This chapter contains sections titled: Nature, Nurture, and the Female Serial Killer Introduction Female Nurture and Human Nature: Some Philosophical Background Female Serial Killers: A Typology Of Poets and Monsters: Our Common Nature.

Another title in the reissued Oxford Classic Texts in the Physical Sciences series, Jeffrey's Theory of Probability, first published in 1939, was the first to develop a fundamental theory of scientific inference based on the ideas of Bayesian statistics. His ideas were way ahead of their time and it is only in the past ten years that the subject of Bayes' factors has been significantly developed and extended. Until recently the two schools of statistics were distinctly different and set apart. (...) Recent work has changed all that and today's graduate students and researchers all require an understanding of Bayesian ideas. This book is their starting point. (shrink)

This paper considers two reasons that might support Russell’s choice of a ramified-type theory over a simple-type theory. The first reason is the existence of purported paradoxes that can be formulated in any simple-type language, including an argument that Russell considered in 1903. These arguments depend on certain converse-compositional principles. When we take account of Russell’s doctrine that a propositional function is not a constituent of its values, these principles turn out to be too implausible to make these arguments troubling. (...) The second reason is conditional on a substitutional interpretation of quantification over types other than that of individuals. This reason stands up to investigation: a simple-type language will not sustain such an interpretation, but a ramified-type language will. And there is evidence that Russell was tacitly inclined towards such an interpretation. A strong construal of that interpretation opens a way to make sense of Russell’s simultaneous repudiation of propositions and his willingness to quantify over them. But that way runs into trouble with Russell’s commitment to the finitude of human understanding. (shrink)

In Chapter 12 of his book Material Beings (Van Inwagen, Peter. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press) van Inwagen argues that there are no artefacts, or very few, certainly fewer than most people believe. Artisans very rarely create, at least in the sense of causing things to come into existence. The argument in Chapter 12 is a very powerful one. I do not think that it establishes van Inwagen’s conclusion, but it does, I think, given its (plausible) premise, establish (...) that if there are not far fewer material things in the world than we ordinarily believe, then there are far more. In this sense it establishes, as Russell once said, ‘the truth about physical objects must be strange’. Furthermore, I argue at the end, we cannot avoid this conclusion even if we reject van Inwagen’s premise. Thus the defender of our common sense ontology is caught on the horns of a dilemma. So our commonsense ontology is indefensible. (shrink)

This book explores the thought of Jacques Derrida as it relates to the tradition of apophatic thought--negative theology and philosophy--in both Western and Eastern traditions. Following the Introduction by Toby Foshay, two of Derrida's essays on negative theology, Of an Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted in Philosophy and How to Avoid Speaking: Denials, are reprinted here. These are followed by essays from a Western perspective by Mark C. Taylor and Michel Despland, and essays from an Eastern perspective by David Loy, a (...) Buddhist, and Harold Coward, a Hindu. In the Conclusion, Jacques Derrida responds to these discussions. (shrink)

