A central distinction in Curzer and Epstein (2022) is the one between “protect the disadvantaged” and “protect the data”. This can open up discussions about the relationship between ethics and epistemology in the practice of science. Focusing on the disadvantaged to the exclusion of good scientific practices, Curzer and Epstein argue, can harm everyone impacted by medical science, including the disadvantaged. For this reason, they propose that “ethical data scientists should strive for accurate data and scientifically sound data analysis” (2022, (...) p 2) with attention to minimizing data processing errors, bias, and outside influence, and that includes identifying errors caused by tendencies to neglect disadvantaged and historically underrepresented communities and groups. While we agree with several points made by Curzer and Epstein, we also have three main points of concern. We believe that Curzer and Epstein partially mischaracterize our original paper (Ratti & Graves, 2021) as “protect the disadvantaged.” We view as a controversial that “advancing knowledge” is a pure epistemic goal achievable by pure epistemic means. We see as important the social context to which data science is going to make a difference, and why ethics and epistemology are necessarily intertwined because of that context. (shrink)

The article is a criticism of Professor Nowell-Smith's contention that 'I ought' is a way of saying 'I shall'. In the author's own words: "'I ought' would be too good a reason for a decision if it entailed 'I shall'. Since it is possible to choose to do what one believes to be wrong, 'I ought' does not entail 'I shall'." (staff).

The practice of burying objects with the dead is often claimed as some of the earliest evidence for religion, on the assumption that such “grave goods” were intended for the decedents’ use in the afterlife. However, this assumption is largely speculative, as the underlying motivations for grave‐good practices across time and place remain little understood. In the present work, we asked if explicit and implicit religious beliefs (particularly those concerning the continuity of personal consciousness after death) motivate (...) contemporary grave‐good practices. Across three studies, and comparing participants from the United States and NZ, we measured grave‐good deposition at actual or hypothetical funerals, finding that jewelry, photographs, and other items with sentimental, emotional, and relationship value were common. In addition, intuitive afterlife reasoning (as measured by people's attributions of mental states to the dead) motivated grave‐good decision‐making for about half (Study 2) or more (Study 3) people, including afterlife nonbelievers (“extinctivists”), while those who held explicit (i.e., stated) afterlife beliefs were more likely to participate in the practice. The decision to leave grave goods was also associated with magical contagion beliefs and a need for personal comfort, while other motivations, such as social signaling, were less common. Our results suggest that “afterlife use” is a common motivation for grave‐good practices, and that humans possess evolutionarily early intuitions about postdeath consciousness. (shrink)

L. J. Savage and I. J. Good have each demonstrated that the expected utility of free information is never negative for a decision maker who updates her degrees of belief by conditionalization on propositions learned for certain. In this paper Good's argument is generalized to show the same result for a decision maker who updates her degrees of belief on the basis of uncertain information by Richard Jeffrey's probability kinematics. The Savage/Good result is shown to be a special case of (...) the more general result. (shrink)

One will be hard-pressed to find a morally perfect agent in this world. It’s not that there aren’t any morally good people. It just takes a lot to be morally perfect. However, theists claim that God is morally perfect. (Atheists claim that if God exists, God is morally perfect.) Perhaps they are mistaken. This chapter presents an argument for the conclusion that God is not morally perfect. The argument depends upon two things: (1) the nature of the concept of moral (...) perfection, and (2) the modest theistic claim that God is involved in the affairs of the world. (shrink)

Practical wisdom enables moral decision-making and action by aligning one’s apprehension of proximate goods with a distal, socially embedded interpretation of a more ultimate Good. A focus on purpose within the overall process mutually informs human moral psychology and moral AI development in their examinations of practical wisdom. AI practical wisdom could ground an AI system’s apprehension of reality in a sociotechnical moral process committed to orienting AI development and action in light of a pluralistic, diverse interpretation of that (...) Good. Defining AI purpose in terms of the human struggle to determine the moral “ought” (versus the way reality is) can overcome practical and normative limitations of principle-based approaches to AI ethics without requiring idiosyncratic moral reasoning or a premature commitment to a single ethical theory, which could hinder navigating the moral implications of future unknowns. Dividing practical wisdom into proximate, mediating, and distal processes enables each division to incorporate the moral dimensions of the situation, individual AI system, and sociotechnical community, respectively. Drawing upon externalist (4E) and ecological cognitive psychology theories to extend Xavier Zubiri’s sentient intelligence, proximate apprehension of what an object affords the perceiver includes affordances for practical and moral purposes. Those apprehensions are structured by moral and other social-cognitive schemas that mediate moral constructs, the apprehended situation, and individual commitments and other motivating identifications in a process Ignacio Ellacuria calls historical reality. Distally, Josiah Royce’s community of interpretation characterizes one way of organizing a sociotechnical process to synthesize diverse interpretations of the Good, orient AI moral practice, and align AI development with human and AI moral purpose. (shrink)

Terrence Deacon has described three orders of emergence; Arthur Peacocke and others have suggested four levels of human systems and sciences; and Philip Clayton has postulated an additional, transcendent, level. Orders and levels describe distinct aspects of emergence, with orders characterizing topological complexity and levels characterizing theoretical knowledge and causal power. By using Deacon's orders to analyze and relate each of the four "lower" levels one can project that analysis on the transcendent level to gain insight into the teleodynamic emergence (...) of transcendent-level systems. I argue that cross-cultural interactions among human cultural-level systems results in the emergence of the "universal" transcendental norms historically characterized as the Greek Good, Beauty, and Truth. These norms require a dynamic existence that I characterize as the emergence of Spirit, using Josiah Royce's community of interpretation, and that I suggest provides a pragmatic clarification of Clayton's transcendent level. An understanding of those emergent norms clarifies ethical systems, highlights the importance of aesthetics in understanding scientific systems, and suggests the necessity of community in fruitful science-and-religion dialogue on human systems. (shrink)

The identification of human rights issues has become more prominent in statements from national and international nursing organisations such as the American Nurses Association and the United Kingdom’s Royal College of Nursing with the International Council of Nursing asserting that human rights are fundamental to and inherent in nursing and that nurses have an obligation to promote people’s health rights at all times in all places. However, concern has been expressed about this development. Human rights may be seen as the (...) imposition of legal considerations for nurses and other healthcare workers to bear in mind, as yet more responsibilities with the consequent fear of litigation. Although a more hopeful scenario is that consideration of human rights is something that is supportive of good practice. If this more hopeful scenario is to be realised, the role of education will be crucial. As with human rights generally, human rights education is a global phenomenon, a practice-orientated expression of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the goal of human rights education is to build a culture of respect and action for human rights for all. However, the nature of human rights has long been contested. A ‘mapping exercise’ of the academic literature on human rights identified ‘four schools’ or ‘ideal types’ that have shaped thinking about human rights. This sets out the conceptual context in which human rights problems are defined and solutions are proposed, which is particularly important for human rights education. However, it also complicates the picture. The different approaches taken by the four ‘types’ would likely lead to different outcomes in terms of human rights education. It is timely to discuss the nature of human rights education and examine its potential for impact on patient care. This will involve identifying the challenges and potential benefits of this approach and analysing the implications for professional practice. (shrink)

