Outlining an improved approach that meets the expectations of 21st-century students and teachers, the author proposes a new definition of that object of study which addresses inconsistencies in the literary canon by including nontraditional narratives such as films, comic books and pop songs.

Hypertext may represent a new paradigm capable of exploring legal sources within which links are established according to pertinent relationships found between statute texts and case law. However, to discover relevant information in such a network, a browsing mechanism is not enough when faced with a large volume of texts. This paper describes a new retrieval model where documents are represented according to both their content and relationships with other sources of information.

The Grand Challenges literature brings under its umbrella a wide variety of disjointed phenomena but runs the risk of reinventing the wheel as well as overlooking incremental progress and past work. To avert this, scholars need to (dis)connect (dis)similar issues, build on past research on these issues, and create opportunities for generalizability through theoretical examinations.

(2012). DEL-sequents for regression and epistemic planning. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics: Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 337-367. doi: 10.1080/11663081.2012.736703.

Conventional economic theory assumes that agents should be consistent across decisions. However, it is often observed that experimental subjects fail to report consistent preferences. So far, these inconsistencies are almost always examined singly. We thus wonder whether the more inconsistent individuals in one task are also more inconsistent in other tasks. We propose an experiment in which subjects are asked to report their preferences over risky bets so as to obtain, for each subject, three measures of inconsistencies: classical preference reversals, (...) framing effects and preference instability. In line with previous experimental findings, subjects are largely inconsistent according to each of these three measures and there are considerable individual differences. The main result is that we find no correlation among these three measures of inconsistency. (shrink)

Representing an epistemic situation involving several agents obviously depends on the modeling point of view one takes. We start by identifying the types of modeling points of view which are logically possible. We call the one traditionally followed by epistemic logic the perfect external approach, because there the modeler is assumed to be an omniscient and external observer of the epistemic situation. In the rest of the paper we focus on what we call the internal approach, where the modeler is (...) one of the agents involved in the situation. For this approach we propose and axiomatize a logical formalism based on epistemic logic. This leads us to formalize some intuitions about the internal approach and about its connections with the external ones. Finally, we show that our internal logic is decidable and PSPACE-complete. (shrink)

Corporate codes of ethics, which have spread in the last decades, have shown a limited ability to foster ethical behaviors. For instance, they have been criticized for relying too much on formal compliance, rather than taking into account sufficiently agents and their moral development, or promoting self-reflexive behaviors. We aim here at showing that a code of ethics in fact has meaning and enables ethical progress when it is interpreted and appropriated with practical wisdom. We explore a model that represents (...) an uncommon organizational code of ethics: the monastic Rule of St. Benedict, written in the sixth century and still used today. Our empirical study—conducted in several monasteries living under this rule—shows that organization members interpret this rule, both hermeneutically and ethically, to adapt it to situations. They also appropriate this rule as a way of life and treat it as a dynamic framework that helps them to follow their purpose within their organization. This exceptional code actually offers an alternative model for practicing codes of ethics, in a virtue-ethical manner, beyond mere compliance with the text. The way in which reflexive and active agents practice the code, both individually and collectively, shapes their organizational experience and fosters their moral development. (shrink)

La réflexion philosophique, dont l'ouverture à l'univers dans lequel nous nous découvrons - avec une acuité proportionnelle à un étonnement renouvelé - n'a pas de limites, n'en est que plus tributaire des sciences et des techniques, des arts et de multiples activités qui régissent plus ou moins fructueusement notre expérience. Or, au sein des sciences humaines, privilégiées pour éclairer une condition que nous ne saurions cesser d'interpréter, peu d'oeuvres du dernier siècle auront enrichi en le précisant notre être-au-monde, comme la (...) théorie linguistique de Gustave Guillaume, assez solitaire, et les recherches multiformes de Jean Piaget - où la psychologie de l'enfant a souvent occulté la visée épistémologique et son enracinement biologique (cf Biologie et connaissance, 1967) et ses prolongements pédagogiques, voire éthiques. Le Cinquantenaire et le Trentenaire de leur disparition appelaient un hommage d'autant plus impératif qu'ils sont restés marginaux ou ignorés dans les milieux philosophiques, malgré la centralité de leurs élucidations. Leur commune orientation génétique et structurale n'ayant suscité aucun échange, pendant la contemporanéité de publications d'un tiers de siècle (1923-1960), mesurer leur complémentarité s'impose d'autant plus. S'ils peuvent aider à repenser la condition humaine, c'est qu'ils auront contribué à dissiper le "mystère de la pensée". L'un cherchant à habiliter les caractères systématique et cinétique des langues, irremplaçables moyens de penser ; l'autre dans un vis-à-vis cognitif et opératoire de Freud, en relavant sur les plans épistémologique et logique, notamment, l'élan révolutionnaire de la seconde modernité, autour de l'évolutionnisme. Mais les thèmes majeurs du constructivisme, du schème et de la symbolisation - et plus largement du temps et du langage - auront sans doute aidé à spécifier les mutations autorisées par la révolution critique. Entre l'Instant du je parle et un décentrement exigible pratiquement (éthique) comme théoriquement (épistémique), c'est bien la condition humaine dans son ensemble qui est concernée. Si repenser cette Condition s'impose en permanence, il importe de ne pas manquer des oeuvres qui, par-delà toute mode, proposent à notre expérience des fondations résistant à d'inéluctables vicissitudes. (shrink)

