This research scrutinises the correlation between state ownership and the attributes of green innovation, specifically underscoring generality as a primary trait of innovation favoured by governments. Green innovation with generality, due to its applicability across diverse contexts at reduced expense, becomes an appealing strategy for states to address environmental concerns. Consequently, we suggest that state ownership encourages the prevalence of green innovation characterised by generality. Furthermore, we delve into two contingencies related to ascribed and achieved political connections, positing that they, (...) respectively, impose negative and positive moderating influences. Support for our propositions comes from data gathered from Chinese listed firms during the period 2004–2019. By emphasising the importance of green innovation characteristics over their quantity, our research offers a significant contribution to the literature on green innovation in the context of state ownership. (shrink)

Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad, 1201-1274's Tajrīd al-ʻaqāʼid; selections; philosophy, Islamic; early works to 1800.

Hume's Epistemological Evolution argues that Hume's Enquiry represents a significant departure from the Treatise in respect of its epistemological framework. The Treatise's treatment of skepticism is an unsatisfactory one, as Hume seems to realize, and he therefore forms a new epistemological framework in the Enquiry. Qu's central argument is that Hume's epistemology evolves between these two works.

College students have gradually become the main force of entrepreneurship in mass entrepreneurship and innovation. However, their entrepreneurial performance was not as good as expected. We have carried out research to analyze the predictive factors of entrepreneurial performance of college students and put forward targeted suggestions, hoping to be helpful to improve their entrepreneurial performance of them. Based on questionnaire data obtained from 2,097 college student entrepreneurs, this study uses the structural equation model to analyze the predictive factors of the (...) entrepreneurial performance of college students. The survey results of the questionnaire show that both personal and behavioral factors influence the entrepreneurial performance of college students. In this study, personal factors in this study mainly include entrepreneurial willingness, personality, and ability of entrepreneurs. Behavioral factors mainly refer to the positive behaviors of entrepreneurs that can affect entrepreneurial performance. (shrink)

The aesthetic functional education of film art lies in the fact that Chinese people of their background in traditional culture, can be influenced and infected by truth, goodness, and beauty through excellent film works and develop empathy in the ritualized activity of watching movies. The animation film "30,000 Miles from Chang’an" combines historical narrative previous historical cultural and artistic aesthetics, presenting a colorful world of aesthetic education. The film is based on traditional poetry, and is conducive to unique narrative art (...) techniques, presenting history and reality to the audience to the extensive greatest. The audience cannot appreciate the prosperity of the heyday of the Tang Dynasty from the film pictures only appreciate the charm of Tang Dynasty poetry, which enhances the audience's understanding and recognition of Chinese traditional culture. This movie provides the audience with an animated film with an opportunity to explore information about the original history that is told as a true story through this film through the traditional culture of China and enrich the audience's aesthetic experience and cultural literacy. Interestingly, the film system of China and the socialist film system were established at this stage and exerted a continuous influence on the political, economic, social, and cultural fields. (shrink)

Sir, The recent discussion by Elovici et al. on “Ethical Considerations when Employing Fake Identities in Online Social Networks for Research ” is very interesting . Elovici et al. raised an important question “Is it legitimate to use fake identities for studying OSNs or for collecting OSN data for research? ” In fact, “fake” is not a reality and this might be problematic. In medicine, “fake” is not acceptable. This is not the same as “placebo”, which is a standard method (...) for management of the disorder of the patients. Also, it is not the “blinding”, which is the standard clinical trial technique. As a worker in the field of medical journalism, “fake” might be classified as a “falsification”. According to the standard international medical journal, the “fake” data is totally not acceptable. However, focusing on the “fake identities”, if it is used in researching, it might deviate the research result. This has to be disclose .. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of THN 1.4.7, which sees his sceptical problem and solution in THN 1.4.7 as taking a broadly deontological structure. Briefly, I read the ‘Dangerous Dilemma’ (THN 1.4.7.6-7) as embodying a false dichotomy between two deontological extremes concerning reflection, that is, thinking carefully about our mental states and faculties. The two horns of the Dangerous Dilemma are as follows: either embracing an absolute duty to constantly and incessantly reflect (leading to excessive scepticism); or (...) maintaining that it is not the case that we have any duty to reflect to any degree (leading to credulity). Hume thus seeks to straddle these two horns and find a deontological middle path. The resolution to this dilemma turns on Hume’s realising that we have a duty to reflect only up to a point. Beyond this threshold, there is a level of reflection that is not required of us, but which is nevertheless good; in other words, such reflection is supererogatory. However, this seems to render excessive scepticism supererogatory. This unintuitive outcome can be avoided by appealing to a suitable account of value beyond the deontological threshold that is founded on usefulness and agreeableness. In the end, Hume manages to tread a path between scepticism and credulity, while nevertheless rejecting superstition and endorsing science and philosophy. (shrink)

