sein) roughly as a synonym of Buddha-nature, Tao and so on: whereas the latter is unthinkable and inexpressible, for Heidegger the word “being” is not an empty word, for it has its “appellative force.” In fact, for him it is not a mere sound or written sign that brings nothing to our mind; on the contrary, it causes us to immediately conceive something, and what we thus conceive manifests in our experience as a (non-Kantian) phenomenon. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 125-132 [Access article in PDF] Incomprehensibility and Understanding:On the Interpretation of Severe Mental Illness Louis A. Sass Keywords hermeneutics, psychopathology, paradox, Wittgenstein, solipsism, delusion, principle of charity, phenomenological psychopathology. I would like to begin by thanking Rupert Read for the care he has put into reading my work, and into thinking through its implications in the context of the "new-Wittgensteinian" interpretation of (...) the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This interpretation derives from an influential reading of this philosopher's early book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1961), that is not explicitly discussed in Read's article, yet that lies behind much of his argument. Read does allude to this reading of the Tractatus when he refers to the concept of "logically alien thought" (see Conant [1992]), and by citing, in his endnotes, the Diamond, Conant, and Cerbone articles that appear in Crary and Read's edited collection, The New Wittgenstein (2000). In an earlier paper that also addresses my work, "On approaching schizophrenia through Wittgenstein," Read (2001) explicitly discusses the relevance of the new-Wittgensteinian interpretation of the Tractatus.According to this new-Wittgensteinian interpretation of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein took absolutely seriously his own realization (explicitly stated at the end of the Tractatus) that his book was internally self-contradictory, and he therefore realized that all or nearly all the sentences of the Tractatus must be totally devoid of any meaning or semantic reference. According to this austere view, the vast bulk of the Tractatus only pretends to be making meaningful statements about the nature of logic and semantics; its real purpose is to give the reader the illusion of meaning, and this it does in order to lead the reader to the eventual realization that there can in fact be no meaningful statements or thoughts at the level of self-referential abstraction at which the Tractatus pretends to be operating. Further, when Wittgenstein (1961) writes (in the famous last line of the book), "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (p. 189), this statement should, supposedly, not be taken as any kind of mystical pointing toward some ineffable realm or truth, but, rather, as an austere recognition that there just are no ineffable truths—that, so to speak, there just is no mystical there there. [End Page 125]Rupert Read sees an analogy between, on the one hand, the (supposedly mistaken) readers of Wittgenstein's Tractatus who think that Wittgenstein is exploiting self-contradiction to allude to some higher, ineffable truth (i.e., something that can be pointed at even if it cannot be said), and, on the other hand, my own elucidation of Schreber's contradictions (see especially Chapter 2 of Paradoxes of Delusion [1994]) to argue that Schreber can be said to be having particular kinds of experiences, which I refer to as solipsistic or quasi-solipsistic in nature. Just as Wittgenstein's self-contradictions can (supposedly) point nowhere other than to their own failure to mean, so Schreber's self-contradictory and other nonstandard statements cannot (according to Read) be used to illuminate in any meaningful way the form of experience that supposedly lies behind them—as I, for example, have tried to do by offering a phenomenological account of Schreber and schizophrenia. Patients like Schreber and Renée cannot really be understood, just as we cannot really understand logically alien thought—which, in fact, is not really thought at all; in both cases, there is only the illusion of meaning, only the mirage of an alternative mode of thinking or of living. This, at least, is Read's new-Wittgensteinian claim.Few readers of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology will, I suspect, be familiar with these discussions centering on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, which were introduced largely by the philosophers Cora Diamond and James Conant (see Crary and Read [2000]). (I myself have found their writings fascinating and inspiring in many ways, despite my ultimate disagreement on fundamental issues.) 1 Most readers of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology will have no way of assessing the validity of this austere reading of the Tractatus... (shrink)