One way social scientists explain phenomena is by building structural models. These models are explanatory insofar as they manage to perform a recursive decomposition on an initial multivariate probability distribution, which can be interpreted as a mechanism. Explanations in social sciences share important aspects that have been highlighted in the mechanisms literature. Notably, spelling out the functioning the mechanism gives it explanatory power. Thus social scientists should choose the variables to include in the model on the basis of their function (...) in the mechanism. This paper examines the notion of ‘function’ within structural modelling. We argue that ‘functions’ ought to be understood as the theoretical underpinnings of the causes, namely as the role that causes play in the functioning of the mechanism. (shrink)

The confrontations of stakeholder visions about agriculture and food production has become a focal point in the public sphere, coinciding with a diversification of agrifood models. This study analyzes the debates stemming from the coexistence of these models, particularly during the initial term of neoliberal-centrist Emmanuel Macron’s presidency in France. Employing collective monitoring from 2017 to 2021, a corpus of 958 online news and blog articles was compiled. Using a computational analysis, we reveal the framings and controversies emerging from this (...) media discourse. The macro-structuring of discourse on model coexistence revolves around scientific, economic and political framings. Coexistence is a complex of debates based on specific frames associated with specific arenas and actor configurations: growth of organic agriculture, transformations of agrifood systems, sciences of production and impacts, livestock and meat diet controversies, agroecological innovations, CAP reform criticism, discourse of peasant agriculture and State-Profession _co-gestion_. Employing global sentiment analysis and focusing on salient controversies, namely EGAlim law, pesticide regulations, and agribashing, we show the shift from conciliation to a hardening of debates. Finally, we discuss the causes and consequences of this trend. The political will to support the transition of agriculture remains influenced by the _co-gestion_ system, an inherited configuration of decision-makers instrumental in the agricultural modernization. As a consequence, significant agricultural challenges, particularly highlighted in the scientific macro-frame, persist unresolved. This lock-in of the agrifood system is based on defensive strategies that challenge the democratic debate about food and agricultural practices. (shrink)

The development of phenomenology in nineteenth‐century German philosophy is that of a particular stream within the larger historical‐philosophical complex of Austro‐German philosophy. As the “grandfather of phenomenology” resp. the “disgusted grandfather of phenomenology,” but also as the key figure on the “Anglo‐Austrian Analytic Axis”, Brentano is at the source of the two main philosophical traditions in twentieth‐century philosophy. This chapter focuses mainly on his place in nineteenth‐century European philosophy and on the central themes and concepts in his philosophy that were (...) determinant in the development of the philosophy of his most gifted student: Edmund Husserl. Despite the variety of stances which Brentano expressed on ontology, metaphysics, and psychology over the course of his career, the five general principles remain central to his whole philosophy throughout: they have an important place in what could be called Brentano's philosophical worldview or system. By extension, they also are essential to his conception of phenomenology. (shrink)

