Law and the legal system through which law is effected are very powerful, yet the power of the law has always been limited by the laws of nature, upon which the law has now direct grip. Human law now faces an unprecedented challenge, the emergence of a second limit on its grip, a new “species” of intelligent agents (AI machines) that can perform cognitive tasks that until recently only humans could. What happens, as a matter of law, when another species (...) interacts with us, can be integrated into human minds and bodies, makes “real-world” decisions—not through human proxies, but directly—and does all this “intelligently”, with what one could call autonomous agency or even a “mind” of its own? The article starts from the clear premise that control cannot be exercised directly on AI machines through human law. That control can only be effected through laws that apply to humans. This has several regulatory implications. The article’s first discusses what, in any attempt to regulate AI machines, the law can achieve. Having identified what the law can do, the article then canvases what the law should aim to achieve overall. The article encapsulate its analysis in a list of both doctrinal and normative principles that should underpin any regulation aimed at AI machines. Finally, the article compares three transnational options to implement the proposed regulatory approach. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Virgil Should Have Said KYLE GERVAIS Mortem infelicem canimus famamque perennem Sidoniae praeclara ducis quae sustulit alte moenia—multum illa et furiis iactata et amore saucia, deseruit cum foedera barbarus hospes, vique deum quassa et fratris, dum conderet ensem fatiferum profugi sub pectore et iret ad umbras, arma virumque ciens magnam contundere Romam. I sing the tragic death and endless glory Of Sidon’s exiled queen, the famous walls (...) She raised on high, her wild and wounded love When savage guest betrayed his bonded word And gods and brother shook her—till she took The fateful sword he left and sought the shades To call a man in arms to topple Rome. note With thanks to Sarah Shaughnessy for the idea and advice, and to Michael Putnam, who taught me that Dido never really dies in the Aeneid. arion 28.2 fall 2020... (shrink)

Contempt is typically studied as a uniquely human moral emotion. However, this approach has yielded inconclusive results. We argue this is because the folk affect concept “contempt” has been inaccurately mapped onto basic affect systems. “Contempt” has features that are inconsistent with a basic emotion, especially its protracted duration and frequently cold phenomenology. Yet other features are inconsistent with a basic attitude. Nonetheless, the features of “contempt” functionally cohere. To account for this, we revive and reconfigure thesentimentconstruct using the notion (...) of evolved functional specialization. We develop the Attitude–Scenario–Emotion (ASE) model of sentiments, in which enduring attitudes represent others' social-relational value and moderate discrete emotions across scenarios. Sentiments are functional networks of attitudes and emotions. Distinct sentiments, includinglove,respect,like,hate, andfear, track distinct relational affordances, and each is emotionally pluripotent, thereby serving both bookkeeping and commitment functions within relationships. The sentimentcontemptis an absence ofrespect; from cues to others' low efficacy, it represents them as worthless and small, mutingcompassion,guilt, andshameand potentiatinganger,disgust, andmirth. This sentiment is ancient yet implicated in the ratcheting evolution of human ultrasocialty. The manifolds of thecontemptnetwork, differentially engaged across individuals and populations, explain the features of “contempt,” its translatability, and its variable experience as “hot” or “cold,” occurrent or enduring, and anger-like or disgust-like. This rapprochement between psychological anthropology and evolutionary psychology contributes both methodological and empirical insights, with broad implications for understanding the functional and cultural organization of social affect. (shrink)

