Due to the prevalence, severity, and costs associated with autism spectrum disorders, it has become a public health issue. In response, state governments have adopted ASD-specific private insurance mandates requiring coverage of ASD screening, diagnosis, and treatment. Despite rapid uptake of these laws, differences exist in the type and levels of coverage, especially for allied health services including occupational therapy. We piloted a structured legal research methodology to code ASD insurance mandates that impact allied health service provisions. State private insurance (...) mandates were obtained from WestlawNext. A coding methodology was piloted on 14 states and included variables for age and service limits, treatments covered, and medical necessity. Coding methods were feasible and highly reliable among raters. Ten of 12 states had a coverage mandate, many with specific provisions for allied health providers. A full analysis of all 50 states is warranted to identify provisions affecting allied health providers serving individuals with ASD. (shrink)

An abstract framework for structured arguments is presented, which instantiates Dung's ('On the Acceptability of Arguments and its Fundamental Role in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming, and n- Person Games', Artificial Intelligence , 77, 321-357) abstract argumentation frameworks. Arguments are defined as inference trees formed by applying two kinds of inference rules: strict and defeasible rules. This naturally leads to three ways of attacking an argument: attacking a premise, attacking a conclusion and attacking an inference. To resolve such attacks, preferences may (...) be used, which leads to three corresponding kinds of defeat: undermining, rebutting and undercutting defeats. The nature of the inference rules, the structure of the logical language on which they operate and the origin of the preferences are, apart from some basic assumptions, left unspecified. The resulting framework integrates work of Pollock, Vreeswijk and others on the structure of arguments and the nature of defeat and extends it in several respects. Various rationality postulates are proved to be satisfied by the framework, and several existing approaches are proved to be a special case of the framework, including assumption-based argumentation and DefLog. (shrink)

_Epistemology and Inference _ was first published in 1983. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Henry Kyburg has developed an original and important perspective on probabilistic and statistical inference. Unlike much contemporary writing by philosophers on these topics, Kyburg's work is informed by issues that have arisen in statistical theory and practice as well as issues familiar to professional philosophers. In (...) two major books and many articles, Kyberg has elaborated his technical proposals and explained their ramifications for epistemology, decision-making, and scientific inquiry. In this collection of published and unpublished essays, Kyburg presents his novel ideas and their applications in a manner that makes them accessible to philosophers and provides specialists in probability and induction with a concise exposition of his system. (shrink)

By summarizing, in a single piece, various current perspectives on addiction, Redish et al. have performed a useful service to the field. Their central message is that addiction comprises many vulnerabilities rather than a single vulnerability. Such a message may not be new, but it is worth repeating.

There is an overriding orthodoxy amongst philosophers that attention is a ‘unified phenomenon’, subject to explanation by one monistic theory. In this article, I examine whether this philosophical orthodoxy is reflected in the practice of psychology. I argue that the view of attention that best represents psychological work is a variety of conceptual pluralism. When it comes to the psychology of attention, monism should be rejected and pluralism should be embraced. _1_ The Monistic Consensus _2_ The Varieties of Pluralism _3_ (...) Three Concepts _3.1_ Blindsight _3.2_ Executive attention _3.3_ Alerting _4_ Pluralism _4.1_ Methodological conceptual pluralism _4.2_ Three monist interpretations _5_ Philosophical Monism? _6_ Conclusion. (shrink)

A central question for philosophical psychology is which mental faculties form natural kinds. There is hot debate over the kind status of faculties as diverse as consciousness, seeing, concepts, emotions, constancy and the senses. In this paper, I take emotions and concepts as my main focus, and argue that questions over the kind status of these faculties are complicated by the undeservedly overlooked fact that natural kinds are indeterminate in certain ways. I will show that indeterminacy issues have led to (...) an impasse in the debates over emotions and concepts. I first consider and reject one way of resolving this impasse. I then suggest a different method, which places more emphasis on a close analysis of predictive and explanatory practices in psychology. I argue that when we apply this method, a new position emerges: that it is indeterminate whether concepts or emotions are natural kinds. They are neither determinately natural kinds, nor determinately not natural kinds. Along the way, we will see that natural kinds have been put to two completely different theoretical uses, which are often been blurred together, and that they are ill-suited to fulfil one of them. (shrink)

Defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy have to explain how both physical and phenomenal concepts provide a substantive grasp on the nature of their referents, whilst referring to the very same experience. This is the ‘new challenge’ to physicalism. In this paper, I argue that if the physicalist adopts the powerful qualities ontology of properties then a new and powerful version of the phenomenal concept strategy can be developed, which answers the new challenge.