Lynne Huffer's ambitious inquiry redresses the rift between feminist and queer theory, traversing the space of a new, post-moral sexual ethics that includes pleasure, desire, connection, and betrayal. She begins by balancing queer theorists' politics of sexual freedoms with a moralizing feminist politics that views sexuality as harm. Drawing on the best insights from both traditions, she builds an ethics centered on eros, following Michel Foucault's ethics as a practice of freedom and Luce Irigaray's lyrical articulation of an ethics of (...) sexual difference. Through this theoretical lens, Huffer examines everyday experiences of ethical connection and failure connected to sex, including queer sexual practices, sodomy laws, interracial love, pornography, and work-life balance. Her approach complicates sexual identities while challenging the epistemological foundations of subjectivity. She rethinks ethics "beyond good and evil" without underestimating, as some queer theorists have done, the persistence of what Foucault calls the "catastrophe" of morality. Elaborating a thinking-feeling ethics of the other, Huffer encourages contemporary intellectuals to reshape sexual morality from within, defining an ethical space that is both poetically suggestive and politically relevant, both conceptually daring and grounded in common sexual experience. (shrink)

Mandatory vaccination, including for COVID-19, can be ethically justified if the threat to public health is grave, the confidence in safety and effectiveness is high, the expected utility of mandatory vaccination is greater than the alternatives, and the penalties or costs for non-compliance are proportionate. I describe an algorithm for justified mandatory vaccination. Penalties or costs could include withholding of benefits, imposition of fines, provision of community service or loss of freedoms. I argue that under conditions of risk or (...) perceived risk of a novel vaccination, a system of payment for risk in vaccination may be superior. I defend a payment model against various objections, including that it constitutes coercion and undermines solidarity. I argue that payment can be in cash or in kind, and opportunity for altruistic vaccinations can be preserved by offering people who have been vaccinated the opportunity to donate any cash payment back to the health service. (shrink)

Aristodemus, a Phigalian by birth, was tyrant of Megalopolis for around fifteen years in the first half of the third century b.c., possibly from the time of the Chremonidean War until around 251, when he was murdered by two Megalopolitan exiled citizens, Megalophanes and Ecdelus, pupils of the Academic Arcesilaus. While giving an account of his violent death, Pausanias, none the less, draws a very positive portrait of him, also mentioning the nickname ‘the Good’ which he probably read on Aristodemus' (...) grave. Pausanias also reports the foundation of two temples by the tyrant, both dedicated to Artemis. At 8.35.5 he locates one of the two temples at thirteen stades from Megalopolis on the road to Methydrion, so to the north. There, he says, is a place named Scias, where there are ruins of a sanctuary of Artemis Sciaditis. At 8.32.4, Pausanias briefly refers to the temple of Artemis Agrotera at Megalopolis. He says only that the sanctuary was on a hill in the south-east district of the polis, and adds that it was dedicated as an ἀνάθημα by the tyrant as well. (shrink)

Should we allow grave harm to befall one individual so as to prevent minor harms befalling sufficiently many other individuals? This is a question of aggregation. Can many small harms ‘add up’, so that, collectively, they morally outweigh a greater harm? The ‘Close Enough View’ supports a moderate position: aggregation is permissible when, and only when, the conflicting harms are sufficiently similar, or ‘close enough’, to each other. This paper surveys a range of formally precise interpretations of this view, (...) and reveals some of the problems they face. It also proposes a novel interpretation which avoids these problems. (shrink)

This commentary on Isabelle Stengers's article “Comparison as a Matter of Concern,” takes its entry point in a battle between comparisons: imposed comparisons, where extraneous, irrelevant criteria are laid down, and active, interested comparisons, where rapport is established between the scientist and the phenomenon she studies. According to Stengers, the comparison, which establishes rapport, is a crucial ingredient in good science. In the context of a symposium titled “Comparative Relativism,” perhaps the crucial point to make about what characterizes Stengers's matter (...) of concern is that, in being utterly uninterested in defining absolute scales for comparison and in focusing only on the generative potential of comparing, she relativizes the very act of comparing. What matters to her is how experimental devices simultaneously sensitize their users to the phenomena at hand and to the workings of particular comparisons. Since (a relativized) comparison is a matter of concern to the scientists involved, finding out what other ways of comparing there are (besides objectivist comparison) should be a matter of concern to those of us who are engaged in studying knowledge production. This commentary suggests that “knowledge economy” researchers begin unpacking the science/industry collaboration through participation and careful analysis as a way of staying with the present moment. (shrink)

The practice of giving the wealthy perpetual control of their assets is re-emerging in an era of great wealth inequality, long after it had been banned in common law countries. The philosophical justification for such control rests on the claim that there are posthumous rights to wealth, and that such rights do not extend in problematic way to other goods, such as political suffrage. On the basis of such a claim, we give people freedom of testation, and deem them (...) vulnerable to posthumous harm. I present a short history of legally sanctioned posthumous control of property in common law, and I argue that its philosophical justification is untenable. No principled case for posthumous rights to wealth survives scrutiny, and the large and powerful institutions that enforce such rights are morally illegitimate. (shrink)

The excavation of the bamboo slips from Jingmen Guodian Tomb No. 1 in Hubei has had major significance for scholarship. How to determine the date of this tomb has thus become a key issue in current research. A paper entitled "Jingmen Guodian Chu Tomb No. 1," published in Wenwu 7, noted: As Guodian Tomb M 1 had been robbed, the accompanying grave goods are not complete. And though a large number of bamboo slips was excavated, there is a (...) lack of precise chronological records able to determine the date of the tomb. Therefore we can only roughly infer its date from the structure of the tomb and the excavated items. (shrink)

The practice of mortuary archaeology often relies upon the examination of funerary assemblages in order to reconstruct socio-cultural changes among a group of people. This paper takes a closer look at the grave goods from two pairs of Iron-Age elite Lucanian tombs at the settlement of Roccagloriosa in order to detect how funerary ideology changed over time. From the evidence I argue that there was an evolution of aristocratic gentilician identity alongside the establishment of the newly formed Lucanian (...) ethnos in Southern Italy between the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. (shrink)