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume’s claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this (...) tension by appealing to Hume’s treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (1997). (shrink)

Although there is consensus that authentic leaders act according to their true values, we have no empirical evidence of what specific values authentic leaders have. While traditional leadership approaches place power at the core of leadership, authentic leadership scholars would argue that benevolence is the value that is central to effective authentic leadership. To date, the questions about whether and when authentic leaders with high power values promote or hurt followers’ performance have not been investigated. Ostensibly, authentic leaders with high (...) power values seem to represent the dark side of authentic leadership. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model and empirically investigate the role that leaders’ power values play in the functioning of authentic leadership. We also test the assumption that authentic leaders with high benevolence values promote followers’ performance. Based on our multilevel analyses of 477 employees in 72 teams, we found that authentic leaders with prominent power values could foster followers’ performance, only when followers’ perceived value congruence was low. Authentic leaders with high benevolence values, however, cultivated followers’ performance unconditionally, regardless of perceived value congruence levels. (shrink)

Does the physicalist have to fold his hand in admitting that Mary gains new knowledge, or can he accommodate this intuition and still maintain that all facts are physical facts?

Based on the social network theory and the institutional theory, this study examines the influence of corporate network position on corporate social responsibility, and further explores the moderating role of ownership concentration. Given the characteristics of CSR in different aspects, this study explores the relationship between corporate network position and economic CSR, environmental CSR, and social CSR from the two aspects of the centrality and structural holes of interlocking directorate network based on the data of 1,034 Chinese A-share listed companies (...) from 2010 to 2019. The results show that the centrality and structural holes of interlocking directorate network have positive effects on the overall level of CSR, and the impacts on economic CSR and environmental CSR are stronger than that on social CSR. In addition, ownership concentration has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between corporate network position and CSR. These findings enrich the depth of research on CSR, clarify the influence of the characteristics of interlocking directorate network on CSR in different dimensions, and supplement the knowledge of existing research. (shrink)

صدر عن المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات كتاب زهير قوتال "المفهوم الفلسفي عند جيل دولوز"، الذي ينظر فيه إلى جيل دولوز بصفته فيلسوفًا شديد الفضول، يهتم بكل ما يشكله حاضره وينتجه عصره؛ إذ وجه جلّ فكره نحو القبض على مساحة حدْثية مرآوية، طاويًا سحر كتابته لتجاوز الأماكن الفارغة من المعنى. وقع الاختيار على المفهوم الفلسفي عنده لأنه أكثر الفلاسفة اشتغالًا على المفاهيم الفلسفية، من خلال حواراته مع كبار الفلاسفة.

In this paper, I examine the epistemological positions of Philo and Cleanthes in the Dialogues. I find that Philo's attitude towards skepticism mirrors that of the first Enquiry, most notably in its endorsement of mitigated skepticism, and its treatment of religious reasoning as distinctly discontinuous with science and philosophy. Meanwhile, Cleanthes's epistemological framework corresponds to that of the Treatise, most notably in its adoption of something like the Title Principle, and its treatment of some forms of religious reasoning as broadly (...) continuous with science and philosophy. It is not merely that the epistemological systems of the Treatise and Enquiry are echoed in Cleanthes's and Philo's positions respectively; these frameworks seem to clarify, provide a substantive basis for, and render more complete their somewhat piecemeal statements on this topic in the Dialogues. Thus, Philo's and Cleanthes's dispute is not limited to the theological, but extends to the epistemological. -/- . (shrink)

The approximate number system (ANS) enables organisms to represent the approximate number of items in an observed collection, quickly and independently of natural language. Recently, it has been proposed that the ANS goes beyond representing natural numbers by extracting and representing rational numbers (Clarke & Beck, 2021a). Prior work demonstrates that adults and children discriminate ratios in an approximate and ratio-dependent manner, consistent with the hallmarks of the ANS. Here, we use a well-known “connectedness illusion” to provide evidence that these (...) ratio-dependent ratio discriminations are (a) based on the perceived number of items in seen displays (and not just non-numerical confounds), (b) are not dependent on verbal working memory, or explicit counting routines, and (c) involve representations with a part-whole (or subset-superset) format, like a fraction, rather than a part-part format, like a ratio. These results vindicate key predictions of the hypothesis that the ANS represents rational numbers. (shrink)