The distinction of „understanding“ and „explaining“, formulated by Karl Jaspers in his „General Psychopathology“, has had a lasting effect on psychiatry. As a result, phenomenological, hermeneutic, or psychodynamic approaches have often been accorded only descriptive or epiphenomenal status, while the actual causes of mental illness have been sought in neurobiologically or genetically based explanations. In contrast, this paper defends the explanatory role of understanding and phenomenological approaches. To this end, two levels of explanation are distinguished and shown to be equally (...) justified in principle, namely, motivational explanation at the macro-level and physical explanation at the micro-level. The actual causal role of motivational, i.e., understandable connections is then demonstrated by means of a conception of circular causality, which includes downward causality. Finally, the explanatory role of phenomenological analyses is also shown in psychotic disorders that refuse motivational understanding, using the example of schizophrenic delusion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 163-179 [Access article in PDF] Emptiness and Dogma Joseph S. O'Leary Sophia University The controversial Vatican document Dominus Iesus reasserts that non-Christian religions are objectively in a defective situation as regards salvation.Etymologically, salvation (soteria salus) means health. Here I should like to reflect on apparent symptoms of ill health in Christian theology and ask if Buddhist wisdom can help us formulate a diagnosis and bring (...) the issues into perspective in a healing way. I shall take as my guiding thread an idea familiar to readers of this journal, namely, that Christian theology has suffered from a delusive clinging to substance and identity, and that the Buddhist teachings of dependent co-arising, emptiness, and non-self may provide an antidote.Biblical and Christian traditions are rich in resources for a critique of substantialist conceptions of God and self. The God of the Bible is constantly shattering the fixated, idolatrous images his worshippers form of him, and the Johannine language of God as Spirit, light, love, locates God in a dynamic realm of communal contemplation from which it would be difficult to distill a well-defined divine substance suited to metaphysical analysis. As for self, Paul, and later Luther, present the Christian self as an existential and relational event, not a substantial self-contained soul.What of Christian theology as shaped from Greek metaphysics? Is it irredeemably substantialist, prey to naive reification and objectification? The definition of God as ipsum esse subsistens("being itself subsisting") sufficiently eludes objectification to include the Plotinian sense of God as "beyond being." The idea adopted from Aristotle that "the soul [as knower] is in a manner all things" suggests that metaphysical theology also developed a nonobjectifying conception of human being. The Christological debates of the early Christian centuries rely of necessity on substance language, yet in placing that terminology at the service of a revealed mystery beyond the grasp of language or thought, they introduce a ferment of paradox into the play of concepts and make of it a dance of traces, following the contours of a reality that cannot be brought under substantialist rubrics.Some might see the brilliant relational fireworks of Thomist trinitarian speculation as deconstructing logocentric images of divinity. However, the Trinity in itself is probably best seen as an abstract remainder concept, postulated as a dim background of the revealed phenomenon of Father, Jesus Christ, and Spirit, so that to spin stories of theories about it is futile, a form of misplaced concreteness. Robert Magliola finds [End Page 163] Nagarjunian resonances in the trinitarian logic of the Council of Florence, notably in the decree it addressed to the Copts in 1442 (Magliola, 85-89). The Copts were given an extra dose of the logic that had caused profound unease among the Greek delegates three years earlier (see Gill, 227-232; 325). How much of this later logic did the Latins read back into the patristic texts they cited? Though unbeatable in the fifteenth century, how convincing is it today? Theology has to face the hermeneutical task, and an ongoing one, of assessing the status and function of this trinitarian logic and referring it back to the biblical basis.The desubstantializing tendencies just noted can be drawn on in a contemporary "overcoming of metaphysics" in theology. But the mainstream of the tradition invested massively in substance and identity. It was by strong affirmations of substantial identity that Christianity made its way in the world. Dogma determined the identities of Father, Son, and Spirit as consubstantial hypostases of the one God, the identity of Jesus Christ as true God and true man united in one hypostasis, the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, the unity, sufficiency, infallibility of the Church and its Scriptures, the continuity of the episcopal and papal ministries as transmitted from the apostles. The substantiality of what was proclaimed was matched by the total conviction of the faith that proclaimed it. Theologians might tinker with speculative elaborations, but the core of faith and dogma was untouchable, never subjected to doubt or questioning.It is a kind of metadogma that all... (shrink)