Though it is an attractive popular book dealing with some major episodes in the history of nineteenth‐century vertebrate paleontology, The Dragon Seekers fails to establish the connection between Darwin and his predecessors promised by its title. As scholarship, it is seriously deficient except when dealing with ichthyosaurs, about which its Canadian author, a paleontologist, is thoroughly knowledgeable.Of the several persons central to Christopher McGowan's topic, Mary Anning, William Conybeare, and Thomas Hawkins had little or no role in the discovery of (...) dinosaurs. All three of them were instead devoted to ichthyosaurs and plesiosaurs; McGowan writes confidently and reliably about each of these impressive prehistoric families. Despite his subtitle, the fossil reptile depicted on McGowan's title page is not a dinosaur but an ichthyosaur—and an excessively “made up” one at that . He begins and ends the book with Mary Anning and her famously fossiliferous hometown. In the Blue Lias cliffs of Lyme Regis, both ichthyosaurs and plesiosaurs were found—but no dinosaurs. Though Lyell, Agassiz, and Darwin appear as dragon seekers also, none of them was associated importantly with saurians. Cuvier, a French seeker of dragons and much else, is mentioned only in passing.The three dinosaur discoverers important to McGowan's book are William Buckland, Gideon Mantell, and Richard Owen . A more energetic researcher than some, McGowan actually visited the Kirkdale and Paviland caves made famous by Buckland. He provides up‐to‐date information about each cave, as he does about other topics throughout the text. Unfortunately, his exploration of the available literature on Buckland, Mantell, and Owen is less impressive. McGowan is clearly unacquainted with major publications by all three; their later thinking in particular is generally ignored. More broadly, McGowan has too obviously written in haste. He never provides the more coherent reading of Victorian vertebrate paleontology and associated sciences that his audience‐seeking thesis requires.Persons familiar with early dinosaur discoveries will notice the absence from McGowan's book of many useful sources and studies. The weak notes and “further reading” bibliography that he provides are inadequate. Only direct quotations have been identified; all other matters of substance, frequently controversial, are left to be taken on faith. In some introductory remarks , McGowan tells us that fossils have been known since the time of classical Greece. They have actually been found among the grave goods of Neanderthals. Some persons, Greeks among them, realized the significance of fossils long before the latter eighteenth century. McGowan even fails to acknowledge that there were evolutionary theories before Vestiges . He ignores James Secord's recent facsimile of the latter and is apparently unaware that a magnificent new edition of Darwin's correspondence is appearing.A number of factual mistakes are disconcerting. Cuvier's seminal Recherches is dated 1799 . No other foreign publication is considered, though there were several of importance. Mantell and Owen are described as physicians, which they were not; both were instead surgeons, an occupation not involving university education. Mantell joined the Geological Society in 1818, not 1820. McGowan is significantly misleading when he describes the financing of Mantell's first book and the chronology of its writing. It appeared in May 1822, not four months later . The first chapter of Mantell's book was contributed by the Rev. Henry Hoper, not Harper . Mantell was surgeon to three parishes, not just one . McGowan fails to realize that the name “Megalosaurus” had been published by James Parkinson in 1822 . He also distorts the history of Buckland's famous 1824 paper on Megalosaurus by assuming that some later additions were already in it at the time of presentation . Once again, however, he includes some useful modern knowledge.On page 87 McGowan insists that Mantell and Conybeare had not yet met, though they were both present at the meeting of 20 February 1824 and had corresponded earlier. Mantell did not receive Conybeare's most recent letter “shortly after” 10 February 1825 but on 24 November 1824 . On page 89 Robert Trotter is not fully identified, and his later generosity to Mantell is ignored. Though Lyell's geological views influenced Mantell's, they would never be entirely congruent. Mantell was still very much a catastrophist in 1832 . On page 111 McGowan's explanation of British money is erroneous. According to page 113, Mantell and Benjamin Silliman never met. Yet they spent several days together in 1851. In January 1837 Darwin was actually living at Cambridge . On page 179 McGowan claims that “our present preoccupation with dinosaurs dates back less than three decades.” Finally, there is some inadequate editing, as with “their's” and “Gooses” . On page 229 a note from Lyell to Owen is quoted but not cited.Though many of these lapses will be of no consequence to the general reader, scholars should be forewarned. This is not a book on which one can rely, despite occasionally useful points. It should not be recommended to students, for whom better sources are available. It should not be taken as a model. Several would‐be popularizations of the history of the earth sciences have appeared recently, none of them based on sound historical arguments. The writing of defensible history is not so simple a task as these facile popularizers would like the public to believe. (shrink)

In order to build a better world we need to learn how to do it. That in turn requires that our institutions of learning, our schools and universities, are rationally organized for, and devoted to, the task. At present, devoted as they are to the pursuit of knowledge, they are not. We need urgently to bring about a revolution in academia so that the basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom, construed to be the capacity to realize what is (...) of value in life for oneself and others, wisdom including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides. Priority needs to be given to tackling problems of living, above all our grave global problems. The basic intellectual aim needs to be to help people achieve what is of value in their lives, the scientific pursuit of knowledge and understanding being undertaken as an aspect of that endeavour. A basic task needs to be to help people around the world acquire a good understanding of what our global problem are and what we need to do about them. It needs to be recognized much more widely that the kind of academic inquiry we have inherited from the past, devoted primarily to the pursuit of knowledge, is damagingly irrational, in a wholesale, structural way, when judged from this standpoint. The long-standing, successful pursuit of scientific knowledge and technological know-how dissociated from a more fundamental concern with problems of living is a key factor in the creation of our current global problems, and our current incapacity to resolve them. (shrink)

We face grave global problems. One might think universities are doing all they can to help solve these problems. But universities, in successfully pursuing scientific knowledge and technological know-how in a way that is dissociated from a more fundamental concern with problems of living, have actually made possible the genesis of all our current global problems. Modern science and technology have led to modern industry and agriculture, modern medicine and hygiene, modern armaments, which in turn have led to much (...) that is good, but also to habitat destruction, extinction of species, population growth, the lethal character of modern war, and the impending disasters of climate change. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities so that they put problems of living at the heart of the academic enterprise and take, as their basic task, to help humanity learn how to make progress towards as good a world as possible. (shrink)

David Hume has warned us not to endeavor to derive an “ought” from an “is” (1990, 469–70), reprimanding those who attempt to draw value judgments from empirical facts. But Judith Jarvis Thomson refuses to accept that values and facts are logically disjoint in this manner, primarily because of her worry that such a partition of our moral values from the “facts” will place a grave limitation on any ethical system, namely, that its claims apparently cannot be proven. Consequently, Thomson (...) is on the lookout for some provably true facts that can be used, contra Hume, to draw conclusions about moral values. Thomson begins by rejecting all generalist conceptions of the good (specifically, the utilitarian's identification of the good with pleasure) and proceeds to fracture the good into various kinds of “goodness in a way,” hoping to produce by this disintegration some moral facts that can be used to set ethics on an objective foundation. But I will argue that Thomson's so‐called objective facts are actually nothing but disguised moral claims, and that in attempting to sidestep the classic fallacy identified by Hume, she has blundered into another pitfall—the Smuggler's Fallacy, the offense of concealing her moral conclusions inside the premises of her argument. (shrink)

We face grave global problems. One might think universities are doing all they can to help solve these problems. But universities, in successfully pursuing scientific knowledge and technological know-how in a way that is dissociated from a more fundamental concern with problems of living, have actually made possible the genesis of all our current global problems. Modern science and technology have led to modern industry and agriculture, modern medicine and hygiene, modern armaments, which in turn have led to habitat (...) destruction, extinction of species, population growth, the lethal character of modern war, and the impending disasters of climate change. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities so that they put problems of living at the heart of the academic enterprise and take, as their basic task, to help humanity learn how to make progress towards as good a world as possible. (shrink)