After observing that the truth conditions of connectives of non–classical logics are generally defined in terms of formulas of first–order logic, we introduce ‘protologics’, a class of logics whose connectives are defined by arbitrary first–order formulas. Then, we introduce atomic and molecular logics, which are two subclasses of protologics that generalize our gaggle logics and which behave particularly well from a theoretical point of view. We also study and introduce a notion of equi-expressivity between two logics based on different classes (...) of models. We prove that, according to that notion, every pure predicate logic with \ variables and constants is as expressive as a predicate atomic logic, some sort of atomic logic. Then, we prove that the class of protologics is equally expressive as the class of molecular logics. That formally supports our claim that atomic and molecular logics are somehow ‘universal’. Finally, we identify a subclass of molecular logics that we call predicate molecular logics and which constitutes its representative core: every molecular logic is as expressive as a predicate molecular logic. (shrink)

Guillaume Fréchette | : Il est généralement admis dans la littérature analytique sur l’intuition que celle-ci est principalement, ou même fondamentalement, une attitude propositionnelle. Partant de là, elle est aussi souvent caractérisée comme une croyance que P, comme la formation d’une croyance sans inférence que P, comme une impression que P, comme une impression intellectuelle que P, comme l’attitude consistant à être poussé, mu par P. Dans tous les cas, la spécificité de l’intuition reposerait au moins en partie sur (...) les propriétés doxastiques qui la distingue d’autres attitudes propositionnelles, comme savoir que P ou douter que P.Cette caractérisation de l’intuition semble à première vue incommensurable avec le concept d’intuition discuté dans la tradition phénoménologique, où l’intuition est caractérisée comme ce type d’expérience qui rend les objets présents, et peut certes être caractérisée en termes d’attitude propositionnelle, mais ne l’est pas essentiellement.Dans ce qui suit, je soulève quelques problèmes auxquels fait face la conception de l’intuition comme attitude propositionnelle. Partant de là, j’aimerais suggérer qu’en amendant cette idée, on peut développer une théorie de l’intuition qui peut employer de manière fructueuse les ressources de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique. Cette suggestion montre que l’incommensurabilité des conceptions analytiques et phénoménologiques de l’intuition est superficielle, plus superficielle que ne le laissent entendre ses défenseurs respectifs. | : It is generally acknowledged in the analytic literature on intuitions that these are generally, or even fundamentally, propositional attitudes. For this reason, intuitions are often characterized as beliefs that P, as seeming that P, as the intellectual seeming that P, or as the attitude of being pushed by P. In all cases, the specificity of intuitions would consist at least in part in the doxastic properties that distinguishes them from other propositional attitudes, such as knowing that P or doubting that P.At first glance, this characterization of intuitions seems incommensurable with the concept of intuition discussed in the phenomenological tradition, where intuition is characterized as the type of experience that make objects present to us. While intuitions in this sense may be characterized as propositional attitudes, it doesn’t imply that they fundamentally are propositional.In the following paper, I raise some problems which faces the conception of intuitions as propositional attitudes. I would suggest that amending this idea allows to develop a theory of intuition which can use fruitfully both the resources of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. As a consequence, the alleged incommensurability of analytical and phenomenological conceptions of intuitions appears to be more superficial than it is usually taken to be defenders of intuitions as propositional attitudes. (shrink)

This paper deals with the history of “pathogenic environments,” understood as places, regions, or environments whose characteristics are considered to be the origin of diseases in the human beings. While some specific environments were almost universally considered noxious, some others had a different trajectory. Crowded and poorly-ventilated premises as well as tropical regions were perceived as “the most unhealthy spots in the world.” However, the progressive “medicalisation” of hospitals transformed what were previously considered to be hellholes into therapeutic places. This (...) does not mean that iatrogenic diseases disappeared, but that hospitals tended to be seen in a more positive way. Similarly, European colonial expansion changed medical perspectives on tropical regions. Western physicians became increasingly convinced not only that could they prepare Europeans for long travel, but also that they could shape foreign environments. For instance, the perception of the Caribbean climate gradually changed “from deadly to healthy” from the middle of the 19th century onwards. Changes in perceptions could thus follow scientific progress, but also arise from political agendas and stigmatising narratives. Victims of the harmful influences of a pathogenic environment were often presented as responsible for their fate. For instance, some were accused of not carrying out the instructions delivered by the administrative or medical authorities. The process of (un)making pathogenic environments thus offers privileged access to the understanding of the relationship between health and environment. This paper provides situated accounts of how some places or regions came to be perceived as pathogenic or ceased to be so. It explores avenues of research, such as the study of lay perspectives on health and environment, the dangers of travel itself, and the connection between environmental health and military medicine. (shrink)