Mental health research and care in the twenty first century faces a series of conceptual and ethical challenges arising from unprecedented advances in the neurosciences, combined with radical cultural and organisational change. The Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry is aimed at all those responding to these challenges, from professionals in health and social care, managers, lawyers and policy makers; service users, informal carers and others in the voluntary sector; through to philosophers, neuroscientists and clinical researchers. Organised around a series (...) of case studies in five key topic areas - concepts of disorder, the philosophical history of psychopathology, philosophy of science, ethics and philosophical value theory, and philosophy of mind - the book provides a detailed introduction to the field and a framework for study and skill development. Each case study is supported by selected readings from both philosophy and mental health, thinking skills exercises, self-test questions, key learning points and detailed guides to further reading. There is an introduction for philosophers to classification and descriptive psychopathology, and for practitioners to philosophical methods (including logic). The philosophical topics covered include philosophical methods (analytic and Continental); phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism, logical empiricism and its successors; idealism and realism; reasons and causes; and modern theories of mind and brain, free will and personal identity. Topics from mental health include psychiatry and 'anti-psychiatry'; Jaspers' psychopathology and the new neurosciences; the future of psychiatric classifications; strengths-based approaches, recovery practice, social inclusion and diversity; and key topics in psychopathology, such as delusion, autism, disorders of volition, thought insertion and other experiences in schizophrenia. The Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry aims to secure the skills-base of the discipline by bringing philosophers closer to the realities of practice in mental health, and mental health practitioners closer to the resources of philosophy as a partner to the sciences in responding to the challenges of twenty-first century mental health and social care. (shrink)

The article constitutes the second part of a larger paper concerning the philosophical heritage of Mr. Cogito, the lyrical subject of Zbigniew Herbert’s poems. The self-consciousness of the title character is formed, quite like in P. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of existence, in relation to the sphere of history and culture, as well as to the other. Mr. Cogito, when confronted with the war and annihilation, cannot simply use the Cartesian deductive method of reasoning in order to intelligibly prove the existence of (...) God and an immortal soul. Therefore, he refers in his philosophical thinking not merely to rationalism, but also to symbol, which more profoundly than ratio describes the nature of his existence. When challenged by boundary situations, he unsuccessfully attempts to find consolation in the Upanishads, Stoicism, or the wisdom of Chasidism. His attitude towards the modern philosophy of nature as well as to the relative motion theory is that of a sceptic; he juxtaposes them with Aristotle’s Logic. The propensity of contemporary Western civilization to follow magic or gnosis is perceived by him as a sign of self-delusion, or even self-destruction. (shrink)

This article addresses contemporary concerns about critique through an interpretation of the “writing prophets.” This approach draws on Foucauldian genealogy and suggests that alongside Greek parrhesia, Old Testament prophecy is a key forerunner of contemporary critical discourses. Our analysis draws upon Weber’s interpretative historical sociology and Gadamerian hermeneutics but shifts the emphasis from charisma to critique, through a direct engagement with prophetic texts. In particular, prophetic discourse claims to reveal injustice and idolatry and speaks from a position of transcendence within (...) immanent historical moments. Prophets position their own era as a moment of crisis, and themselves as liminal figures, opposed to the delusion of others and “false prophets” which resonates with contemporary conceptions of “ideology.” Rather than focusing on historical individuals, we approach prophecy as a discourse, multiple and hybrid, discontinuous, and contradictory, yet constituting a distinctive precursor which informs contemporary critique. (shrink)

When the Neo- or "New Atheist" publishing frenzy climaxed with Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, Daniel C. Dennett's Breaking the Spell, Sam Harris's The End of Faith, Christopher Hitchens' god is not Great and subsequent titles; New Atheists repeatedly denounced the Bible as dangerously false, suppressive to scientific inquiry, and as inculcating and promoting problematic, contemptible, even abhorrent moral values. The Genesis 1-11 and 19 Creation, Noah, and Lot narratives persist among the New Atheists' favorite targets. Heretofore there has (...) been no systematic examination of New Atheist treatments of Genesis generally or Genesis 1-11 and 19 particularly. This article scrutinizes leading New Atheist interpretations of Genesis 1-11 and 19 articulated by Richard Dawkins, Daniel C. Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens. Part one documents these New Atheist renderings of Genesis 1-11 and 19 through the entire corpus of their published books. Part two synthesizes, applies, and extends relevant Genesis 1-11 and 19 scholarship to appraise and respond to the most serious New Atheist allegations, concluding that a more rigorous analysis of Genesis 1-11 and 19 nullifies and potentially reverses New Atheist criticisms. (shrink)