Ethical dilemmas are part of medicine, but the type of challenges, the frequency of their occurrence and the nuances in the difficulties have not been systematically studied in low-income settings. The objective of this paper was to map out the ethical dilemmas from the perspective of Ethiopian physicians working in public hospitals. A national survey of physicians from 49 public hospitals using stratified, multi-stage sampling was conducted in six of the 11 regions in Ethiopia. Descriptive statistics were used and the (...) responses to the open-ended question “If you have experienced any ethical dilemma, can you please describe a dilemma you have encountered in your own words?” were analyzed using a template analysis process. A total of 587 physicians responded, and 565 met the inclusion criteria. Twelve of 24 specified ethically challenging situations were reported to be experienced often or sometimes by more than 50% of the physicians. The most frequently reported challenge concerned resource distribution: 93% agreed that they often or sometimes had to make difficult choices due to resource limitation, and 83% often or sometimes encountered difficulties because patients were unable to pay for the preferred course of treatment. Other frequently reported difficulties were doubts about doing good or harming the patient, relating to conflicting views, concern for family welfare, disclosure issues and caring for patients not able to consent. Few reported dilemmas related to end-of-life issues. The 200 responses to the open-ended question mirrored the quantitative results. Ethiopian physicians report ethical challenges related more to bedside rationing and fairness concerns than futility discussions and conflicts about autonomy as described in studies from high-income countries. In addition to the high report of experienced challenges, gravity of the dilemmas that are present in their narratives are striking. Recognition of the everyday experiences of physicians in low-income settings should prompt the development of ethics teaching and support mechanisms, discussion of ethical guidelines as well as increase our focus on how to improve the grave resource scarcity they describe. (shrink)

Hoy se vive una grave crisis de valores. A la inmensa mayoría de la humanidad le resulta difícil saber lo que es correcto de lo que no lo es. Es una costumbre utilizar los principios bioéticos expuestos por Beauchamp y Childress, autonomia, no maleficencia, beneficencia y justicia, mismos que deben estar dentro de la ética y del derecho y más aún en la biojurídica. En ese sentido, el presente trabajo realiza un breve recorrido desde la sindéresis, la regla de (...) oro, los principios éticos: mal menor, doble efecto, totalidad, libertad y responsabilidad, sociabilidad y subsidiariedad en conjunción con los principialistas; por último los que debe utilizar la biojurídica ya reconocidos por Ulpiano junto a sus dos pilares: de prevención y precaución.Today there is a serious values crisis. The vast majority of humanity finds it difficult to know what is right from what is not. It is frequent to use the bioethical principles set out by Beauchamp and Childress: autonomy, non maleficence, beneficence and justice, that are a must in ethics and law and more so in biojuridics. In that sense, this paper provides a short view from the good judgment, the golden rule, and the ethical principles: the lesser evil, double effect, completeness, freedom and responsibility, sociability and subsidiarity in conjunction with the principlism and finally those who must use the already recognized by Ulpian biojuridics with the two pillars of prevention and precaution. (shrink)

The basic relationship between people should be care, and the caring life is the highest which humans can live. Unfortunately, care that is not thoughtful slides into illegitimate intrusion on autonomy. Autonomy is a basic good, and we should not abridge it without good reason. On the other hand, it is not the only good. We must sometimes intervene in the lives of others to protect them from grave harms or provide them with important benefits. The reflective person, therefore, (...) needs guidelines for caring. Some contemporary moralists condemn paternalism categorically. This work examines weaknesses in their arguments and proposes new guidelines for paternalism, which it calls "parentalism" to avoid the patriarchal connotations of the old term. Its antiparentalism is more moderate than standard antipaternalism based on an exaggerated respect for autonomy. The work explores implications for both the personal sphere of interactions between individuals, such as friends and family members, and the public sphere of institutions, legislation, and the professional practices. (shrink)

Alternative food movements work to create more environmentally and economically sustainable food systems, but vary widely in their advocacy for social, racial and environmental justice. However, even those food justice activists explicitly dedicated to equity must respond to the unintended consequences of their work. This paper analyzes the work of activists in Oakland, CA, who have increasingly realized that their gardens, health food stores and farm-to-table restaurants play a role in what scholars have called green gentrification, the upscaling of neighborhoods (...) through the creation of environmental amenities. Gentrification has had grave consequences for the low-income communities of color that food justice activists seek to serve. Activists are reflexive about this dynamic, and have developed strategies to push back against displacement. Most commonly, non-profit organizations and individual social entrepreneurs found businesses that seek to raise the profile of people of color in the trendy Oakland food scene while employing long-term residents in well-paying, green jobs. However, while these efforts are an essential component of a broader agenda to create both food justice and development without displacement, even these relatively high paying “good food jobs” cannot keep up with escalating rents. For this reason, we also highlight the direct action and policy-oriented strategies engaged by a smaller number of food justice activists, and argue that these are necessary compliments to a market-based approach. (shrink)

Many people argue that we should practice conscientious consumption. Faced with goods from gravely flawed production processes, such as wood from clear-cut rainforests or electronics containing conflict minerals, they argue that we should enact personal policies to routinely shun tainted goods and select pure goods. However, consumers typically should be relatively uncertain about which flaws in global supply chains are grave and the connection of purchases to those grave flaws. The threat of significant uncertainty makes (...) conscientious consumption appear to be no better, or even worse, than an overlooked option. This overlooked option is consumption with relinquishment: disregarding each product’s possible connections with upstream grave flaws and using the time, money, and energy saved in this way to address grave flaws directly. (shrink)

Is there a duty to prosecute grave international crimes? Many have thought so, even if they recognize the obligation to be defeasible. However, the theoretical literature frequently leaves the grounds for such a duty inadequately specified, or unsystematically amalgamated, leaving it unclear which considerations should drive and shape processes of criminal accountability. Further, the circumstance leaves calls to end impunity vulnerable to skeptical worries concerning the risks and costs of punishing perpetrators. I argue that a qualified duty to prosecute (...) can be substantiated on the basis of a single class of reasons, though also that standard justifications of international criminal law (as currently conceived) are not up to the task. The account exploits the expressive dimension of punishment, but locates the central good of criminal accountability in its capacity to appropriately enable an agential stance on the part of subjects in transitional circumstances. It can legitimate, in a way to be specified, hope. The approach also displays the cynicism of an anti‐impunity ethos in the absence of a robust commitment to securing basic human rights in transitional circumstances. (shrink)

In this article, I consider Grouchy's critique of economic inequality and her proposed solution to what she perceives as this grave social ill. On her view, economic inequality chips away at the bonds of accountability in society and prevents people from seeing one another as moral equals. As a step toward restoring these bonds between people, Grouchy argues that: first, we should expand property ownership, thereby giving each person a stake in the community; second, we should ensure access to (...) education and redirect its aims, to provide people with the necessary tools to reason about the common good. In so doing, Grouchy claims, we can reawaken the sense of accountability that people have to one another in community. (shrink)

This article considers the charge that citizens of developed societies are complicit in large-scale harms, using climate destabilisation as its central example. It contends that we have yet to create a lived morality – a fabric of practices and institutions – that is adequate to our situation. As a result, we participate in systematic injustice, despite all good efforts and intentions. To make this case, the article draws on recent discussions of Kant’s ethics and politics. Section 1 considers Tamar Schapiro’s (...) account of how otherwise decent actions can be corrupted by others’ betrayals, and hence fall into complicity. Section 2 turns to discussions by Christine Korsgaard and Lucy Allais, which highlight how people can be left without innocent choices if shared frameworks of interaction do not instantiate core ideals. Section 3 brings these ideas together in order to make sense of the charge of complicity in grave collective harms, and addresses some worries that the idea of unavoidable complicity may raise. (shrink)

