SummaryIn the Social Contract, Rousseau predicted that Europe would experience a cycle of increasingly intense wars, culminating in invasion from the east: first, Russia would conquer Europe's exhausted and war-torn states; then, Russia would itself become overextended and Europe would ultimately be overrun by the Tartars. The future of the modern state would be a version of the fall of Rome. The present essay provides an explanation of why Rousseau held such apocalyptic views by placing them in the context of (...) projects to reform Europe's political economy in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War. In 1767, when Catherine the Great was planning a major revision of the Russian legal code, she outlined her goals in a manifesto called the Grand Instruction, key sections of which were derived from Montesquieu's analysis of depopulation of the countryside caused by uncontrolled industrialisation. The Grand Instruction became the subject of a critical exchange between the Physiocrat Le Trosne and Diderot, who, drawing upon Rousseau, was by turns both sympathetic to and sceptical of Physiocracy. This discourse reveals a triangular debate about the possibility of stabilising the international order by imposing a balance between the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of Europe's rapidly growing economies. (shrink)

We humans tend to believe that things are only real in as much as we perceive them, an idea reinforced by modern philosophy, which privileges us as special, radically different in kind from all other objects. But as Graham Harman, one of the theory's leading exponents, shows, Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) rejects the idea of human specialness: the world, he states, is clearly not the world as manifest to humans. "To think a reality beyond our thinking is not nonsense, but (...) obligatory." At OOO's heart is the idea that objects--whether real, fictional, natural, artificial, human, or non-human--are mutually autonomous. This core idea has significance for nearly every field of inquiry which is concerned in some way with the systematic interaction of objects, and the degree to which individual objects resist full participation in such systems. In this brilliant new introduction, Graham Harman lays out OOO's history, ideas, and impact, taking in art and literature, politics and natural science along the way. From Sherlock Holmes, unicorns, and videogames to Dadaism, Voltaire, and string theory, this book will change the way you understand everything. (shrink)

This paper is a excursus into a philosophy of science for deployment in the study of sport. It argues for the virtues of Thomas Kuhn's account of the philosophy of science, an argument conducted strategically by contrasting that account with one derived from views of Karl Popper. In particular, it stresses, first, that Kuhn's views have been widely misunderstood; second, that a rectified Kuhnianism can give due weight to truth in science, while recognising that social sciences differ in crucial ways (...) from natural sciences. For, as Kuhn recognised, social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences. Yet there Kuhn's jargon, and especially misguided talk of ?paradigms?, is almost ubiquitous. These thoughts have relevance for three groups. First, as both sports scientists and exercise scientists come to grips with the claims to scientificity of their work, they will need increasingly to locate it within an epistemological framework provided by philosophy of science. So they must begin to take Kuhn's view seriously. Second, social scientists of sport ? faced with the predominant scientism of colleagues in sport and exercise science ? must also recognise alternatives to a postmodernist rejection of the concept of truth, where Kuhn's picture of natural science clarifies one such. Finally, philosophers writing on sport must not let antipathy to scientism close off the options they present or the terms in which they (we!) present them. And that may require debate among ourselves on abstract issues not immediately connected with sport. (shrink)

In this study, Daniel W. Graham addresses two major problems in interpreting Aristotle. First, should we reconcile the apparent inconsistencies of the corpus by assuming an underlying unity of doctrine, or by positing a sequence of developing ideas? Secondly,what is the relation between the so-called logical works on the one hand and the physical-metaphysical treatises on the other? Although the problems appear to be unrelated, Graham finds that the key to the first lies in the second, and in (...) doing so provides the first major alternative to theunitarian approach since Jaeger's pioneering developmental study of 1923. (shrink)

The core of the truthmaker research program is that true propositions are made true by appropriate parts of the actual world. This idea seems to give realists their best shot at capturing a robust account of the dependence of truth on the world. For a part of the world to be a truthmaker for a particular it must suffice for, or necessitate, the truth of the proposition. There are two extreme and unsatisfactory truthmaker theories. At one extreme any part of (...) the world (up to and including the whole world) that suffices for a proposition is deemed to be a truthmaker for that proposition. At the other extreme there is only one truthmaker that can do the job, and that is the entire world, the whole show. Another possibility suggests itself, that a truthmaker be any minimal sufficer for a proposition. A truthmaker is minimal if it suffices but no proper part of it suffices. A minimal sufficer would be both sufficient for the truth of the proposition and, in one sense, necessary for it as well. A minimal sufficers would be commensurate with the proposition it makes true. Unfortunately not all propositions have minimal sufficers. But it does not follow that not every proposition has a commensurate sufficer. The problem, then, is to specify a coherent notion of commensurateness on which every truth has a commensurate sufficer. I argue that this problem may not be soluble. (shrink)

This chapter presents a promising way of defending the determination of value by nature, while resisting reduction. Recent developments in both property theory and value theory help clarify a thesis about the relation between irreducibility and multiple realizability which has not been as clearly articulated as it can be. This in turn will help to establish and illustrate the possibility of supervenience without reduction.

It is truism that accuracy is valued. Some deem accuracy to be among the most fundamental values, perhaps the preeminent value, of inquiry. Because of this, accuracy has been the focus of two different, important programs in epistemology. The truthlikeness program pursued the notion of propositional accuracy—an ordering of propositions by closeness to the objective truth of some matter. The epistemic utility program pursued the notion of credal state accuracy—an ordering of credal states by closeness to the ideal credal state. (...) It may be tempting to think that each question that informs an inquiry must be  determinate of necessity. That is to say, there must be one correct, precise answer to it. That precise, correct answer is not only the maximally accurate answer to the question, but it also singles out the ideal credal state that is the epistemic target of the inquiry. An enormous amount of the effort has been focused on accuracy with respect to necessarily determinate questions. But often the focus of an inquiry is a question that is not necessarily determinate. Those who deem accuracy to be cognitively valuable, and fundamentally so, need an account of accuracy for indeterminate questions. Ideally such an account would cover both propositional accuracy and credal state accuracy. This is a tall order, and it is not clear that the order can be filled. (shrink)

The stated goal of Donna Haraway's “Cyborg feminism” is to liberate sensuality from violence. In examining her book alongside that of Jesuit Toletus it becomes clear that both argue that sensuality is a place of metaphysical violence. The first two sections of the essay demonstrate this, and, in addition that Toletus' commentary on Aquinas is hardly accurate. This fact will help justify the claim that the Jesuit tradition includes a rather particular theory of sensuality, the origin of which is perhaps (...) Giles of Rome. A third section shows how the Jesuit Gaston Fessard rediscovered Aquinas' own theory of sensuality through a thoroughgoing critique of Hegelian and Marxist dialectic. The essay concludes that Haraway would do well to adopt Aquinas' non‐violent theory of sensuality as her own. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper I begin to theorize what secondary school music education might look like “post-deconstruction.” In particular, I explore the argument for a reconsideration of the importance of conceptualization in the process of music education. I argue that is it through coming into contact with powerful conceptual knowledge that students’ potential to participate fully as capable musicians in their world is most likely to be realized. Conceptual knowledge provides the link between experience and the understanding of that experience. The (...) great paradox of postmodernism is that in opening up some possibilities we have subsequently closed others down. There is a danger that in placing the knower rather than knowledge at the center of our educational endeavors, we have reduced access to something extremely important: the dimensions of knowledge that hold the power for students to move beyond their experiences, to imagine, and conceptualize a different world. (shrink)