Superficially, the proximity of Wittgenstein's work and its undisputed influence by Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas and concepts suggests that there are also overlaps in the large and in Nietzsche's work decisive field of progress and criticism of progress. The article tries to show that this is not the case. Despite all the overlaps that may exist between Friedrich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein, these do not come to light in the concept of progress and the critique of progress. Both thinkers pursue a (...) very different movement of thought; Wittgenstein sees Nietzsche's focus on the "idea of great progress" as a "delusion", which he does not consider to be expedient. Ludwig Wittgenstein explicitly distances himself here from the spirit that defined the prevailing European and American civilization in the 1930s. He does not succumb to the delusions of grandeur of new, higher-level civilization, but leaves progress as the constantly progressing background noise of any civilization. (shrink)

Proceedings of the First Conference of the International Society for Hermeneutics and Science.

The significance of critical phenomenology for psychiatric praxis has yet to be expounded. In this paper, I argue that the adoption of a critical phenomenological stance can remedy localised instances of hermeneutical injustice, which may arise in the encounter between clinicians and patients with psychosis. In this context, what is communicated is often deemed to lack meaning or to be difficult to understand. While a degree of un-shareability is inherent to subjective life, I argue that issues of unintelligibility can (...) be addressed by shifting from individualistic conceptions of understanding to an interactionist view. This takes into account the contextual, historical and relational background within which meaning is co-constituted. I conclude by providing a corrective for hermeneutical injustice, which entails a specific attentiveness towards the person’s subjectivity, a careful sensitivity to contingent meaning-generating structures, and a degree of hermeneutical flexibility as an attitude of openness towards alternative horizons of possibility. (shrink)

This article is designed to form a question-focused cross-cultural dialogue, rather than compare Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) with Meister Eckhart (1260–1328) in general terms. It will start with an analysis of the exegetical/hermeneutical rules that Zhu Xi and Eckhart set up for their own scriptural commentaries. The study of Eckhart will then be extended to Augustine, in order to explore how Eckhart resorts to Augustine in his commentary writings. Having explored Eckhart’s affinity with Augustine regarding their consensus about the (...) multiplicity of literal senses, as well as their emphasis on the renewal or the continuous growth of the meaning of scriptural texts, the discussion will come back to the starting point of this comparative model, and attempt to form a comparison between the two traditions, through the exemplars of Zhu Xi, Eckhart, and Augustine, with a focus on the implications of these hermeneutical rules. (shrink)

According to Miranda Fricker, a hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a deficit in our shared tools of social interpretation, such that marginalized social groups are at a disadvantage in making sense of their distinctive and important experiences. Critics have claimed that Fricker's account ignores or precludes a phenomenon I call hermeneutical dissent, where marginalized groups have produced their own interpretive tools for making sense of those experiences. I clarify the nature of hermeneutical injustice to make room (...) for hermeneutical dissent, clearing up the structure of the collective hermeneutical resource and the fundamental harm of hermeneutical injustice. I then provide a more nuanced account of the hermeneutical resources in play in instances of hermeneutical injustice, enabling six species of the injustice to be distinguished. Finally, I reflect on the corrective virtue of hermeneutical justice in light of hermeneutical dissent. (shrink)