Prakken gives an argumentation‐based analysis of the manslaughter case using logical tools developed in AI. Prakken regards evidential argumentation as the construction and attack of ‘trees of inference’ from evidence to conclusions by applying generalizations. He argues that this approach clearly shows how evidence and hypotheses relate and what are the points of disagreement, but that it cannot give a clear overview over a case and lacks a systematic account of degrees of uncertainty.

This work offers a provocative new historical and systematic interpretation of the epistemological doctrines of three twentieth-century giants: Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Pietersma argues that these three philosophers, while connected by their phenomenological doctrines, have underappreciated and interestingly-linked views on the theory of knowledge.

I offer a new response to the regress argument against pure powers ontologies. This involves rejecting an overlooked premiss, which is that a power’s manifestation is exhaustively accounted for by the powers involved in it. Rejection of this premiss not only answers the regress argument, but also brings with it wider metaphysical consequences, including a shift away from one-category ontologies.

One of the most important topics in current work on consciousness is what relationship it has to attention. Recently, one of the focuses of this debate has been on the phenomenon of identity crowding. Ned Block has claimed that identity crowding involves conscious perception of an object that we are unable to pay attention to. In this article, we draw upon a range of empirical findings to argue against Block's interpretation of the data. We also argue that current empirical evidence (...) strongly supports an interpretation of the data that emphasises cognitive inference over conscious perception. (shrink)

According to the renowned biomimicry specialist, Janine Benyus, biomimicry offers a new way of valuing nature based on the principle of learning from nature. Comparing and contrast­ing this new way of valuing nature with the dominant conception of nature as valuable for the ecosystem services it provides, an articulation of the respective theoretical frameworks of ecosystem services and biomimicry can be proposed. This articulation depends on the insight that each of the four basic categories of ecosystem service identified in the (...) Millen­nium Ecosystem Assessment correlates with a principle of biomimicry —an insight that makes it possible to add a whole new layer of complexity to ecosystem service theory such that it henceforth covers not just what nature does for us, but also what nature may teach us how to do. This articulation of the theoretical frameworks of ecosystem services and biomimicry implies a significant bifurcation of the general normative orientation of EST such that it is no longer oriented primarily or exclusively toward conserving nature, but also toward imitating and following nature. (shrink)

Interdisciplinary work is intractable because the search for knowledge in different fields entails different interests, and thereby different values too; and the different possibilities of knowledge about different subjects also lead to different epistemologies. Thus differ ences among practitioners of the various disciplines are pervasive and aptly described as cultural ones, and interdisciplinary work requires transcending unconscious habits of thought. The more those unconscious habits are explicated and the more we under stand how the disparate characteristics of the various intellectual (...) cultures are related to the necessarily different interests, values, and epistemologies, the more feasible becomes the goal of transcending thought habits. Two sorts of interdisciplinary effort seem to have been successful: specific, delimited problems have been solved by teams in what is actually multidisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary work, and new disciplines have sprung up at the intersections of existing ones. STS fits neither of those patterns. Can it nevertheless be viable? (shrink)

David Chalmers’ ‘conceivability’ argument against physicalism is perhaps the most widely discussed and controversial argument in contemporary philosophy of mind. Recently, several thinkers have suggested a novel response to this argument, which employs the ‘powerful qualities’ ontology of properties. In this paper, I argue that this response fails because it presupposes an implausible account of the physical/phenomenal distinction. In the course of establishing this, I discuss the so-called ‘ultimate’ argument for the claim that dispositional properties form the subject matter of (...) physics. I argue that the ultimate argument can be interpreted in a strong or a weak way, and that the strong interpretation is implausible. I argue that this undermines the powerful qualities based response to the conceivability argument. I also argue for a general conclusion: that we should not define ‘the physical’ exclusively in terms of a distinction drawn from ontology. (shrink)

The Ancient Greeks understood both art and technology (techne) as imitation (mimesis) of Nature (physis). This article argues that the rapidly growing ecological innovation strategy known as biomimicry makes it possible for technology to leave behind the modern goal of “mastering and possessing” Nature and instead to rediscover the initial vocation it shared with art: imitating Nature. This in turn suggests a general strategy for philosophical inquiry into the biomimetic principle of “Nature as model”: the transposition of philosophical analyses of (...) concepts associated primarily with poetics and related fields—mimesis, mimicry, translation, analogy, metaphor, etc.—into the philosophy of biomimicry. (shrink)

First, a comment on a pessimistic note: Salmon says we can't be sure there is any such thing as inductive inference: in demanding that some explanations have the form of correct inductive inferences, “we may be laying down a requirement which cannot be fulfilled.” To doubt that we can fulfill that requirement is to doubt that we can formalize inductive logic. It may be true, but why begin the fight by throwing in the sponge? It is also true that there (...) are difficulties involved in formalizing acceptance rules for inductive conclusions, but these difficulties may be overcome. It is false to claim that we ‘cannot claim to know exactly’ what these acceptance rules are. Only two years ago I did just that. It was true that my claim was shown to be erroneous a year later, but that fate can befall almost any worthwhile claim. (shrink)