This paper and its sequel “look under the hood” of the usual sorts of proof-theoretic systems for certain well-known intuitionistic and classical propositional modal logics. Section 1 is preliminary. Of most importance: a marked formula will be the result of prefixing a formula in a propositional modal language with a step-marker, for this paper either 0 or 1. Think of 1 as indicating the taking of “one step away from 0.” Deductions will be constructed using marked formulas. Section 2 presents (...) the model-theoretic concepts, based on those in [7], that guide the rest of this paper. Section 3 presents Natural Deduction systems IK and CK, formalizations of intuitionistic and classical one-step versions of K. In these systems, occurrences of step-markers allow deductions to display deductive structure that is covered over in familiar “no step” proof-theoretic systems for such logics. Box and Diamond are governed by Introduction and Elimination rules; the familiar K rule and Necessitation are derived (i.e. admissible) rules. CK will be the result of adding the 0-version of the Rule of Excluded Middle to the rules which generate IK. Note: IK is the result of merely dropping that rule from those generating CK, without addition of further rules or axioms (as was needed in [7]). These proof-theoretic systems yield intuitionistic and classical consequence relations by the obvious definition. Section 4 provides some examples of what can be deduced in IK. Section 5 defines some proof-theoretic concepts that are used in Section 6 to prove the soundness of the consequence relation for IK (relative to the class of models defined in Section 2.) Section 7 proves its completeness (relative to that class). Section 8 extends these results to the consequence relation for CK. (Looking ahead: Part 2 will investigate one-step proof-theoretic systems formalizing intuitionistic and classical one-step versions of some familiar logics stronger than K.). (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bernard Mandeville and the Therapy of “The Clever Politician”Harold J. CookAs the institutional authority of the learned physicians of Augustan London waned, new threats to the classical foundations of medical practice appeared. 1 Patients had more freedom to chose from a variety of practitioners and practices, giving both consumer demand and the advertising skills of suppliers an even more powerful hand in medical affairs. While the burgeoning medical (...) marketplace developed mostly because of the profound socio-economic and political changes of the late Stuart period, intellectual transformations were at play, too. The new science appeared to encourage empiricism and the development of new remedies based on experimentation, devaluing university education in medical classics, but conversely the new science could strengthen physicians’ claims to superiority over mere patients and practitioners. Medical materialists, for instance, could turn the classical advisor/client relationship into that of an expert contolling a passive recipient (patient) for his or her own good.One contemporary debate that shows the implications of materialism for medical relationships is the theory of the passions. The passions linked mind and body. According to most classical accounts, one could (or should) control the passions by applying reason, resulting in both a virtuous and a healthy life. But according to a strong version of materialism, the mind could not hope to control the passions. A doctor therefore could no longer appeal to patients’ reason; rather, he had to manipulate the patient’s passions for his or her own good. Hence for a materialist, the doctor was not an adviser to the patient but an expert therapist, not a teacher of health and virtue but a “clever politician” who ordered bodily passions. Some versions of the new science, then, favored [End Page 101] the expertise of physicians while undermining older views about learned authority. Such an outlook is clear in the work of Dr. Bernard Mandeville, whose famous Fable of the Bees shows how the “clever politician” played on passions to make the body politic run smoothly. Mandeville held coherent views on politics, economics, moral philosophy, and medicine. Like many doctors of his time, he fought to establish his expertise in the new science. His views are expressed most clearly in the theory of the passions. By examining his discussion of the passions in both his social commentary and his medical dialogues, we can note similarities among his various writings and glimpse one of his fundamental positions on medicine and humanity.The Fable and its CriticsTo many English minds of the early eighteenth century, no one exemplified materialism’s threat better than Dr. Bernard Mandeville. Mandeville’s famous slogan, the subtitle of his Fable of the Bees—“private vices, public benefits”—seemed to epitomize materialism’s inherent immorality. The book seemed to argue that what most people recognized as human vices were the main engines of the collective good. Mandeville’s famous book pictured human nature as animalistic, in which the passions held sway over reason. In Mandeville’s world, it appeared, reason became little more than the ability to rationalize, the instrument of hypocrisy, merely letting people cover their true motives (grounded as they were in the passions) with empty words pretending to more exalted ends.His Fable had begun as a little, anonymous, satirical poem in 1705, titled “The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves Turn’d Honest.” It began by speaking of “A Spacious Hive well stockt with Bees, / That liv’d in Luxury and Ease.” Many of the bees were knaves, with no calling free of deceit, but while “every Part was full of Vice, / Yet [was] the whole Mass a Paradise; /... Such were the Blessings of that State; / Their Crimes conspir’d to make them Great.” Avarice, prodigality, luxury, pride, envy, vanity, folly, fickleness, and inconstancy employed millions, encouraging ingenuity and industry and creating pleasures and comforts “To such a Height, the very Poor / Liv’d better than the Rich before.” But many of the thriving bees complained, shouting for honesty and virtue. When Jove “rid / The bawling Hive of Fraud,” economic collapse followed, with the consequent end of arts and sciences as well; population declined; the hive’s territory decreased; and the remaining bees toiled long and... (shrink)

This paper takes issue with the thesis of Rashed and Auffret that the Critias that has come down to us is not a genuine dialogue of Plato. Authors do not consider the style of the Critias, which should be a factor in any complete study of authorship. It observes the widespread consensus that the style of the Timaeus and Critias are virtually inseparable. It surveys a wide range of stylistic studies that have tended to confirm this, before answering a possible (...) objection that cites the similarity of style between the genuine Laws and Philip of Opus’ Epinomis. Since the main argument used by Rashed and Auffret relies on an inconsistency between Timaeus and Critias consideration is given to the types of inconsistency found within Platonic dialogues and sequences of dialogues, particularly the hiatus-avoiding dialogues including Timaeus itself and Laws. Finally, alternative explanations of the alleged inconsistency are offered. (shrink)

I prove that the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem is equivalent, under some weak set-theoretic assumptions, to what I will call the Cut-for-Formulas to Cut-for-Sets Theorem: for a set F and a binary relation |- on Power(F), if |- is finitary, monotonic, and satisfies cut for formulas, then it also satisfies cut for sets. I deduce the CF/CS Theorem from the Ultrafilter Theorem twice; each proof uses a different order-theoretic variant of the Tukey- Teichmüller Lemma. I then discuss relationships between various (...) cut-conditions in the absence of finitariness or of monotonicity. (shrink)