I argue that patients who suffer genital surgery to ‘disambiguate’ their sexual anatomy, a practice labelled ‘intersex genital mutilation’ (IGM) by intersex advocates, can be understood as victims of hermeneutical injustice in the sense elaborated by Miranda Fricker. This claim is clarified and defended from two objections. I further argue that a particular subset of cases of IGM-based hermeneutical injustice instantiate a novel form of hermeneutical injustice, which I call deception-based hermeneutical injustice. I highlight how this (...) differs from central types of hermeneutical injustice in the literature and trace its harms. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker's original presentation of Hermeneutical Injustice left open theoretical choice points leading to criticisms and subsequent clarifications with the resulting dialectic appearing largely verbal. The absence of perspicuous exposition of hallmarks of Hermeneutical Injustice might suggest scenarios exhibiting some – but not all – such hallmarks are within its purview when they are not. The lack of clear hallmarks of Hermeneutical Injustice, moreover, obscures both the extent to which Fricker's proposed remedy Hermeneutical Justice – roughly, (...) virtuous communicative practices – adequately addresses the injustice, and the accuracy of criticisms suggesting that Hermeneutical Justice is insufficient to the task. In what follows, after briefly defending necessary and sufficient conditions for what I take to be the best candidate interpretation of Hermeneutical Injustice, I build on recent work on moral responsibility to construct and defend a rigorous explication of Hermeneutical Justice. (shrink)

There is a long tradition of employing a phenomenological approach to gain greater insight into the unique experience of psychiatric illness. Researchers in this field have shed light upon a distur...

This paper defends a novel view of hermeneutical epistemic injustice. To this effect, it starts by arguing that Miranda Fricker’s account is too restrictive: hermeneutical epistemic injustice is more ubiquitous than her account allows. That is because, contra Fricker, conceptual ignorance is not necessary for HEI: hermeneutical epistemic injustice essentially involves a failure in concept application rather than in concept possession. Further on, I unpack hermeneutical epistemic injustice as unjustly brought about basing failure. Last, I show (...) that, if this view right, HEI is a form of distributive injustice, and affords the corresponding traditional normative theorising. (shrink)

Hermeneutical injustice, as a species of epistemic injustice, is when members of marginalized groups are unable to make their experiences communicatively intelligible due to a deficiency in collective hermeneutical resources, where this deficiency is traditionally interpreted as a lack of concepts. Against this understanding, this paper argues that even if adequate concepts that describe marginalized groups’ experiences are available within the collective hermeneutical resources, hermeneutical injustice can persist. This paper offers an analysis of how this can (...) happen by introducing the notion of hermeneutical excess: the introduction of additional concepts into collective hermeneutical resources that function to obscure agents’ understanding of the lived experiences of marginalized groups. The injustice of hermeneutical excesses happens not due to hermeneutical marginalization (the exclusion of members of marginalized groups from the construction of hermeneutical resources), but rather hermeneutical domination: when members of dominant groups have been inappropriately included in the construction of hermeneutical resources. By taking as exemplary cases the concepts of “reverse racism” and “non-consensual sex” this paper shows how such excesses are introduced as a kind of defensive strategy used by dominant ideologies precisely when progress with social justice is made. (shrink)

"This book is a virtual case study in the application of hermeneutical principles to illuminate philosophical texts. The book contains translations of eight of Gadamer's best known essays on Plato.

This paper draws on the phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches to philosophy of science to develop realist perspectivism, an integration of experimental realism and perspectivism. Specifically, the paper employs the distinction between “manifestation” and “phenomenon” and it advances the view that the evidence of a real entity is “explorable” in order to argue that instrumentally-mediated robust evidence indicates real entities. Furthermore, it underpins the phenomenological notion of the horizonal nature of scientific observation with perspectivism, so accounting for scientific pluralism even in the (...) cases of inconsistent models. Overall, realist perspectivism is proposed as the way to go for (phenomenologically-hermeneutically minded) philosophers of science. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to investigate how sexist ideology distorts our conceptions of sexual violence and the hermeneutical gaps such an ideology yields. I propose that we can understand the problematic issue of hermeneutical gaps about sexual violence with the help of Fricker’s theory of hermeneutical injustice. By distinguishing between hermeneutical injustice and hermeneutical misfire, we can distinguish between the hermeneutical gap and its consequences for the victim of sexual violence and (...) those of the perpetrator of such violence. I then argue that perpetrators are both morally responsible and accountable for their acts, even if they are the result of a hermeneutical misfire. Ultimately, I show that with regard to sexual violence, we should opt for accountability to change the behaviour of the perpetrator and the social structure. Content warning: The paper discusses sexual violence and difficulties conceptualising experiences of such violence. (shrink)

