Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive (...) access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point. (shrink)

Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology.

In this paper I propose to read and understand gestures as logical tools within a synthetic paradigm of knowledge. This interpretation of gesture is drawn from a new pragmatist reading of reasoning in general, and synthetic reasoning in particular. Complete gestures are actions with a beginning and an end that bear a meaning. It is our regular way to embody vague ideas into singular actions with general meaning. The tool is forged by a dense blending of icons, indices, and symbols (...) and by a complexity of phenomenological characteristics as feelings, actual actions, general concepts and habits. The paper illustrates this new way to look at gestures and different kinds of complete and incomplete gestures. (shrink)

In this study, we use temporally aligned word embeddings and a large diachronic corpus of English to quantify language change in a data-driven, scalable way, which is grounded in language use. We show a unique and reliable relation between measures of language change and age of acquisition (AoA) while controlling for frequency, contextual diversity, concreteness, length, dominant part of speech, orthographic neighborhood density, and diachronic frequency variation. We analyze measures of language change tackling both the change in lexical representations and (...) the change in the relation between lexical representations and the words with the most similar usage patterns, showing that they capture different aspects of language change. Our results show a unique relation between language change and AoA, which is stronger when considering neighborhood-level measures of language change: Words with more coherent diachronic usage patterns tend to be acquired earlier. The results support theories positing a link between ontogenetic and ethnogenetic processes in language. (shrink)

The problem of self-knowledge has been thoroughly discussed in the context of traditional epistemology. In parallel to the traditional approach to epistemology, Radically Embodied Cognitive Science (RECS) has emerged in the last 30 years as a genuine contender in its field. According to RECS, the unity of analysis of cognitive processes is the dynamics between brain, body and environment. In this paper, I advance a RECS approach to self-knowledge, which immediately suggests that knowing oneself is a matter of knowing what (...) one’s body can do. I then turn to resistance training, particularly weightlifting, and argue that it offers a paradigmatic case of self-knowledge in RECS’s terms. More precisely, resistance training allows the trainee to achieve knowledge of themselves in a fundamentally practical manner—and doing so is transformative of the kind of actions they are capable of. (shrink)

David Harvey : On peut difficilement imaginer vérification plus spectaculaire de ce que tu prédis depuis très longtemps dans tes théories que l’actuelle crise du système financier mondial. Y a-t-il des aspects de la crise qui t’ont surpris? Giovanni Arrighi : Ma prédiction était très simple. Dans The Long Twentieth Century, je qualifiais de crise annonciatrice d’un régime d’accumulation le début de la financiarisation et je faisais remarquer qu’après un certain temps – en général environ un demi-siècle – la (...) crise terminale suivait. L’hypothèse fondamentale est que toutes ces expansions financières ne pouvaient pas tenir parce qu’elles amenaient à la spéculation plus de capital qu’il n’était possible d’en gérer – en d’autres termes, ces expansions financières avaient tendance à créer des bulles de différentes sortes. Je prévoyais que cette expansion financière mènerait à une crise terminale parce que, aujourd’hui comme dans le passé, les bulles ne peuvent pas tenir. (shrink)

Some real life processes, including molecular ones, are context-sensitive, in the sense that their outcome depends on side conditions that are most of the times difficult, or impossible, to express fully in advance. In this paper, we survey and discuss a logical account of context-sensitiveness in molecular processes, based on a kind of non-classical logic. This account also allows us to revisit the relationship between logic and philosophy of science (and philosophy of biology, in particular).

The field of psychiatry has long struggled with developing models of practice; most underemphasize the interpersonal aspects of clinical practice. This essay is unique in putting intersubjectivity front and centre. It is an attempt to provide a clinical method to re-establish the fragile dialogue of the soul with oneself and with others.

This work addresses biological explanations and aims to provide a philosophical account which brings together logical-procedural and historical-processual aspects when considering molecular pathways. It is argued that, having molecular features as explananda, a particular non-classical logical language – Zsyntax – can be used to formally represent, in terms of logical theorems, types of molecular processes, and to grasp how we get from one molecular interaction to another, hence explaining why a given outcome occurs. Expressing types of molecular biology processes in (...) terms of the Zsyntax language allows us to represent causal interactions by taking into account their context-sensitivity, and amounts to partly reviving the spirit of the so-called received view of explanation – which aimed to capture scientific explanatory accounts in terms of their logical structure and their appealing to nomological relations. Such a partial revival is pursued by invoking here non-classical deductions and empirical generalisations, which are called to provide the epistemic norms to explain the behavior of molecular pathways. (shrink)

It is difficult to devise a new approach to any topic in Peirce scholarship, and it is also difficult to convincingly bring one to life. Tullio Viola's book, Peirce on the Uses of History, elegantly accomplishes this second trick, making it well worth reading. Viola is one of the many representatives of a new generation of Italian Peirce scholars who are connecting a solid philological and historical work about Peirce's writings with a vivid theoretical depth. Similar works by Chiara Ambrosio, (...) Francesco Bellucci, Maria Regina Brioschi, Claudia Cristalli, Gabriele Gava, Maria Luisi, and Marco Stango on various aspects of Peirce's thought testify to the vitality of studies inspired by this profound... (shrink)