For decades, intensive research on emotion has advanced general theories of culture and cognition. Yet few theories can comfortably accommodate both the regularities and variation empirically manifest in affective phenomena around the world. One recent theoretical model (Gervais & Fessler, 2017) aims to do so. The Attitude-Scenario-Emotion (ASE) model of sentiments specifies an evolved psychological architecture that potentiates regular variation in affective experience and behavior in lived interaction with social, ecological and normative contexts. This model holds that sentiments – (...) functional networks of bookkeeping attitudes and commitment emotions – produce context-dependent universals in salient social-relational experiences, predictably patterning affect concepts. The present research aims to empirically evaluate implications of the ASE model of sentiments using quantitative data from 10 months of fieldwork in Indigenous iTaukei villages on Yasawa Island, Fiji. Study 1 is a series of structured interviews that aim to elicit the full breadth of the Yasawan affect lexicon. In freelists and sentence frames, Yasawans use distinct sets of terms to refer to “feelings about” particular people (attitudes), and “feelings because of” particular events (emotions). Study 2 uses a pile sort task to show that the salient features of Yasawan affective experience are social-relational dimensions of communion and power, while both HCA and MDS reveal distinct social attitudes – “love” (lomani) and “like’ (taleitaki), “respect” (dokai), “contempt” (beci), “hate” (sevaki), and “fear” (rerevaki) – anchoring the conceptual organization of Yasawan emotions. Study 3 uses hypothetical vignettes with a between-subjects attitude manipulation and Likert-style emotion ratings to show that these attitudes differentially moderate emotions across social scenarios; differences are both quantitative and qualitative; each attitude is emotionally pluripotent; and divergent attitudes (e.g., “love” and “hate”) produce the same emotions in starkly different situations – a predicted three-way interaction of attitude x scenario x emotion. These data are broadly consistent with ASE hypotheses; population variation in affective worlds may follow from differential engagement of universal attitude-emotion networks (sentiments) experienced across social, ecological and normative contexts. (shrink)

La première grande question qui se pose au lecteur de la Critique de la Raison Dialectique est certainement celle des rapports entre les problématiques sartrienne et marxiste. Dans sa conclusion à Questions de Méthode, Sartre la forrnule clairement en écrivant que l'existentialisme « ne remet rien en question, sauf un déterminisme mécaniste qui n'est précisément pas marxiste et qu'on a introduit du dehors dans cette philosophie totale. Il veut, lui aussi, situer l'homme dans sa classe et dans les conflits qui (...) l'opposent aux autres classes à partir du mode et des relations de production. Mais il veut tenter cette ‘situation’, à partir de l'existence, c'est-à-dire de la compréhension ». En termes plus généraux, l'existentialisme « veut dans le Savoir même et dans l'universalité des concepts réintroduire l'indépassable singularité de l'aventure humaine ». Nous sommes donc ici simultanément en présence d'une profession de foi dans le marxisme—car même la carence que Sartre reproche à celui-ci, l'élimination de l'homme, «tient à l'événement et non aux principes mêmes de la doctrine»—et d'une volonté d'introduire dans cette philosophie une méthode propre à l'idéologie de l'existence. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives about the (...) actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver's continuum of ?how-possibly,? to ?how-plausibly,? to ?how-actually? models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism's activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that explaining cognitive behavior can be achieved through what I call hybrid explanatory inferences: inferences that posit mechanisms, but also draw on observed regularities. Moreover, these inferences can be used to achieve unification, in the sense developed by Allen Newel in his work on cognitive architectures. Thus, it seems that explanatory pluralism and unification do not rule out each other in cognitive science, but rather that the former represents a way to achieve the latter.

Dans un premier article sur le rapport à établir entre les problématiques sartrienne et marxiste é la lumière de la Critique de la Raison Dialectique, nous avions tenté de circonscrire projet spécifique de Sartre face au Savoir marxiste.Nous aimerions poursuivre aujourd'hui notre réflexion par une analyse de quelques thèmes majeurs nous permettant de voir dans quelle mesure et dans quel sens ces deux problématiques se recoupent ou non. A cet effet, nous distinguerons: I) le problème du matérialisme et de la (...) dialectique, 2) la conception de l'homme, 3) la perspective de base, 4) le concept de classe. (shrink)