In update logic as studied by Baltag, Moss, Solecki and van Benthem, little attention is paid to the interpretation of an action by an agent, which is just assumed to depend on the situation. This is actually a complex issue that nevertheless complies to some logical dynamics. In this paper, we tackle this topic. We also deal with actions that change propositional facts of the situation. In parallel, we propose a formalism to accurately represent an agent's epistemic state based on (...) hyperreal numbers. In that respect, we use infinitesimals to express what would surprise the agents (and by how much) by contradicting their beliefs. We also use a subjective probability to model the notion of belief. It turns out that our probabilistic update mechanism satisfies the AGM postulates of belief revision. (shrink)

In this paper, we use an experimental design to compare the performance of elicitation rules for subjective beliefs. Contrary to previous works in which elicited beliefs are compared to an objective benchmark, we consider a purely subjective belief framework. The performance of different elicitation rules is assessed according to the accuracy of stated beliefs in predicting success. We measure this accuracy using two main factors: calibration and discrimination. For each of them, we propose two statistical indexes and we compare the (...) rules’ performances for each measurement. The matching probability method provides more accurate beliefs in terms of discrimination, while the quadratic scoring rule reduces overconfidence and the free rule, a simple rule with no incentives, which succeeds in eliciting accurate beliefs. Nevertheless, the matching probability appears to be the best mechanism for eliciting beliefs due to its performances in terms of calibration and discrimination, but also its ability to elicit consistent beliefs across measures and across tasks, as well as its empirical and theoretical properties. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à mettre en évidence, au sein de l’histoire du spiritualisme, la fonction transcendantale d’un possible basculement vers l’idéalisme. Au travers de la comparaison et de la confrontation des philosophies de Ravaisson, de Lachelier et de Brunschvicg, on cherchera ainsi à interroger la légitimité de ce passage. En effet, si le spiritualisme refuse dans un premier temps l’idéalisme, c’est pour le considérer ensuite comme un moyen nécessaire afin de dépasser les apories initiales de la philosophie de Ravaisson. Le (...) passage à l’idéalisme a-t-il signé la trahison du spiritualisme, ou a-t-il au contraire permis sa poursuite la plus adéquate? (shrink)

Cet article analyse le sens que prend, dans l’activité théorique de Lukács des années 1930, la notion de narration, cruciale dans ses travaux ultérieurs. On y fait l’hypothèse que c’est l’événement révolutionnaire russe et ses suites qui posent directement la question du statut de la narration dans le discours politique révolutionnaire et tous les problèmes liés : continuité historique et importance de l’héritage, point de vue de l’écriture de l’histoire, etc. Lukács partage ce questionnement avec les théoriciens du réalisme socialiste, (...) alors en voie de formalisation (et de stérilisation), mais il leur confère une dimension théorique qui sera plus tard réinvestie, en premier lieu dans l’ Esthétique, et lui permettra de préciser le statut du marxisme au sein des sciences sociales. (shrink)

À propos de : Jacques Rancière, Les Mots et les torts. Dialogue avec Javier Basas, Paris, La Fabrique, 2021, 96 p. Comme le titre de l’ouvrage l’indique, il s’agit de la transcription d’un entretien entre le philosophe français et le jeune philosophe espagnol Javier Basas. Ce der- nier interroge Jacques Rancière sur ses pratiques d’écriture, plus précisément sur le rapport entre ces pratiques et la notion d’égalité que le philosophe français met au cœur de sa philosophie de la politique. Il (...) y... (shrink)

In epistemic logic, some axioms dealing with the notion of knowledge are rather convoluted and difficult to interpret intuitively, even though some of them, such as the axioms.2 and.3, are considered to be key axioms by some epistemic logicians. We show that they can be characterized in terms of understandable interaction axioms relating knowledge and belief or knowledge and conditional belief. In order to show it, we first sketch a theory dealing with the characterization of axioms in terms of interaction (...) axioms in modal logic. We then apply the main results and methods of this theory to obtain specific results related to epistemic and doxastic logics. (shrink)

David Chalmers argues that virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality. In one of its readings, this “virtual realism” states that virtual entities ontologically depend on real digital entities. This article explores that suggestion and offers a novel account of the dependence of the virtual on the digital. Drawing on Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution, we contend that virtual objects should be seen as constituted by digital objects, when these are placed in certain favourable circumstances. We explore the (...) rationale and implications of this view, which we see as a promising form of virtual realism. (shrink)