Decisions concerning proof of facts in criminal law must be rational because of what is at stake, but the decision‐making process must also be cognitively feasible because of cognitive limitations, and it must obey the relevant legal–procedural constraints. In this topic three approaches to rational reasoning about evidence in criminal law are compared in light of these demands: arguments, probabilities, and scenarios. This is done in six case studies in which different authors analyze a manslaughter case from different theoretical perspectives, (...) plus four commentaries on these case studies. The aim of this topic is to obtain more insight into how the different approaches can be applied in a legal context. This will advance the discussion on rational reasoning about evidence in law and will contribute more widely to cognitive science on a number of topics, including the value of probabilistic accounts of cognition and the problem of dealing with cognitive biases in reasoning under uncertainty in practical contexts. (shrink)

We apply Mints’ technique for proving the termination of the epsilon substitution method via cut-elimination to the system of Peano Arithmetic with Transfinite Induction given by Arai.

This paper compares two ways of formalising defeasible deontic reasoning, both based on the view that the issues of conflicting obligations and moral dilemmas should be dealt with from the perspective of nonmonotonic reasoning. The first way is developing a special nonmonotonic logic for deontic statements. This method turns out to have some limitations, for which reason another approach is recommended, viz. combining an already existing nonmonotonic logic with a deontic logic. As an example of this method the language of (...) Reiter's default logic is extended to include modal expressions, after which the argumentation framework in default logic of [20, 22] is used to give a plausible logical analysis of moral dilemmas and prima facie obligations. (shrink)

In his work on personal identity, Derek Parfit makes two revolutionary claims: firstly, that personal identity is not what matters in survival; and secondly, that what does matter is relation R. In this article I demonstrate his position here to be inconsistent, with the former claim being defensible only in case the latter is false. Parfit intends his famous fission argument to establish the unimportance of identity – a conclusion disputed by, among others, Mark Johnston. My approach is to critically (...) assess their debate, focusing on Johnston's reductio of Parfit's position. I contend that although Parfit's own response fails, there are other ways to save the fission argument. The unimportance of identity then comes at a cost, however, because the reductio can only be avoided by accepting either that nothing matters in survival, or else that facts about particles and forces do. Either way, relation R cannot be what matters. (shrink)

In recent years biomimicry has emerged as a powerful response to the problem of sustainability and today exerts an important influence on both architecture and urbanism. The implications of this trend for the humanities have, however, been largely overlooked. Taking a historical approach, the first key argument of this article is that throughout Western history the dominant model for the polis, qua both city and State, has been the human being and that it was also this basic model that underlay (...) traditional understandings of the place of humans in cities and States. With the transition to biomimetic cities and States, the key model of which is the forest ecosystem, the question of the place of humans arises once again. In response to this question, the article proposes a speculative philosophical anthropology based on a combination of Heidegger’s thinking of the clearing and recent insights from the study of human evolution and pre-history with a view to grounding a new model of the polis not simply on the forest, but rather on the forest and the clearing. (shrink)

Dennett’s work has had a profound impact on philosophical and scientific understanding of consciousness. However, interpreting Dennett’s work on consciousness is notoriously challenging. Some have even suggested that his ideas are contradictory. This paper develops and defends an interpretation of Dennett’s views, on which consciousness is a real pattern. I argue that this interpretation can make sense of some initially puzzling features of the view, including: multiple drafts, global workspace theory, qualia eliminativism, consciousness as a user-illusion, and the claim that (...) our reports about consciousness have a special kind of authority. Far from being a tangle of contradictory ideas, this interpretation of Dennett consists of a consistent and robust theory of conscious experience. (shrink)

Thoreau's political writing is intensely personal and direct. Both his life and work focus uncompromisingly on the question 'how should I live?', and for Thoreau, no element of day-to-day existence is left untouched by moral and political issues. This edition of Thoreau's political essays includes 'Civil Disobedience', selections from Walden, 'Life Without Principle', and the anti-slavery addresses, such as 'Slavery in Massachusetts'. In her introduction, Nancy L. Rosenblum places the essays in the context of Thoreau's life of self-examination, and the (...) debates about the abolition of slavery, and she analyses the themes of citizenship and resistance that have made Thoreau an enduring influence in political philosophy and practice. (shrink)

Hindman's Theorem is a prototypical example of a combinatorial theorem with a proof that uses the topology of the ultrafilters. We show how the methods of this proof, including topological arguments about ultrafilters, can be translated into second order arithmetic.