This article presents Simondon’s psycho-biological thinking as a type of heterodox naturalism centring on the self-organizing activity of vital forms. Despite his critique of classic notions of form, notably Aristotelian hylomorphism, Simondon revises this concept through a critical expansion and synthesis of information theory and Gestalt psychology. In his lecture series Imagination and Invention (1965–6) in particular, he develops an account of psycho-biological activity as governed by what he calls ‘images’: relatively autonomous informational sub-systems that serve to regulate the relationship (...) between organism and environment and that constitute the condition for creative action or invention. Focusing on his analysis of the individualization of perceptual objects, the article goes on to show that ‘forms’ for Simondon feature as emergent properties of quantum thresholds of ‘information’ within these systems. It also argues that such a conception offers a more promising alternative to both idealist philosophies of perception and materialist interpretations of deconstruction. (shrink)

A realidade virtual tem se tornado cada vez mais presente, o que dá origem a novas questões filosóficas: qual a natureza de experiências em realidade virtual? Seriam elas exatamente como percepções usuais, ou elas possuem algum traço que as diferencia? Seriam ilusórias? Nós argumentamos que experiências em realidade virtual não devem ser tratadas como ilusórias, assim como defendido pela maioria dos teóricos contemporâneos, mas sim como alusórias, condicionadas à incorporação do hardware e ao conhecimento prático envolvido no uso da tecnologia. (...) Para tal, abordamos sua associação com ilusões, exploramos como se relacionam com as nossas experiências do cotidiano e apresentamos nossa proposta de que podem ser compreendidas como alusórias. Em seguida mostramos que seu caráter alusório não as torna indistinguíveis de experiências não-virtuais, uma vez que os limites biológicos e sensório-motores da cognição fornecem o limiar de diferenciação, mesmo nos casos de realidade aumentada. Além disso, exploramos o surgimento da tecnologia de realidade aumentada e discutimos a possibilidade de substituir sistematicamente a percepção por projeções ilusórias. No entanto, até o momento, não há evidências empíricas que sustentem essa possibilidade. Destacamos a importância da relação entre percepção e ação no ambiente físico e argumentamos que erros pontuais em experiências virtuais não caracterizam seu estado como ilusório. (shrink)

Negli ultimi anni di vita Giovanni Gentile aveva in progetto una Storia della Filosofia che abbracciasse tutta la materia dalle origini ai giorni nostri. La morte tragica nel 1944 non gli permise di portare a compimento l'opera, che si ferma a Platone: ritrovata tra le sue carte, è stata ricostruita e pubblicata postuma. Pur incompleta, rappresenta un'accurata panoramica del pensiero greco antico, a partire dai filosofi naturalisti fino ai presocratici e ai capisaldi Socrate e Platone, tramite una scrittura appassionata, (...) al tempo stesso accessibile e ricca di dettagli. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s ideas are a common ground for developers of Natural Language Processing (NLP) systems and linguists working on Language Acquisition and Mastery (LAM) models (Mills 1993; Lowney, Levy, Meroney and Gayler 2020; Skelac and Jandrić 2020). In recent years, we have witnessed a fast development of NLP systems capable of performing tasks as never before. NLP and LAM have been implemented based on deep learning neural networks, which learn concepts representation from rough data, but are nonetheless very effective in tasks (...) such as question answering, textual entailment, and translation (Devlin et al. 2019; Kitaev, Cao and Klein 2019; Wang et al. 2019). In this paper, I will debate some Wittgensteinian concepts that impact the architectures of many NLP deep-learning systems. I will focus, in particular, on the attempt to build a specific kind of architecture to model a private language. The discussion, I think, helps extract philosophical assumptions leading the research and development of AI systems capable of language modelling. In this paper, I will address some of the main features of NLP systems2 used for word embedding and one proposal to manipulate through a neural network a form of private language (Lawney et al. 2020). In §2, I will reconstruct the complex path of the private language argument (PLA). In §3, I will discuss connectivist language models and introduce notions about NPL systems' architecture. An overview of this kind of model is helpful to introduce the work of Lowney, Levy, Meroney and Gayler (2020). They submit that their model can respond to the issues raised by Wittgenstein in the notorious Private Language Argument (PLA). This argument unexpectedly turned out to be relevant not only for the philosophy of language but also for NLP and LAM modellers. I will describe the language game concept in NLP, how it is embedded, and its role in inductive systems development. This central concept in Wittgenstein’s work is relevant to describe the role of context in understanding the meanings of words. In §4, I present the Wittgensteinian main concepts in play in the connectivist paradigm. I argue that the connectionist theoretical framework can better catch the dependency of word meaning on context. There seems to be a correlation between Wittgenstein's invitation to look, an invitation to dismiss the aim of theorizing about languages, and the absence of theory-ladenness in deep learning technologies involved in NLP. In §5, I criticize Lowney and colleagues’ claim, whose model does not successfully capture Wittgenstein’s Beetle in the Box case. Moreover, I argue that even if we can distinguish a strong and a weak definition of a private language, Wittgenstein’s argument also holds for deep-learning models, and his worries are still a good guide for NLP developers. (shrink)