How do we individuate the senses, what exactly do we do when we do so, and why does it matter? In the following article, I propose a general answer to these related questions based on Franz Brentano's views on the senses. After a short survey of various answers offered in the recent literature on the senses, I distinguish between two major ways of answering this question, causally and descriptively, arguing that only answers giving priority to description and to the classification (...) involved in it are on the right track for a general answer to the related questions. In the second part of the article, I argue that Brentano's descriptive psychology is an attractive candidate for such an answer. His descriptive psychology provides a plausible account of the classification involved in description, in particular regarding the classification of sensory qualities. I close the article by briefly explaining how Brentano spells out the priority of descriptive answers over causal ones. (shrink)

Cet article propose la première publication complète d’un monument consacré par les Thespiens aux Muses dans leur sanctuaire au pied de l’Hélicon, dont les éléments constitutifs sont connus depuis le xixe s., et notamment depuis les fouilles de P. Jamot au Val des Muses. Les statues en bronze de petite taille des neuf Muses se dressaient sur une base en arc de cercle d’une ampleur de ca 10 m, placée dans un écrin architectural largement ouvert sur l’extérieur. Un nouveau lustre (...) est donné à ce groupe statuaire hellénistique exceptionnel à l’époque d’Auguste par la gravure, sous chacune des figures, d’une épigramme descriptive et érudite signée par le poète corinthien Honestos. Est ainsi conservé l’un des rares exemples archéologiques de recueil de poèmes décrivant des œuvres d’art figuré. L’analyse des épigrammes et l’observation détaillée des mortaises de fixation visibles à la face supérieure des blocs de la base permettent d’émettre des hypothèses sur les types utilisés pour la représentation des Muses, mais aussi d’assurer, au‑delà de tout doute, que les statues prenaient place au milieu d’ornements végétaux en bronze qui évoquaient le paysage du Val des Muses. La représentation de la nature comme élément non plus secondaire, mais essentiel d’un groupe sculpté correspond aux recherches nouvelles de la basse époque hellénistique. Faute de fouilles exhaustives du sanctuaire des Muses, l’emplacement du monument ne peut être déterminé avec certitude. Des lettres de remontage nous apprennent en revanche qu’il a été déplacé, peut‑être à l’époque où furent gravés les poèmes d’Honestos. (shrink)

Resumo O artigo descreve o poema “An die Melancholie” como um momento crucial e essencial da evolução da filosofia de Nietzsche, aquele de uma primeira intuição da noção de “vontade de potência”. O filósofo se afasta da longa tradição alemã dos hinos à melancolia, ao mesmo tempo em que subverteu os poemas filosóficos - os darwinistas em particular - de sua época, para superar seu pessimismo schopenhaueriano.The article aims at describing the poem “An die Melancholie” as an essential and crucial (...) moment within the development of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which refers to the first intuition of the notion of “Will to Power”. The philosopher deviates from the long German tradition of odes to melancholy, whilst subverting the philosophical poems of his own time - specially the Darwinian ones -, in order to overcome his Schopenhauerian pessimism. (shrink)

This article introduces the reader to the very first complete edition and translation of Nietzsche’s poems. The hitherto published editions are in fact mere anthologies. Many of his poetical works, especially his Juvenilia, are not included in these collections, and yet they bear testimony to a primary stratum of his imagination and consequently help us to explore his use of metaphor in his thinking. This edition of the poems, which tries to be faithful to their original form, aims at shedding (...) new light on Nietzsche’s body of work by giving his poetry a central position within his philosophical writings. (shrink)

Galileo asked in his Dialogue of the Two New Sciences what relationship exists between the size of the set of all natural numbers and the size of the set of all square natural numbers. Although one is a proper subset of the other, suggesting that there are strictly fewer squares than natural numbers, the existence of a simple one-to-one correspondence between the two sets suggests that they have, in fact, the same size. Cantor famously based the modern notion of cardinality (...) on the second intuition, but recent advances in mathematical logic (most notably, numerosity theory) have renewed an interest in the question whether Cantor’s way out of Galileo’s paradox was the only possible one. I present a new solution to Galileo’s paradox and argue that it is a better alternative to the Cantorian solution than numerosity theory. In fact, I argue that it is the best possible way out of Galileo's Paradox that can be based on the "Euclidean" intuition that the whole is always greater than any of its proper parts. (shrink)