Part 1 [Hodes, 2021] “looked under the hood” of the familiar versions of the classical propositional modal logic K and its intuitionistic counterpart. This paper continues that project, addressing some familiar classical strengthenings of K and GL), and their intuitionistic counterparts. Section 9 associates two intuitionistic one-step proof-theoretic systems to each of the just mentioned intuitionistic logics, this by adding for each a new rule to those which generated IK in Part 1. For the systems associated with the intuitionistic counterparts (...) of D and T, these rules are “pure one-step”: their schematic formulations does not use □ or ♢. For the systems associated with the intuitionistic counterparts of K4, etc., these rules meet these conditions: neither □ nor ♢ is iterated; none use both □ and ♢. The join of the two systems associated with each of these familiar logics is the full one-step system for that intuitionistic logic. And further “blended” intuitionistic systems arise from joining these systems in various ways. Adding the 0-version of Excluded Middle to their intuitionistic counterparts yields the one-step systems corresponding to the familiar classical logics. Each proof-theoretic system defines a consequence relation in the obvious way. Section 10 examines inclusions between these consequence relations. Section 11 associates each of the above consequence relations with an appropriate class of models, and proves them sound with respect to their appropriate class. This allows proofs of some failures of inclusion between consequence relations. Section 12 proves that the each consequence relation is complete or weakly complete, that relative to its appropriate class of models. The Appendix presents three further results about some of the intuitionistic consequence relations discussed in the body of the paper. For Keywords, see Part 1. (shrink)

Harold Noonan; VI*—Names and Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 93–108, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

Relative to any reasonable frame, satisfiability of modal quantificational formulae in which “= ” is the sole predicate is undecidable; but if we restrict attention to satisfiability in structures with the expanding domain property, satisfiability relative to the familiar frames (K, K4, T, S4, B, S5) is decidable. Furthermore, relative to any reasonable frame, satisfiability for modal quantificational formulae with a single monadic predicate is undecidable ; this improves the result of Kripke concerning formulae with two monadic predicates.

"For thirty-four years, from 1962 to 1996, the Open Court Publishing Company sold elementary math and reading textbooks that tried to combat the culture and bring about real school reform. Stories from the company's struggles help make this culture visible." "In Let's Kill Dick and Jane, Harold Henderson gives a historical, yet personal, portrait from the company's beginnings through all the financial and cultural travails and its sale in 1996 to McGraw-Hill. It shows how a company of idealistic pragmatists (...) can chip away at the edifice of mediocrity that has become American education."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

C. S. Peirce's indictment that "the chief cause of [metaphysics'] backward condition is that its leading professors have been theo (Collected Papers 6:3) falls heavily at my door. For it logians" was out of reflection upon religious experience and its meaning that the present relational metaphysic was conceived. My hope, however, is that its scope is sufficiently wider than its theological origins to justify its appearance as a work in philosophy. Having been nurtured in existential philosophy and having reached some (...) measure of maturity with the wise counsel of Professor Dr. Fritz Buri, of Basel, I came to feel that theology as a modern discipline had reached an impasse owing to its overextended commitments to a subject-object paradigm of thought. Even those theologians who despaired of these ties seemed unable to find an independent alternative idiom for their ideas. A second tension in my thinking resulted from the inordinate neglect by theologians of the natural world. Also, my natural interest in physical understanding seemed unfulfilled within the narrow confines of theology, even of philosophical theology as then practiced. As I turned decisively toward the study of modern physics, and especially of cosmology, a new world seemed to open up to me. After extensive study with prominent astronomers and physicists, it began to dawn on me that the new physics has devised conceptual paradigms of thought which could be generalized into a metaphysical system of universal interest. (shrink)

“It is almost impossible for a working neurologist to think clearly about the functions of the highest centres because the counters of thought, the words he must employ—are often of psychological origin and for the most part meaningless.”.

Harold Osborne; Creativity, Progress and Personality, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 213–221, https://doi.org/10.111.