"Today our nation saw evil." - President George W. Bush, September 11th 2001 Evil! Like a zombie back from the grave, it has arisen--a word many of us had long ago relegated to Sunday sermons, video games and horror flicks. But of course, evil is not old fashioned, nor has it ever gone away, and may be as robust as ever. So what is evil? Does it exist? Veteran journalist Bill Hart tries to drag evil out of the darkness (...) and hold it up to the light. In doing so, he has written a very readable account of 5,000 years of philosophy, theology and human history as it reflects and refines its notion of evil. More than an explanation of why bad things happen, Evil: A Primer is a tour through the nether regions in search of what we really know. (shrink)

Some of my best friends are women, but I would not want my sister to marry one of them. Modern-minded persons criticize me for manifesting such out-dated prejudices, and would like to send me to Coventry for a compulsory course of reindoctrination. They may be right. It could conceivably be the case that in due course the Sex Discrimination Act will be tightened up, even to the extent of our recognizing that there are no ‘good reasons why the State should (...) not recognize contracts which are in all respects like marriage, except for the sex of the parties concerned’. We can envisage a society so enlightened that the relations between men and women will be purely platonic and it will be a matter of no concern whether two people are members of the opposite sex or not: or, alternatively, our feelings could be so completely homogenized, that it will make no difference to an emotional relationship whether Leslie and Julian have only one Y-chromosome between them, or two, or none at all. In that event I shall be shown to be wrong, and my critics entitled to erect a monument to female equality on my grave. But I have doubts, and suspect that long after I am dead men will go on falling in love with women and women will continue to find their hearts wooed and won by men. And this fact, if it is a fact, makes a profound difference to our social institutions. I want to follow out the logic of social differentiation, relying as little as I can on putative facts about the differences between the sexes. Scientifically attested knowledge is scarce in this field. Many academics take refuge in a safe suspension of judgment, but this is a craven dereliction of duty. We have yet to develop an adequate theory of knowledge in social matters, and only by thrashing out the apparently telling arguments on this and similar issues can we clear our minds about the nature of social knowledge. Moreover, if those who might argue rationally draw back from doing so, they leave the field clear for others who suffer from fewer inhibitions and fewer scruples. And finally, serious social consequences can follow from public confusion about the logic of a situation, and what things are possible and what desirable. There is a danger that in our attempts to remedy the real wrongs done to women we shall only succeed, as with much modern legislation, in making a bad case worse. (shrink)

According to many scholars, Aristotle holds that judgments in ethics can hold true only “for the most part”. Such judgments state general claims about ethical life, not specific claims about how to act in a particular situation. These judgments can be either descriptive or prescriptive. When they are descriptive, they hold true “for the most part” insofar as they express observed regularities that occur neither always and necessarily, nor by mere chance. For example, courage is good “for the most part,” (...) except when it causes injury or death ; brave men are fearless “for the most part,” except when in grave danger. When.. (shrink)

According to 2021 data, the United States’ opt-in system of posthumous organ donation results in seventeen Americans dying each day waiting for vital organs, while many good undonated organs go to the grave with the corpse. One of the most aggressive, and compelling, proposals to resolve this tragedy is postmortem organ conscription, also called routine salvaging or organ draft. This proposal entails postmortem retrieval of needed organs, regardless of the prior authorization or refusal of the deceased or his family. (...) The argument of most proponents of conscription relies heavily upon a denial of the possibility of posthumous harms. While I also deny the possibility of posthumous harms, I argue this denial fails to acknowledge other serious wrongs that could be done to the deceased person and his corpse. While the person can no longer be harmed, his _life_, in a roughly biographical sense, can be damaged. Humans highly value life in this sense, often more than biological life. Respect for this sense of life also informs appropriate treatment of particular human corpses, which already have special value beyond mere resource. I will argue that conscription proponents fail to appropriately value lives and human corpses. This failure can lead to multiple wrongs, among them a wrongful exploitation of the vulnerability of a person’s life and corpse and a disrespect of persons. While it is possible that some biographical lives could be made better, or at least less bad, by conscription, the judgments such decisions would require make conscription bad policy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XX, Number 2, November 1994, pp. 211-218 Symposium A version of this paper was presented at the symposium on A Progress of Sentiments by Annette C. Baier, held at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Los Angeles, March 1994. Response to My Critics ANNETTE C. BAIER I thank my critics for their generous compliments on what they find good about my book, and (...) thank them even more for their criticisms. Both my critics query the role given to reason, in my version of Hume's version of our nature. If David Owen is right, I downplay Hume's scepticism, in Treatise Book I, about what we can expect of what he there calls our reason, and, if Rachel Cohon is right, I downplay Hume's scepticism in Books II and III about the role of reason in our passionate and active lives. Cohon even charges that my Hume is barely distinguishable from Samuel Clarke. Grave charges! In response, I want first to concede that in A Progress of Sentiments I should have given more space to the section "Of scepticism with regard to reason" than I did, and that, even though I did not purport to more than touch on Hume's attitude to other philosophers, I should have more explicitly acknowledged the background role of Clarke as Hume's target, throughout the Treatise, and given more emphasis to Hume's anti-religious aims, which I mention from time to time, but do not dwell on. I could also have given more prominence to Hume's treatment of liberty and necessity, and have said a bit more about Hume's section, "Morality not based on reason." As Rachel Cohon says, I dismiss what, for some, is the distinctively Humean claim that morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions as largely an ad hominem move against rationalists who expect their pronouncements about eternal fitnesses, or divine commands, to produce or prevent actions, possibly by exciting fear of divine punishment. The Humean moral sentiment, I claimed, is not an Annette C. Baier is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260 USA. 212 Annette C. Baier especially motivating passion, although it does normally produce good will towards those whose character traits it approves, and some dislike of those whose character traits are disapproved. So it may excite some self-dislike, when it is our own character that we find distasteful, or produce some pride, if we pass muster. Hume writes: "There may perhaps, be some, who being accustom 'd to the style of the schools and pulpit, and having never consider'd human nature in any other light than that in which they place it, may here be surpriz'd to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look on as a vice..." (T 297). So Humean morals does often excite passions. But pride and humility, Hume claims, are "compleat in themselves," not "attended with any desire" (T 367), so are not directly motivating passions. And even the love and hatred that are felt towards fellow persons for their virtues and vices may, as motivating influences on the will, have to compete with other loves, such as esteem for the rich and powerful. Hume is a realistic and often rather cynical moralist, and has no easy story about how the moral sentiment can produce the virtues of which it approves. Still, there is some active power in the moral sentiment. It is an impression, namely a sentiment or "peculiar pleasure," not an idea, and so not a belief. In my book I first contrasted Humean sentiments with beliefs in Chapter 1, discussing the conclusion of Book I, and then continued to discuss passions in Chapter 2, on association. There it is said plainly enough that, for Hume, it is pleasure and pain on which most of our passions are founded. (He exempts some instinctive desires.) His own decision to continue with his philosophical journey, after the near shipwreck of Part 4 of Book I, is based, he claims, on the fact that he would be the loser in point of pleasure if he inhibited his philosophical impulses. But... (shrink)