Identifying, locating and interpreting both what is present and what is not present in theory and data lies at the core of scientific practice. Most experienced researchers know that social reality and psychological phenomena cannot always be apprehended directly, and that the forces that shape them must often be inferred rather than positively demonstrated. Yet, the important analytical problems raised by “absence” have rarely occupied the centre stage in professional journals. The aim of this paper is to sensitise researchers to (...) the problem of absence. It considers the various guises in which absences may appear, their repercussions in the research process, and the solutions that researchers have used to render absences visible. The paper focuses on the issue of absence as it appears in theory and research on social representations. A typology of absence, structured in terms of the research process, is proposed. The typology is intended purely as a heuristic tool. It identifies and discusses forms of theoretical, methodological, empirical and analytical/interpretive absences. This typology is used to explore forms of absence and their interrelationships throughout the research process in three studies on social representations. The discussion as a whole contributes to reaffirming the radical character of the theory of social representations by stressing how the latter locates the space of explanation at the interface between individual and collective representations, between social and cognitive processes, between intentional and non-conscious dynamics, and between material and symbolic realities. (shrink)

In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and non-mechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the non-mechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed by proponents (...) of mechanistic explanations that such models do not really explain cognitive phenomena . I will argue against this view. Although I agree that the three arguments usually offered to vindicate the explanatory power of non-mechanistic dynamical models are not enough, I consider a fourth argument, namely that such models provide understanding. The Voss strong anticipation model is used to illustrate this. (shrink)

This study investigated the knowledge of academic integrity and associated emotions of a small sample of international students studying at Canadian postsecondary institutions using survey methodology. Depending on the survey item, 25–60 participants provided responses. Many respondents appeared knowledgeable about academic integrity and misconduct and reported that expectations in their home countries and in Canada were similar. There was, however, disagreement on the concept of duplicate submission/self-plagiarism, indicating an important gap in educating students about specific aspects of policy in postsecondary (...) education in Canada. In addition, more than a third of respondents provided neutral responses to a situation involving contract cheating, suggesting a lack of certainty in how to respond when witnessing peers’ engagement in outsourcing academic work. Many respondents reported feeling confident upon reading the academic integrity and misconduct policies of their Canadian postsecondary institution, although nearly one third indicated feeling fearful, anxious, and/or confused. These negative feelings were associated with reduced knowledge of academic integrity and misconduct. Future research should further explore the experiences and emotions of international students related to academic integrity and misconduct to better understand the successes and challenges that they face in their postsecondary studies in Canada. Our findings have important implications for the delivery of academic integrity education, enhancing supports and resources, and refining academic integrity policies and procedures to improve the experience of students who come from abroad to study in Canada. (shrink)

This article provides a critical survey of the debate on intertheoretic relations, with particular emphasis on the cognitive sciences. I begin by distinguishing two opposing sides, reductionism and antireductionism, and proceed by tracking the changes these positions underwent in the twentieth century. It appears that these changes consist to a significant degree in smoothing out the rough edges of both, so that the original positions can be understood as crude extremes. The monistic accounts of intertheoretic relations were traded in for (...) more tolerant and nuanced approaches, a tendency that is chiefly inspired by an increasing focus on actual scientific practice. (shrink)

In the debate about values in science, it is a time-honored tradition to distinguish between the normative question of whether non-cognitive values should play a role in science and the descriptive question of whether they in fact do so or not.1 Among philosophers of science, it is now an accepted view that the descriptive question has been settled. That is, it is no longer disputed that non-cognitive values play a role in science. Hence, all that is left to do on (...) the descriptive front is to describe these values and their roles in more detail. In the words of Longino: “We should stop asking whether social values play a role in science and ask which values and whose values play a role and how” (2004, p. .. (shrink)

Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism.We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although (...) these explanations do not conform to Hempel’s DN model, they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic explanations are crucial to biology in three ways: sometimes, they are the only thing we have, they are heuristically useful, and they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right.In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues. (shrink)

This article studies the evolution of the urban space of Boksburg, a neighbour-town to Johannesburg. The forms of political activism developed to resist apartheid, as well as the very needs of the segregated economy, had tied a number of links which dissolved during the 1990s. Is a city like Boksburg condemned to fragmentation as the only alternative to segregation? Can this situation be remedied by policies of urbanism based on participative democracy? Or should we look for urbanity somewhere else, in (...) a specific relation to time and space, as constitutive of the urban identity? (shrink)