Dans l’essai Objets intentionnels de 1894, Husserl développe en réaction à Twardowski une théorie originale de l’assomption comme solution au problème des représentations sans objet. Après avoir examiné le détail de cette théorie et en avoir soulevé les difficultés, je montre dans cet article que la solution proposée par cette théorie doit être abordée de manière indépendante de celle qui sera développée plus tard dans les Recherches logiques et j’expose dans quelle mesure elle est ancrée dans la psychologie descriptive brentanienne (...) tout en mettant à profit certains outils de la logique de Bolzano. Enfin, j’indique que Husserl continuera à développer cette théorie après les Recherches logiques, confirmant ainsi qu’elle occupe une place de choix dans la théorie phénoménologique du jugement.In his essay Intentional Objects of 1894, Husserl develops in response to Twardowski an original theory of assumptions as a solution to the problem of objectless presentations. First, I analyze in this paper the main points of his theory and point out some of the difficulties it raises. I then suggest that the solution presented in this theory must be addressed independently of the one developed by Husserl later in the Logical Investigations and try to show in which extent his theory of assumptions is rooted in the brentanian descriptive psychology, although it makes good use of some logical tools from Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre. Since Husserl continues to work on this theory even after the Logical Investigations, it confirms the important place one should give to the theory of assumptions it the phenomenological theory of judgment. (shrink)

Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) deals with the representation and the study in a multi-agent setting of knowledge and belief change. It can express in a uniform way epistemic statements about: 1. what is true about an initial situation 2. what is true about an event occurring in this situation 3. what is true about the resulting situation after the event has occurred. We axiomatize within the DEL framework what we can infer about (iii) given (i) and (ii). Given three formulas (...) φ,φ' and φ" describing respectively (i), (ii) and (iii), we also show how to build a formula φ ? φ' which captures all the information which can be inferred about (iii) from φ and φ'. We show how our results extend to other modal logics than K. In our proofs and definitions, we resort to a large extent to the normal form formulas for modal logic originally introduced by Kit Fine. In a companion paper (Aucher, 2012), we axiomatize what we can infer about (ii) given (i) and (iii), and what we can infer about (i) given (ii) and (iii), and show how to build two formulas φ ? φ" and φ' ? φ" which capture respectively all the information which can be inferred about (ii) from φ and φ", and all the information which can be inferred about (i) from φ' and φ". (shrink)

Guillaume Collett questions to what extent we can locate Deleuze within the Lacanian School during the late-1960s, prior to Guattari. In so doing, he offers a new, integrated reading of Deleuze's The Logic of Sense by understanding it as a 'psychoanalysis of sense', and gives a new interpretation of Deleuze's conception of philosophy itself. The Psychoanalysis of Sense shows that Deleuze was not merely aware of the debates animating the Lacanian School during the 1960s: he sought to contribute to (...) them. Emphasising his appropriation of the work of post-Lacanian Serge Leclaire, Collett explains how Deleuze constructed a more singular and immanent theory of the linguistic structure of the unconscious - granting the erogenous body a larger structuring role. (shrink)