Il percorso di Rosa Calcaterra all’interno della filosofia pragmatista è segnato da un’intuizione principale e originale: nonostante tutte le differenze, il progetto pragmatista è unitario. Gli articoli della raccolta Il progetto comune dei pragmatisti mostrano questa unitarietà, che Calcaterra persegue con tecnica sofisticata, facendo emergere non solo ciò che la parola dice, ma anche ciò che essa tradisce. Prima di immergersi nelle pagine del libro e rivolgere all’autrice alcune domande che...

By foregrounding a first-person perspective, this text enacts and explores self-reflection as a mode of inquiry in educational research and highlights the centrality of the individual researcher in the construction of knowledge. Engaging in particular with the work of Thomas Merton through a dialogical approach to his writings Self and Wisdom in Arts-Based Contemplative Inquiry in Education offers rich examples of personal engagement with text and art to illustrate the pervasive influence of the personal in reflective, narrative, and aesthetic forms (...) of inquiry. Chapters considers methodological and philosophical implications of self-study and contemplative research in educational contexts, and show how dialogic approaches can enrich empirical forms of inquiry, and inform pedagogical practice. In its embrace of a contemplative voice within an academic treatise, the text offers a rich example of arts-based contemplative inquiry. This unique text will be of interest to postgraduate scholars, researchers, and academics working in the fields of educational philosophy, arts-based and qualitative research methodologies, and Merton studies. (shrink)

In Novatian’s De Trinitate there is a passage which, while it makes a reference to an “invidia mortalitatis”, has been to some extent the torment of editors and of translators. On the one hand, the genitive tends mostly to be read as objective, on the other, the text is manipulated at times (even in recent editions) on the basis of a lectio facilior derived from conjecture. The article summarizes the history of criticism relative to the above-mentioned passage, highlighting some of (...) its limits. From there it searches for historical-philological bases of a reading of the passage in which the genitive is understood as subjective. The evidence gathered seems to point to an Origenist source, and that would lean us toward welcoming the invitation, already formulated by Manlio Simonetti, to new research inNovatian and his sources. (shrink)

This essay is unique in putting intersubjectivity front and center. It is an attempt to provide a clinical method to re-establish the fragile dialogue of the soul with oneself and with others. Throughout, the book builds on the assumption that to be human means to be in dialogue. It uses dialogue as a unitary concept to address three essential issues for clinical practice: 'What is a human being?', 'What is mental pathology'?, and 'What is care?'. To be human - it (...) is argued - means to be in dialogue with oneself and with other persons. Thus, mental pathology is the interruption of this dialogue - of the person with the alterity that inhabits them, and with the alterity incarnated in other persons. Therefore, therapy is a dialogue with a method whose aim is to re-enact one's interrupted dialogue with alterity. Lost in Dialogue provides a method to approximate the Other, to understand its experiences, actions, and in general, understand the world in which it lives. (shrink)

According to Reid, color sensations are not extended nor are they arranged in figured patterns. Reid further claimed that ‘there is no sensation appropriated to visible figure.’ Reid justified these controversial claims by appeal to Cheselden's report of the experiences of a young man affected by severe cataracts, and by appeal to cases of perception of visible figure without color. While holding fast to the principle that sensations are not extended, Dugald Stewart tried to show that ‘a variety of colour (...) sensations is a necessary means for the perception of visible figure.’ According to John Fearn, two motives appear to be central to Reid's views about color sensations and extension: his commitment to the Cartesian doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, and his attempt to evade ‘Hume's dilemma’ about the existence and immateriality of the soul. (shrink)

The relationship between philosophy and psychology could be introduced by resuming freely two episodes occurred to the first two recognized exponents of the respective disciplines, Talete and Freud. The fall of Talete in the well and the astonishment of Freud in front of the picture of the Monna Lisa can symbolize the characteristic of surprise, but also of encounter-clash of the philosophy and the psychology with an unexpected reality, reassumed in both with the smile, the smile of the servant Tracia (...) and the smile of the Gioconda: two smiles that show the presence of a greater wealth of the knowledge which they inaugurated. These two smiles can highlight the tasks of instruction and criticism to which philosophy and psychology refer reciprocally: to be aware of the risk of reductivism, the conceit to enclose the complexity of man and life in a banal formula, a risk always existing and fascinating, in order to face the effort of undertaking more complex and multiple ways, open to the mystery of existence. (shrink)