On the basis of PM2.5 data of the national air quality monitoring sites, local population data, and baseline all-cause mortality rate, PM2.5-related health economic benefits of the Air Improvement Action Plan implemented in Wuhan in 2013–2017 were investigated using health-impact and valuation functions. Annual avoided premature deaths driven by the average concentration of PM2.5 decrease were evaluated, and the economic benefits were computed by using the value of statistical life (VSL) method. Results showed that the number of avoided premature deaths (...) in Wuhan are 21,384 (95% confidence interval (CI): 15,004 to 27,255) during 2013–2017, due to the implementation of the Air Improvement Action Plan. According to the VSL method, the obtained economic benefits of Huangpi, Wuchang, Hongshan, Xinzhou, Jiang’an, Hanyang, Jiangxia, Qiaokou, Jianghan, Qingshan, Caidian, Dongxihu, and Hannan District were 8.55, 8.19, 8.04, 7.39, 5.78, 4.84, 4.37, 4.04, 3.90, 3.30, 2.87, 2.42, and 0.66 billion RMB (1 RMB = 0.1417 USD On 14 October 2019), respectively. These economic benefits added up to 64.35 billion RMB (95% CI: 45.15 to 82.02 billion RMB), accounting for 4.80% (95% CI: 3.37% to 6.12%) of the total GDP of Wuhan in 2017. Therefore, in the process of formulating a regional air quality improvement scheme, apart from establishing hierarchical emission-reduction standards and policies, policy makers should give integrated consideration to the relationship between regional economic development, environmental protection and residents’ health benefits. Furthermore, for improving air quality, air quality compensation mechanisms can be established on the basis of the status quo and trends of air quality, population distribution, and economic development factors. (shrink)

Taguergoust (Morocco), history; Cities and towns; Morocco; history.

This article investigates Hume's account of mental transparency. In this article, I will endorse Qualitative Transparency – that is, the thesis that we cannot fail to apprehend the qualitative characters of our current perceptions, and these apprehensions cannot fail to be veridical – on the basis that, unlike its competitors, it is both weak enough to accommodate the introspective mistakes that Hume recognises, and yet strong enough to make sense of his positive employments of mental transparency. Moreover, Qualitative Transparency is (...) also philosophically satisfying in providing good philosophical reason for why the mental states that are incorrigible should in fact be so. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine three mutually inconsistent claims that are commonly attributed to Hume: all beliefs are involuntary; some beliefs are subject to normative appraisal; and that ‘Ought implies Can’. I examine the textual support for such ascription, and the options for dealing with the puzzle posed by their inconsistency. In what follows I will put forward some evidence that Hume maintains each of the three positions outlined above. I then examine what I call the ‘prior voluntary action’ solution. (...) I argue that this position in any form fails to account for synchronic rationality. I then raise more specific objections depending on how we disambiguate the position, which can be read as either granting beliefs derivative voluntariness, or as denying their normative significance; the former version is inconsistent with Hume’s treatment of natural abilities, while the latter falls to a regress given Hume’s thesis regarding the inability of actions and passions to be subject to epistemic normativity. I then propose to reject instead for two reasons: first, the weakness of textual support for such an ascription; secondly, Hume’s explicit recognition of the irrelevance of involuntariness to normative evaluation in the moral case. (shrink)

Hume argues that whenever we seem to be motivated by reason, there are unnoticed calm passions that play this role instead, a move that is often criticised asad hoc(e. g. Stroud 1977 and Cohon 2008). In response, some commentators propose a conceptual rather than empirical reading of Hume’s conativist thesis, either as a departure from Hume (Stroud 1977), or as an interpretation or rational reconstruction (Bricke 1996). I argue that conceptual accounts face a dilemma: either they render the conativist thesis (...) trivial, or they violate Hume’s thesis that ‘a priori, any thing may produce any thing’ (THN1.4.5.30). I defend an empirical construal of Hume’s conativist thesis. I provide two theoretical frameworks within which Hume’s appeal to the calm passions may be justified: first, by the framework of theoretical virtues, and secondly, by lights of his own “rules by which to judge of causes and effects” (THN1.3.15). (shrink)