Unlike in physics, the category of thought experiment is not very common in biology. At least there are no classic examples that are as important and as well-known as the most famous thought experiments in physics, such as Galileo’s, Maxwell’s or Einstein’s. The reasons for this are far from obvious; maybe it has to do with the fact that modern biology for the most part sees itself as a thoroughly empirical discipline that engages either in real natural history or in (...) experimenting on real organisms rather than fictive ones. While theoretical biology does exist and is recognized as part of biology, its role within biology appears to be more marginal than the role of theoretical physics within physics. It could be that this marginality of theory also affects thought experiments as sources of theoretical knowledge. Of course, none of this provides a sufficient reason for thinking that thought experiments are really unimportant in biology. It is quite possible that the common perception of this matter is wrong and that there are important theoretical considerations in biology, past or present, that deserve the title of thought experiment just as much as the standard examples from physics. Some such considerations may even be widely known and considered to be important, but were not recognized as thought experiments. In fact, as we shall see, there are reasons for thinking that what is arguably the single most important biological work ever, Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, contains a number of thought experiments. There are also more recent examples both in evolutionary and non-evolutionary biology, as we will show. Part of the problem in identifying positive examples in the history of biology is the lack of agreement as to what exactly a thought experiment is. Even worse, there may not be more than a family resemblance that unifies this epistemic category. We take it that classical thought experiments show the following characteristics: They serve directly or indirectly in the non-empirical epistemic evaluation of theoretical propositions, explanations or hypotheses. Thought experiments somehow appeal to the imagination. They involve hypothetical scenarios, which may or may not be fictive. In other words, thought experiments suppose that certain states of affairs hold and then try to intuit what would happen in a world where these suppositions are true. We want to examine in the following sections if there are episodes in the history of biology that satisfy these criteria. As we will show, there are a few episodes that might satisfy all three of these criteria, and many more if the imagination criterion is dropped or understood in a lose sense. In any case, this criterion is somewhat vague in the first place, unless a specific account of the imagination is presupposed. There will also be issues as to what exactly “non-empirical” means. In general, for the sake of discussion we propose to understand the term “thought experiment” here in a broad rather than a narrow sense here. We would rather be guilty of having too wide a conception of thought experiment than of missing a whole range of really interesting examples. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous livrons une analyse du statut épistémologique de l’hypothèse d’efficience des marchés. Sans juger de sa véracité ou de sa fausseté, nous montrons qu’elle ne peut, en aucun sens rigoureux, être entendue comme une proposition empirique testable. Aucune expérience n’existe permettant de la falsifier irrévocablement. A rebours, nous montrons qu’elle ne peut être entendue que comme une proposition analytique, comme inaugurant un nouveau système de définitions cohérent par lui-même. En cela, la formulation de l’hypothèse d’efficience des marchés (...) a ouvert un nouveau programme de recherche, dont nous mettons en évidence les grandes lignes directrices. (shrink)

L’auteur montre que le principe de précaution est souvent confondu avec d’autres (notamment principes de prévention ou de préparation). Sa formulation en droit français est restrictive et, même dans cette acception, son application par le législateur ou la jurisprudence est rare. Alors que le principe de précaution exige des évaluations des risques rigoureuses et continues, il est à tort invoqué pour justifier ou critiquer des décisions publiques qui n’en relèvent pas.

Cet article propose de réfléchir sur la nature des images animées, à partir sur trois thèses de Kendall Walton. Le philosophe américain, bien connu dans le monde analytique pour un livre sur les arts représentationnels, Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990), discute très régulièrement de films, mais aucune de ses recherches n’a à proprement parler versé dans la philosophie du cinéma. C’est pourquoi, cet article se demande à quoi ressemblerait une philosophie waltonienne du cinéma. Pour ce faire, je présente et discute trois (...) propositions tirées des travaux de Walton : (1) les œuvres de fiction ne sont pas définies comme des contre-vérités, (2) les dépictions nous donnent à imaginer autant qu’à percevoir ce qu’elles représentent, (3) les photographies nous placent dans une relation épistémique objective avec leurs sujets. De là, j’élabore une interprétation waltonienne de la distinction entre l’image fictive et l’image documentaire. (shrink)

Cette étude constitue la première publication complète de tous les éléments associés à l’autel des Césars au cœur de l’agora de Thasos : les vestiges architecturaux, la dédicace à Lucius César et la tête sculptée mises au jour lors de la fouille du monument. L’identification de l’édifice à un autel est désormais assurée et l’appartenance du bloc inscrit à ce dernier confirmée. La présence d’une seconde dédicace, vraisemblablement à Caius César, est rendue très probable par la structure du monument, dont (...) une restitution est proposée pour la première fois. L’association à la construction de l’autel des deux soubassements de bases qui le flanquent à l’Est est démontrée, ce qui conforte l’identification de la tête à l’un des deux princes de la jeunesse, dans lequel il faut reconnaître Caius plutôt que Lucius. Ces nouveaux éléments permettent de dater précisément le monument entre 4 et 6 apr. J.‑C. et de lui donner sa juste place dans l’histoire des relations entre Thasos et la famille impériale. (shrink)

Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irre- ducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self- consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these (...) phenomenologists was not influenced as much by Husserl as by two important figures in the prehistory of phenomenology: their teacher Theodor Lipps, and – indi- rectly, through Lipps’ influence – Hermann Lotze. Second, I show that their account of self-consciousness takes the metaphysical realism underlying Lotze’s and Lipps’ views on the distinction between feeling and sensations seriously. I argue that this distinction played a central role in the development of many early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness. (shrink)