Over 1000 companies have either curtailed or else completely ceased operations in Russia as a response to its invasion of Ukraine, a mass corporate exodus of a speed and scale which we’ve never seen. While corporate withdrawal appears to have considerable public support, it’s not obvious that it has done anything to hamper the Russian war effort, nor is it clear what the long-run effects of corporate withdrawal as a regularised response to war might be. Given this, it’s important the (...) evaluate the ethical merits of such a response. In this paper I critique what I take to be the two most common arguments given in favour of voluntary corporate withdrawal, which I label ‘the instrumental argument’ and ‘the clean hands argument’ respectively. After illustrating their shortcomings, I reframe corporations’ predicament as a ‘spattered hands’ case—one where they may do good by remaining in a war-waging state, but where they contribute indirectly to grave wrongdoing by doing so. Drawing on ideas from the ‘Business for Peace’ and ‘Business and Human Rights’ literature, I highlight the potentially positive role of corporate presence within war-waging countries, before highlighting four considerations which corporations ought to bear in mind when determining whether to withdraw, or whether it is the lesser evil to stay and to let their hands be spattered. (shrink)

In __Unearthed: The Economic Roots of Our Environmental Crisis_, _Kenneth M. Sayre argues that the only way to resolve our current environmental crisis is to reduce our energy consumption to a level where the entropy produced by that consumption no longer exceeds the biosphere’s ability to dispose of it. Tangible illustrations of this entropy buildup include global warming, ozone depletion, loss of species diversity, and unmanageable amounts of nonbiodegradable waste._ Degradation of the biosphere is tied directly to human energy use, (...) which has been increasing exponentially since the Industrial Revolution. Energy use, in turn, is directly correlated with economic production. Sayre shows how these three factors are invariably bound together. The unavoidable conclusion is that the only way to resolve our environmental crisis is to reverse the present pattern of growth in the world economy. Economic growth is motivated by social values. Key among them are the desire for wealth and consumer values including gratification, convenience, and acquisition of goods. Sayre maintains that economic growth can be reversed only by eliminating these social values in favor of others more conducive to environmental health. Eliminating these values will involve major changes in lifestyle within industrial societies generally. Only with such changes in lifestyle, he argues, does human society as we know it have a chance of survival. Clearly written and thoroughly documented, this book provides a comprehensive overview of our complex environmental predicament. "With unerring logic and science, Kenneth Sayre dissects the origins of the ecological crisis and points to the necessary recalibration of industrial societies with the laws of thermodynamics and ecology. It is a radical book in that he gets to the heart of what ails us, and it charts a course toward a future grounded in authentic hope." — David W. Orr, Oberlin College__ “Sayre’s assessment forces all seeking a sustainable future to reexamine the preeminence accorded to clean energy. _ Unearthed __uniquely combines thermodynamics and ethics to challenge and broaden readers’ understandings of the systemic issues we face. Assembled and presented with piercing clarity, __Unearthed __constructs a brilliant framework for making sense of our quiet, but growing crises.” —_Felipe Witchger, IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates__ “Kenneth M. Sayre’s _ Unearthed: The Economic Roots of Our Environmental Crisis__ constitutes a major and significant contribution to our understanding of the grave ecological crisis facing humanity. It covers the complete picture, from the basic physical causes of the destruction of our environment to the sociological or anthropological forces that condition our self-destructive actions. The work not only is a brilliant and mind-sweeping piece of diagnosis and prognosis, but it goes all the way to point towards possible solutions.” —_Fernando del Río Haza, Laboratorio de Termodinámica, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Iztapalapa, Mexico_. (shrink)

This book gives an account of work that I have done over a period of decades that sets out to solve two fundamental problems of philosophy: the mind-body problem and the problem of induction. Remarkably, these revolutionary contributions to philosophy turn out to have dramatic implications for a wide range of issues outside philosophy itself, most notably for the capacity of humanity to resolve current grave global problems and make progress towards a better, wiser world. A key element of (...) the proposed solution to the first problem is that physics is about only a highly specialized aspect of all that there is – the causally efficacious aspect. Once this is understood, it ceases to be a mystery that natural science says nothing about the experiential aspect of reality, the colours we perceive, the inner experiences we are aware of. That natural science is silent about the experiential aspect of reality is no reason whatsoever to hold that the experiential does not objectively exist. A key element of the proposed solution to the second problem is that physics, in persistently accepting unified theories only, thereby makes a substantial metaphysical assumption about the universe: it is such that a unified pattern of physical law runs through all phenomena. We need a new conception, and kind, of physics that acknowledges, and actively seeks to improve, metaphysical presuppositions inherent in the methods of physics. The problematic aims and methods of physics need to be improved as physics proceeds. These are the ideas that have fruitful implications, I set out to show, for a wide range of issues: for philosophy itself, for physics, for natural science more generally, for the social sciences, for education, for the academic enterprise as a whole and, most important of all, for the capacity of humanity to learn how to solve the grave global problems that menace our future, and thus make progress to a better, wiser world. It is not just science that has problematic aims; in life too our aims, whether personal, social or institutional, are all too often profoundly problematic, and in urgent need of improvement. We need a new kind of academic enterprise which helps humanity put aims-and-methods improving meta-methods into practice in personal and social life, so that we may come to do better at achieving what is of value in life, and make progress towards a saner, wiser world. This body of work of mine has met with critical acclaim. Despite that, astonishingly, it has been ignored by mainstream philosophy. In the book I discuss the recent work of over 100 philosophers on the mind-body problem and the metaphysics of science, and show that my earlier, highly relevant work on these issues is universally ignored, the quality of subsequent work suffering as a result. My hope, in publishing this book, is that my fellow philosophers will come to appreciate the intellectual value of my proposed solutions to the mind-body problem and the problem of induction, and will, as a result, join with me in attempting to convince our fellow academics that we need to bring about an intellectual/institutional revolution in academic inquiry so that it takes up its proper task of helping humanity learn how to solve problems of living, including global problems, and make progress towards as good, as wise and enlightened a world as possible. (shrink)

‘Death is bad for those who die, but good for the undertakers and the grave-diggers’. And for archaeologists and for epigraphers as well, even though epitaphs, and especially simple or formulaic ones, are probably the most understudied and unloved area of ancient epigraphy. Yet the mere fact of an inscribed epitaph indicates deliberate and intentionally enduring commemoration, and therefore embodies a social attitude; epitaphs thus constitute a matter of historical importance that can be studied for the very reason that (...) so many—in Athens over 10,000—survive. Most Athenian epitaphs which have been found have been dated, and for approximately two-thirds of them a general find-spot has been recorded. Temporal and spatial variations within the distribution of Athenian epitaphs prompt not only the question of why aspects of this habit should change over time, but why the habit of epitaphs should exist at all; the answer suggested here links the function and distribution of Athenian epitaphs to changing concepts of Athenian citizenship. For epitaphs function as more than testimonials to grief: they represent what survivors saw as defining the deceased, and the significantly greater number of epitaphs in fourth-century Athens derives from Athenians' emphatic definition of themselves as citizens at that time. Finally, the Athenians's use of tombstones has no parallel in the classical Greek world, for the Athenians' developing perceptions of their own city and of their own special relationship, as citizens, to it, were also unparalleled. (shrink)

Jar Jar Binks might be the most hated individual in the Star Wars universe. He should feel a great deal of guilt over his actions in the Senate, though well meaning, because they caused so much strife. This chapter considers how Darth Vader would reflect on his own actions: it is unlikely that he feels particularly good about inadvertently provoking Leia's confession of love. The chapter now talks about Immanuel Kant. Kant's ethics are focused on intentions, the reasons why people (...) choose to act as they do. Jar Jar was, like most of the Senate, a victim of Palpatine's deceptions. The author highlights that it is fair to say that Jar Jar did not make the choice to grant Palpatine emergency powers because he could not do otherwise. So, even though the consequences were grave, and Jar Jar's decision hasty, he can be absolved for what he did. (shrink)