When relating genomic data to survival outcomes, there are three main challenges that are the censored survival outcomes, the high-dimensionality of the genomic data, and the non-normality of data. We propose a method to tackle these challenges simultaneously and obtain a robust estimation of detecting significant genes related to survival outcomes based on Accelerated Failure Time model. Specifically, we include a general loss function to the AFT model, adopt model regularization and shrinkage technique, cope with parameters tuning and model selection, (...) and develop an algorithm based on unified Expectation–Maximization approach for easy implementation. Simulation results demonstrate the advantages of the proposed method compared with existing methods when the data has heavy-tailed errors and correlated covariates. Two real case studies on patients are provided to illustrate the application of the proposed method. (shrink)

There seems a potential tension between Hume's naturalistic project and his normative ambitions. Hume adopts what I call a methodological naturalism: that is, the methodology of providing explanations for various phenomena based on natural properties and causes. This methodology takes the form of introducing ‘the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’, as stated in the subtitle of the Treatise; this ‘experimental method’ seems a paradigmatically descriptive one, and it remains unclear how Hume derives genuinely normative prescriptions from this methodology. (...) In resolving this problem, I will argue that Hume's naturalistic methodology – that is, his ‘experimental philosophy’, or what has come to be known as his experimental method – consists of the systematization of phenomena pertaining to human nature. In applying his experimental method to normative subjects, Hume systematizes our normative judgements, deriving general principles of normative justification; he then reflexivel... (shrink)

Consistency is commonly taken to be an interpretive virtue in scholarship, but the rationale behind this assumption is unclear. This paper explores the question of why we should take consistency to be an interpretive virtue; it finds that while considerations of accuracy might render the issue underdetermined, we nevertheless have reason to take consistency to be an interpretive virtue on the basis of considerations of philosophical worth.

Much has been written about Kemp Smith's famous problem regarding the tension between Hume's naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address the Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume's scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume's inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems that Section 12 has (...) been unduly neglected. This paper seeks to address Kemp Smith's problem from the standpoint of Hume's treatment of scepticism in EHU 12, and finds an interesting internalist account that makes sense both of Hume's discussion in EHU 12, and his aims in the Enquiry as a whole. Moreover, it is one that is of substantive philosophical interest, having intriguing parallels to contemporary epistemological accounts. (shrink)

Discussion on whether Hume's treatment of induction is descriptive or normative has usually centred on Hume's negative argument, somewhat neglecting the positive argument. In this paper, I will buck this trend, focusing on the positive argument. First, I argue that Hume's positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues . I then argue that Hume's positive argument in the Enquiry is normative in nature; drawing on his discussion of scepticism in Section 12 of the Enquiry, I (...) explain a framework by which he provides what I call consequent justification for our inductive practices in his positive argument. Based on this, I argue that his negative argument in the Enquiry should similarly be read as normative in nature. (shrink)

The inoffensive title of Section 1.4.7 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, ‘Conclusion of this Book’, belies the convoluted treatment of scepticism contained within. It is notoriously difficult to decipher Hume’s considered response to scepticism in this section, or whether he even has one. In recent years, however, one line of interpretation has gained popularity in the literature. The ‘usefulness and agreeableness reading’ (henceforth U&A) interprets Hume as arguing in THN 1.4.7 that our beliefs and/or epistemic policies are justified via (...) their usefulness and agreeableness to the self and others; proponents include Ardal (in Livingston & King (eds.) Hume: a re-evaluation, 1976), Kail (in: Frasca-Spada & Kail (eds.) Impressions of Hume, 2005), McCormick (Hume Stud 31:1, 2005), Owen (Hume’s reason, 1999), and Ridge (Hume Stud 29:2, 2003), while Schafer (Philosophers, forthcoming) also defends an interpretation along these lines. In this paper, I will argue that although U&A has textual merit, it struggles to maintain a substantive distinction between epistemic and moral justification—a distinction that Hume insists on. I then attempt to carve out the logical space for there being a distinctly epistemic notion of justification founded on usefulness and agreeableness. However, I find that such an account is problematic for two reasons: first, it cannot take advantage of the textual support for U&A; secondly, it is incompatible with other features of the text. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that a number of Hume’s claims generate a putative inconsistency with regard to complex ideas and independent existence. I first provide a prima facie argument for the existence of this inconsistency. Then, I examine a number of attempts to rescue Hume from this problem, and argue that each of them fails, before proposing my own solution.