Given his expertise in the classroom and in school, the cooperating teacher is essential to teacher training. Expectations towards him are coming from ministerial authorities (gouvernement du Québec, 2002, 2008), but also from student teachers (Caron, Portelance and Martineau, 2013). In order to meet these expectations, the cooperating teacher is strongly encouraged to enroll in a continuous training process leading to enhance his training practices. With the intention of supporting the development of the expected cooperating teacher’s competencies (Portelance, Gervais, (...) Lessard, Beaulieu et al., 2008), a research funded by the Quebec Ministry of Education [1] uses a collaborative approach with cooperating teachers gathered in a community of practice. The members are engaged in a reflection process and a co-construction of meaning (Bourassa, Philion and Chevalier, 2007). Discussions focus on their training practices. The analysis of their purposes emphasizes the manifestations of interactional dynamics that favor their professional co-development. (shrink)

L'historiographie des États-Unis de la fin du xviiie siècle et du premier xixe siècle est caractérisée par l'accent mis sur le rôle essentiel du développement du marché dans la croissance économique. Les différentes écoles s'opposent sur l'importance de l'économie morale non-marchande (ou économie du foyer), et le rythme et l'ampleur de l'intégration des marchés. Pourtant, du fait de la chronologie du développement économique du pays, différente de celle observée en Grande-Bretagne, cette intégration, plus que l'évolution technique, a dans l'ensemble toujours (...) été considérée comme la source première de la révolution industrielle et du capitalisme industriel. Mais la notion même de marché, elle, n'a jamais été critiquée et historicisée. L'article propose un modèle historiquement déterminé de fonctionnement marchand et avance quelques hypothèses sur la transition au capitalisme industriel. (shrink)

The target article argues that contempt is a sentiment, and that sentiments are the deep structure of social affect. The 26 commentaries meet these claims with a range of exciting extensions and applications, as well as critiques. Most significantly, we reply that construction and emergence are necessary for, not incompatible with, evolved design, while parsimony requires explanatory adequacy and predictive accuracy, not mere simplicity.

Merchant activity was a central element in the networks and webs of relationship over the Atlantic in the eighteenth century. When closely analyzed, however, daily merchant practice does not fit easily into regional categories, whether Atlantic or imperial. Merchant life was heavily dependent on the building of chains of trusted correspondents, who would both be able to guarantee adequate quality and satisfactory pricing upon acquisition or sale of the goods traded, and willing to extend credit in a trading world in (...) which all operations included long time lags before final payment. For each trading center, the addition of such chains of correspondents constituted networks both supra-regional, covering the entire world, and sub-regional, specializing in some areas more than others according to prevalent political-imperial pressures. It is argued that the common element in all these networks, i.e. merchant development, is best identified as a worldwide, but Europe-dominated social process underpinning much of what is usually meant by “Atlantic” history. (shrink)

Le monde moderne de par son mode de vie a reçu l'empreinte de l'hygiène et de la médecine ainsi que des principes résultant des découvertes de l'industrie pharmaceutique chimique, de Pasteur, de Flemming, etc. Ces produits sont certes d'un apport utile pour garantir le confort anatomique et physiologique de l'organisme humain, mais il faut raisonnablement les considérer aujourd'hui comme un triomphe d'une humanité à l'incessante poursuite d'une santé durable. La physiologie et l'anatomie n'étant pas les seules composantes de l'être humain, (...) la santé ne saurait en aucun cas être considérée, prise en charge ou ajustée, comme une simple machine industrielle ou être comparée à un plan d'ajustement structurel ou de relance économique pour assurer la croissance et la survie d'un peuple. C'est la colonne vertébrale de la thèse de l'auteur Gervais Mvogo dans son ouvrage Limites et échecs de la médecine occidentale. Théorie de la guérison. Le sujet de réflexion fascine dans son ancrage de parallélisme des sources ontologiques de la nature humaine, s'appuyant ainsi sur Dieu. Le titre ouvre le débat sur la démarche, la pratique, l'émergence et la radiance des firmes et des intelligences artificielles de l'industrie pharmaceutique, véritable politique de la médecine occidentale. (shrink)

In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley’s approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather (...) than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductive-nomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not. (shrink)