We explore our role as researchers and witnesses in the context of an emerging partnership with the Penelakut Tribe, the aim of which is to locate the unmarked graves of children who died while attending the notorious Kuper Island Indian Residential School on their territory (southwest British Columbia). This relationship is in the process of taking shape, so we focus on understanding conditions for developing trust, and the interactional expertise necessary to work well together, with a good heart. We suggest (...) that, in some respects, this may be usefully understood as a practice of witnessing on several dimensions. (shrink)

Reasons have recently occupied the centre of the theory of value. Some writers, such as Tim Scanlonthink that they are not only central, but exhaust the topic, since everything important that we want to say about the good or the valuable, or the obligatory and the required, can be phrased in terms of reason. An action is good to perform if the reasons in favour of performing it are stronger than those in favour of doing anything else or doing nothing. (...) An action is the right thing to do, or ought to be performed, if the reasons for doing it are so strong that it would be unreasonable to do anything else. In this kind of way, reasons can occupy the whole territory of ethics. Furthermore, if people who choose badly are choosing against reason, then this might seem to be a special and grave defect. It would locate the kind of fault they are indulging. It would give us, the people of reason, a special lever with which to dislodge their vices. For reason seems to have a peculiar compulsion about it. It is sometimes tempting to be bad, but surely not tempting to be irrational or unreasonable. Being able to corral knaves and villains in a compound reserved for those who trespass against reason and rationality may therefore represent definite progress. Reasons have another feature that attracts many contemporary theorists. They are just there, anyway. They exist whether or not agents take any notice of them. They do not only exist in the light of mere desires or mere inclinations. They are ‘external’ not ‘internal’. They bear on us, even when through ignorance or wickedness we take no notice of them. They thus very conspicuously shine the lights of objectivity, and independence, and even necessity. By basking in this light, ethics is rescued from the slough of sentiment and preference, and regains the dignity denied to it by theorists such as Hobbes or Hume, Gibbard or myself. Whole books have therefore been written stressing the external nature of reasons. These lines of thought contain less than meets the eye, however, if talk of reason just turns out to be another idiom for talking about the good and the right.. (shrink)

Business ethics seeks to apply diverse ideas about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, the ‘good life’ and the ‘good society’ to the decisions, attitudes and behaviour of people and institutions in profit-making business, and it does so in order to understand or evaluate, and to improve. In the broad sense, this has been a millennial activity, coterminous with the very existence of ‘business’ , and it has gone on under diverse rubrics including those of social ethics, social thought, political economy or economic (...) ethics, and within the disciplines of history, literature, sociology and politics. In the 20th century, and especially since the 1960s, a narrower-gauge subject has employed ‘business ethics’ as its explicit title.This has developed its own literature, journals and courses, academics, experts, networks and promoting bodies, usually within business schools or management studies, and with a markedly pedagogic or even ‘missionary’ tone. It is this more explicit, institutionalized and in a sense more ‘proprietary’ stream of ‘business ethics’ that I intend to criticize in this paper. Let us call it ‘conventional business ethics’ . I believe that this subject makes unwarranted claims for itself, while remaining somewhat insular and neglecting fundamental issues vital to ‘business ethics’ in the wider sense, and that it badly needs reconstruction.My criticisms are threefold and partly interrelated. They apply in varying degrees to all the current approaches, whether substantive or procedural in emphasis, whether related to utilitarian, deontological or other traditions in ethics, whether structured around social values, policy areas, management functions or stakeholder groups, and whether ‘problem-solving’ or more wisdom encouraging or ‘philosophical’. My first charge is of a-historicity. Far from ‘currentism’ assisting realism, it shortchanges proper empirical understanding of business persons, firms, sectors and decisions. My second charge is of a weak approach to the methods of ‘improvement’; a narrow view of the dynamics of desirable change. My third charge relates to a grave neglect of socio-political issues of mainly collective business influence. At issue here is a problem of micro market entrapment. Some of the most central ethical problems of business behaviour and belief are thereby bypassed, those relating to overall business roles, power and resources. (shrink)

There can be no doubt that the public face of contemporary philosophy is the professional who goes by the name of “bioethicist.” Since the bioethics industry—which is what it is—sprang up in the 1970s, large numbers of professional philosophers have found it a congenial and remunerative way in which to make a reputation for themselves. A few general observations can be made about bioethicists. Some of them are well-meaning. For example, they are dedicated to the laudable notion that philosophy should (...) be heard in the public square and have an influence on the making of policy. Or they believe, rightly, that the bioethical problems of our day are of such grave moment that philosophers should try to grapple with them, at least, and provide solutions if possible. It is not only that the welfare of society depends on such solutions, but that if philosophers, who are supposed to be trained in rigorous thinking, do not do the hard conceptual work that needs to be done, the void will be filled by the looser and fuzzier moral thinking of others—especially lawyers, politicians, and economists. Some are simply committed to the idea, again admirable, that bioethics is a serious intellectual discipline that demands equally serious analytical application. Some find bioethics just interesting and worthy of philosophical pursuit in its own right. Again, this is true. On the other hand, it is all too evident that very many, perhaps the majority, of bioethicists are, to put it frankly, less than competent. I believe that this is a view a good number of philosophers share. The bioethics industry is, unfortunately, populated by many individuals whom one might even call second-rate philosophers. They have found themselves unable to grapple with the more technical or abstract areas of philosophy—or at least to make a name for themselves in such areas—but have found that it is relatively easy to forge a name for oneself in the bioethics business. For one, there is an insatiable demand by the media for comment upon the latest developments in biotechnology, medicine, genetics, and so on, or for comment upon someone else’s comment upon such developments.. (shrink)

Nothing survives deconstruction unless we accept that survival in some sense attaches to the ghostly or etiolated figures (the marks and traces) of things, by which deconstruction proceeds. If the ghostly figure survives then it may be because it is undeconstructible. Yet the spectral figure would no doubt remain insignificant if it was not for the force it brings to bear on more central and familiar categories of philosophical and literary discourse. These categories, like style, friendship, justice and hospitality, tend (...) to occupy those spectral spaces that mark the structural difference between philosophy (conceptual, abstract, universal) and literature (figurative, concrete, singular). Yet nothing defines such spaces so well as the trace and its paradoxical structure. And nothing describes the structure of the trace so well as that of the signature. This paper identifies the movement of the trace as occupying and to a great extent defining the difference between philosophy and literature. The example, in this case, is the appearance of asphodels in Homer's Odyssey, according to which the fields where ghosts live are thick with the so-called grave-flower. But the asphodel on closer examination breaks down into mere traces of itself in a series of insoluble philological problems. The larger implications have to do with death, the signature of the writer, the relation between philosophy and literature and their respective modes of survival. There is no philosophy (no truth, no good, no chance) without its attachment to the etiolated figure, the trace of itself. The paper proposes readings of Blanchot, Derrida, Hegel and Plato, in addition to a focus on the main philological problem in Homer and its implications for a tradition of literary allusion, as a way of establishing the consistency of the paradoxical structure of the signature. (shrink)