Harold Osborne; The Cultivation of Sensibility in Art Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 31–40, https://doi.o.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:408 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Fellowship of Being. By John B. O'Malley. (The Hague: Martinus Niihoff, 1966. Pp. xii + 140. $5.60) This book is a study of the concept of person in the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel. It is the revision of a doctoral thesis, completed at the University of London, under the direction of A. J. Ayer. This fact, in addition to the intrinsic interest of the (...) subject, gives the volume special interest, for it is one of an increasing number of essays establishing dialogue between British analytic interests and continental phenomenology. John B. O'Malley is well aware of current analytic concerns and frequently notes the relevance of Marcel's analysis to these issues. It is even argued that Marcel anticipated numerous concerns which became central in analytic philosophy includingproblems of language. O'Malley proposes that the person is the central and guiding concept in Marcel's philosophy and that his analysis of this phenomenon allows him to escape Idealism and ghost theories, and to reconcile the moral and the metaphysical viewpoints. It is to the person that bodily or mental predicates are applied. Consequently this concept is fundamental to the analysis of body-mind problems. It is this reality which offers the nonlinguisticreferent to which such predication may apply. An adequate analysis of person must not abstract from its subject matter but rather must include the person in "an act of reflective withdrawal." This is central in Marcers methodology, and thus the epistemology of the person is neither "acquaintance with" nor "knowledge about." The neglect of such involvement results in either extreme objectivism or extreme subjectivism, either of which misses the person. Objectivism replaces the personal with successive states and qualities. Subjectivism results in either solipsism or in a division between an absolute and a particular ego, and thus both lose the concrete and incarnate person. The embodied person is the center of my relationships and thus even ontological analysis must be directed toward it. The analysis cannot be merely problematic but needs to be meta-problematic. The person offers such meta-problematic analysis a meeting point of Being, Truth, and Value, thus overcoming the dichotomy between the moral and the metaphysical and between the normative and the descriptive. Unfortunately the essay could have used a further proof reading for it is marred by numerous printing errors. Although it is somewhat ponderous in style, it is a very carefully argued analysis of what is central to Marcel. To have such a discussion sympathetic to Marcel's perspective and yet written by one quite conscious of British philosophical concerns affords significant insight for the reader into a new stage of contemporary philosophy which is undoubtedly to center upon such conversation across the English channel. HAROLDA. D ~ American University Menschliche Existenz und moderne Welt. Ein internationales Symposion zum Selbstverst~indnis des heutigen Menschen. Hrsg. Richard Schwarz. (Berlin, 1967. Two vols., S. 810 and 885) In der "Einfiihrung" umreisst der tterauageber den Titel des Werkes. Es soil nach dem Selbstverst~indnis des Menschen gefragt werden, das heiflt, worin sieht der heutige Mensch die besondere Eigenheit seines Menschseins, sein "Epochalbewul~tsoin" (Litt). Gibt es gewisse Grundbefindliehkeiten,die MienMensehen gemeinsamsind? Kann noch yon einer gemeinsamen Wertwelt gesproehen werden? Sind dieses nicht infolge einer inneren Bedrohung nur fiberholte Gedanken? Das Werk soll die Antwort geben. Es ist nicht mSglich, alle in dem Buch aufgenommene Aufs~tze zu behandeln, mSgen sic auch gewinnreiche Beitr~ige sein. Datum muff eine gewisse Auswabl getroffen werden. Zu Beginn des Werkes spricht der leider verstorbene Eduard Spranger fiber den "Humanit ~tsgedanken", den er unter dem dreifachen Aspekt der Humanit~t als Bildung, als ethischpolitischen Begriff und als religiSs-ethischen Begriff wiedergibt. Bildung ist nicht blofl Tradi- BOOK REVIEWS 409 tion, sondern immer neue lebendige Durehdringung, Gelstesformung, nicht nur Grammatik. Humanitat fordert ethisch-politische Freiheit als Voranssetzung der Personentfaltung, ist darum mehr als blofie Nfitzlichkeit und verlangt Anerkennung des Lebensreehts anderer V61ker. Nach Spranger gibt es einen religiSs-ehristlichen Humanismus im Gegensatz zur "Theologie der Krisis". Er steht in Verbindung mit dem Weltsein, verleiht ihm den letzten transzendenten Bezug und fordert "echte Toleranz". Alfred yon Martin-M~nehen erSrtert dann in "Humanitgt als Problem tier Gegenwart" angesichts... (shrink)

Porphyry’s position in the ancient hermeneutic tradition should be considered separately from his place in the Platonic tradition. He shows considerable respect for allegorizing interpreters with links to Pythagoreanism, particularly Numenius and Cronius, prominent sources in On the Cave of the Nymphs. The language of Homer’s Cave passage is demonstrably distinctive, resembling the Shield passage in the Iliad, and such as to suggest an ecphrasis to early imperial readers. Ecphrasis in turn suggested deeper significance for the story. While largely content (...) to follow Numenian trends in interpreting Homer’s cave symbolically and in relation to multiple belief-systems, Porphyry shows occasionally signs of wanting to adhere more closely to Homeric evidence, resorting to symbolic interpretation mainly when no more straightforward truth is on offer. (shrink)