How many factors, i.e. departures from normality, are necessary to explain a delusion? Maher’s classic one-factor theory argues that the only factor is the patient’s anomalous experience, and a delusion arises as a normal explanation of this experience. The more recent two-factor theory, on the other hand, contends that a second factor is also needed, with reasoning abnormality being a potential candidate, and a delusion arises as an abnormal explanation of the anomalous experience. In the past few (...) years, although there has been an increasing number of scholars offering a variety of arguments in defence of Maher’s one-factor theory, these arguments have not been adequately addressed by two-factor theorists. This paper aims to address this gap by critically examining the arguments on three crucial issues: the intelligibility of delusions, the dissociation between anomalous experiences and delusions, and the empirical evidence of a second factor. I will argue that the Maherian notion of anomalous experience is not sufficient for explaining delusions and the two-factor theory is on the right track in its search for the missing factor in the aetiology of delusions. (shrink)

이 연구는 성서텍스트에 대한 나이브한 접근인 “1차 단순성”을 해체한 불트만의 비신화화를 비판하면서 리쾨르가 성서의 신화를 해석학적으로 복원하는 논증이다. 소위 2차 단순성(seconde naïveté)을 해명하기 위해 이 논문의 3장부터 리쾨르가 본격적으로 비판하게 될 불트만은 성서의 신화에서는 사유할 거리가 있는 그 어떤 것도 찾아내지 못한다. 말하자면 불트만은 신화를 너무 무가치한 것으로 본 것이다. 게다가 불트만은 자신의 신앙을 보존하기 위해 결국 이성에서 벗어나야만 했다. 고로 비합리적이고 실존적인 결단력에 의한 믿음의 비약이 그에게 필요했으며 이것이 바로 ‘신앙주의’로 불리게 된다. 반면 리쾨르는 신화에서조차 인간이 사유할 거리를 발견하면서 (...) 이성의 외부로 신화를 던져버리지 않는다. 그는 결코 합리적 반성의 외부에서는 판단하지 않을 이 신화들의 공헌으로부터 자신을 단절하지 않은 채 믿음의 보존을 바란 것이다. 요컨대 리쾨르는 신화를 다룬 그리스비극 및 성서텍스트가 인류학적 차원에서 중요할 뿐만 아니라, ‘주체의 발견’과 같은 인간 조건에 대한 인식에도 공헌한다고 강조하면서 불트만을 비판함으로 해석학적 철학을 재구성한 것이다. (shrink)

Recent work at the junction of epistemology and political theory focuses on the notion of epistemic injustice, the injustice of being wronged as a knower. Miranda Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice. I focus here on hermeneutical injustice in an attempt to identify a difficulty for Fricker's account. In particular, I consider the significance of background social conditions and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms of disadvantage to achieve its status as an (...) injustice. Thus reformulated, the notion of epistemic injustice can help us to achieve an even deeper understanding of the relationship between knowledge and privilege. (shrink)

In this paper, we have two goals. First, we argue for a blueprint for hermeneutical injustice that allows us to schematize existing and discover new varieties of hermeneutical injustices. The underlying insight is that Fricker provides both a general concept of hermeneutical injustice and a specific conception thereof. By distinguishing between the general concept and its specific conceptions, we gain a fruitful tool to detect such injustices in our everyday lives. Second, we use this blueprint to provide (...) a further example of hermeneutical injustice that draws our attention to yet another distinction: Some hermeneutical injustices result from a lack or distortion in the collective conceptual resource and some are due to problems in the application of existing concepts. We argue that to combat hermeneutical injustices, we have to make sure not only that individuals have accurate concepts at their disposal but that they have the capabilities to use these concepts adequately. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker explains that hermeneutical injustice occurs when an area of one’s social experience is obscured from collective understanding. However, Fricker focuses only on the injustice suffered by those who cannot render intelligible their own oppression. I argue that there is another side to hermeneutical injustice that is other-oriented; an injustice that occurs when one cannot understand, to a basic extent, the oppression of others. Specifically, I discuss the hermeneutical injustice suffered by nonhuman animals made possible by (...) objectifying concepts available in the collective hermeneutical resource. (shrink)