As a form of da’wah, the grave pilgrimage has didactic function. Some didactic values contained in the pilgrimage of the grave are the exemplary to the charismatic figures, the transformation of remembering death as a spirit of the good deed, the building of social capital, the medium of gratitude, and of order and obedience. One of the challenges faced in Indonesian education is the rampant violence done by students and parents to teachers. This problem can not be solved (...) only through the application of the concept of humanistic education. Therefore, the author offers the concept of humanistic religious education. This concept contains the use of some didactic values of the grave pilgrimage to complement the weaknesses of the concept of humanistic education. The use of didactic value is motivated by the reason that the grave pilgrimage is the religious practice that is easily accessible to the public from all social classes, except for those who reject it. Some of the companion values of the concept of humanistic education are the sacralization of the function of the teacher, the transformation of remembering death for charity and commitment to order and obedience. The sacralization of teachers is necessary to awaken parents and students that violence to teachers can lead to quality for perpetrators of violence. The concept of charity should be maintained in education to encourage the awareness of parents and students to not only need to respect the teacher during the learning process, but also to continue after the student completes his education. Commitment to obeying the order is necessary so that the parents and the student do not resort to violence to the teacher when the teacher carries out his disciplinary duties. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 25 (2005) 49-65 [Access article in PDF] The Three Minds and Faith, Hope, and Love in Pure Land Buddhism Sharon Baker Southern Methodist University,Messiah College Generally, the Buddhist path to nirvana calls a person to leave the mundane life and live as a monk, a sage, or a saint who continually works toward the pure state, toward nirvana. The way to Buddhahood can take the practitioner through (...) the process of death and rebirth for many centuries until he attains enlightenment and nirvana. Hence, Pure Land Buddhism is good news to those forced by karma to live mundane lives keeping house, working a trade, raising children. In other words, Pure Land Buddhism is good news for the common person. Pure Land Buddhism, especially in the thought of Shinran and Tanabe, seeks to provide a straight and easy way for the "small, foolish beings," for the greatest of sinners and those who are most evil. Even the most evil person possessed by blind passions is grasped by the great compassion of Amida Buddha. This great compassion, as revealed in Amida's Vow, knows no limits. Even a person's karmic evil, deep and heavy as it is, is not oppressive for the one who is embraced by the love of Amida Buddha—love that never tires, blessing that constantly protects, compassion that never abandons. The love and compassion of Amida Buddha are realized through his Vow of Great Compassion. Shinran states that "the joy of knowing the wonder and benevolence of the Vow of great compassion that Amida established for us, beings of karmic evil, is boundless and can never be fully expressed, for it surpasses all thought and all words."1 The Vow of Great Compassion The Vow of Great Compassion does not take into consideration whether or not one is good or evil, young or old; only faith matters. Indeed, through faith, the Vow saves all sentient beings, especially those burdened with powerful sins and those torn by great evils. Believing in the Vow, therefore, does not depend upon any other good—no matter how hard he tries, no human being can ever be good enough for salvation without belief in the Vow of Great Compassion.2In an attempt to discover a salvation by faith not generated by an act of human will, Shinran is drawn to the three spiritual attitudes described in the Eighteenth Vow, which states: "If, when I attain Buddhahood, the sentient beings of the ten [End Page 49] quarters with sincere mind entrusting themselves, aspiring to be born in my land, and saying my Name even ten times, should not be born there, may I not attain the supreme enlightenment. Excluded are those who commit the five grave offenses and those who slander the right dharma."3 This is the Vow upon which true shinjin4 is based—the Vow of sincere mind and trust. Those who practice the Vow include all the good, the evil, and the foolish, who, after realizing shinjin, are certain of attaining salvation—that is, enlightenment in the Pure Land. Shinran states that "this shinjin is the very cause for the attainment of the supreme enlightenment."5 Birth in the Pure Land, along with supreme enlightenment, is assured for those who have been given true shinjin. Amida and the countless Buddhas in the ten quarters watch over believers and protect them so that they cannot be led astray into strange teachings or tormented by demonic forces. In fact, "Shinran might have said in the modern situation that just as assuredly as the sun rises in the morning, our enlightenment is guaranteed by the Vow."6It is important to note that faith in the Vow of Great Compassion is brought about only by the power and compassion of Amida Buddha. By using various compassionate means, Amida Buddha (and even Sakyamuni) awakens the supreme shinjin in people. Amida and Sakyamuni grasp the person in whom they have awakened shinjin and they never abandon him. There is no calculation on the part of the person whatsoever; there is only... (shrink)

Generally speaking, just war theory (JWT) holds that there are two just causes for war: self-defence and ‘other-defence’. The most common type of the latter is popularly known as ‘humanitarian intervention’. There is debate, however, as to whether these can serve as just causes for preventive war. Those who subscribe to JWT tend to be unified in treating so-called preventive war with a high degree of suspicion on the grounds that it fails to satisfy conventional criteria for jus ad bello; (...) – particularly the just cause and last resort criteria. Francisco di Vitoria held that the only just cause for war was ‘a wrong received’, which renders impossible any justification for preventive war. There are assumptions implicit in recent military practice, however – most notably, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 – that challenge this ban on preventive war. Interestingly, both supporters and critics attempt to justify their views through the broader logic of JWT; viz., through a conception of what is good for both political communities and individuals, and through a legitimate defence of these goods. Supporters point to situations where so-called rogue states represent ‘grave and imminent risk’ of committing acts of aggression as grounds that justify preventive war; critics argue that to attack another political community on the basis of crimes not yet committed is a breach of the very rights JWT was created to defend. The advocate of preventive war does not appreciate important aspects concerning the morality of war. In the ongoing tension between Iran and The United States and her allies – if the rhetoric is to be believed – I am asked to tolerate a threat to my security and liberty, and to risk suffering aggression in defence of the rights of the antagonistic, but not yet aggressive, state. The crucial question is how such tolerance and risk fit in with the logic of just war: at what point, if any, does the risk of being attacked become great enough to justify declaring war in anticipation? In this paper I highlight some of the theoretical and practical difficulties in determining what counts as a grave and imminent threat, focusing especially on the complicated case of ‘imminence’ in the face of so-called ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Secondly, I will argue that not only is the notion of preventive war inconsistent with the defence of the rights of political communities that JWT requires; it is also forbidden by the proportionality requirement of jus ad bellum. A risk of being subjected to aggression is the price for global peace. Whilst political communities can do much to prevent aggression and prepare themselves in case it occurs, the conditions for just war require that this prevention and preparation stop short of declaring war. We must live with a certain degree of risk in this area. (shrink)

EVER SINCE PLOTINUS SOUGHT CLARITY in the notion of privation to dispel our human perplexity about evil, philosophers have debated whether this concept is adequate to the task. The intensity and scope of evil in the twentieth century—which has seen the horrors of world war and genocide—have added fuel to the debate. Can the idea of a falling away from the good, however refined, come anywhere close to capturing the calculation, the commitment, the energy, and the drive that underlie the (...) most virulent projects in malfeasance? While the privation account might appear a reasonable strategy for explaining passive wrongdoing—indifference to people in grave need, or cooperation with injustice—the more active and dynamic forms of evil would nevertheless seem to elude its conceptual net. (shrink)