The ideas of the South African Black Consciousness Movement developed as an intellectual response to the situation of black South Africans under apartheid. Though influential, Black Consciousness ideas about how the injustice of apartheid was to be conceptualised, and what form resistance to it consequently needed to take, have always awoken controversy. Here I defend the original Black Consciousness theorists, Bantu Steve Biko and Nyameko Barney Pityana, against charges of racial inherentism, espousing a prescriptive conception of black identity, and racism. (...) I argue that, on Biko and Pityana's account, a central aspect of the injustice of South African apartheid was a hermeneutical injustice – at first deliberately perpetrated, but structurally self-reproducing – against the oppressed groups. Thus illuminated, I argue, the ideas of the original Black Consciousness theorists have great plausibility, connect interestingly with contemporary thinking about race and justice, and are of practical relevance today both in South Africa and elsewhere. (shrink)

Our country has celebrated democracy for more than a decade now, the democracy in which everyone enjoys all the basic human rights, including the right to an abortion. Public and private hospitals and some traditional healers are engaged in this act where some give preabortion and post-abortion counselling to their patients whilst others do not. It becomes a serious question of course to ask whether those patients who did not receive counselling, cope with life after the experienced trauma. By the (...) looks of things it seems very clear that the people who commit abortion have a special need for help in order to cope with life thereafter. Another question now is whether the little counselling that they receive in the hospital before and after an abortion is satisfactory to their individual needs. That is why the author’s focus is on the method or approach which the author thinks will better help the patients who find themselves in such a traumatic situation. The concentration is on the narrative-hermeneutical approach as one of the applicable approaches from the author’s point of view. (shrink)

In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played (...) by the phenomenology underlying the disorder, both in terms of the formation and maintenance of the delusional belief. This paper therefore proposes an interactionist two-stage model in which the phenomenal experience of the Capgras patient is examined, emphasised, and its relation to top-down processing discussed. (shrink)

We observed that despite international declarations on child-rights, outsourced domestic girl-child labour still persists. Raising the question whether outsourced domestic girl-child labour constitutes hermeneutical injustice, we respond affirmatively. Relying on two indigenous victimology-narratives that are newspaper reports, we expose some of the horrors that the victims of outsourced domestic girl-child labour suffer. Comparing these reports with other victimology-narratives of hermeneutical injustice as reported by Miranda Fricker and Hilkje Hänel, we argue that the victims of outsourced domestic girl-child labour (...) suffer a hermeneutical gap and hermeneutical interference; and that the perpetuators of this practice, help to foster what we call ‘hermeneutical obstruction’. We recommend different counteracting measures such as: a radical feminization of educational curricula, which will allow for the introduction of the relevant hermeneutical resources that female children need in making sense of their experiences, into the classrooms and other places of learning; establishing feminist liberation agencies in all schools, religious institutions and hospitals, as ways of increasing the level of awareness about the rights of the girl-child in children and adults; feminizing legislation and legislative processes, to allow for the enactment of laws to protect the rights of the girl-child; and campaigning for a more rigorous enforcement of child-rights laws. (shrink)

I would like to thank Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof for their stimulating comments on my 2023 paper in Neuroethics. In this reply, I will (1) articulate some deeper disagreements that may underpin our disagreement on the nature of delusion, (2) clarify their misrepresentation of my previous arguments as a defence of the two-factor theory in particular, and (3) finally conduct a comparison between the Maherian one-factor theory and the two-factor theory, showing that the two-factor theory is better supported by evidence.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the hermeneutical nature of the concept of the understanding-of-being that grounds Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. I first consider the merging between ontology and hermeneutics that takes place in Being and Time and then interpret the hermeneutical sections of Being and Time (§§ 31–32) in order to clarify the ontological scope of under­standing, interpretation, and meaning. This allows me to examine the three dimensions of the “understanding-of-being principle” (according to which our encounter (...) with entities is made possible by an understanding-of-being): the semantic, the ontological, and the transcendental. Finally, I try to make sense of the problematic use Heidegger makes of the concept of understanding for both the ontic encounter with entities and the ontological access to being. (shrink)